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Abstract 
 
  The major aims of this study are as follows. First, to macro model prospective 
developments in the Lebanese economy for policy analysis and evaluation. The main 
purpose of this study is to develop a dynamic macroeconomic model for Lebanon 
including the budget deficit and the funding of it, as well as the composition of 
government expenditures (capital or current). Hence this study develops behavioural 
equations not used before for Lebanon. The model developed emphasises the effects of 
exogenous shocks arising from budget deficits and the funding of it (e.g. monetary 
accommodation or bond financing). This macroeconomic model is utilised as well to 
analyse the effects of exogenous shocks arising from increased government expenditures 
(capital expenditure or consumption expenditure) upon key macroeconomic variables. The 
current government’s policy approach as well as the separate government policies in 
response to the Lebanese fiscal crisis is analysed as well through the use of this 
macroeconomic model. 
The second aim of this study is the application of estimation techniques to 
Lebanese data. This study generates parameter values of key macroeconomic behavioural 
relationships in the context of Lebanon by using efficient estimation techniques and 
appropriate data definitions for Lebanon. This represents a new contribution to the 
literature, since there have not been any empirical studies on such relationships in the case 
of Lebanon. 
The third aim of this study is the application of a simulation analysis to the 
Lebanese economy. This study conducts a numerical simulation analysis of the 
macroeconomic model developed, in order to analyse a number of economic policies in the 
context of the Lebanese fiscal crisis with the aim of improving the country’s 
macroeconomic performance. Since there has been no research in the area of simulation 
and policy analysis for the case of Lebanon, this research makes a major contribution to the 
literature and to an understanding of the Lebanese economy. 
The model developed in this study is based on the contributions of the Dornbusch 
model (DB) (1976), the portfolio balance model (PBM) (Branson (1977, 1984) including 
the work of Dornbusch and Fisher (1980). The model also incorporates the work of Harvie 
and Kearney (HKM) (1996). The DB and PBM models have a number of deficiencies, 
especially the neglect of the supply side of the economy; no wealth effects; no funding 
implications from fiscal deficits; and a lack of stock-flow interactions, among others. The 
model developed attempted to remedy these deficiencies by incorporating the supply side 
of the economy, wealth effects, capital stock accumulation, alternative ways of funding the 
budget deficit and the composition of government expenditures (capital or current). Hence, 
many amendments have made to these existing models in order to make the model 
developed more applicable to the case of Lebanon, especially to analyse the impact of the 
composition of budget funding and the composition of government expenditures shocks 
on macroeconomic variables.  
Because of a lack, or unavailability, of parameter values for key macroeconomic 
behavioural relationships in the context of Lebanon, and the need for these parameters 
values in the conduct of a simulation analysis, this study empirically estimated the 
behavioural equations of the macroeconomic model developed by using efficient 
estimation techniques (FIML, ECM) and appropriate data definitions for Lebanon. The 
results from the FIML approach indicated the existence of long run relationships, or 
cointegration, for all the equations employed. The findings of cointegration allow us to 
investigate the dynamics of the system with the information of the cointegration 
relationship, and an error-correction model (ECM) is estimated. Hence these estimates (the 
long run and short run estimated coefficients from cointegration and the error correction 
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model) provide a range of possible parameters values, which are used to conduct a 
simulation and policy analysis in chapter 7. The parameter values estimated make a unique 
contribution to the literature, since there are no other empirical studies analysing such 
behavioural relationships in the case of Lebanon. In addition, this study examined the time 
series data to find out whether the series are stationary or non-stationary, by using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The results showed that only real private 
consumption expenditure ( pc ), real government investment spending ( gi ), rate of change 
of real bonds stock )( pb &&− , real government expenditure )(g  and real private investment 
spending ( pi ) seem to be stationary I(0). The rest of the variables included in the model are 
found to be non-stationary of different orders, either I(1) or I(2).  
The major findings from the simulation results presented in this study are that, 
implementing the policy of expansion in government capital expenditure, for two 
presumed cases (unanticipated/gradual), produces larger favourable impacts upon 
Lebanese economic development in terms of private sector investment, and in terms of the 
supply side of the economy (crowding in effects) during the whole adjustment process 
towards long run steady state. This policy produces, as well, favourable impacts in terms of 
external developments.  
Implementing the policy of an expansion in government consumption expenditure 
produces unfavourable effects in terms of external developments during the adjustment 
process. The trade balance deteriorates in line with a deterioration in foreign asset stocks as 
a result of current account deficits, and hence results in an increase in foreign debt. This 
policy produces, as well, unfavourable effect in terms of private investment and aggregate 
supply (crowding out effect). 
Implementing the two policies (expansion in capital expenditure/government 
consumption expenditure) produces similar outcomes in terms of the interest rate and the 
rate of inflation. However, both policies produce higher inflation during the short run 
period. The interest rate is higher as well during the first year of the short run period due to 
the increase in public spending arising from the funding component through bond sales. 
However, the simulation results for the two policies show that money deficit financing is 
inflationary and shows large sensitivity in terms of the interest rate. Bond financing is non 
inflationary and shows little sensitivity in terms of interest rates. 
  The main finding is that if the government considers a fiscal expansion policy in 
order to improve macroeconomic performance, the simulation results suggest that the 
government should adopt the policy of an expansion in capital expenditure because it 
produces the most desirable outcomes. In addition, it should adopt a gradual approach 
because this produces considerably less volatility in terms of major macro variables.  
The main findings from our simulation results dealing with the government 
approach to the fiscal crisis, does not support the government policy in dealing with the 
crisis. The results presented suggest that it produces the most undesirable economic 
outcomes, and hence will only exacerbate Lebanon’s economic difficulties. However, if the 
Lebanese government is willing to go ahead with this approach, it is advised that, based 
upon the results presented and in order to minimise the adverse effects of this policy, the 
government should adopt a gradual approach because it leads to much less macroeconomic 
volatility. Another important conclusion is that the government in Lebanon should be 
aware that the reduction in government expenditures, in order to reduce the budget deficit, 
is not the best strategy and especially the policy of reduction in government capital 
expenditure. If the government in Lebanon decides to implement the policy of 
expansionary monetary policy in order to reduce the budget deficit, our results show that 
this policy will have some positive effect on Lebanon’s economy, but the government has 
to be aware that this policy has an inflationary effect.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 The budget deficit issue has attracted a great deal of attention over the past two 
decades, as reflected in substantial debate in the academic literature and in the policy- 
making community. The budget deficit, and its financing, has become a major problem 
facing the Lebanese economy, and currently attracts considerable attention amongst 
politicians during election campaigns. 
 This attention towards the budget deficit stems mainly from the fact that budget 
deficits in Lebanon have become so large, especially during the last two decades. Most of 
the deficit occurred during the period of the Civil War (1975-1990), and in the post-war 
period (1990-2000). The Civil War period experienced large falls in real GDP growth, 
significant increases in the budget deficit, an accompanying massive increase in the money 
supply, high inflation rates and severe depreciation of the Lebanese currency. The budget 
deficit, as a percent of GDP, increased from 12% of GDP (76% of total expenditure) in 
1976 to about 30% of GDP (84% of total expenditure) in 1990 (see Chapter 3), being one 
of the highest recorded amongst the Middle East countries. Increased government 
expenditure and reduced government revenues were both responsible for the steep increase 
in the public sector deficits. As a result of large budget deficits during this period, Lebanese 
public debt started to increase after 1975. By the end of 1990, gross public debt 
represented 99.8% of GDP. Of this, 80.6% was due to domestic public debt and the rest, 
19.2%, was external public debt.  
However, the Lebanese deficit has mainly been financed by the issue of treasury 
bills of various maturities. Treasury bills used to finance the budget deficit grew by an 
average of 69.2% during the Civil War period. Short-term bills registered a very high 
average share of 85.2% in total treasury bills issued during the war (see Chapter 3). Most 
treasury bills are subscribed to by the commercial banks, with an average share of 56.9% 
during the war. This would have a negative impact on private investment and the role of 
the private sector overall, because pouring money into treasury bills crowds out the private 
sector by creating a liquidity shortage. It has been argued by many economists in Lebanon, 
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such as Chami (1992, 1994), Makdissi (1998, 1999) and others, that the main effect of the 
huge budget deficit, and the way it was financed, was to increase the money supply at an 
unprecedented rate, and to contribute significantly to rising inflation and a depreciation of 
the Lebanese pound during the Civil War. 
Over the post-war period, two phases in the evolution of Lebanon’s public debt 
can be distinguished. During 1990-1992, the overall budget deficit to GDP ratio declined 
to 11%. This happened as a result of: the gradual reassertion of government authority; 
government revenues increased from 9.7% of GDP in 1990 to 12% in 1992 (revenue 
collection improved especially with respect to customs duties and non-tax revenue); fiscal 
restraint brought total expenditure down to 23% of GDP, while at the same time interest 
payments on domestic debt went down to 6.9% of GDP as a result of increased monetary 
financing.  
The second phase of the evolution of the deficit and public debt in Lebanon was 
during 1993-2000. This period was different than the other periods, economically and 
politically, especially in relation to the steady appreciation of the value of the Lebanese 
pound and the causes of the budget deficit. As a result of rebuilding the country’s 
infrastructure (the government’s crucial contribution to the reconstruction effort), the 
acceleration in the growth of government capital expenditure, together with large and 
expanding current expenditure and the slow recovery of the revenue-generation capacity, 
led to sizable fiscal imbalances. Consequently, government budget deficits increased from 
9.2% of GDP in 1993 to 20.2% and 23.7% in 1997 and 2000 respectively. This huge 
increase in the budget deficit led to a sustained growth in government debt. During 1993-
2000, the average annual growth rate of public debt registered 31%, gross public debt, as a 
percent of GDP, increased from 48.6% in 1993 to 102.9% and 151.8% in 1997 and 2000 
respectively, and net public debt rose from 38% in 1993 to 141.2% in 2000. 
Hence, the Lebanese government is unable to service its debt from revenues, and is 
borrowing to finance its debt servicing obligations and to pay salaries of civil servants. 
While public debt in Lebanon has accumulated significantly in the last ten years, the growth 
of the Lebanese economy has slowed down since 1996. The annual real GDP growth in 
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Lebanon declined from 38.2% in 1992 to 4%, 3%, 2%, and 0% in 1996, 1998, 1999, and 
2000 respectively.  
The fiscal crisis in Lebanon has resulted in many arguments between economists in 
Lebanon. Some have argued that debt financing in Lebanon has led to a permanent deficit 
in the budget, high interest rates, increases in the money supply, rising inflation, a 
depreciation of the Lebanese pound, and a slowing of economic growth. Other 
economists, such as Bolbol (1999), Chami (1992, 1994), Makdissi (1998, 1999), Atia (1998), 
and Ayash (1998), believe that the ballooning debt is the cause of recession and economic 
slowdown in Lebanon. Hence, this thesis aims to review the theoretical arguments 
regarding the relationship between budget deficits and economic outcomes, as well as 
empirical studies, econometric models and their results in both developed and developing 
countries (see Chapter 4). 
The large fiscal deficits crisis facing the Lebanese economy has pushed policy-
makers to pay attention to this particular problem, with the objective of trying to introduce 
appropriate policy to reduce the effects of this crisis on Lebanon’s economy. Therefore, a 
key aim of this study is to analyze current government policy on this issue and its impact 
on Lebanon’s economy, in order to improve macroeconomic performance in Lebanon.  
The two major objectives of this study are, first, to examine the impact of the 
accumulation of budget deficits and debt on the economic performance of the Lebanese 
economy over the period 1970-2000; second to develop a dynamic macroeconomic model 
for Lebanon including the budget deficit and the funding of it (e.g. through monetary 
accommodation, bond financing, or a combination of the two), which can be used to 
examine the effects of exogenous shocks arising from budget deficits and the funding of it. 
In addition, the model developed is utilized to analyze exogenous shocks arising from 
increased government expenditures (capital expenditure or consumption expenditure) and 
their impact upon key macroeconomic variables such as output, private investment, the 
interest rate, exchange rate, among many others. The government’s current policy approach 
is analyzed through the use of this macroeconomic model. This study will also simulate the 
separate impact from each of these government policies (such as reduced public capital 
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expenditure; reduced consumption expenditure; and an increase in the money supply), to 
identify the contribution of each of these to the overall effect. 
The model developed is based on the contributions of the Dornbusch model (DB) 
(1976), the portfolio balance model (PBM) (Branson (1977, 1984)), and also including the 
work of Dornbusch and Fischer (1980). However, the model developed also incorporates 
the work of Harvie and Kearney (HKM) (1996).  
It is worth noting here that the DB and PBMs have many deficiencies, such as 
neglecting the supply side of the economy, no wealth effects, no funding implications from 
fiscal deficits, among others. Moreover, many additional amendments are required to be 
made to these existing models in order to make them applicable to the case of Lebanon, 
especially to analyse the impact of the composition of budget funding (e.g. monetary 
accommodation, bonds financing, or a combination of the two) and compositional effects 
of government expenditure shocks (capital or current) on macroeconomic variables such as 
output, prices, interest rates, exchange rate, among many others. As noted previously the 
model developed focuses upon the main aspects of the current Lebanese crisis, which is 
the public sector deficit.  
In addition, the model developed will be empirically estimated by using the Microfit 
4 package and appropriate Lebanese data wherever possible. The estimated parameters are 
then used to conduct a simulation analysis to examine the impact of the macroeconomic 
effects arising from the budget deficit and the way it is funded, and to analyse as well 
exogenous shocks arising from increased government expenditures (capital expenditure or 
consumption expenditure) and their impact upon key macroeconomic variables. 
Furthermore, the main aim of the simulation analysis of this study is to identify appropriate 
policy responses that will reduce the macroeconomic consequences of these shocks, and 
hence improve Lebanon’s macroeconomic performance. 
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
 The main objectives of this thesis are as follows: 
 (1). Macro modelling the Lebanese economy. The main aim of this study is to 
develop a dynamic macroeconomic model for Lebanon including the budget deficit and the 
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funding of it, as well as explicitly distinguishing between the composition of government 
expenditures (capital or current). Hence this study develops behavioural equations not used 
before for Lebanon. The model developed emphasises the effects of exogenous shocks 
arising from budget deficits and the funding of it (e.g. monetary accommodation, bond 
financing, or a combination of the two). Furthermore, the model developed is utilised to 
analyse the effects of exogenous shocks arising from increased government expenditures 
(capital expenditure or consumption expenditure) upon key macroeconomic variables.  
(2). Critically analysing the current government’s policy approach in response to the 
Lebanese fiscal crisis, through the use of this macroeconomic model. 
 (3). Applying estimation techniques to Lebanese data. This study generates 
parameter values of key macroeconomic behavioural relationships in the context of 
Lebanon by using efficient estimation techniques and appropriate data definitions for 
Lebanon (see Chapter 6). This represents a new contribution to the literature since there 
have not been any empirical studies on such behavioural relationships in the case of 
Lebanon. 
(4). Applying a simulation analysis to the Lebanese economy. This study simulates 
the macroeconomic model developed in Chapter 5 in order to analyze a number of 
economic policies in the context of the Lebanese fiscal crisis, with the aim of improving 
the country’s macroeconomic performance. Since there has been no research in the area of 
simulation and policy analysis in the case of Lebanon, this research makes a major 
contribution to the literature and to an understanding of the Lebanese economy. 
(5). Examining appropriate policies to overcome, or reduce, economic problems 
arising from debt accumulation arising from the budget deficit and the funding of it. 
 To achieve the objective of this study, a numerical simulation of the theoretical 
macroeconomic model will be conducted in order to analyse the macroeconomic 
consequences arising from the current Lebanese deficit crisis. 
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1.3 Methodology 
1.3.1 Data Collection 
This study used annual data for the sample period 1970-2000. Different sources for 
the data were researched (Lebanese government, private sector, and international 
organisation) to find out the nature of the available data. It was found that some variables 
are available as a complete series, while other variables are not available in official statistics 
and they are not in a complete series. There are some gaps in some years (see Table 6.1) 
because of the Civil War period during 1975-1990, which made the task of issuing 
Lebanese data by the government very difficult during that time (see Chapter 6). 
 However, all the annual data used in this study covering the sample period of 1970-
2000 have been taken from the following sources:  
1- International Financial Statistics Yearbook (IFS), various issues 
2- World Bank (WB), World Tables, various issues. 
3- United Nations, National Account Statistics (NAS), various issues 
4- Eken et al., IMF, Occasional Papers (1995; 1999). 
5- Ministry of Finance, Lebanon, various years 
6- Central Bank of Lebanon or Banque du Liban (BDL), Annual and quarterly 
reports, various issues 
7- The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Profile, (1998-2000). 
8- Banque Audi (BA), Lebanon. 
 
1.3.2 Method of Study 
 (a). Developing a Macroeconomic Model 
 A macroeconomic model for Lebanon will be developed in this study (See Chapter 
5). The model has its conceptual foundations in the original contribution of some models 
such as that of DB, PBM, and HKM.  
The model developed focuses upon the main aspect of the current Lebanese 
economic crisis, which is the size and growth of the public sector deficit. In addition, the 
model to be developed will remedy the deficiencies in both the DB and PBM models, 
especially their neglect of the supply side of the economy, the funding of the budget deficit, 
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and the composition of government expenditure. However, many amendments are 
required of the existing models in order to make them applicable to the case of Lebanon, 
especially to analyse the impact of the composition of budget funding and the composition 
of government expenditure shocks on macroeconomic variables. 
First, the model developed distinguishes between two types of public expenditures, 
capital expenditure and current expenditure. Second, the model developed explicitly 
incorporates the funding of the budget deficit via bond financing (pure fiscal policy), via 
money accommodation (pure monetary policy) or a combination of the two. Third, it 
incorporates exogenous shocks arising from increased government expenditures (capital 
expenditure or consumption expenditure) and their impact upon key macroeconomic 
variables such as output, private investment, interest rates, and prices amongst others.  
The model developed assumes that the Lebanese economy operates under a 
flexible exchange rate and perfect capital mobility. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, 
the nominal exchange rate adjusts so that the balance of payments is in equilibrium and 
there will be no effect upon foreign exchange reserves. Hence, the money supply is 
exogenous, and the nominal exchange rate is endogenous. Furthermore, the model is 
dynamic and focuses upon long run adjustment because it incorporates capital stock 
accumulation and its effect on the supply of output; and economic agents possess rational 
expectations (as with the previously identified models). This is equivalent to the case of 
perfect foresight (this will be discussed in detail later). The model also emphasises the 
supply side of the economy, wealth effects, stocks/shares as reflected in the q ratio, capital 
stock accumulation, and budget deficits and their funding. In addition, the model 
developed assumes that there are four financial assets, domestic money, domestic bonds, 
foreign bonds, and equities. Assets denominated in domestic currency and foreign 
exchange are assumed to be perfect substitutes, with arbitrage between them resulting 
instantaneously in the same expected real rate of return. 
 
(b). Estimation of the Model 
 The model will be estimated using the Microfit 4 package. The data utilised for the 
estimations are yearly data from 1970-2000. However, it is necessary, before starting to 
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perform any empirical estimations of the macroeconomic model, to analyse the time series 
data used in this study. The analysis of the data depends on finding out whether the series 
are stationary or non-stationary. However, firstly, to test if a time series is non-stationary 
this study uses the Dickey-Fuller test, which examines the hypothesis that the variable in 
question has a unit root. If the series is found to have a unit root differencing the data is 
appropriate before performing the regression analysis, to avoid the problem of spurious 
regression arising from non-stationarity in the time series. Secondly, this study involves 
testing for cointegration using the Johansen maximum likelihood approach (Johansen, 
1988; Johansen and Juselius, 1990, 1992), to detect the existence of a long run relationship 
between the variables included in this study. To investigate the short-run dynamics of the 
system with the information of the cointegration relationship, an error-correction model 
(ECM) (Engle and Granger (1987)) is estimated (if there is a long-run cointegrating 
relationship). 
 
c. Simulation 
 The parameters estimated from the previous estimation process, and those imposed 
to ensure model stability, will be used to conduct a simulation analysis to analyse 
exogenous shocks arising from increased government expenditures (capital expenditure or 
consumption expenditure) and their impact upon key macroeconomic variables such as 
output, private investment, interest rates, and prices amongst others, as well as to analyse  
the government policy approach in response to the Lebanese fiscal crisis. 
It is worth noting here that the analysis of the steady state and dynamic properties 
of the model is conducted by numerical simulation. The program which will be used to 
derive the results is called “Saddlepoint”, it is designed to solve linear rational expectations 
models with constant coefficients (see Chapter 7). 
 
1.4 Structure of the Study 
 The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter two will examine the 
economic performance of the Lebanese economy over the period 1970-2000, broken down 
into three distinct phases: pre-Civil War period (1970-1974), the Civil War period (1975-
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1990) and the post-war and reconstruction period (1990-2000). This chapter points out the 
main economic characteristics of the Lebanese economy. The focus is on economic growth 
and development indicators (the growth of GDP, GDP per capita, structure of GDP, and 
consumption, investment and domestic savings) as well as foreign trade and the balance of 
payments. Monetary developments and prices (the exchange rate, inflation, currency 
substitution and dollarisation, and monetary policy instruments in Lebanon) are also 
examined in this chapter. 
 Chapter three analyses the Lebanese experience with fiscal deficits and public debt. 
It will focus on the role of the government in the economy, the methods used by the 
authorities to fund the budget, and the problems that might occur for the economy from 
rising fiscal deficits and public debt in Lebanon. This chapter analyses the public sector and 
debt in Lebanon during the period 1975-2000, broken down into two distinct phases: the 
Civil War period (1975-1990) and the post-war and reconstruction period (1990-2000). 
 Chapter four will review the extensive literature examining the relationship between 
budget deficits and economic variables, concentrating on theoretical debates, empirical 
studies, and econometric models and their results in both developed and developing 
countries. 
Chapter five will review the existing theoretical models concerned with identifying 
macroeconomic adjustments arising from the effects of monetary and fiscal policy. The 
theoretical framework, and the assumptions of these models, will be analysed, with the aim 
of developing a dynamic macroeconomic model for Lebanon. This will be used to: analyse 
the macroeconomic effects arising from budget deficits and their funding (e.g. monetary 
accommodation, bond financing, or a combination of the two); to analyse as well 
exogenous shocks arising from increased government expenditures (capital expenditure or 
consumption expenditure) and their impact upon key macroeconomic variables; and to 
analyse the government policy approach in response to the Lebanese fiscal crisis. 
The theoretical frameworks investigated in this chapter for analysing the effects of 
monetary and fiscal policy, are the Dornbusch model (DB) (1976), the Portfolio balance 
model (PBM) (Branson (1977, 1984)) including the work of Dornbusch and Fischer (1980). 
The model to be developed combines the contributions of these general models with that 
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of the Harvie and Kearney model (HKM) (1996). However, many amendments of the 
existing models are required in order to make it applicable to the case of Lebanon and 
these are discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 empirically estimates some of the equations of the macroeconomic 
model developed in chapter 5. The data collection procedure and the econometric methods 
used to estimate the model will be emphasised. The time series data will be examined to 
find out whether the series are stationary or non-stationary by using the most popular test, 
which is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. A cointegration analysis and an error-
correction model will be conducted as well in this chapter to find out long run and short 
run estimated coefficients for the model. 
Chapter seven presents the simulation results and the policy implications for 
Lebanon. A simulation analysis is conducted in this chapter in order to analyse the 
macroeconomic consequences arising from three exogenous shocks. First, an increase in 
government investment expenditure (capital expenditure) by assuming two cases 
(unanticipated/gradual increase) and by assuming that the budget deficit in Lebanon is 
financed partly through a temporary increase in the monetary growth rate; second, an 
increase in government consumption expenditure by assuming two cases, an unanticipated 
or gradual increase; and third, the government policy approach in response to the 
development of the financial crisis in Lebanon. This chapter will also simulate the separate 
impact from each of these government policies (such as reduced public capital expenditure; 
reduced consumption expenditure; and an increase in the money supply), to identify the 
contribution of each of these to the overall effect. The analysis will focus upon the 
adjustment of six key macroeconomic variables which are: the real exchange rate, foreign 
assets stocks, private capital stock, public capital stock, aggregate supply, trade balance, and 
the q ratio. Policy implications derived from this simulation analysis will be discussed as 
well in this chapter. 
Chapter eight summarises the major conclusions derived from the whole thesis, 
and suggestions for future study. 
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Chapter 2  
Macroeconomic performance of the Lebanese Economy 1970-2000 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Lebanon is located in the Middle East, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between 
Palestine, “Israel”, and Syria. Lebanon is a small country with an area of 10,452 square 
kilometres, approximately 4036 sq. miles, of which 10,282 sq. kms is land and 170 sq. kms 
is water. It has relatively limited natural resources such as that of limestone, iron ore, and 
salt, but is a water-surplus state in a water-deficient region. Lebanon’s land use is divided 
into arable land 21%, permanent crops 9%, permanent pastures 1%, forests and woodland 
8%, and other 61% (World Fact Book, 2000). Lebanon gained independence from French 
administration on 22 November 1943 from a League of Nations mandate. Although the 
state’s sympathies gravitate toward the Arab world, and it is Arab in its fundamental 
cultural base, it is different from other Arab countries in several respects. Its exposure to 
Western culture, especially French culture, has spanned centuries and French serves as a 
second language for most educated people. The country is primarily a commercial nation, 
with the economic life of the country being highly dependent on the outside world. 
 
Pre-Civil War Period (1970-1974) 
However, since independence Lebanon has been described as the Switzerland or 
Paris of the East, for its beauty, four weather seasons, beaches, financial centre, skiing, 
mountains and of course hospitable people. In the ten years prior to 1975, the Lebanese 
economy was one of the most dynamic in the Middle East region. In the 1960s and early 
1970s Beirut was the main financial services centre for the Middle East, and the regional 
headquarters for many international companies. In addition, Lebanon was characterized by 
low inflation, high rates of economic growth, large balance of payments surpluses, small 
fiscal deficits, and a floating, stable, and fully convertible domestic currency. 
Furthermore, Lebanon had an important role as the key economic intermediary 
between the developed economies of Europe and the developing countries of the Middle 
East. Because of this combination of a stable macroeconomic environment, liberal 
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economy, and its role as a regional intermediary, Lebanon enjoyed a strong comparative 
advantage in the service sectors of its economy, particularly in banking and finance, 
insurance, and trade-related services. 
In general, the major economic features that characterize Lebanon are the private 
and liberal aspects of the economy, and the openness to capital and labour mobility. The 
Lebanese economy is a predominantly private sector economy. The private sector 
contributes around 80% of aggregate demand, and is a well-diversified sector that covers 
the totality of economic sectors and is a major pillar for growth. The Lebanese economy is 
also a free market economy with a very attractive business environment including: highly 
skilled human capital; a freely floating exchange rate regime; liberal trade and investment 
policies; comprehensive banking secrecy; open entry and exit for foreign capital with the 
exception of real estate and banking; and a lenient fiscal system with a flat 15% corporate 
tax rate and a 10% withholding tax rate. The flow of capital, people and goods are 
structural for the Lebanese economy, and capital inflows make up a continuous 40% of the 
aggregate demand for goods and services (Banque Audi, 2000).  
 
Civil War Period (1975-1990) 
  Lebanon’s Civil War, which started in 1975 and spanned 15 years, exacted a heavy 
toll in human and material terms, and caused fundamental changes in the economy. The 
economy suffered from the destruction of infrastructure and industrial facilities, while the 
reluctance by both foreigners and domestic residents to invest resulted in the obsolescence 
of the remaining production capacity. Moreover, the flow of goods and factors of 
production in Lebanon was disrupted as a result of the fragmentation of the country. There 
was mass emigration, with an accompanying loss in professional and entrepreneurial skills. 
The emigration of workers was accompanied by a flight of capital, and Lebanon’s access to 
flows of foreign capital was much reduced. Meanwhile, Lebanon’s public finances 
deteriorated significantly owing to the lack of central government authority in the country, 
and the consequent inability of the authorities to collect revenues while continuing to 
provide a minimum of public services. Large fiscal deficits were financed primarily through 
the banking system. The consequent rapid growth in liquidity compared with economic 
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activity, and the erosion of private sector confidence, led to continuous pressure on the 
Lebanese pound in the foreign exchange market, heightened inflationary pressures, and 
resulted in high levels of currency substitution. 
The basis for a peaceful settlement to the Civil War was provided by the 1989 Taif 
Accord for National reconciliation negotiated under the aegis of the Arab League.  
 
Post-War and Reconstruction Period (1990-2000) 
Following the accord government authority was gradually restored, and hostilities 
came to an end in 1990. Subsequently, the authorities began the difficult task of 
simultaneous economic stabilization and confidence building, and post-war reconstruction 
and development on the other hand, to ensure a sustainable recovery of the dislocated 
Lebanese economy. Confidence was restored in the last quarter of 1992 following the 
completion of parliamentary elections, the first in 20 years, and the installation of the new 
government. 
In 1993, improved political stability, increased confidence, and an effective 
adjustment effort spurred favourable macroeconomic development. Real GDP growth 
picked up, inflation decelerated sharply, foreign exchange reserves were built up to a 
comfortable level, and the exchange rate was stabilized. However, the lack of adequate 
infrastructure, a weak institutional framework, and shortages of human capital continued to 
constrain overall economic recovery. In the circumstances, the authorities aimed at 
accelerating the reconstruction and rehabilitation program in the period ahead while 
strengthening the macro economic stance.  
However, the Lebanese now realize that Civil War does not end in triumph but in 
poverty and exhaustion, and that someone has to pay for the rehabilitation of cities that 
were destroyed facing the wrath of the various militiamen. Lebanon’s Civil War costs are 
estimated at US$25 billion plus a loss of more than 150,000 lives, together with 
immeasurable suffering (IMF, 1995). The government’s participation in the reconstruction 
and rehabilitation process has been exceptionally large, and it has been responsible for 
much of the country’s recent good fortune. However, it has also contributed to a new and 
emerging set of problems. The most worrisome among these is the acceleration in the 
 14 
growth of government capital expenditure and the slow recovery of the revenue-generation 
capacity that has led to sizable fiscal imbalances. During 1993-2000, gross public debt, as a 
percent of GDP, increased from 49% to 151%, and net public debt rose from 38% to 
141% (BDL, 1999-2000). This huge increase is easier to digest if we bring to mind the fact 
that the rebuilding of Beirut’s city centre, which is by far the largest of the reconstruction 
projects, is comparable to the resurrection of the cities of post-World War II Europe and 
Japan. Sadly, the costs incurred so far do not even include financial commitments that have 
to be made for urgently needed public schools, low-income housing, and health programs. 
This chapter is subdivided into eight sections. Section 2.2 discusses the movement 
of population and labour force. We deal first with the changes in these aggregates. Section 
2.3 is concerned with economic growth and development indicators. We will explore, in 
turn, the growth of GDP, GDP per capita, the structure of GDP, and consumption, 
investment and domestic savings as well. Section 2.4 will deal with foreign trade and the 
balance of payments. Section 2.5 will examine monetary developments and prices. It covers 
topics like the exchange rate, inflation, currency substitution and dollarization, and 
monetary policy instruments in Lebanon. Section 2.6 provides a summary of the discussion 
of the whole chapter. 
 
2.2 Population and Labour Force 
2.2.1 Population Growth 
Lebanon is a small country with a total population of 4.3 million people and a 
population density (people per sq. km) of 418 in 2000 (World Bank, 2001). In 1991, 
there were approximately 1.5 million people living in the capital city Beirut  (40% of 
the total population). In terms of population, Beirut is the largest city. Other large cities 
in Lebanon are Tripoli (240,000) and Saida (100,000), with the remainder of the 
population living in other parts in the north and the south of the country. But, in 1999, 
the population in Beirut increased to 1.826 million (42.5% of the total population) 
(World Fact book, 2000). Table 2.1 indicates the changes in the pattern of population 
growth in the transition from a traditional to modern economic life. In 1971 Lebanon’s 
population grew by 2.53%. This percentage started to decline and registered 0.5% in 
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1978. Between 1970-1975 the average annual growth of population was 2.4%, declining 
to 0.7% between 1975-80, increasing to 2.1% between 1985-1990, but after that started 
to decline and reached 1.6% between 1995-2000 (Table 2.1). 
 
 
Table 2.1 Population Trends in Lebanon (1971-2000) 
Years Population 
(per 1000) 
Growth rate 
(%)* 
Crude death 
rate (per 
1000) 
Crude 
birth rate 
(per 1000) 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
(years) 
Fertility rate 
(births per 
women) 
1971 2684.20 2.53 8.0 34.9 64.1 5.4 
1975 2946.86 2.17 n.a. n.a. 65.0 4.9 
1977 2933.69 0.05 8.0 32 65.0 4.7 
1978 2947.89 0.48 8.0 33 65.0 4.7 
1980 3002.35 1.02 8.0 31.7 65.0 4.0 
1981 3041.56 1.30 7.7 30 65.0 4.0 
1983 3149.14 1.85 7.1 29 66.0 3.8 
1987 3414.63 2.15 n.a. n.a. 68.0 3.4 
1992 3781.05 1.96 7.1 27.7 68.5 3.2 
1993 3855.07 1.94 7.1 27.6 68.5 3.1 
1994 3929.73 1.92 6.6 27.9 69.2 2.9 
1995 4005.00 1.90 6.4 26 69.6 2.8 
1996 4077.01 1.78 6.4 22.7 69.9 3.2 
1997 4145.53 1.67 6.0 22 69.9 2.5 
1998 4210.34 1.55 6.0 21 70.0 2.4 
1999 4271.23 1.44 6.4 22.5 70.0 2.2 
2000 4359.34 1.38 6.4 20.2 71.5 2.1 
                       
Average Annual Growth of Population (%)* 
 
1971-75  1975-80  1980-85  1985-90  1990-95  1995-2000 
 
   2.4     0.7      1.6      2.1      1.9       1.6 
 
Source:   World Bank World tables (2001); UNDP (various years); World Development Indicators (various 
years); World Development Report (various years); United Nations (1999); Muth (1996); World 
Resources (1999); US. Census Bureau (2000). 
Note: * Calculated by the author; n.a. not available 
 
 
Several factors caused the reduction in the growth rate of population in Lebanon. 
First, the civil war which started in 1975. The World Bank (1993) estimated that during 
1975-90, 150,000 people lost their lives and 300,000 were injured. Second, during that 
period 875,000 migrated, one-third of the Lebanese population, with some 200,000 
professional and skilled Lebanese seeking employment in other countries. Lebanese 
migration during that period accounted for 7.33% of the 1974 population and is 
reflected in the growth of population in Lebanon (Table 2.1). Third, the fertility rate 
(births per women) declined from 5.4 in 1971 to 2.1 in 2000 because of women’s 
 16 
education and later marriage. In addition, Table 2.1 indicates the decline in the crude 
death rate per 1000 from 8.0 in 1971 to 6.4 in 2000. The crude birth rate per 1000 
declined as well from 34.9 in 1971 to 20.2 in 2000. Life expectancy at birth (years) as 
shown in the table is high. It increased from 64.1 in 1971 to 71.5 in 2000. 
The decline in the population growth in Lebanon, and in the fertility rate (births per 
women), can be taken as an indication of changes in the standard of living, and inadequate 
government policies which placed economic and social restrictions on the young 
generation to marry at an early age and to push them toward leaving their country and in 
losing their identities. But this is an issue that will not be analyzed further. 
 
2.2.2 Growth of the labour Force and Structural Change of the Economy 
The total labour force in Lebanon increased at an average annual rate of 2.5% 
between 1970-2000 (Table 2.2), which is much higher than the growth rate of population as 
shown in Table 2.1. As shown in Table 2.2, the labour force increased from 709,200 in 
1975 to more than 1,522,000 in 2000. This increase in the labour force was due to changes 
in the age structure of the population towards an increase in the population of labour force 
age (15-64 years), and to an increase in the share of the labour force in economic activity1. 
The working age population increased from 50.7%2 of the total population in 1970 to 
53.2%2, 65.7%3 in 1980 and 2000 respectively. The agricultural labour force, as a 
percentage of the share of the total labour force, has shown a continuously decreasing 
trend over the years, from 19.8% in 1970 to 7.3% in 1990 and to 5% in 2000. The clear 
reduction in the agricultural labour force in the past 30 years can be mainly attributed to 
severe labour migration from rural areas, especially male labour, in search of more 
remunerative work in the larger cities and in other production sectors. It is worth noting 
here that the agricultural labour force in Lebanon, since the beginning of the year 1992, has 
been dominated by non-Lebanese labourers from neighbouring and Asiatic countries. On 
the other hand, the labour force in industry, as a percentage of the total labour force, has 
                                                 
1 For a detailed discussion about the increase in the labour force, see Atia (1996, pp.22-25). 
2 CAS (Central Administration of Statistics) (1970; 1972). 
3 World Fact book (2000). 
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increased from 25.2% in 1970 to 31% in 1990 and to 32% in 2000. The labour force in the 
services sector, as a percentage of the total labour force, has increased as well from 55% in 
1970 to 61.7% in 1990 and to 63% in 2000. Therefore, the increase in the labour force and 
employment during 1970-2000 was almost totally absorbed by the industrial and services 
sectors. As shown in Table 2.2, the urban population (% of total) increased from 59.4% in 
1970 to 84.2% in 1990 and to 90% in 2000.  
 
Table 2.2 Evolution of the Labour Force and Percentage Share of Labour Force by 
Main Economic Sectors in Lebanon (1970-2000) 
Years Labour 
force 
(000’s) 
Unemploy
-ment 
(% of total 
labour 
force) 
Growth 
rate 
(%)* 
 
Agriculture 
(%) 
Industry 
(%) 
Services 
(%) 
Urban 
population 
(% of total) 
1970 709.2 8.1 2.24 19.8 25.2 55.0 59.4 
1975 816.3 8.1 2.53 17.0 26.0 57.0 67.0 
1977 818.5 n.a. 0.40 13.0 27.0 60.0 69.7 
1978 825.4 n.a. 0.84 12.0 27.0 61.0 71.0 
1979 838.1 n.a. 1.53 12.0 26.0 62.0 72.4 
1980 849.7 12 1.37 11.0 27.0 62.0 73.7 
1981 869.9 n.a. 2.35 11.0 27.0 62.0 74.8 
1985 975.9 35 2.97 14.2 27.4 58.4 79.4 
1990 1134.1 30 2.93 7.3 31.0 61.7 84.2 
1994 1292.9 30 3.14 7.0 31.0 62.0 86.8 
1997 1409.5 18 2.85 7.0 31.0 62.0 88.4 
1999 1482.1 20 2.60 5.0 32.0 63.0 89.3 
2000 1522.1 20 2.70 5.0 32.0 63.0 90.0 
 
        Average Annual Growth of Labour force (percent)* 
 
  1970-1980  1980-1990  1990-2000 
     
        1.85         2.75         2.95 
 
Source:  Banque du Liban/Ministry of Finance (various years); World Bank World tables (2001-
2002); World Development Report (2000/2001); UNDP (various years); World Bank, 
Social Indicators of Development (1994, 195); World Fact book (2000); Essa (1996); CAS 
(1970; 1972); * Author’s calculation; n.a. not available. 
 
Therefore, unproductive economic and social government policies especially in the 
rural areas4, the concentration of projects and workplaces in the cities, especially in the 
capital Beirut (the centre of business which attracts domestic and foreign investors), 
resulted in increased labour migration from rural areas to the cities during the last three 
decades. It should be noted here that with no mineral resources, and only a limited 
                                                 
4 For a detailed discussion about the problems facing the rural areas, see Yamout (1994). 
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agricultural and manufacturing sector, Lebanon has traditionally relied heavily on imported 
goods as the basis for economic activity. Typically, imports amount to 40-60% of GDP 
(EIU, 2000). In the post-war period, this trend has been exacerbated by the need to import 
capital goods for reconstruction. An end to the forced austerity of the war has also led to 
rapidly rising consumer spending on imported food, vehicles, electrical goods and luxury 
items. 
Thus, because of a lack of government policies to stimulate the agricultural sector 
in Lebanon, the land can no longer provide sustainable living. All these factors led to an 
increase in migration from the rural areas to the cities, especially the capital Beirut which 
now absorbs approximately half of the population in Lebanon. 
 
2.3 Economic Growth and Development Indicators 
This section deals with economic growth and development indicators during the 
1970-99 period, focusing on real GDP growth, real per capita GDP, consumption, 
investment, and domestic savings. This section also discusses the structure of GDP, by real 
growth in sectoral output at constant 1974 prices, and some social indicators will be 
addressed as well. 
 
2.3.1 Economic Growth and Per Capita Income 
Throughout the period 1970-93, developments in real GDP reveal large falls in 
economic activity during the war years of 1975-76, 1982, 1986, and 1988-905. Table 2.3 
presents an index of real GDP, which reveals a steady increase in real output up to 1974, 
then a rapid decline in activity in 1976 to only 36% of its 1974 level.  
Interestingly, by 1987 output had recovered to 92% of its 1974 level, only to fall 
again with the active resumption of hostilities to a period low of 33% of the 1974 level in 
1990. It gradually increased thereafter to reach 51% of its 1974 level by 19936. Despite the 
                                                 
5 These falls are also reflected in declines in the volume of electricity production in 1976, 1981, 1984, 
1986, and 1980-99, see Eken, et al. (1995, pp.3-4), for more details. 
 
6 The strong recovery in real GDP in 1987, and its subsequent fall in 1988, could partly reflect the 
different methodology used for estimating the 1987 GDP. 
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resilience of the Lebanese economy, real output has yet to recover from the hostilities that 
began in 1975. A similar story exists for real per capita GDP, with net emigration during 
the 1980s raising real per capita GDP during those years as well as during the 1990s. The 
Lebanese population index (1974 = 100) shows that by 1993 Lebanon’s population had 
grown to more than 6% above its 1974 level. All three series are depicted in Figure 2.1. 
 
Table 2.3 Population and GDP in Lebanon 1965-1993 
Years Real 
GDP 
Real per 
Capita GDP 
 
Population 
 
 
Real Per 
Capita GDP 
(In 1974 Lebanese 
pounds) 
Growth of Real 
Per Capita GDP 
(In percent) 
(Indices, 1974 = 100) 
1965 60.10 76.31 78.75 2274.58 5.94 
1970 75.07 82.97 90.48 2473.06 3.57 
1971 82.00 88.48 92.67 2637.16 6.64 
1972 92.12 96.73 95.24 2883.14 9.33 
1973 96.98 99.53 97.44 2966.67 2.90 
1974 100.00 100.00 100.00 2980.59 0.47 
1975 83.86 82.65 101.47 2463.45 -17.35 
1976 35.57 35.05 101.47 1044.75 -57.59 
1977 59.65 59.00 101.10 1758.51 68.32 
1978 58.11 58.11 100.00 1732.00 -1.51 
1979 59.49 60.15 98.90 1792.92 3.52 
1980 60.37 61.73 97.80 1839.87 2.62 
1981 60.70 62.29 97.44 1856.71 0.92 
1982 38.37 39.38 97.44 1173.70 -36.79 
1983 47.08 48.32 97.44 1440.22 22.71 
1984 68.02 69.55 97.80 2072.98 43.93 
1985 84.55 86.45 97.80 2576.62 24.30 
1986 78.83 80.60 97.80 2402.40 -6.76 
1987 92.01 93.73 98.17 2793.61 16.28 
1988 66.05 67.03 98.53 1998.02 -28.48 
1989 38.19 38.47 99.27 1146.63 -42.61 
1990 33.06 32.94 100.37 981.80 -14.38 
1991 45.71 44.89 101.83 1338.01 36.28 
1992 47.77 45.92 104.03 1368.70 2.29 
1993 51.14 48.10 106.32 1433.60 4.74 
Source: Banque du Liban (various years); IMF (various years), International Financial Statistics; Eken 
et al. (1995, p.5) 
 
As noted by Saidi (1986) the chief determinants of Lebanon’s failure to retain its 
real pre-war output levels were (1) a large decline in investment owing to the war-induced 
heightening of risk, which drastically slowed productivity growth rates; (2) the dislocation 
of goods and labour markets; and (3) the widespread destruction of physical capital stocks 
and large-scale emigration of those Lebanese endowed with relatively high levels of human 
capital. The total damage to physical assets during the war period has been estimated by the 
UN (1991) at US$25 billion. 
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In addition, as noted earlier in this chapter, the World Bank (1993) estimated that, 
during 1975-90, some 200,000 professional and skilled Lebanese sought employment in 
other countries. This is 7.33% of the 1974 population and is reflected in the population 
index of Table 2.3. According to the above estimates, Lebanese real per capita incomes at 
the end of the 1980s had been reduced to about one third of their 1974 level as a direct 
result of the Civil War (Table 2.2). 
 
Figure 2.1 GDP and Population Indices, 1965-1993, 
(1974 = 100)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
19
65
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
93
Real GDP Per capita real GDP Population
                       
Source: Plotted by the author based on data provided by Table 2.3 
 
This raises the question of how long it will take Lebanon not only to recover to its 
1974 level of per capita income, but also to attain the steady-state (or long-run) real income 
level it would have realized in the absence of the war. Lebanese real per capita income (in 
constant 1974 Lebanese pounds) in 1974 was LL 2,981 but by 1993 it had fallen to LL 
(Lebanese Lira) 1,434. 
In addition, Table 2.4 presents the growth rate of real GDP during 1970-2000.  
GDP is listed in Lebanese pounds (both nominal and real GDP is measured at constant 
1974 prices); real GDP per capita is measured also at constant 1974 prices. As shown in 
Table 2.4, during 1970-1974 (pre-Civil War period) the average annual growth rate of real 
GDP was 7.3%; therefore throughout this period the Lebanese economy grew rapidly. Real 
GDP per capita was L.L 2,462, growing to L.L 2,967 in 1974. The average annual growth 
rate of real GDP per capita for the pre-Civil War period was 4.6%. Because of the Civil 
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War, which started in 1975, and its continuation in various forms until late 1990, a decline 
in growth is evident if we consider GDP measured in real terms. Negative growth can be 
noted after 1975. Real GDP growth was –16.14% in 1975 declining to –57.14% in 1976 
and registered -36.79% in 1982.  It should be pointed out that the year 1982 was marked by 
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The figures also show that GDP growth deteriorated 
further after 1985 when central state authority came to an end and gave way to an 
escalation in violence. A similar pattern is reflected by real GDP per capita. It was L.L 
2,967 in 1974 declining to L.L 1,037 in 1976 and to L.L 977 in 1990. 
On the other hand, following the end of Lebanon’s Civil War, which started in 
1975 and spanned 15 years, the authorities began the difficult task of simultaneous 
economic stabilization and confidence building, and post-war reconstruction and 
development on the other hand. Therefore, positive signs in growth have been noted since 
the end of the Civil War in 1991. The end of the war allowed households, firms, and the 
government to return to normal conditions of production and consumption, which, in 
conjunction with a rebuilding of residential and business structures, the productive capacity 
of enterprises, the stock of consumer durables, and the government-led reconstruction 
program to build infrastructure, had the expected strongly positive effect on growth. 
Therefore, during 1991-97 (during the post-war years), the average annual growth rate of 
real GDP amounted to 10.3%, significantly improving per capita income (Table 2.4). Real 
GDP per capita was L.L 977 in 1990, increasing to L.L 1,460 in 1994 and to L.L 1,581 in 
1997. Lebanon’s real growth rate for the years, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 
were 38.27%, 7%, 8%, 6.5%, 4% and 4% respectively. In 1996, the rate of economic 
growth slowed to 4%, adversely affected by bombings in April and the decline in 
construction activities resulting from the excess supply in some segments of the real estate 
market. In 1997 the rate also slowed as the contractionary impact of further declines in 
construction activity offset increased service sector activity (e.g., tourism). It also should be 
noted here that the average GDP growth rates of 10.3% annually during 1991-1997 (Table 
2.4), were accompanied by rising fiscal deficits and escalating public sector debt (this will be 
discussed in the next chapter). 
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Table 2.4 Lebanon’s Macroeconomic Performance, 1970-2000 (in billions of Lebanese pounds, unless otherwise indicated). 
 
Years Nominal 
GDP (at 
current 
market 
prices) 
Real 
GDP 
growth 
(%) at 
constant 
1974 
prices 
Real 
GDP 
Per capita 
(LL) at 
constant 
1974 
prices) 
 
Real 
GDP 
per 
capita 
growth 
(%) 
 
 
Gross 
domestic 
investment 
(GDI) 
Private 
consump-
tion 
(PC) 
Government 
consump- 
tion 
(GC) 
Gross 
domestic 
savings 
(GDS) 
In percentage of nominal GDP 
 
Real growth in sectoral output 
(%) at constant 1974 prices* 
GDI PC GC GDS 
Agricult-
ure 
Industry Services 
1970 4.8 6.59 2462 3.57 0.90 3.77 0.52 0.51 18.75 78.54 10.63 10.62 3.01 6.78 7.02 
1971 5.3 9.23 2634 6.98 1.06 4.15 0.54 0.61 20.00 78.30 10.19 11.51 3.42 10.21 10.20 
1972 6.3 12.35 2875 9.14 1.29 4.88 0.57 0.85 20.37 76.81 9.04 13.35 29.03 12.16 10.36 
1973 7.1 5.27 2966 3.16 1.54 5.66 0.61 0.83 21.68 79.78 8.59 11.68 -0.62 6.98 5.78 
1974 8.1 3.11 2967 0.03 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.98 12.68 0.53 
1975 7.5 -16.14 2450 -17.42 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -17.63 -23.62 -14.40 
1976 4.1 -57.59 1037 -57.67 0.84 3.57 0.63 -0.1 20.48 87.24 15.41 -2.43 -60.01 -57.65 -57.65 
1980 14.0 1.48 1831 2.46 2.19 12.90 3.51 -2.41 15.68 92.17 25.10 -17.21 0.56 -5.90 1.02 
1982 12.6 -36.79 1167 -36.88 1.17 15.84 4.85 -6.75 9.35 125.71 38.49 -53.57 -15.95 -22.73 -22.24 
1987 740.7 16.72 2780 16.22 118.81 714.19 41.99 -15.48 16.04 96.42 5.67 -2.09 16.69 16.69 16.69 
1988 1356.0 -28.21 1983 -28.66 408.61 1307.73 87.00 -38.73 30.13 96.44 6.42 -2.86 -12.77 -28.40 -40.68 
1989 1350.0 -42.18 1141 -42.46 201.01   1265.66 99.43 -15.09 14.89 93.75 7.37 -1.12 -31.08 -18.20 -37.59 
1990 1973.0 -13.43 977 -14.37 350.60 2753.51 485.00 -1265.5 17.75 139.55 24.58 -64.14 -13.42 -13.42 -12.19 
1991 4132.0 38.27 1332 36.33 797.00 5475.04 794.00 -2137.0 19.28 132.50 19.21 -51.71 38.27 38.27 26.65 
1992 9499.0 4.50 1362 2.25 2374.75 11840.22 1409.00 -3750.2 25.00 124.64 14.83 -39.47 -17.06 4.50 9.11 
1993 13122.0 7.0 1426 4.69 3818.39 15484.10 1840.00 -4202.5 29.09 118.00 14.02 -32.02 6.95 -2.43 1.23 
1994 15305.0 8.0 1460 2.38 4958.82 16919.49 2220.34 -3834.8 32.40 110.54 14.50 -25.05 20.81 3.76 4.14 
1995 18028.0 6.5 1520 4.10 5949.11 19194.04 2548.00 -3714.0 33.00 106.47 14.13 -20.60 5.83 1.29 3.92 
1996 20417.0 4.0 1551 2.03 6145.52 20835.36 3149.00 -3567.3 30.10 102.04 15.42 -17.47 0.50 0.50 0.50 
1997 22880.0 4.0 1581 1.93 6150.08 23274.76 3613.00 -4007.76 26.87 101.72 15.79 -17.51 4.42 4.42 4.43 
1998 24509.0 3.0 1596 0.94 5882.16 24009.02 3311.17 -3734.46 24.00 97.96 13.51 -15.24 6.79 6.79 6.79 
1999 24816.0 1.0 1575 -1.31 5898.76 23954.88 3285.64 -2699.94 23.77 96.53 13.24 -10.88 0.85 0.85 0.85 
2000 24816.0 0.0 1575 0.00 4466.88 21838.08 4715.04 -1737.12 18.00 88.00 19.00 -7.00 0.60 0.60 0.60 
Source:  United Nations, National accounts statistics (various years); IMF, International Financial Statistics (various years); World Bank, World Tables (1976, pp.146-147); World 
Bank (1999; 2000); World Bank World tables (2001); Eken et al. (1995); Shahnawaz (1998); Banque du Liban (various years), annual report, Quarterly Bulletin; Ministry of 
Finance (2001); Banque Audi (2001); EIU (2000); * Author’s calculations; n.a. not available
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Furthermore, the Lebanese economy has been slowing down in the last few years, 
and entered a recession in 2000. Real GDP growth was 7% in 1993 declined to 4% in 1997 
and to 3% in 1998 and to 0% in 2000 (Table 2.4). Real GDP per capita, at constant 1974 
prices, declined from L.L 1,596 in 1998 to L.L 1,575 in 2000. The real GDP growth rate in 
Lebanon during 1970-2000 is depicted in Figure 2.2. It is worth noting that the fall in 
overall consumption led to an economic slowdown from which the country has yet to 
recover. The decline was hastened as the slowing economy led to a fall in government 
receipts, increasing the budget deficit and forcing the government to raise borrowing and 
taxation (EIU, 2000). 
Therefore, despite the rising GDP growth rates of the early 1990s (38.2% in 1991), 
which later fell back to a considerably lower level, the rate of growth in budgetary spending 
has consistently exceeded growth. Government spending as a percentage of GDP rose 
from 23% in 1993 to 42% in 2000; the deficit ratio (deficit-to-GDP) increased from 9.2% 
to more than 23% in 2000 (BDL, 2001). 
 
Figure 2.2 Real GDP Growth (%) at Constant 1974 Prices, 1970-2000.
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  Source: Plotted by the author based on data provided by the IMF (1995; 1999); and Ministry of Finance   
(2001). 
 
2.3.2 Structure of GDP and Real Growth in Sectoral Output 
The structure of the Lebanese economy is characterized by a much higher rate of 
development of the service sector (which includes trade, real estate, finance, transport, and 
government) than of the agricultural and industrial sectors7, both of which are considered 
to be part of the “production” sector. 
                                                 
7 The main industries in Lebanon are food processing, textiles, cement, chemicals, oil refining, furniture, 
jewellery and some metal work. Virtually all industry is privately owned and much of the manufacturing 
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Table 2.5 provides a clear picture of sectoral shares in the economy. From the table 
we can see that the share of the agricultural sector8 in GDP declined from 11.8% in 1964 
to about 9% in the years, 1973, 1980 and 1982. The industrial sector, on the other hand, 
maintained a more or less steady share of 20.6% in 1964 and 20.4% in 1970.  
The service sector experienced a steady increase in its share of GDP and reached 
70.5% in 1970, which was higher than in 1964 (69.85%). For 1970-1982, the service and 
production sector continued to account for roughly two-thirds and one-third of GDP 
respectively.  
The contribution of agriculture dropped below its pre-Civil War level of 9.1% in 
1970 to 8.5% in 1977. Industry, on the other hand, boasted a share of more than 21% in 
1977 but this was only a result of the inclusion of electricity and water production as part 
of the industrial sector. Lebanon’s specialization in services allowed it to take advantage of 
its unique position in the region. Commerce is of major importance to the economy. 
Before the mid-1970s, many foreign firms had branches in Beirut.   
Before the Civil War Lebanon was a major tourist centre, and its scenic beauty, 
sunny climate and historic sites attracted some two million visitors annually9. In 1974 
                                                                                                                                               
capacity is located in East Beirut. The industrial sector is still trying to recover from the impact of the 15 
years of Civil War. The lack of adequate infrastructure, rising cost of services and scarce bank credits are 
slowing recovery. 
 
8 30% of total land is cultivated arable or utilized forest. The most fertile areas are located along the 
coastal strip and in the Beka’a valley. The main crops are wheat, barley, corn, vegetables, potatoes, citrus 
fruit, hemp (hashish), olives and tobacco. The primary livestock are sheep and goats. The agricultural 
sector suffers from labour shortages, lack of banking facilities and rising costs of services. 
 
9 But because of the war, this number dropped to less than half a million per year during the 1980s. After 
the Civil War the private and public sectors started to invest in rebuilding the tourism industry to attract 
tourists to Lebanon. But, because of the war in Lebanon, tourists found safer places to go to, resulting in 
other countries in the region becoming competitive with Lebanon in this sector and especially Israel, 
Turkey, Syria and Egypt. With all the effort by both the private and public sectors the year 1995 saw 
402,000 tourists increasing to 600,000 tourists in 1998 (spending about US$1.3 billion that year, 8% share 
of GDP) visiting Lebanon, compared to more than 2 million in the early 1970s. Nearly half of the tourists 
hailed from Arab countries, see IPR (1999); EIU (2000)  
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tourism contributed about 20% of the country’s income (IPR, 1999). It should be noted 
that these high figures attributed to the service sector were not as a result of primarily 
domestic needs and demands. Instead, Lebanon’s role as a regional intermediary, and 
external demand for such activities, accounted for these figures.  
  
Table 2.5 Evolution of GDP and the Percentage Share of GDP by Main Economic 
Sectors (1964-2000) 
Years GDP (at current 
prices in billions of 
US$) 
Agriculture Industry Services 
1964 1.0 11.9 20.6 67.5 
1965 1.1 11.6 21.0 67.4 
1967 1.2 11.2 20.4 68.4 
1969 1.4 9.5 20.3 70.2 
1970 1.5 9.1 20.4 70.5 
1971 1.7 8.6 20.5 70.9 
1972 2.1 9.2 20.5 69.6 
1973 2.7 9.3 20.8 69.6 
1974 3.5 9.2 22.7 68.1 
1977 2.7 8.5 21.9 69.6 
1980 4.1 9.2 20.4 70.4 
1982 2.7 9.2 20.4 70.4 
1985 3.6 15.0 25.0 60.0 
1990 2.8 23.0 25.0 52.0 
1992 5.5 10.0 18.0 72.0 
1994 9.1 12.0 22.0 70.0 
1995 11.1 12.4 20.0 67.6 
1996 12.9 10.0 20.0 70.0 
1997 14.9 12.4 26.5 61.1 
1998 16.2 12.0 27.0 61.0 
1999 16.5 12.0 27.0 61.0 
2000 16.5 12.0 22.0 66.0 
Source:  IMF (1995; 1999); Ministry of Finance (2001); Khoury et al. (1998); World Bank (1999; 2000); 
World Development Report (2000/2001); CAS (Central Administration of Statistics) (1964-1973); 
CDR (Council for Development and Reconstruction) (1977); CCIB (Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of Beirut) (1980-1982); Author’s calculations. 
 
Complementing this dominance of the service sector was the crucial role of the 
banking sector. As noted earlier, in the 1960s and early 1970s Beirut was the main financial 
services centre for the Middle East, and the regional headquarters for many international 
companies. During the Civil War most foreign firms fled, while local banks established 
offshore centres in Bahrain, Cyprus, and Europe. Highly trained local staff followed, 
joining institutions in the US and Europe. Hence, the Civil War caused the service sector to 
either experience some contraction or a reorientation in new directions. Even with the 
losses sustained during the war, banking remained the country’s most profitable sector. The 
Lebanese banking sector witnessed unprecedented growth during the period from 1992 to 
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the present. Total deposits with commercial banks increased from US$6.5 billion at the end 
of 1992 to US$37.6 billion at the end of 2000. In addition, since 1996, Lebanese banks 
have been successfully accessing international capital markets, and three banks raised 
approximately US$300 million through the issuance of global depositary receipts on the 
international equity market (Ministry of Finance, 2001). The banking system, with a 9% 
share of GDP, holds a position of considerable importance in the economy, financing on 
average 45% of aggregate demand and 50% of imports in 1999. Banks’ foreign exchange 
accounted for around 7.5 months of imports and customers’ deposits represented on 
average 90% of gross domestic savings (Banque Audi, 2000). 
With the government launching a reconstruction plan to rebuild the infrastructure 
devastated by the civil strife, the economy improved in nominal terms during 1992-2000. 
Nominal GDP increased from US$5.5 to US$16.5 billion from 1992 to 2000 respectively 
(Table 2.5). The services sector was clearly the sector that benefited most from the 
reconstruction. The banking sector benefited from such a reconstruction, this is due to the 
improvement in the fundamentals of the economy, along with the Central Bank’s stable 
exchange rate policy paralleled by high rates on Lebanese pound assets. This led to a 
strengthening of the domestic value of the currency, with the exchange rate appreciating by 
18% from 1992 until 1999 (Banque Audi, 2000). Hence, favourable post-war monetary 
developments translated into increased capital inflows and consecutive balance of 
payments surpluses (more details later throughout this chapter). Gross capital inflow rose 
from US$3 billion a year in 1992 to a peak of US$7.3 billion in 1996, before following a 
downward trend to US$5.8 billion in 1999 (Banque Audi, 2000).  
Table 2.4 shows the real growth in sectoral output at constant 1974 prices. This 
reveals a steady increase up to 1974, then a rapid decline in activity in 1976. Real growth in 
the agricultural sector declined from 3.01 in 1970 to –60.01 in 1976; in the industrial sector 
from 6.78% to –57.65 in 1976; in services from 7.02 to –57.65 in 1976. Despite the 
resilience of the Lebanese economy, real growth in sectoral output has yet to recover from 
the hostilities that began in 1975. The end of the war allowed households, firms, and the 
government to return to normal conditions of production and consumption, with the 
rebuilding of residential and business structure, and the government-led reconstruction 
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program to build infrastructure had a positive effect on growth in sectoral output. With 
virtually no natural resources, the Lebanese economy is marked by its dependence on the 
service sector10. The expansion of the sector remains a top government priority. The 
enlargement of the Beirut airport, the reopening of prestigious hotels as well as the rapid 
opening-rate of cafés and restaurants, reflect strong faith in the potential of the tourist 
sector. However, regional instability, in addition to air and sea pollution, are not helping the 
sector.   
During 1991-97, the average annual real growth rate of the agricultural sector 
amounted to 8.5%, for industry 7.2%, and for the services sector 7.1%. As noted earlier the 
agricultural and industrial sectors are facing problems in obtaining loans, credits and are 
facing problems of selling their products either domestically or abroad. In addition, they 
also suffer from high risks due to the unpredictable security situation, high interest rates, 
severe fluctuations in the exchange rate and inadequate infrastructure (energy, roads, 
telecommunications) and others11. Therefore, a slow growth in sectoral output can be 
noted. The real growth in each sector under consideration amounted 0.6% in 2000 (Table 
2.4). 
 Therefore, and as shown in Table 2.5, the structure of the Lebanese economy is 
characterized by a much higher rate of development of the service sector (which includes 
trade, real estate, finance, transport, and government) than of the agricultural and industrial 
sectors, both of which are considered to be part of the production sector. 
 
2.3.3 Consumption, Investment and Domestic Savings 
2.3.3.1 Private and Public Consumption  
Expenditures on total consumption relative to GDP in Lebanon are traditionally 
high, especially in the mid 1970s and during the 1980s and 1990s. Table 2.4 shows that the 
average share of private consumption, as a percentage of GDP, was 78% during 1970-1973 
                                                 
10 According to BDL (Banque du Liban)  (1995), this sector includes, as percentage of total GDP, the 
following: commerce (30.5%), services (16.6%), public administration (7.5%), housing (4.2%), and 
transport and communication (2.9%). 
 
11 See, Al-Khalil (1992).  
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and the average share of government consumption was only 9%; this share is low 
compared to other periods, because before the war the government had a limited role in 
the economy12. The country was well known for its conservative fiscal policies with low 
expenditure and low tax ratios, in a macroeconomic environment characterized by a stable 
currency, low inflation, sustainable growth, and overall balance of payments surpluses. The 
share of private consumption (PC) increased to 87% in 1976, to 125% and 139% in 1982 
and 1990 respectively. This evolution in PC may be explained not by the evolution of GDP 
per se, but by the pattern of income redistribution which occurred in favour of profits. 
Consumers, in general, attempted to maintain as much as possible their previous standard 
of living, financing this attempt by dissaving and by various income transfers received from 
local and foreign sources. The share of government consumption increased to 15% in 
1976, to 38% and to 24% in 1982 and 1990 respectively.  
Since the ending of hostilities in 1990, the public sector has played an increased role 
in the reconstruction process. Consequently, during 1990-2000, government consumption, 
as a percentage of GDP, averaged about 16% compared to only 9% during 1970-1973; 
while private consumption as a percentage of GDP averaged 110% during 1990-2000. 
Private remittances, together with government transfers, allowed for a consumption ratio 
higher than GDP These shares have shown a slight decline during the last few years. 
Private consumption declined from 139% in 1990 to 88% in 2000, while government 
consumption declined from 19% in 1990 to 13% in 1999 (Table 2.4). The difference 
between consumption and GDP is usually financed largely through domestic and foreign 
resources (this will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter). The average annual 
growth in total consumption (private and public) during 1991-2000 was 28%.  
The increase in the volume of total consumption can be explained by a high relative 
share of private consumption. The increase in government consumption is attributed 
mainly to the large amount of domestic resources (through tax revenue) received by the 
government. The major components of government consumption were, salary and wages, 
and debt servicing in the form of interest payments. 
                                                 
12 See Saidi (1989); Eken et al. (1995), on fiscal developments in Lebanon since 1974. 
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2.3.3.2 Gross Domestic Investment  
The share of gross domestic investment in Lebanon’s GDP averaged 20% during 
1970-1973. This share, on the other hand, declined from about 20% during the 1970s to 
9.35% in 1982 (Table 2.4). This happened as a result of the Civil War and the Israeli 
invasion of Beirut in 1982. According to the IMF (1995) one of the direct economic costs 
of the Civil War was the consequent loss of output during 1975-1993. This has been 
estimated at LL 98 billion at constant 1974 prices, or about 24 times the value of Lebanon’s 
1993 real GDP. During 1991-2000, the share of gross domestic investment relative to 
GDP averaged 26%. This share increased rapidly from 17% in 1990 to 32% and 33% in 
1994 and 1995 respectively (Table 2.4). It was high primarily owing to the increased role of 
the government in rehabilitating a significant part of the country’s infrastructure, and the 
reconstruction program has been one of the forces underlying the rapid economic growth 
during 1991-1997. This, in turn, can be attributed to the increased amount of domestic and 
external resources available to the central government. Domestic resources are available 
mainly through the issuance of government papers (with maturities of up to two years) 
denominated in Lebanese pounds and held primarily by the domestic banking system, 
while the external resources are mainly through foreign loans (see Chapter 3). 
The average growth rate of gross domestic investment during 1991-2000 was 41%. 
Investment expenditures were concentrated in physical infrastructure, irrigation, public 
services, state apparatus and others13.  
As shown in Table 2.4 negative savings can be noted during 1976-2000); it is also 
clear that the savings gap (investment minus savings) after 1973 exceeded total investment, 
indicating that consumption exceeded GDP. This gap is financed primarily by issuing debt, 
particularly in the form of short-term treasury bills denominated in Lebanese pounds, as 
the source not only for investment but also for consumption. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 See Eken et al. (1999) on public investment planning and progress. 
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2.3.3.3 Gross Domestic Savings 
Gross domestic savings is defined as gross domestic product minus consumption. 
Table 2.4 indicates that Lebanon practiced negative savings during 1976-1999. In other 
words, consumption exceeded GDP and imports exceeded exports, with the shortfalls 
being financed from domestic and external resources. During 1970-1973, Lebanon 
practiced positive savings that averaged about 12% of GDP. But, between 1976-1999, 
negative savings. The negative savings remarkably increased from –2.43% of GDP in 1976 
to –53.5% in 1982. The negative domestic savings averaged –27.4% during 1990-2000, 
which is considered very high by international standards.  
Domestic savings are affected by various factors, including: (1) high consumption 
expenditures; (2) income per capita fluctuations as a result of war and economic and 
political instability; (3) Lebanon’s import system, which may encourage higher 
consumption; (4) the lack of efficient financial institutions, which discourages domestic 
savings; (5) transfer of domestic savings abroad by high-income recipients as a result of 
political instability in the Middle East. 
The above analysis indicates the necessity of domestic and external resources to fill 
gaps and deficits in Lebanon’s economy. The negative savings is considered one of the 
main factors requiring access to other domestic and external resources; since investments 
exceeded domestic savings, domestic and external resources were required to cover the gap 
especially given the high growth rates desired. Negative levels of domestic savings were due 
to a high level of government spending on consumption expenditures and to inadequate 
policies adopted to attract savings. In addition, domestic and external resources were 
required to cover the chronic deficit in the balance of trade (this will be discussed later). 
The trade gap can be attributed to the increasing demand for imports without a 
corresponding growth in exports. Thus, the main reasons behind the need for financial 
resources was to cover the gaps left by negative savings and the balance of trade deficit. All 
the series for gross domestic investment, private consumption, government consumption, 
and gross domestic savings are depicted in Figure 2.3 below. 
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Figure 2.3 Selected National Account Statistics in Lebanon (% 
of GDP), 1970-2000
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Source:   Plotted by the author based on data provided by Table 2.4 
  Note:    GDI = Gross domestic investment 
PC = Private consumption 
GC = Government consumption 
GDS = Gross domestic savings 
 
2.4 Foreign Trade and the Balance of Payments 
Lebanon has followed an open economy approach to international economic 
relations through non-restrictive economic policies regarding foreign trade. The size and 
composition of Lebanon’s international transactions, and the general state of its balance of 
payments, are indicators of how much it depends on external resources. 
The importance of international trade to the economy can be shown by an analysis 
of exports, imports, the balance of trade, balance of payments and direction of trade. 
 
2.4.1 Exports, Imports and the Trade Balance 
The growing importance of external trade for the Lebanese economy is evident 
from Table 2.6 below. Trade played a vital role during the Civil War as imports rose and 
exports fell due to the devastation of the industrial sector. As shown in Table 2.6, high 
trade deficits remain to be its most conspicuous feature. However, Lebanon is a small 
country and much of the trade imbalance is caused by imports of machinery that is to be 
put to productive use14. Table 2.6 shows that during the period 1970-1999, Lebanon’s 
balance of trade has been in deficit. The deficit increased steadily from US$492 million in 
1970 to US$768.6 million in 1974, US$2,814.4 in 1980, US$3,185 in 1992, and to US$5,913 
million in 1998. The annual average trade deficit was US$678.2 million during 1970-1975, 
                                                 
14 IMF, Direction of trade Statistics (1989-1992). 
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or 28.5% of GDP (before the Civil War), US$1,481.5 million during the 1976-1980 period, 
or 45.5% of GDP, US$2,171 million during the 1981-1985 period, or 61.5% of GDP, 
US$1,466.4 million during the 1986-1990 period, or 49.5% of GDP, and US$4,951.7 during 
the 1991-2000 period, or 47.2% of GDP. Therefore, the highest trade deficits were during 
the 1980s and 1990s. Deficits during the 1991-2000 period were as a result of post-war 
reconstruction and development, and increased demand for imports of machinery and 
equipment, and petroleum products. From the table it can be seen that the export to 
import ratio, which increased to 65.6% by 1974, started to decline after 1976 as a result of 
the Civil War period (1975-1990). Although it has shown some signs of improvement, the 
situation remained troublesome even after the end of the Civil War. Furthermore, the trade 
deficit to GDP ratio remained extremely high, soaring to –85.4% in 1982 and –63.5% in 
1990. 
From Table 2.6, we can see that the value of Lebanese exports amounted to 
US$197 million in 1970 and increased to US$1,162.7 million in 1975. The export growth 
rate averaged 51.7% per year during 1971-1975, and the value of exports accounted for 
26.7% of GDP during the same period (Table 2.6). Therefore, throughout this period 
Lebanese exports grew rapidly from a very low base, as a result of economic and political 
stability, and as a result of an expansion of industrial and agricultural output due to high 
demand for such products from Gulf Arab countries especially.  
After that, because of the Civil War, a decline in the value of exports is clear from 
Table 2.6. The export growth rate averaged –3.1% per year during 1976-1990. The average 
annual amount of exports as a percentage of GDP during the period 1976-1990 was 22.9%. 
Exports declined from US$1,162.7 million in 1975 to US$582 million in 1986 before 
increasing to US$628 million in 1988. As for the surge in exports after 1986 this was caused 
by the sharp depreciation of the national currency in 1987-88, which resulted in a 
substantial increase in agricultural industrial exports. 
On the other hand, during 1991-2000 (the post-war reconstruction and 
development period), the value of Lebanese exports increased from US$539 million in 
1991 to US$601 million in 1992 and to US$712 million in 2000. The average annual 
amount of exports as a percentage of GDP during the period 1991-2000 was 7%. The 
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average growth rate of exports during this period was 4.1% as a result of security 
stabilization, the gradual recovery of production activities, and the depreciation of the 
Lebanese pound in 1992 sustained the improvement of Lebanese exports. In addition, 
exports rose from US$668 million in 1998 to US$712 million in 2000, registering an annual 
growth of 3%. This increase owes much to the domestic slowdown witnessed since the 
mid-1990s, which forced agricultural producers and manufacturers to look overseas for 
increased sales. The increase also occurred despite a strengthening of the domestic 
currency, which made Lebanese goods progressively more expensive each year. 
 Lebanon relies on imports to satisfy many of its consumption and investment 
needs. Imports are large in relation to GDP. Table 2.6 shows that the average annual 
amount was US$1,356.2 million, equal to an average 52.9% of GDP during the period 
1970-1975. This average is much higher than that of exports. The average annual growth of 
imports during 1971-1975 was 26.7%, which is similar to exports. During 1976-1990, the 
average annual growth rate of imports was 7.2%. The average annual amount of imports as 
a percentage of GDP was 75.1%, compared to 22.9% for exports during the same period. 
As shown in Table 2.6, there was a decline in imports in 1976, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985 and 
1987. This was as a result of the Civil War, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and 
other important factors such as shortages of foreign exchange and a decline in real income 
which induced import-substitution in the Lebanese market especially in 1987. Moreover, 
the relative stability of the Lebanese pound in 1991 contributed to the increase in imports. 
The annual growth rate of imports during this year was 48.2% before declining to 11.3% in 
1992 as a result of a sharp depreciation of the national currency. The average annual 
growth of imports during 1991-2000 amounted to 11%, while the annual average of 
imports as percentage of GDP during this period amounted to 54%. This was much higher 
than the rate for exports.  
The sharp increase in imports during the period from 1991-2000 was due to the 
post-war reconstruction and development program, increased demand for imports of 
machinery and transport equipment, and petroleum products. It should be noted also that 
the annual growth rate of imports declined to –12.2% in 1999 because of an economic 
slow down and increased tariffs on some consumer goods. This led to a decline in the 
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domestic demand for imported goods15 during that year. In addition, the value of imports 
and exports, during 1970-2000, are depicted in Figure 2.4. It is evident from this figure that 
imports showed a sharp rise, especially during the period of the 1990s as noted earlier. The 
growth rates of exports and imports are also depicted in Figure 2.5, during 1971-2000. As 
shown in the figure the growth rate of both imports and exports showed a sharp decline in 
1976, and after that fluctuated between a rise and decline throughout the rest of the period 
(1976-2000). Negative growth rates occurred in some years (1982, 1984, 1986, and 1999). 
These fluctuations can be attributed to the Civil War which started in 1975, the Israeli 
invasion in 1982, exports being adversely affected by a recession in traditional markets, 
especially in the Arab countries, a depreciation of the domestic currency in 1986, 1988, 
1990, and 1992, and the reconstruction and development program which started in the 
early 1990s. 
 
Figure 2.4 Export and Import Levels  (US$ million)
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Source: Plotted by the author and based on data provided by Table 2.6. 
 
In conclusion, Lebanon’s trade gap has been financed by emigrants’ remittances, 
transit and re-export trade, capital transfers, and from domestic and other external 
resources. The largest source has been official transfer payments in the form of budget 
support, technical and economic assistance, and public borrowing. Therefore, the 
international transactions that make up such a large part of the budget reflect the weakness 
of the Lebanese economy. 
                                                 
15 See, Banque du Liban, Annual Report (1999, pp.55-56) for a detailed discussion about the external 
sector in Lebanon. 
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Figure 2.5 Growth of Lebanese Exports and Imports 1970-2000, (%)
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Source: Plotted by the author and based on data provided by Table 2.6 
 
2.4.2 Balance of Payments 
As noted earlier it is clear that Lebanon traditionally ran a trade deficit before the 
war. However, this increased sharply after 1990 with the import of capital goods, mainly 
for reconstruction, and the resurgence in consumer demand. However, as shown in Table 
2.6, Lebanon’s balance of payments was not in deficit until 1983, except for 1976. This was 
due to substantial transfer inflows from remittances of Lebanese migrant workers who 
went to the Gulf countries between 1970-1981, and other transfer inflows from foreign 
countries16. It is worth noting that the number of Lebanese workers in the Gulf in 1970 
was 50,000. This figure rose considerably in just ten years, becoming 210,000 by 1980. The 
increase in the number of workers translated into higher remittances to Lebanon, 
increasing from $US250 million in 1970 to US$2,254 million in 1980. In 1983, remittances 
from the Gulf countries accounted for roughly 53% of GDP17.  
The balance of payments deficit recorded US$933 million in 1983, US$1,353 
million in 1984 and US$301 million in 1986 (Table 2.6). This was severely affected in the 
post 1982 period by shortages of capital inflows due, in part, to falling remittances from the 
                                                 
16 Transfer inflows relied mainly on foreign assistance or aid, particularly from Arab funds, foreign 
deposits in Lebanese banks, and International funds. 
 
17 Nasr and Salim (1989, p.44). 
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Gulf countries arising from falling oil prices. Remittances fell drastically from US$2,524 
million in 1980 to only US$460 million in 1983.  
 
Table 2.6 Trend in Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments in Lebanon 1970-2000 (US$ million). 
Years Imports 
(f.o.b)  
Exports  
(f.o.b) 
Trade 
balance 
Trade 
balance/
GDP 
(%) 
Imports/
GDP 
(%) 
Exports/
GDP 
(%) 
Exports/
imports 
(%) 
 
BOPs 
1970 689.0 197 -492.0 -33.1 46.3 13.2 28.9 +284.5 
1971 767.0 250.0 -517.0 -30.9 45.9 14.9 32.6 --- 
1972 951.0 383.0 -568.0 -27.2 45.6 18.4 40.3 +251.4 
1973 1451.0 612.0 -839.0 -30.8 53.3 22.5 42.2 +100.4 
1974 2231.9 1463.3 -768.6 -22.0 63.9 41.9 65.6 +643.5 
1975 2047.3 1162.7 -884.6 -27.1 62.8 35.7 56.8 +11 
1976 818.0 555.3 -262.7 -18.4 57.3 38.9 67.9 -355 
1977 1749.5 740.7 -1008.8 -37.8 65.5 27.7 42.3 +748 
1978 2050.0 817.8 -1232.8 -41.5 68.9 27.5 39.9 +185 
1979 2976.5 887.8 -2088.7 -60.7 86.5 25.8 29.8 +3388 
1980 3847.3 1032.9 -2814.4 -69.2 94.5 25.4 26.8 +472 
1981 3447.6 1001.3 -2446.3 -62.8 88.4 25.7 29.0 +585 
1982 3156.1 885.6 -2270.5 -85.4 118.7 33.3 28.1 +254 
1983 3400.3 736.5 -2663.8 -72.8 92.9 20.1 21.7 -933 
1984 2713.3 611.8 -2101.5 -48.6 62.7 14.1 22.5 -1353 
1985 1953.0 580.0 -1373.0 -37.9 54.1 16.1 29.7 +350 
1986 1899.0 582.0 -1317.0 -46.7 67.4 20.7 30.6 -301 
1987 1640.0 497.0 -1143.0 -34.7 49.7 15.1 30.3 +32 
1988 2151.0 628.0 -1523.0 -45.9 64.9 18.9 29.2 +610 
1989 2032.0 485.0 -1547.0 -56.9 74.8 17.8 23.9 -309 
1990 2296.0 494.0 -1802.0 -63.5 80.9 17.4 21.5 -431 
1991 3403.0 539.0 -2864.0 -64.3 76.4 12.1 15.8 +1074 
1992 3786.0 601.0 -3185.0 -57.4 68.3 10.8 15.9 +53 
1993 4908.0 686.0 -4222.0 -56.0 65.1 9.1 13.9 +1169 
1994 5541.0 737.0 -4804.0 -52.7 60.8 8.1 13.3 +1131 
1995 6722.0 816.0 -5906.0 -53.1 60.5 7.3 12.1 +256 
1996 6992.0 783.0 -6209.0 -47.8 53.8 6.0 11.1 +786 
1997 6897.0 649.0 -6248.0 -42.0 46.4 4.4 9.4 +420 
1998 6581.0 668.0 -5913.0 -36.6 40.7 4.1 10.1 -488 
1999 5778.0 695.0 -5083.0 -30.9 35.1 4.2 12.0 +261 
2000 5795.0 712.0 -5083.0 -30.9 35.2 4.3 12.3 -289 
Source:  Banque du Liban, Annual Report (various years); World Bank World Tables (2001); Ministry  
of Finance (various years); Eken et al. (1995);Yamout (1994); Author’s calculations. 
 
An additional cause of the deficit was the departure of the PLO (Palestine 
Liberation Organization) from Lebanon to several Arab countries, and the consequent 
exodus of much of the male Palestinian workforce. This deprived Lebanon of more than 
US$400 million in annual spending. At its height, Palestinian spending in Lebanon formed 
15% of GDP, and they accounted for 10% of the employed workforce18. In 1987 and 
1988, due to the enhanced performance of the real sector, the boost in exports, and a 
                                                 
18 Saidi (1986); Dahi (1994, p.48). 
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significant decrease in the balance of trade deficit, surpluses in the balance of payments 
were recorded. These were US$32 and US$610 million in 1987 and 1988 respectively. The 
eruption of hostilities in 1989, with their destructive impact on the Lebanese economy as 
well as increased pessimism and lower confidence in the Lebanese banking sector, led to an 
important flight of capital, causing a deficit of US$309 million in the balance of payments 
in 1989 which increased to US$431 million in 1990.  
In addition, as shown in Table 2.6, the balance of payments incurred continuous 
overall surpluses from 1991 to 1997, before turning into a deficit in 1998. However, the 
balance of payments recorded a deficit of US$488 million for 1998, due, in part, to the 
turbulence in certain financial markets in 1998 and a consequent withdrawal of funds by 
foreign investors from Lebanese treasury bonds as part of their overall reduction of 
exposure to emerging markets and to increased foreign borrowings. Following the 
appointment of the current government and a reduction in the amount of foreign 
borrowings, the balance of payments recorded a surplus of US$261 million in 1999. In 
2000, there was a balance of payments deficit of US$289 million, due principally to 
increased capital outflows resulting from losses incurred by investors in US equity markets, 
and increased fuel prices, a fall in external public debt disbursements of approximately 
41%, and the near doubling of amortisation on external public debt. These surpluses 
during 1991-1997 were due to several factors:  
First, the return of stability to Lebanon in the form of the end of the Civil War and 
the reassertion of authority by the government. Second, increased confidence, as a result of 
improvements in security, led to a significant inflow of funds in the form of transfers and 
deposits. The major source of fund inflows are the regular remittances19 from expatriates to 
family and relatives, as well as the deposits in local banks from the Arab Gulf countries. In 
addition, the stabilization of the exchange rate after 1992 allowed the Central bank to build 
up its stock of foreign exchange reserves, as the demand for the Lebanese pound was 
                                                 
19 According to the EIU (2000) there are some 12m Lebanese, or those of Lebanese extraction, currently 
living and working overseas, with many in Brazil, West Africa, Canada, the US, Australia and Europe. 
Overall, repatriation from these “nationals” is estimated at up to US$6 billion a year. 
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increasing on the exchange market. Gross official reserves rose from US$1.2 billion at the 
end of 1991 to over US$6.1 billion (equivalent to about 10 months of imports) at the end 
of June 1998, while net foreign exchange reserves rose from US$1.2 billion to over US$3.2 
billion (6.9 months of imports) during the same period20. The above situation added to 
high interest rates that helped attract large capital inflows primarily from neighbouring Gulf 
countries.  
 
Table 2.7 Summary of the Balance of Payments in Lebanon: 1985-2000 (in millions 
of US$, unless otherwise indicated) 
Years Exports                    
(f.o.b) 
Imports  
(f.o.b) 
Trade 
Balance 
Services Current 
account 
balance 
(CAB) 
Gross 
internat
ional 
reserves 
 
Net 
foreign 
reserves 
(- 
increase) 
CAB/ 
GDP 
(%) 
Capital 
account 
balance 
1985 580 1953 -1373 +332 -581 1073.8 -350 -16.1 931 
1986 582 1899 -1317 +254 -593 488.0 +301 -21.0 292 
1987 497 1640 -1143 +347 -321 367.9 -32 -9.7 353 
1988 628 2151 -1523 +387 -656 977.8 -610 -19.8 1266 
1989 485 2032 -1547 +504 -563 938.2 +309 -20.7 254 
1990 494 2296 -1802 +454 -1068 659.9 +431 -37.6 637 
1991 539 3403 -2864 +222 -2462 1275.5 -1074 -55.3 3536 
1992 601 3786 -3185 -29 -2798 1496.4 -53 -50.5 2851 
1993 686 4908 -4222 -149 -3806 2260.3 -1169 -50.5 4975 
1994 737 5541 -4804 +11 -4058 3884.2 -1131 -44.5 5189 
1995 816 -6722 -5906 +438 -4587 4533.3 -256 -41.3 4843 
1996 783 -6992 -6209 425 -4507 5931.9 -786 -34.7 5293 
1997 649 -6897 -6248 +635 -4153 5976.4 -420 -27.9 4573 
1998 668 -6581 -5913 -199 -5956 6556.3 +488 -36.8 5468 
1999 695 -5778 -5083 +95 -5626 7775.6 -261 -34.2 5886 
2000 712 -5795 -5083 +85 -5630 5943.7 +289 -34.2 5341 
            Source:  Banque du Liban, Annual Report (various years); World Bank World Tables (2001); Ministry of 
Finance (various years); Eken et al. (1995); IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2000, 
pp.630-631); Author’s calculations. 
 
Thirdly, there were large subscriptions of foreign parties, mainly banks in Saudi 
Arabia, to domestic Treasury Bills, warranted by a new Central bank decree issued in 
September 1991. By the end of October 1991, subscription to these bills by Saudi banks 
amounted to US$100 million. Fourthly, the reactivating of old protocols between the 
Lebanese government and foreign parties such as Italy and Belgium, together with the 
contraction of new protocols with several governments and regional organizations, led to a 
noticeable inflow of foreign exchange (Iskandar, 1993). 
                                                 
20 Eken et al. (1999, p.1). 
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In addition, as shown in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, because of a large deficit in the balance 
of trade during 1970-2000, the current account has always been in deficit. This deficit 
sharply increased from US$581 million in 1985 to US$1,068, US$4,587, and US$5,630 
million in 1990, 1995, and 2000 respectively. The current account deficit to GDP ratio 
reached 20.7%, 55.3%, 50.5%, 41.3%, and 34.2% in 1989, 1991, 1992, 1995, and 2000 
respectively (Table 2.7). Figure 2.6 indicates that the current account balance to GDP ratio 
showed a sharp rise, especially during the 1990s, due to the post-war reconstruction and 
development program and increased demand for imports from investments needs. 
Therefore, the economy is heavily dependent on foreign assistance to support the 
deteriorated position of the current account. The prospects for improvement of the deficit 
depend upon the performance of the whole economy in the future. This performance, in 
turn, will be determined by government policies, by whether political stability is achieved in 
the Middle East, and by the relationship between Lebanon and the wealthy Arab countries 
in particular.  
 
Figure 2.6 Current account balance to GDP in Lebanon, 
selected years (%)
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   Source: Plotted by the author and based on data provided by Table 2.7 
 
2.4.3 Structure and Direction of Trade 
The industrial and agricultural exports from Lebanon represent the core of the 
economy, through ensuring access to foreign currencies. These exports reached 61% and 
30%, as a percentage of total exports respectively, in 199421.  
                                                 
21 BDL, Annual report (1990-1994, p.80). 
 40 
Table 2.8 indicates that of all the export categories food and beverage constituted 
the largest share of total exports, averaging 17.2% of total exports per year during 1989-
2000. The remaining exports are: textiles (13.4%), machinery and appliances (13.1%), 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals (12.6%), metal and metal products (12.2%), jewellery 
(10.4%) and others. These exports together accounted for 78.9% of total exports during 
1989-2000. It should be noted that manufactured exports are mainly composed of labour-
intensive and value-added products such as jewellery and textile products.  
Regarding the foreign markets for Lebanon’s exports, Table 2.9 shows that the 
share of Lebanon’s exports in total exports to the Middle East countries (especially Arab 
countries) averaged 47% during 1989-2000. On average 23.5% per year, during the same 
period, was absorbed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which mostly 
imported agricultural products (e.g., fruits, vegetables), jewellery, textiles and 
pharmaceuticals. The industrial countries of France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and other 
countries’ markets, absorbed an average 35.5% of total exports during 1989-2000; mostly in 
the form of textiles, leather products and chemicals. On average 8% of total exports per 
year during the same period were absorbed by Africa and the rest of Europe. The number 
of foreign markets importing Lebanon’s commodities, however, illustrates only a very 
general picture of the country’s market diversification. The degree of market diversification 
for many of Lebanon’s principal exports is low in the sense that most of these exports were 
concentrated largely in a few foreign markets, particularly in the case of primary exports. 
On the other hand, Lebanon’s import structure constituted in 1980, as percentage of the 
total, the following: food 16%, agricultural raw materials 2%, fuels 15%, ores and metals 
4%, and manufactures 63% (World Bank, 1999).  
According to the World Bank Fact book (1999), Lebanon’s import structure in 
1997, registered as a percentage of total imports, was as follows: foodstuffs, which 
dominated the import structure, 29% in 1997, machinery and transport equipment 28%, 
consumer goods 18%, chemicals 9%, textiles 5%, metals 5%, fuels 3%, and agricultural 
foods 3%. 
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Table 2.8 Composition of Industrial Exports1, 1989-2000 (in percent of total) 
 
Years 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Food and beverage 11.0 10.0 13.0 6.0 21.8 21.3 21.9 21.8 20.0 20.0 20.0 19.0 
Textiles 23.0 18.0 15.0 14.0 16.7 13.3 12.4 12.5 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.0 
Leather, plastics, and 
rubber 
3.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 7.3 7.3 6.3 7.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 
Wood and wood 
products 
4.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
Chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals 
10.0 13.0 17.0 35.0 7.3 8.3 7.3 4.7 11.0 12.0 13.0 12.0 
Paper and paper 
products 
7.0 9.0 10.0 6.0 4.3 5.0 6.9 6.5 8.0 7.0 8.0 7.0 
Stone, clay, and glasses 5.0 5.0 4.0 6.0 5.3 5.9 4.9 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 
Metal and metal 
products 
9.0 20.0 20.0 11.0 8.7 10.5 10.2 9.1 11.0 10.0 14.0 13.0 
Machinery and 
appliances 
10.0 9.0 8.0 8.0 15.2 13.8 15.6 20.4 15.0 16.0 13.0 13.0 
Jewellery 16.0 6.0 6.0 3.0 8.9 10.2 10.6 11.1 10.0 11.0 14.0 18.0 
Other 2.0 5.0 3.0 7.0 4.0 3.6 3.7 3.1 8.0 9.0 6.0 6.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source:   Eken et al. (1995; 1999); Higher Council of Customs/Ministry of Finance (2001). 
Note: 1 Exports data were adjusted to reflect changes in the valuation of transfers of banknotes abroad, previously included at face value
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Table 2.9 Destination of Exports from Lebanon 1989-2000 (in percent of total) 
Years 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Industrial 
Countries 
41.1 40.3 42.8 32.8 28.0 33.5 27.5 34.2 32.9 37.0 40.4 35.4 
France 4.9 5.0 5.9 5.3 4.0 4.5 6.9 7.1 7.2 8.7 7.7 5.2 
Germany 2.7 3.4 2.8 2.4 1.4 2.0 2.6 3.0 2.2 3.2 3.6 2.5 
Italy 6.9 9.0 5.7 3.0 1.3 2.6 2.1 6.3 3.3 2.6 2.8 2.5 
Switzerland 10.2 10.4 12.2 8.0 7.8 13.3 2.9 1.9 2.4 3.4 6.6 7.1 
UK 3.4 2.1 2.8 2.9 2.3 1.5 2.1 2.4 3.1 3.0 3.6 1.6 
USA 5.9 4.5 5.3 4.6 3.7 3.5 2.6 4.2 6.0 6.6 6.2 6.5 
Other 7.1 5.9 8.1 6.5 7.6 6.1 8.2 9.3 8.7 9.4 9.9 10.0 
Developing 
countries 
58.9 59.7 57.2 67.2 72.0 66.5 72.5 65.8 67.0 63.0 59.6 64.6 
Middle East 51.5 48.8 43.3 56.1 47.7 42.2 40.4 47.6 54.0 43.4 43.2 45.2 
Saudi Arabia 18.6 16.7 15.2 17.8 14.5 13.9 11.2 18.1 15.1 12.1 10.5 10.9 
Syria 1.2 3.1 5.2 7.5 8.7 7.4 4.7 9.1 5.9 6.5 4.8 3.6 
Jordan 2.2 3.0 5.8 7.2 4.6 3.5 2.1 6.6 3.9 3.6 4.0 4.4 
UAE 10.3 9.9 9.0 12.0 10.8 4.4 4.9 7.5 9.0 9.9 8.0 10.5 
Other 19.2 16.1 8.1 19.1 17.8 20.3 22.2 15.3 20.2 11.2 16.1 15.9 
Africa 4.3 4.6 5.2 5.1 3.2 3.3 3.6 4.9 4.8 5.0 5.5 5.6 
Other Europe 2.0 4.4 7.4 0.7 2.5 1.3 2.7 3.5 1.2 6.0 4.2 5.1 
Other 1.1 1.9 1.3 5.3 18.6 19.7 25.8 9.8 7.0 8.6 6.7 8.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:   Eken et al. (1995; 1999); Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (1999); Higher Council of Customs/Ministry of finance (2001). 
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Table 2.10 Source of Imports into Lebanon 1989-2000 (in percent of total) 
 
Years 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Industrial 
Countries 
58.2 54.4 60.5 60.5 63.9 65.6 65.8 69.1 68.2 66.8 66.4 62.3 
France 8.8 7.9 8.7 8.1 8.6 8.9 7.6 7.8 9.5 9.7 9.6 8.5 
Germany 7.8 5.9 6.7 6.8 9.2 10.0 8.4 8.5 8.7 8.7 8.9 8.3 
Italy 12.8 12.5 13.8 13.6 12.7 13.3 13.0 12.1 13.2 11.5 10.9 10.9 
Switzerland 3.0 3.7 3.6 2.6 3.3 3.5 4.6 3.4 6.6 6.3 7.1 6.9 
UK 3.9 4.1 4.5 4.2 4.4 4.1 3.9 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.4 5.2 
USA 4.5 4.2 4.9 8.1 10.6 9.3 10.6 10.9 9.2 9.3 8.1 7.3 
Other 17.3 16.0 18.2 17.2 15.0 16.4 17.8 22.4 16.6 16.8 17.4 15.1 
Developing 
Countries 
41.8 45.6 39.5 39.5 36.1 34.4 34.2 30.9 31.8 33.1 33.2 37.7 
Middle East 12.1 16.6 14.7 14.3 9.6 7.8 7.5 8.3 9.4 8.7 9.4 12.5 
Saudi Arabia 0.9 1.3 1.0 0.7 1.4 1.4 0.7 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.6 
Syria 6.5 11.4 11.4 11.4 5.0 4.4 3.2 4.1 4.4 3.7 3.6 4.5 
Other 4.8 4.0 2.2 2.2 3.2 2.0 3.5 2.7 3.3 3.3 4.1 5.3 
Africa 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.6 
Europe 16.7 15.3 11.5 10.1 9.1 8.6 11.7 16.0 5.3 5.5 5.3 4.8 
Other 12.5 13.2 12.9 14.6 14.6 15.6 12.8 5.6 16.3 18.4 17.8 19.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:   Eken et al. (1995; 1999); Higher Council of Customs/Ministry of Finance (2001). 
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In terms of import direction Lebanon has relied on industrialized countries, such as 
that of the European countries, the USA and others, as the major sources of non-oil 
imports. Table 2.10 shows, that the share of industrial countries’ imports in Lebanon’s total 
imports averaged 63.5% during 1989-2000. On average, 37.4% of Lebanon’s imports came 
from Italy, France, Germany, and the USA during the same period. Imports from the 
Middle East countries constituted 10.9% of total imports, while those from Syria 
constituted 6.1% of total imports during the same period. Imports from the Middle East 
countries consisted of mostly petroleum products. Imports from the rest of Europe 
constituted 10% and that from Africa only 1.1% of total imports during the same period. 
It can be concluded from the previous discussion that the domination of the trade 
sector, and the weakness of the production sectors, increased the level of the permanent 
deficit in the trade balance. As indicated in Table 2.6, the import to GDP ratio showed a 
sharp increase from 46.3% in 1970, to 118.7%, 80.9%, in 1982 and 1990 respectively. The 
exports to imports ratio also declined from 65.6% in 1974, to 28.1% in 1982 and to just 
12% in the mid 1990s. It can be said that an increase in domestic investment in Lebanon 
has been associated with increased importation of capital goods, raw materials, and 
intermediate products. A large amount of foreign aid, domestic and other foreign financial 
resources, have been used to finance these imports. It is argued that this explains one of 
the reasons behind the economic and financial crisis in Lebanon, which is related to the 
structure of the Lebanese economy. The prospects for improvement of the deficit will 
depend upon the performance of the whole economy in the future.  
 
2.5 Monetary Developments and Prices 
This section will deal with exchange rate developments and inflation, currency 
substitution and dollarization, and monetary policy instruments in Lebanon. 
 
2.5.1 Evolution of the Exchange Rate 
Lebanon has maintained a flexible exchange rate system since 1948. The monetary 
authorities have at times intervened in the foreign exchange market to stabilize short-term 
exchange rate fluctuations, but the exchange rate has largely been determined in an 
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interbank system22. The early 1970s were characterized by a strong macroeconomic 
position with high growth, low inflation, and overall balance of payments surpluses. The 
high rates of growth were not accompanied by a general price increase, since inflation rates 
were kept low and ranged from 2% to 3%23. In these macroeconomic circumstances, 
coupled with a stable political environment, the LL/US$ exchange rate appreciated from 
3.25 in 1970 to 2.3 in 1974 (Table 2.11). Specifically, during 1970-1974, the Lebanese 
pound appreciated by 29% against the U.S. dollar, and the monthly increase and decrease 
in the LL/US$ exchange rate were deliberately limited by the authorities limited. It is worth 
noting that the exchange rate of the Lebanese pound has been largely determined by 
market forces. However, it has not been totally free of intervention, with the Central Bank 
mediating to influence its level through intervention in the foreign exchange market. In the 
mid-1970s, with the onset of the Civil War, the budgetary situation began to deteriorate 
which led to rising credit creation. While the overall balance of payments, as noted earlier 
in this chapter, remained in surplus until the early 1980s, the uncertain political 
environment and the pickup in inflation led to increased currency substitution in private 
portfolios and to speculative behaviour. Reflecting these developments, in the period 1975-
82, the LL/US$ and nominal effective exchange rates depreciated steadily, and exchange 
rate volatility increased significantly. During 1975-82 the Lebanese pound depreciated by 
about 50% against the U.S. dollar, while the nominal effective exchange rate depreciated by 
about 40%24. Moreover, the maximum increase and decrease in the monthly LL/US$ rate 
rose to 8% and 11%, respectively. During the second half of the 1980s, the 
macroeconomic situation deteriorated significantly as the domestic conflict escalated. 
These developments contributed to acceleration in inflation, a weakening in the external 
position, and a rapid dollarization of the economy, and put significant downward pressure 
on the Lebanese pound. Meanwhile, with shifting expectations, the volatility of the 
                                                 
22 For a discussion of the evolution of the exchange rate system and exchange rate developments in 
Lebanon, see Badrud-Din (1984); Chami (1992); Makdisi (1987); Saidi (1981; 1984); and Spitaller 
(1980). 
23 An explanation for this phenomenon is: restrictive monetary policy; relative stability, or even moderate 
appreciation, of the Lebanese pound vis-à-vis major currencies; and confidence in the Lebanese economy 
due mainly to the relative political stability that the country was enjoying in the region (see, Chami (1992, 
p.326). 
 
24 See, Eken et al. (1995, p.32) for more details. 
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exchange rate escalated sharply: during 1983-90, the Lebanese pound depreciated by close 
to 100% vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and in nominal effective terms. The maximum increase 
and decrease in the monthly LL/US$ rate rose to 43% and 20% respectively (Eken et al. 
1995).  
 
Table 2.11 Exchange Rate and Inflation (1970-2000) 
Years LL/US$ 
(End of period) 
LL/US$ 
(Period average) 
Annualised change 
in LL/US$ (%) 
 
CPI Inflation (In  
percent, period  
average) 
Real Effective 
Exchange rate a 
(1989=100) 
1970 3.25 3.27 0.44 6.46 118.29 
1971 3.16 3.23 -1.26 6.46 113.19 
1972 3.01 3.05 -5.48 6.25 110.85 
1973 2.51 2.61 -14.43 5.88 115.56 
1974 2.30 2.33 -10.83 11.11 128.87 
1975 2.43 2.30 -1.11 10.00 122.13 
1976 2.93 2.87 24.74 27.27 125.53 
1977 3.00 3.07 6.87 19.64 124.88 
1978 3.01 2.96 -3.70 10.45 120.94 
1979 3.26 3.24 9.72 22.97 120.35 
1980 3.65 3.44 5.96 24.18 125.64 
1981 4.63 4.31 25.55 19.47 127.64 
1982 3.81 4.74 9.96 18.52 142.36 
1983 5.49 4.53 -4.54 6.88 163.23 
1984 8.89 6.51 43.79 18.13 140.38 
1985 18.10 16.42 152.14 69.31 93.66 
1986 87.00 38.37 133.72 95.32 71.64 
1987 455.00 224.60 485.34 487.13 74.46 
1988 530.00 409.23 82.21 154.97 70.55 
1989 505.00 496.69 21.37 72.20 100.00 
1990 842.00 695.09 39.94 68.82 107.28 
1991 879.00 928.23 33.54 51.46 114.29 
1992 1838.00 1712.79 84.52 119.99 142.11 
1993 1711.00 1741.36 1.67 29.11 170.08 
1994 1647.00 1680.07 -3.50 12.0 181.47 
1995 1596.00 1621.41 -3.51 10.6 196.53 
1996 1552.00 1571.44 -3.08 8.8 210.48 
1997 1527.00 1539.44 -2.03 7.8 221.21 
1998 1508.00 1516.13 -1.51 4.0 229.02 
1999 1507.50 1507.83 -0.55 0.25 231.80 
2000 1507.50 1507.50 -0.02 0.00 231.91 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Banque du Liban/Ministry of Finance (2001); Bolbol (1999, 1863); Eken et 
al. (1995, 33); Author’s calculations. 
Note: a Defined as the ratio of the domestic price level to the foreign price level expressed in Lebanese pounds. A rise in 
the index signifies an appreciation, or an increase in the price of domestic goods in terms of foreign goods. On the other 
hand, the nominal exchange rate is defined as LL per US dollar. Hence, a rise in its value signifies a depreciation against the 
dollar. 
 
After the adoption of the Taif agreement, which provided a framework for settling 
the domestic conflict, the government embarked upon a stabilization plan in 1991. 
Although the central bank did not attempt to fix the exchange rate at this time, it 
effectively linked the pound to the dollar while not committing itself to maintaining a fixed 
exchange rate. Significant fiscal adjustment took place in 1991, with the fiscal deficit as a 
percentage of total expenditure declining to 56% from 84% in 1990. However, a 
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retroactive and sizable wage increase in December 199125 undermined the public’s 
confidence in the government’s fiscal position, which led to a run on treasury bills. It is 
worth noting here that the flight from government paper, capital outflows, and a shift in 
private sector portfolios out of the Lebanese pound and into foreign currencies, led to 
intense downward pressure on the exchange rate in the first half of 1992. This is evident 
from the average exchange rate, which depreciated from LL879 per US$1 in January 1992 
to LL 2,527.8 per US$1 by September 1992, and inflation soared (Eken et al. 1995). 
To counter these phenomena the government adopted new stabilization measures 
starting in the last quarter of 1992. These measures were aimed at reducing the fiscal deficit 
and credit creation, and making financial stability a reality. These measures brought about 
an increase in confidence, as well as attractive interest rates on Lebanese government 
securities, and made prospects in the real estate and construction sectors more favourable 
due to the increase in government expenditure on infrastructure, and led to a surge in 
capital inflows. Overall, net capital inflows, of some US$6 billion annually throughout the 
1990s, consistently offset the large visible trade deficit and left a modest balance-of-
payments surplus (EIU, 2000). The authorities intervened in the foreign exchange market 
to moderate the appreciation of the Lebanese pound and to build up further official foreign 
reserves. Despite this intervention the Lebanese pound appreciated by about 30% against 
the U.S. dollar between October 1992 and March 1994, thereby reversing the sharp 
depreciation that took place in the third quarter of 1992. Starting in 1993, there was a sharp 
decline in exchange rate volatility (Eken et al. 1995).  
The movements in inflation and the exchange rate have caused significant swings in 
the real effective exchange rate of the Lebanese pound, with the most important 
developments occurring in the 1980s. However, the real effective exchange rate depreciated 
by 57% between 1983 and 1988, although it subsequently appreciated by about 70% 
between 1989 and 199326. In spite of these very large swings, the real effective exchange 
rate in 1993 had only appreciated by about 32% in comparison to its level of 1974. During 
                                                 
25 According to the central bank of Lebanon the annual minimum wages in L.L increased from L.L 
540,000 in 1989 to L.L 900,000 in 1991. 
 
 
26 See, Saidi (1989). 
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1993-1999 the Lebanese pound appreciated more or less steadily against the U.S. dollar. As 
shown in Table 2.11 the Lebanese pound (LL) against the dollar appreciated from L.L1,711 
in 1993 to L.L1,508, L.L1,507.5 in 1998 and 2000 respectively. But domestic prices did not 
follow pari passu the movements in the exchange rate. Consequently, the real effective rate 
appreciated sharply after 1992 (Table 2.11).  
In addition, it is worth noting that real labour costs in Lebanon declined 
dramatically after 1974; during 1974-2000, real minimum wages in terms of the Lebanese 
pound declined by 81% (Figure 2.7). As shown in this Figure the real minimum wage in 
Lebanese pounds (1974=100) declined from 3,300 in 1974 to only 449 and 627 in 1993 and 
2000 respectively. According to Sena et al. (1995), real minimum wages in terms of the U.S. 
dollar are estimated to have decline by 43% during 1974-93. 
 
Figure 2.7 Real Minimum Wage in Lebanese Pounds (1974=100)
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Source: Plotted by the author based on data provided by Eken et al. (1995, p.36); Banque Audi  (2000); 
Author’s calculations. 
 
In conclusion, since the end of 1992 the government has stabilized the pound. It 
has, for instance, instructed the central bank to intervene in the foreign exchange market if 
necessary. As a result the value of the Lebanese pound has appreciated steadily over the 
years 1993-2000 (Table 2.11). International reserves showed a sharp increase between 
1992-2000, increasing from US$1.5 billion in 1992 to US$7.8 billion in 1999 before 
declining to US$5.9 billion in 2000 as a result of direct intervention by the central bank in 
the currency markets to smooth excessive volatility of the exchange rate (IMF, 1999). The 
exchange rate based nominal anchor policy was implemented by means of a supportive 
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interest rate policy. High interest rates helped attract large capital inflows, which, together 
with foreign investment into the real estate sector and financing for the reconstruction 
program, more than financed the external current account deficit and led to a sharp 
increase in foreign exchange reserves. Hence, a relatively high level of international 
reserves, and trust in the newly elected government, helped the Lebanese currency to 
stabilize after 1992. 
 
2.5.2 Inflation 
Inflation in Lebanon has remained low and, sometimes, negative even in the face of 
a fast growing economy. However, this changed after the outbreak of the Civil War and the 
country experienced not only double-digit but also triple-digit inflation. Inflation rose from 
around 10% in 1975 to close to an imposing 500% in 1987 (Table 2.11). It is clear from 
Table 2.11 that there has been considerable volatility in inflation rates, and it clearly 
increased overall during 1975-1990. This volatility may be explained by conjunctional 
economic policies, mainly monetary policy coupled with ever changing inflationary 
expectations and loss of confidence in the domestic currency. The eruption of armed 
conflict and hostilities, and the resulting deterioration of the political and security situation, 
had a major adverse effect on the economy as a whole, but most certainly on the rate of 
inflation and the exchange rate (Chami, 1992). The ensuing situation encouraged negative 
expectations and speculation, and had a strong impact on market psychology. Significant 
inflationary pressure comes from the government’s fiscal deficit and the domestic financing 
requirements. The resulting increase in money stock is not met by a substantial rise in 
money demand, leaving the public with an excess supply of money in their hands.  
It is a well-known fact in economic theory that inflationary expectations lead to 
inflation (Dornbusch, 1976). The role of expectations in Lebanon was predominant 
because of the general situation in the country. This situation fuelled expectations and 
speculation, which then contributed to the escalation of inflation. As everybody expected 
prices to increase, people tried to get rid of their Lebanese pounds and buy assets to take 
the edge off inflation. This resulted in an increase in the demand for physical assets, real 
estate and, most notably, foreign currency-denominated assets. Also, it decreased the value 
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of the pound and raised the inflation rate. Moreover, people have become more or less 
knowledgeable about the interdependence of economic variables such as the budget deficit, 
money growth and the inflation tax. Thus, any announcement about an increase in the 
fiscal deficit and debt in the media or press has an exacerbating effect on inflationary 
expectations and, ultimately, inflation. Another important factor influencing inflation, 
especially in a very open economy such as that of Lebanon, is the exchange rate. Lebanon 
imports most of its goods, and, therefore, any depreciation in the currency will be reflected 
in higher prices (Chami, 1992, p.332). 
Movements in the annual CPI and the LL/US$ exchange rate during 1970-2000 are 
captured in Figure 2.8. While there was some co-movement between inflation and 
exchange rate movements during 1970-1974, the nature of the relationship became tight 
and more contemporaneous after the start of the Civil War. With increased political 
tensions, economic imbalances, and dollarization (this will be discussed later) of the 
Lebanese economy, price-setting behaviour became more closely affected by developments 
in the exchange rate. However, this relationship weakened in 1991. In particular, since the 
beginning of 1993, exchange rate policy has been geared to maintaining a stable nominal 
rate, and movements in the price level have not affected the nominal exchange rate but it 
would affect the effective real exchange rate (IMF, 1995). 
 The exchange rate based stabilization policy, supported by a prudent monetary 
policy, helped stabilize expectations and reduce inflation. The annual average inflation rate, 
which had increased from about 52% in 1991 to about 120% in 1992, declined rapidly once 
the nominal anchor policy was implemented. With fiscal imbalances reduced and 
bottlenecks in the economy unclogged as reconstruction took hold, the average annual 
inflation rate slowed to 4.5%, 0.25%, 0% in 1998, 1999, and 2000 respectively (see Table 
2.11). 
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Figure 2.8 Lebanee CPI and Exhange Rate (Nominal), 1970-2000 
(annual percent change)
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      Source: plotted by the author based on data provided in Table 2.11. 
 
2.5.3 Dollarization and Currency Substitution 
After the outbreak of Civil War in 1975, the public resorted to switching portfolios 
to liquid assets. The political situation and the prevailing high inflation led to a further 
switch from the Lebanese pound to the US dollar and dollar-denominated deposits. Large-
scale capital flight occurred as the situation continued to worsen in the 1980s. The situation 
has shown little sign of reversing even after the Civil War, and no substantial increase in 
desire by the Lebanese to hold pound-denominated assets has been observed (assets such 
as treasury bills). Since 1986, the Lebanese economy has been operating with extremely 
high levels of both foreign currency in circulation and foreign deposits in the domestic 
banking system.  
The use of foreign currencies in any given economy is positively related to high and 
variable domestic inflation and any uncertainty over domestic economic policies. In other 
words, these factors lower the demand for domestic fiat money. In a country at war like 
Lebanon, with perfect currency convertibility and free foreign exchange markets, it is not 
surprising that people moved out of Lebanese pound balances and into liquid foreign 
assets27. This process of currency substitution turned into almost full-fledged dollarization 
where the U.S dollar was used as a store of value, in addition to a unit of account and a 
                                                 
27 On the effect of currency convertibility on currency substitution, see Khan and Ramirez-Rojas (1986). 
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medium of exchange, when depreciation of the Lebanese pound reached new heights in 
the second half of the 1980s.  
  It is worth noting that there are some patterns, which influence the foreign 
currency deposit (FCD) to total deposits (TD) ratio. The hostile environment increased 
domestic inflation and exchange rate devaluation, made dollar-denominated deposits a 
more attractive option, and thus these serve as the store of value. From a mere 19% 
between 1978-1979 the FCD/TD ratio rose to 42% in 1981 (IMF, 1995), and soared to a 
high of 92% (Table 2.12) in 1987 following a small drop from its previous peak level. As 
Table 2.12 shows the FCD/TD ratio has gone down since then, maintaining a level at 
about 63% between 1991-2000. Eken et al. (1995) impute this phenomenon to the 
prevailing fiscal deficits and the increasing domestic debt, both of which raise the 
expectancy of future deficit monetisation, inflation, and depreciation. It should be added 
that a close relationship between dollarization and exchange rate movements exist in 
Lebanon with the trend of the changes in both following each other.  
As might be expected, capital flight also played a role in this drama. As uncertainty 
regarding the stability of the Lebanese banking system rose in the early 1980s, capital flight 
occurred and wealth was transferred to cross-border dollar deposits. After experiencing 
jumps due to the war shocks in 1981-1982 and 1986-1987, these deposits peaked in 1990 
and have been declining since then. 
Moreover, as shown in Table 2.12, the monetary base ratio (monetary base to 
GDP) declined from 80.5% in 1982 to a low level of 16.02% in 1992, and even more so by 
the currency ratio (currency to GDP) which fell from 44.4% in 1982 to a lower 5.73% in 
2000. As a result of the low demand for high-powered money, Lebanese inflation had been 
high despite a low level of seigniorage or monetary base. Hence, a higher inflation or “tax 
rate” was needed to generate the same amount of seigniorage. In other words, a continuing 
flight from the currency necessitated an ever-rising inflation and caused an ever-distorted 
economy just to stay in the same place. In addition to the behaviour of the currency and 
monetary base ratios alluded to earlier, caused by flight from the currency, the broad 
liquidity or M3 ratio (M3 to GDP) also followed an expected decline due to the collapse of 
economic activity and an income elasticity that is usually greater than one (Bolbol, 1999). 
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Both M3 and the monetary base ratios partially recovered after 1992, however, but not the 
currency ratio (See Table 2.12).  
 
Table 2.12 Monetary Survey and Macroeconomic Data in Lebanon, 1982-
2000. 
Years Currency 
(% of 
GDP) 
Monetary 
Base 
(% of 
GDP) 
Broad 
Liquidity 
(% of 
GDP) 
Real 
Interest 
rate 
r a (%) 
Real 
GDP 
Growth 
y (%) 
y-r (%)  FCD/TD 
ratio 
1982 44.44 80.55 385.71 -4.57 -36.79 -32.22 26.71 
1983 42.77 69.87 371.68 2.64 22.71 20.07 26.35 
1984 27.33 46.75 270.85 -5.05 44.48 49.53 31.94 
1985 17.36 31.43 200.74 -54.17 24.30 78.47 35.10 
1986 13.59 23.25 299.65 -77.49 -6.76 70.73 70.96 
1987 5.29 7.78 198.62 -461.96 16.72 478.68 91.92 
1988 8.56 14.47 160.37 -131.39 -28.21 103.18 79.13 
1989 14.25 24.59 182.60 -53.36 -42.18 11.18 66.93 
1990 16.87 25.80 183.73 -49.98 -13.43 36.55 73.32 
1991 11.72 19.36 133.09 -33.99 38.27 72.26 67.58 
1992 8.40 16.02 123.96 -97.59 4.5 102.09 68.14 
1993 5.44 16.68 119.48 -10.84 7.05 17.89 67.66 
1994 6.13 24.93 128.39 7.09 8.00 0.91 61.50 
1995 5.80 25.65 126.93 8.80 6.50 -2.3 62.30 
1996 5.65 27.30 140.89 6.39 4.0 -2.39 56.50 
1997 5.07 35.25 145.01 5.62 4.0 -1.62 63.46 
1998 4.90 31.38 159.99 8.70 3.0 -5.7 61.54 
1999 5.47 33.47 179.75 11.32 1.0 -10.32 66.42 
2000 5.73 35.97 198.63 11.18 0.0 -11.18 50.44 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (various issues); Banque du Liban/Ministry of 
Finance (2000; 2001); Bolbol (1999, p.1864); Eken et al. (1995); Author’s calculations. 
Note:  a The difference between the average yield on nominal three-month treasury bills and 
the actual inflation rate. 
 
Three relevant implications can be deduced from the above observations. First, 
until 1992, the monetary base was a relatively small fraction of GDP, and the resultant “de-
monetisation” of the economy would have made the money supply a poor nominal anchor 
for the economy. Its partial recovery after 1992, and the stability in the demand for M2 
(currency plus checkable and time deposits in LL), have improved its reliability as a future 
nominal anchor28. Second, given how low the currency ratio is the composition of broad 
liquidity is largely made of inside money, which in turn is mostly composed of foreign 
currency deposits. What is interesting about the endogenous growth of inside money is that 
it is facilitated by the regulatory framework. This is because the central bank has a clearing 
                                                 
28 On the stability of the demand function for M2, see Eken et al. (1995). 
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system for dollar-denominated cheques; and, more importantly, imposes no required 
reserves on foreign deposits – in contrast to a 13% required reserve ratio on LL deposits- 
which allows commercial banks to offer attractive rates on these deposits. Third, 
dollarization in Lebanon seems to reveal a ratchet effect, or an asymmetric reaction, since 
depreciations produce increasing dollarization29, whereas appreciations decrease it less than 
proportionally. Notwithstanding the stabilization program, habit and a shaky confidence in 
the LL still favour liquidity to be in dollar terms. 
 
2.5.4 Monetary Policy Instruments in Lebanon 
During the last part of the Civil War (1985-89), a significant degree of 
macroeconomic and political instability prevailed. Large budget deficits were monetised for 
debt reduction purposes, and inflation accelerated as noted earlier. Moreover, the 
destruction and loss of capital, both human and physical, were particularly severe during 
the period, and real GDP declined. All these developments were reflected in a rapid decline 
of the external value of the Lebanese pound against the major currencies, a sharp increase 
in dollarization, and capital outflows. Since 1985 the monetary authorities have devoted 
considerable resources to stop the galloping depreciation of the Lebanese pound.   
Accordingly, measures taken by the central bank aimed at constantly interfering on 
the local foreign exchange market and seeking to increase interest rates on Lebanese 
pounds balances, were aimed at countering speculation against the Lebanese currency as 
well as controlling liquidity in the banking system so as to curb the amount of funds 
available for speculation. However, most of the steps were in vain because they did not 
slow the rate of growth of the monetary base: inflationary pressures intensified and the 
Lebanese currency continued to depreciate. One year after the conclusion of the Taif 
agreement at the end of 1989, a government of national unity was reinstated and a period 
of economic normalization and recovery started. Progress was, nevertheless, slow, and 
political uncertainty and macroeconomic fragility remained significant. Inflation rates 
remained high, and the Lebanese currency depreciated further particularly in the first three 
                                                 
29 On the advantages and disadvantages of dollarization, see Bolbol (1999, p.1867).  
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quarters of 1992. It was only in October 1992, after the appointment of Prime Minister 
Hariri, that reconstruction and stabilization began. 
An exchange rate based nominal anchor policy, targeting a slight nominal 
appreciation of the Lebanese pound against the US dollar, has been at the core of the 
government’s stabilization efforts since the early 1990s. The policy has been successful in 
stabilizing expectations, and inflation rates have been rapidly reduced to single digit levels. 
The overall macroeconomic situation, however, remains difficult with large budget deficits, 
associated growing public debt (this will be discussed later), large current account deficits, 
and occasional episodes of domestic and regional political uncertainties. Under these 
circumstances, and given the virtual absence of restrictions on capital account transactions, 
monetary policy has borne a heavy burden, as high and flexible interest rates have been 
necessary to ensure the exchange rate peg and to allow for a comfortable cushion of 
foreign exchange reserves. Hence, to ensure the exchange rate peg, the authorities have set 
monetary policy parameters, particularly the interest rates in the primary sales of treasury 
bills. However, as stabilization through the exchange rate based nominal anchor policy 
took hold starting in 1993, real interest rates became positive during 1994-2000 (see Table 
2.12, Figure 2.9).   
 
Figure 2.9 Real Interest Rates in Lebanon, 1982-2000 (%).
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Source: plotted by the author based on data provided in Table 2.12. 
 
As noted earlier, the central bank carries out monetary policy through a number of 
instruments. Through early 1997, issuance of domestic currency treasury bills and bonds 
for the sterilization of capital inflows was an important monetary policy instrument. Since 
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then the issuance of certificates of deposit (with a typical maturity of 40-60 days) and 
intervention in the foreign exchange market have become more important instruments of 
monetary policy. 
The absence of a deeper secondary market in treasury bills has so far prevented an 
active use of open market operations. Reserve requirements have not been actively used as 
an instrument in recent years. Banks must hold the equivalent of 13% of Lebanese pound 
deposits in reserves at the central bank; interest is paid only on 3% of these deposits held 
by banks as special treasury bills. Effective August 1996, reserve requirements were eased 
as banks were allowed to deduct the equivalent of 13% of loans provided for certain 
productive activities (industry, agriculture, tourism) from obligatory reserves. There are no 
reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits.  
Until March 1997, banks (domestic and foreign owned) also had to hold treasury 
bills equivalent to 40% of Lebanese pound deposits (IMF, 1999) (this constraint was not 
binding as banks held treasury bills far in excess of requirements). The central bank stands 
ready to refinance banks through bilateral repurchase agreements involving treasury bills 
used only in periods of tension and effectively constitutes the lender of last resort facility. 
 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
 To sum up, this chapter has examined the economic performance of the Lebanese 
economy over the period 1970-1999, broken down into three distinct phases: pre-Civil War 
period (1970-1974), the Civil War period (1975-1990) and the post-war and reconstruction 
period (1990-2000).  
 Over the pre-Civil War period Lebanon was one of the most dynamic economies in 
the Middle East, it boasted low inflation, impressive economic growth rates (the average 
annual growth rate of real GDP was 7.3% during 1970-1974), sizable balance of payments 
surpluses, small fiscal deficits, and a floating, stable, and fully convertible domestic 
currency. 
 Over the Civil War period Lebanon not only suffered in human and material terms, 
but its economy also underwent fundamental changes. The infrastructure and industrial 
facilities were destroyed while, at the same time, the economic environment discouraged 
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further investment. During this period, the annual growth rate of real GDP showed large 
falls and averaged a rate of minus 1.46% (Eken et al. 1995, p.4). Also, during this period, 
public finances deteriorated due to crumbling central government authority and the 
resulting inability of the government to collect revenues and/or cut its expenditure. This 
gave rise to huge budget deficits, which registered a rate of minus 32.3 percent of GDP 
(Eken et al. 1999, p.14). These deficits have been financed mainly by the central bank 
(issuing treasury bills) and the banking sector. This led to excessive money creation, 
inflation, and exchange rate depreciation. In addition, the phenomenon of currency 
substitution became so widespread that the Lebanese economy was completely ‘dollarized’ 
(Chami, 1994, p.8). 
 Over the post-war period the authorities set out to bring about economic 
stabilization, together with the task of reconstruction and development of the war-ravaged 
economy. Hence, the year 1993 was marked by favourable macroeconomic developments 
like increasing real GDP, falling inflation, a stable exchange rate, and the strengthening of 
the foreign exchange reserves. But, it is argued, the government’s participation in the 
reconstruction and rehabilitation process has been exceptionally large, and, while it has 
been responsible for much of the country’s recent good fortune, it has also contributed to a 
new and emerging set of problems. The most worrisome among these is Lebanon’s soaring 
gross public debt. During 1993-2000, gross public debt, as a percent of GDP, increased 
from 49% to 151%, and net public debt rose from 38% to 141%. 
The main features of the Lebanese economy have been analysed in this chapter, the 
next chapter will deal with the budget deficit and public debt in Lebanon. It will focus on 
the role of the government in the economy, the methods used by the authority to fund the 
budget deficit, and the problems that might occur for the economy from fiscal deficits and 
public debt in Lebanon. 
 
 
 58 
Chapter 3  
Public Sector Deficits and Debt in Lebanon 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the Lebanese experience with fiscal deficits and public debt. 
The main focus will be on the methods of budget funding and its consequences for the 
economy. However, the chapter will firstly review fiscal performance in Lebanon. The 
study has been divided into two periods, namely the Civil War period (1975-1990), and 
post-war period (1990-2000). The first period experienced large falls in real GDP growth, 
significant increases in the budget deficit, which were accompanied by: a massive increase 
in the money supply; high inflation rates; and severe depreciation of the Lebanese currency. 
The second period is known as the reconstruction and development period. This period, 
especially during 1993-1998, experienced increasing real GDP, falling inflation, a stable 
exchange rate, and a strengthening of foreign exchange reserves. But these developments 
were accompanied by one of the most damaging features of macroeconomic management 
during the last decade, a steep increase in the public sector deficit and debt in Lebanon. 
Gross public debt as a percent of GDP increased from 48.6% to 151.8% in 1993 and 2000 
respectively. The General government budget deficit reached 23.7% of GDP in 2000 (56% 
of total government expenditure), with this being the highest between the Economic and 
Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) member countries30.  
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 conducts an overview of public 
finance in Lebanon. The fiscal performance during and after the war, including 
government revenues and expenditures, are described in this section. Section 3.3 examines 
the budget deficits and public debt in Lebanon. It covers topics like the fiscal deficits and 
public debt performance during 1975-90, fiscal deficits and public debt performance during 
1990-2000, and the mode of financing the deficit and debt in Lebanon. Section 3.4 presents 
the consequences of the deficits and public debt for the Lebanese economy. The major 
conclusions from this chapter are presented in section 3.5. 
                                                 
30 See ESCWA (2000) for a detailed discussion about fiscal positions for all ESCWA members (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Republic of Yemen, 
and West Bank and Gaza Strip). 
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3.2 Public Finance in Lebanon 
3.2.1 Overview of Fiscal Performance During and After the Civil War 
The advent of the Civil War caused a significant deterioration in Lebanon’s overall 
budgetary performance, and, as a percentage of GDP, revenues declined while expenditure 
rose considerably (Figure 3.1).  
During the Civil War there was an important change in the behaviour of revenues. 
The revenue yield was depressed, mainly as a result of the breakdown of government 
authority over revenue sources. Furthermore, revenue collection was adversely affected by 
inflation, which diminished real revenues from specific taxes; this led people to delay tax 
payments; and induced a shift from taxed to non-taxed activities. As a result, revenues 
dropped substantially from 15.6% of GDP in 1974 to 6-9% of GDP in 1989-90 (Table 
3.1). In particular, customs duty receipts declined during 1988-1990 owing to the loss of 
control over legal ports of entry and a consequent surge in illegal imports. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Public Sector Operations, 1972-2000, (in % of GDP)
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Source:  Plotted by the author based on data provided by Table 3.1. 
Note: * Including the budget deficit and the results of treasury operations. 
 
However, toward the end of the war years, direct tax collection improved as 
economic activity began to recover, and the authorities instituted payment of the business 
profit tax on the basis of self-estimation. Non-tax revenue also improved during 
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Table 3.1 Summary of Public Sector Operations: 1972-2000 (in % of GDP) 
 
Years Revenue Expenditure 
 Total Tax revenue Total Current Wages 
and 
Salaries 
Interest payments Fuel 
Subsidy 
(EDL) 3 
Other4 Capital 
expenditure5 
Surplus 
(+)/ 
Deficit (-) 
 
Total Direct 
taxes 
Indirect 
Taxes1 
Nontax2 Total Domestic Foreign 
1972 12.1 8.0 2.4 5.6 4.1 15.4 12.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.3 -3.3 
1974 15.6 11.5 2.6 8.9 4.1 15.0 12.4 6.2 0.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.5 2.6 0.6 
1975 10.7 7.5 1.1 6.4 3.1 13.6 7.6 8 0.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.1 6.1 -3.0 
1976 3.7 2.0 0.2 1.9 1.7 15.7 12.6 13 1.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.2 3.1 -12.0 
1980 13.7 9.5 2.4 7.0 4.3 27.1 20.9 8.5 1.5 1.5 0.0 n.a. 10.8 6.3 -13.4 
1985 7.3 2.0 1.1 0.9 5.3 43.1 39.5 7.4 9.9 9.8 0.1 9.8 12.4 3.6 -35.8 
1988 1.8 0.6 0.5 0.1 1.2 19.2 17.8 4.5 5.9 5.8 0.1 2.9 4.5 1.4 -17.4 
1989 6.8 1.4 1.1 0.3 5.5 39.1 36.7 7.2 11.3 11.2 0.1 7.4 10.9 2.4 -32.3 
1990 9.7 2.1 1.9 0.2 7.6 39.4 37.8 10.6 10.8 10.3 0.5 2.3 14.0 1.7 -29.8 
1991 15.9 5.4 2.2 3.2 10.5 28.9 25.1 9.0 5.0 4.9 0.1 0.8 10.3 3.9 -13.1 
1992 12.0 5.4 0.5 4.9 6.6 23.4 21.8 6.9 5.5 4.8 0.7 1.5 7.9 1.5 -11.4 
1993 14.1 9.3 1.8 7.5 4.8 23.4 20.0 9.9 6.0 5.7 0.2 1.4 4.2 3.4 -9.2 
1994 14.6 9.4 1.8 7.6 5.2 35.1 25.8 11.2 9.7 9.6 0.1 1.6 3.3 9.3 -20.5 
1995 16.8 11.1 1.6 9.5 5.7 35.2 25.7 10.4 10.4 9.7 0.7 1.2 3.8 9.4 -18.4 
1996 17.3 14.0 1.6 12.4 3.3 37.9 29.4 11.1 13.0 12.1 0.9 1.0 4.4 8.5 -20.6 
1997 17.5 11.7 2.3 9.4 5.8 37.8 33.8 10.8 14.9 14.1 0.8 n.a. 8.1 8.6 -20.2 
1998 18.2 12.6 3.1 9.5 5.5 32.3 26.5 9.6 13.7 12.4 1.2 n.a. 3.5 6.3 -14.1 
1999 19.6 13.4 3.7 9.7 6.2 34.1 28.6 11.1 14.6 12.9 1.7 n.a. 2.9 6.3 -14.5 
2000 18.3 11.8 n.a. n.a. 6.6 42.0 32.1 11.7 16.9 14.4 2.5 n.a. 3.4 4.7 -23.7 
Source:  Eken et al. (1995; 1999); BDL (various years); Ministry of Finance (various years); Author’s calculations. 
Note   : 1 Includes customs duties and others 
 2 Includes foreign grants in some years and adjustments with respect to monetary accounts 
 3 Petroleum subsidy paid to the Electricity Company of Lebanon (EDL) 
4 Includes advances and transfers and adjustments with respect to monetary accounts 
5  In 1996, this item includes domestically financed LL 151 billion of exceptional capital expenditure to rehabilitate the damages in 1996 caused by the bombings in             
April; in 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000 these items include capital expenditure of Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) financed externally. This 
expenditure was LL 507 billion in 1996, LL 500 billion in 1997, LL 479 billion in 1998, LL 456 billion in 1999 and LL 260 billion for 2000. 
n.a. not available. 
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Table 3.2 Summary of Public Sector Operations: 1972-2000 (in % of total) 
 
Years Revenue Expenditure 
 Total Tax revenue Total Current Wages 
and 
Salaries 
Interest payments Fuel 
Subsidy 
(EDL) 
Other1 Capital 
expenditure 
Surplus 
(+)/ 
Deficit (-) 
in % of 
total 
expendi-
ture 
 
Total Direct 
taxes 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Nontax Total Domestic Foreign 
1974 100 56 13 44 44 100 66 n.a. 8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 25 25 36 
1975 100 49 7 42 51 100 80 56 10 n.a. n.a. n.a. 30 20 13 
1976 100 55 5 51 45 100 96 80 7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 17 0.2 -76 
1980 100 53 14 39 47 100 83 23 4 4 0.0 n.a. 55 17 -51 
1988 100 39 33 6 61 100 93 23 30 30 0.5 15 24 7 -92 
1989 100 29 23 6 71 100 94 18 29 29 0.1 19 28 6 -88 
1990 100 32 29 3 68 100 96 27 27 26 1.3 6 35 4 -84 
1991 100 42 17 25 58 100 87 31 17 17 0.2 3 35 13 -56 
1992 100 48 4 44 52 100 93 30 23 20 2.9 7 34 7 -52 
1993 100 65 12 53 34 100 85 42 25 25 0.9 6 18 14 -40 
1994 100 64 12 52 35 100 73 32 27 27 0.3 5 10 26 -58 
1995 100 65 10 56 34 100 73 29 29 28 2.1 3 10 27 -52 
1996 100 74 9 65 26 100 77 29 34 32 2.4 2 11 22 -54 
1997 100 67 13 54 33 100 89 29 39 39 2.2 n.a. 21 23 -54 
1998 100 70 17 53 30 100 82 30 42 39 3.8 n.a. 10 19 -44 
1999 100 68 19 49 32 100 84 33 43 38 4.8 n.a. 8 18 -42 
2000 100 64 n.a n.a. 36 100 76 28 40 34 6.0 n.a. 8 8 -56 
Source:  Eken et al. (1995; 1999); BDL (various years); Ministry of Finance (various years); Author’s calculations. 
Note:   1 Includes foreign grants in some years and adjustments with respect to monetary accounts; 
n.a. not available. 
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1989-90, as a result of the rise in real estate prices and the 6% ad valorem registration fee 
applied to real estate transactions.  
In addition, non-tax revenue was boosted by the increase in profits of the Central 
Bank of Lebanon (BDL), reflecting increased treasury bill holdings by the Central Bank of 
Lebanon and profits from foreign exchange operations. 
Revenue losses during the war years were not matched by a corresponding restraint 
in expenditure, because of the government’s efforts to maintain a minimum level of public 
services and operations. Total expenditure rose from 15.4% of GDP in 1972 to 39% in 
1989-90. In particular, domestic interest payments eventually absorbed a much greater 
share of total expenditure as the government increasingly resorted to debt financing of 
budget deficits. In the event, domestic interest payments increased from 4% in 1980, as a 
percentage of total expenditure, to 29% in 1989 (Table 3.2). Similarly, fuel subsidies rose to 
a peak of 19% of total expenditure in 198931. Although intermittent adjustments in wages 
and salaries were effected, the government’s wage bill declined from about 13% of GDP in 
1976 to 7% of GDP in 1989 (Table 3.1). Nevertheless, reflecting the full year effect of the 
sharp wage increase granted in the previous year, the public sector wage bill rose to about 
11% of GDP in 1990, and its share of total expenditure rose to 27%. Finally, budgetary 
capital expenditure declined from 6% of GDP in 1980 to less than 2% in 1990.  
At the end of the Civil War (1975-1990), Lebanon’s budget was characterised as 
follows: (1) low revenue yield, mainly owing to a lack of sufficient government control over 
revenue sources; (2) continued dependence on indirect taxes, as had been the case prior to 
the war; (3) increased importance of direct tax revenue relative to indirect taxes; (4) an 
increased burden from domestic interest payments. 
As a result of these developments, the budget surpluses incurred prior to the war 
were transformed into increasing deficits during the war and post-war years. The overall 
deficit rose from 12% of GDP (76% of total expenditure) in 1976 to about 30% of GDP 
(84% of total expenditure) in 1990.  
                                                 
31 Until 1988, the government controlled all petroleum prices; in that year, the authorities eliminated the 
subsidy on petroleum by privatising the importation of petroleum and limiting fuel subsidies largely to 
electricity generation. 
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3.2.2 Post-war Normalization, 1991-92 
After the reestablishment of a government of national unity at the end of 1990, the 
fiscal situation in 1991 and 1992 improved markedly for several reasons. First, revenues 
increased fourfold to 15% of GDP as a result of the gradual reassertion of government 
authority over revenue sources. Widespread improvement in revenue collection occurred, 
particularly with respect to customs duties and non-tax revenue. Second, the rapid growth 
resulting from the normalization of economic activity reinforced the revenue increase. 
Third, the elimination of war-related expenditures and expenditure restraint (including a 
hiring freeze) resulted in a significant decline in total expenditure to 29% of GDP in 1991, 
down from 39% in the previous year (Table 3.1). Furthermore, interest payments on 
domestic debt declined from 10.3% of GDP in 1990 to 4.8% in 1992 as a result of 
increased monetary financing (Table 3.1). The fuel subsidy was limited to about 1% of 
GDP, and other current expenditure declined by more than 3% age points to 10% of 
GDP. In contrast, capital expenditure increased fivefold to about 4% of GDP, largely to 
restore basic public services and rehabilitate public infrastructure. These developments 
resulted in a substantial reduction in the overall budget deficit from 30% of GDP in 1990 
to 13% in 1991 (56% of total expenditure).  
Fiscal adjustment continued in 1992 as revenues doubled, mainly as a result of a 
substantial increase in both customs duty collections and non-tax revenue. The share of tax 
revenue in total revenue increased to 48% and the share of indirect taxes rose to 44%, 
similar to the levels achieved in 1975. Although revenues declined somewhat to 11% of 
GDP, continued restraint in current expenditure caused total expenditure to decline to 
23% of GDP. Consequently, the budget deficit was further lowered to 11% in 1992 (52% 
of total expenditure) and was financed largely through debt issuance (Table 3.2). In the 
event, the outstanding stock of treasury bills rose from LL 2,333 billion in 1991 to LL 
4,754 billion in 1992 (IMF, 1995). However, because of the rapid nominal growth in GDP 
(130%)32, the ratio of the nominal stock of treasury bills to GDP declined by 6% points to 
50% in 1992. While the shares of both wages and salaries and other expenditure remained 
at levels comparable to the previous year the share of fuel subsidies in expenditure rose 
                                                 
32 During 1992, the annual average rate of inflation was 120% (IMF, 1995). 
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significantly, reflecting increased production and continued difficulties with tariff collection 
and illegal tapping. Development expenditure remained at low levels, declining relative to 
1991. 
To show the structural weaknesses of the budget in Lebanon, it is worth comparing 
the structure of Lebanon’s government finances relative to those of selected Middle 
Eastern countries – Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia (see Table 3.3) during 
the early 1990s. Except for Jordan in 1991 Lebanon had the largest overall budget deficit, 
but made great strides during 1991-93 in closing its fiscal deficit. Furthermore, Lebanon 
had the lowest total revenue to GDP ratio of the seven countries and, apart from Iran, the 
lowest total expenditure to GDP ratio. Despite the increase in the share of government 
expenditure to GDP during the war, the public sector still played a relatively small role in 
the Lebanese economy. 
As for the composition of revenues Lebanon had the lowest contribution from 
direct taxes and (apart from Iran, an oil exporter) the highest contribution from non-tax 
revenues, both of which point to an inelastic tax system (tax revenue does not increase 
commensurate with increases in income). In addition, Lebanon, along with Jordan, had the 
lowest revenue from taxation of imports as a share of imports, although planned reforms 
to strengthen customs administration did increase such receipts (IMF, 1999).  
Of the seven countries, Lebanon’s share of current expenditures in total spending 
was the highest, and its share of capital expenditure was the lowest (Table 3.3). Finally, 
Lebanon (with Egypt) devotes a large and growing share of its public expenditure to 
servicing its debt commitments, which reduces the authorities’ flexibility to conduct fiscal 
policy and respond to unforeseen shocks to the economy.  
These observations point to the following main structural weaknesses on the 
revenue side in the early 1990s: (1) there was a heavy reliance on indirect taxes and 
relatively small income tax collections, while taxable income was not applied on global 
earnings;33 (2) although the bulk of indirect taxes consisted of customs duties, the average 
effective taxation of imports remained low; (3) existing excise taxes were largely outmoded 
                                                 
33 For example, tax on income from rental property is subject to a different schedule. 
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Table 3.3 Fiscal Indicators for Selected Middle Eastern Countries 
Years 
 
Overall 
Balance 
Current 
balance 
 
Total 
Revenue 1 
 
 
Total 
expenditure 
 
 
Direct 
taxes 
 
Indirect 
taxes 
 
 
Non-tax 
revenue 
 
 
 
Import 
Duties 
 
 
 
Current 
Expenditures 
 
 
 
Wage 
Bill 
Interest 
Payments 
Capital 
Expenditure 
 
 
(In percent of GDP) (In percent of total revenue) (In percent of 
imports) 
(In percent of total expenditure) 
Lebanon  
1991 -16.3 -12.4 12.6 28.9 17.2 25.3 57.7 2.8 86.5 30.9 17.2 13.5 
1992 -12.2 -10.7 11.1 23.4 4.3 44.1 51.6 5.0 93.4 29.7 23.4 6.6 
1993 -8.4 -6.9 14.1 22.5 9.3 43.4 47.2 9.0 93.2 21.6 26.5 6.8 
Egypt  2  
1991/92 -5.0 4.1 34.8 39.8 24.3 34.7 41.1 13.3 76.9 17.1 20.2 23.1 
1992/93 -4.7 3.9 35.0 39.7 23.9 34.8 41.3 14.4 79.0 18.8 25.6 21.0 
1993/94 -2.8 3.5 35.1 37.9 22.9 37.6 39.5 14.7 82.4 19.8 29.3 17.6 
Iran  
1991 -2.0 4.8 18.1 20.0 14.0 11.7 74.3 n.a. 66.5 n.a. n.a. 33.5 
1992 -2.4 4.9 17.5 19.8 16.7 16.4 66.9 n.a. 64.1 n.a. n.a. 35.9 
1993 -1.9 6.0 18.5 20.5 17.1 15.3 67.6 n.a. 67.3 n.a. n.a. 32.7 
Jordan  
1991 -17.8 -8.0 29.0 46.8 3 11.5 40.7 47.8 6.6 86.0 15.6 25.2 14.0 
1992 -3.7 2.1 36.1 39.9 9.4 45.9 44.7 8.6 84.4 16.3 24.4 15.6 
1993 -6.4 0.1 32.4 38.8 10.2 45.2 44.6 8.9 82.0 17.8 17.7 18.0 
Morocco  
1991 -3.1 3.1 23.0 26.1 24.2 32.7 22.5 19.0 76.2 39.5 21.1 23.8 
1992 -2.2 4.9 26.3 28.5 26.6 34.2 19.9 19.5 75.1 37.3 19.6 24.9 
1993 -2.8 4.9 26.4 29.2 23.0 33.3 25.0 20.4 73.7 36.1 19.9 26.9 
Syria             
1991 -1.4 6.2 23.8 25.1 37.1 43.6 19.3 14.7 70.0 52.6 1.2 30.0 
1992 -4.9 4.9 19.8 24.7 27.4 49.2 23.3 10.0 60.4 44.4 1.4 39.6 
1993 -9.2 4.5 17.9 27.1 22.9 52.7 24.5 n.a. 49.2 34.6 1.0 50.8 
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Table 3.3 (Continued) 
Years 
 
Overall 
Balance 
Current 
balance 
 
Total 
Revenue 1 
 
 
Total 
expenditure 
 
 
Direct 
taxes 
 
Indirect 
Taxes 
 
 
Non-tax 
Revenue 
 
 
 
Import 
Duties 
 
 
 
Current 
Expenditures 
 
 
 
Wage 
Bill 
Interest 
Payments 
Capital 
Expenditure 
 
 
(In percent of GDP) (In percent of total revenue) (In percent of 
imports) 
(In percent of total expenditure) 
Tunisia  
1991 -5.6 2.6 28.6 34.2 29.5 52.8 17.7 19.5 76.0 27.7 10.0 24.0 
1992 -3.0 3.9 28.8 31.8 29.2 52.5 18.3 19.3 78.5 29.3 9.8 21.5 
1993 -2.6 4.7 30.1 32.7 27.6 53.2 19.2 19.6 77.9 29.6 10.0 22.1 
Sources:  IMF (1995). 
Note: 1 Excludes grants 
2 Includes central and local governments, food supply authority, and investment expenditure of public authorities; fiscal year July/June. 
3 On a commitment basis;  
n.a. not available. 
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and very limited in scope and yield;34 and there was no comprehensive tax on consumption, 
such as a general sales tax; (4) there was an overemphasis on non-tax revenue, such as 
various fees, charges, fines, and miscellaneous property and enterprise income; and (5) the 
effectiveness of tax administration and collection remained limited. 
Further, in order to contain inflationary pressures, the authorities intended in the 
early 1990s to continue financing budget deficits through debt creation, which led to a 
substantial increase in the budgetary burden of domestic interest payments. Massive 
reconstruction projects were undertaken directly by the Government and other public 
entities (in particular, by the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)), 
financed largely from foreign concessional loans and official grants. The magnitude of the 
financing need led to a sharp increase in the level of foreign indebtedness and foreign debt 
service after 1993 (this will be discussed later), which had been relatively low before this 
time. 
 
3.2.3 Revenue Developments and Policies, 1993-2000 
In contrast with the period 1991-92, during which revenue increases were primarily 
the result of the re-established government authority over revenue sources and the 
normalization of economic activity, the authorities embarked on a number of reforms to 
mobilize revenue during this period 1993-2000. Reflecting the favourable revenue effects 
of major reforms introduced during this period and the improvement in the tax 
administration, Lebanon’s tax ratio (total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP) increased 
from 5.4% in 1992 to 13.4% in 1999 before falling to 11.8% in 2000 (Table 3.1) as a result 
of a general tariff reduction generated by the government’s decision in December 2000 to 
lower customs tariffs on most imports.  
The principal reform measures included the following steps. (1) Duties and taxes 
on imports. This category of taxes for the period 1993-2000 increased from 5% as a 
                                                 
34 Apart from a 10% levy imposed on water, electricity, and telecommunications, the main excisable 
items are petroleum products, cement, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco and cigarettes. Excises on these 
items are levied at specific as opposed to ad valorem rates; specific rates greatly limit the responsiveness 
of revenues to price increases and encumber tax administration. 
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percent of GDP in 1993 to 7.9% and 7% in 1999 and 2000 respectively (Table 3.4), 
reflecting the favourable revenue effects of the 1995 and 1999 tariff reforms and the 
temporary increase in imports required for reconstruction. The reform measures included 
the introduction of a minimum tariff rate of 2%. 
(2) Taxes on income and profits. This tax category, despite some progression in nominal 
rates, registered a ratio of less than unity until 1996, reflecting the major income tax reform 
of 1993. The reform included the following measures: (I) the reduction in the nominal tax 
rates from 26% to 10% on corporate profits and from 15% to 5% on dividends and on 
other corporate distributions; (II) the reduction of the top marginal rates for individual 
income taxes from 32% to 10% for wages and salaries, and from 50% to 10% for 
individual business profits; (III) the adoption of an amnesty program that added 9,700 
taxpayers; and (IV) accelerating the payment of taxes withheld at the source by having the 
withholders release the funds quarterly (IMF, 1999). The reduction of the nominal tax rates 
was intended to encourage the flow of international capital and direct investments and 
improve the voluntary compliance by taxpayers. In 1997 and 1999, after significant 
strengthening of the tax administration, the revenue yield of taxes on the income and 
profits category improved (Table 3.4).  
 
Table 3.4 Revenue in Percent of GDP of Major Categories of Taxes and Duties 
Years Taxes on 
income, 
profits and 
property 
Taxes on goods 
and services1 
Duties and 
taxes on 
imprts1 
Other 
taxes2 
Total tax 
revenue 
Non-tax 
revenue2 
Total 
revenue 
1993 1.8 2.5 5.0 n.a. 9.3 4.8 14.1 
1994 1.8 2.5 5.2 n.a. 9.4 5.2 14.6 
1995 1.6 2.1 7.3 n.a. 11.1 5.7 16.8 
1996 1.6 2.0 8.0 2.5 14.0 3.3 17.3 
1997 2.0 2.3 7.5 0.8 12.6 3.8 16.4 
1998 3.1 1.5 7.2 0.8 12.6 3.6 16.2 
1999 3.6 0.9 7.9 0.9 13.3 4.6 17.9 
2000 n.a. n.a. 7.0 n.a. 11.8 4.7 16.5 
Source: BDL (various years); Ministry of Finance (various years); IMF (1999); Author’s calculation. 
Note: 1 With the 1995 tariff reform, the excise tax on cement, petroleum, cars and some other taxes on 
goods and services became part of customs duties and are recorded in duties and taxes on imports. 
2 Under the revised budget classification scheme of 1996, some revenue, such as fiscal stamp duties, 
which were classified as non-tax revenue until 1995, are now included in the new item “other taxes”; 
n.a. not available. 
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(3) Taxes on goods and services. During the period 1993-95 the excise rates on tobacco 
and cigarettes were raised from 5% to 30%, and the prices of petroleum products were also 
raised a number of times to narrow the gap with international prices. The taxation of real 
estate transactions also yielded increasing revenue given the real estate boom of 1993-95. 
Despite these developments, this category of taxes registered a decline from 2.5% of GDP 
in 1993 to 2% and 0.9% in 1997 and 1999 respectively. This can be attributed to the 
collection of excise tax on cement, petroleum, cars and tobacco at the stage of importing 
and recording of their revenue with that from customs duties, as explained earlier. 
Analysing the evolution of the structure of revenue over the period 1993-2000 
shows that the improvements in tax revenue mobilisation were primarily the result of the 
customs reforms of 1995. The decline in the share of taxes on income and profits until 
1996, reflected the combination of the revenue effects of the 1993 reform and weaknesses 
in taxpayer compliance and tax collection. The literature relating to optimal tax theory 
suggests that the most efficient means of raising tax revenue is by means of income and 
consumption taxes. While the reform of income taxation has not yet resulted in an 
increased tax yield, even with the improvements registered in 1997, ongoing reform should 
remain focused upon improving the raising of income taxes as well as consumption taxes. 
Today, Lebanon’s revenue structure is unbalanced, as it is relying heavily on three sources: 
imports, some excisable goods, and a plethora of taxable public services and administrative 
fees. 
 
3.2.4 Expenditure Developments and Policies, 1993-2000 
A sharp increase in government expenditure has been the predominant 
characteristic of public finances during the period 1993-2000. Government expenditure 
rose from 23% of GDP in 1993 to 37.9% and 42% in 1996 and 2000 respectively (Table 
3.1), with all expenditure categories, albeit to a different degree, contributing to the 
increase. 
Current expenditure (excluding interest payments). This expenditure category consists 
primarily of salaries, and transfers and subsidies. The government has, in general, 
succeeded in containing the overall wage bill through wage freezes despite considerable 
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political pressure to compensate government employees for the accumulated loss of 
purchasing power on wages during and after the Civil War. In late 1995, a retroactive wage 
increase was granted (from 1 January 1995 onward)35. On a cash basis, only one-third of 
the retroactive increase was effectively disbursed in 1995; the full effect of the wage 
increase only materialized in 1996. Since then, the government has adopted the policy that 
further wage increases will only be granted if they are covered by compensating revenue 
measures. Subsidies to public enterprises have remained important, reflecting the slow 
cost-recovery capability experienced by providers of basic public services. The ongoing 
conflict with Israel has led to recurrent transfers to people and institutions in the south of 
Lebanon. 
Interest payments. Interest payments have been a major factor underlying the growth 
dynamics of expenditure. Expenditure on domestic interest payments rose from 20% of 
total expenditure (4.8% of GDP) in 1992 to 34% of total expenditure (14.4% of GDP) in 
2000 (Tables 3.1, 3.2). Since 1991, the budget deficit has been financed almost entirely by 
issuing debt, largely denominated in domestic currency, to institutions and agents other 
than the central bank. 
In the context of the government’s exchange-rate-based nominal anchor policy, 
and given the significant domestic and regional political risks, nominal interest rates on 
domestic currency assets have been high and subject to dramatic adjustments. Together 
with the rapid accumulation of public debt, this has led to sharp increases in budgetary 
interest payments. 
Capital expenditure. After the launch of the Horizon 2000 program36, the government 
embarked on a large number of infrastructure rehabilitation and enhancement projects, and 
capital expenditure rose from 3.4% of GDP in 1993 to 9.3% and 9.4 % in 1994 and 1995, 
                                                 
35 For the lowest wage categories, the increase amounted to 20%. Middle-and upper-wage categories 
received an increase of between 10 and 20%. 
36 Horizon 2000 went beyond the initial emergency works of the National Emergency Recovery Program 
(the NEPR short term program 1993-97, originally costed at US$2.25 billion, was designated to 
rehabilitate key physical and social infrastructure) and included the rehabilitation and expansion of 
infrastructure and public facilities so as to lay the foundations for future economic growth. In its 1995 
version, Horizon 2000 envisaged total public investments of US$17.7 billion between 1995 and 2007 
valued at 1995 prices (estimated at US$22.2 billion at current prices), see Eken et al. (1999) for more 
details. 
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respectively. In the preparation of the program the government had envisaged spreading 
capital expenditure in nominal terms equally across the 12-year planning period. Capital 
expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, would therefore decline overtime. This effect was 
already visible in 1996, 1998, and 2000 when, with almost unchanged levels in nominal 
terms, capital expenditure fell to 8.5%, 6.3% and 4.7% of GDP respectively (Table 3.1). 
In conclusion, the impressive improvement in Lebanon’s fiscal stance through 1993 
is attributable to the recovery of revenues and considerable expenditure restraint. Although 
total expenditure was effectively lowered in real terms at the beginning of the post-war 
years, it remained significantly above the levels that prevailed prior to the war resulting in a 
relatively higher overall deficit. Thus, the government sector has become larger than it had 
been before the war, absorbing a larger share of domestic resources. The revenue 
composition that emerged at the end of 1993 is comparable to that of the pre-war years, 
with indirect taxes and non-tax revenue accounting for large shares of total revenue. 
However, total revenue mobilization in real terms still remains below the levels that 
prevailed before the war. Although the improvement in revenue performance can be 
expected to continue in the coming years of reconstruction and recovery, a number of 
structural weaknesses remain to be addressed requiring substantial reform so as to improve 
domestic resource mobilisation. 
 
3.3 Budget Deficits and Public Debt in Lebanon 
Before the 1975-90 Civil War Lebanon largely ran balanced budgets. But, as 
mentioned at the outset, the war worsened the fiscal position of the government by 
shrinking an already narrow tax base, while it continued a minimal level of government 
expenditures on the provision and subsidization of basic services and on wages for 
government employees. The expenditure to GDP ratio changed from 13.6% in 1975 to 
39% and 42% in 1990 and 2000 respectively (Table 3.1). This led to large budget deficits 
and an accumulation of a huge public debt. The end of the war improved the tax collection 
capability of the government, but the post-war stabilization program involved debt 
financing of deficits and high real interest rates. As a result, by 2000, the deficit ratio and 
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gross public debt as a percentage of GDP climbed to 23.7% and 151.8% respectively, while 
interest payments reached 40% of expenditures. 
The following section analyses the Lebanese experience with fiscal deficits and 
public debt. It examines this experience during the period of 1975-1990 and 1990-2000. 
This section also investigates the mode of financing the deficit and the debt structure of 
Lebanon’s public debt, which has been characterized by a large share of short-term treasury 
bills, denominated in Lebanese pounds, which have been issued at a high discount and sold 
domestically. 
 
3.3.1 Fiscal Deficits and Public Debt in Lebanon (1975-1990) 
Prior to 1975 the government budget was always balanced and the government had 
never resorted to borrowing. Therefore, borrowing and deficits are recent phenomena in 
Lebanon, and it is of interest to note the creation and evolution of deficit financing. As is 
the case in any country, the government can borrow from the general public, the central 
bank, and the commercial banks. It should be noted here that the period of 1975-1990 was 
the most difficult of the Lebanese crisis, because of the Civil War, political crisis, and the 
Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982. 
As can be seen from Figure 3.2 the increase in public deficits in Lebanon occurred 
after 1974, but the largest increases occurred after 1980 and peaked during the 1980s and 
1990s. This was a period (1975-1990) of deepening crisis for the Lebanese economy, as 
evidenced by the marked deceleration in economic growth and private investment activity 
(see Chapter 2). The Budget deficit, as a percent of GDP, increased from only 3% in 1975 
to 32.3% in 1989 (Table 3.1), and was one of the highest amongst the Middle East 
countries. Increased government expenditure and declining government revenues were 
both responsible for the steep increase in the public sector deficits. Total government 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Lebanon increased from 15.4% in 1972 to 39.4% in 
1990 (Table 3.1). The dramatic increase in total government expenditure was mainly made 
up of current expenditure, the generous wages and salaries paid to government employees, 
and the interest payments on the public debt (see Table 3.1).  
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Government revenues, on the other hand, remained very low as a proportion of 
GDP during the period of 1975-1990 (around 6%), due to the slowdown of economic 
activity, the inability of the government to collect revenues (Lebanon’s Civil War), most of 
the government’s revenues were in the form of indirect taxes, and custom and trade taxes  
became, as noted earlier, a difficult mission with the loss of control over legal ports of 
entry and a consequent surge in illegal imports. In addition, Lebanon’s budgetary capital 
expenditure witnessed a decline as well from 6% of GDP in 1980 to 1.7% in 1990 (Table 
3.1), and contributed to the deterioration in Lebanon’s public capital stock. 
 
Figure 3.2 Budget Deficit in Lebanon, 1970-2000, (in percent 
of GDP)
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Source:  Plotted by the author based on data provided by BDL (various years); Ministry of  
Finance (various years); IMF (1995; 1999); Author’s calculations. 
 
During 1970-1975 the average annual growth of nominal gross public debt 
registered only 3.5%, and the nominal gross public debt as a percent of GDP averaged 
5.4% (Table 3.5). Therefore, in the pre-war period public debt was not a major concern 
for Lebanon. As mentioned earlier, the economy was prosperous and the country 
enjoyed balanced budgets. As a result of large budget deficits during 1975-1990 
Lebanese public debt started to increase after 1975, but the largest increases occurred 
after 1980 and peaked during the 1980s and 1990s (Figure 3.3). The average annual 
growth of nominal gross public debt during 1976-1983 registered about 66%. The gross 
public debt as a percent of GDP increased from 3.5% in 1975 to 137.8% in 1983 (Table 
3.5). 
This can be explained by the fact that while government expenditures were 
increased to subsidize some commodities, such as petroleum and wheat, government 
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revenues deteriorated considerably. During the war, as noted earlier, taxes could not be 
collected due to the breakdown of the state authority. These taxes were mostly indirect, 
especially customs and trade taxes, which were collected by private parties and militias 
controlling the major ports in Lebanon. In addition, income taxes were reduced due to the 
decrease in the tax base or aggregate income, which fell by 50% in 1976 and did not 
recover its pre-1975 level until the late 1980s (Chami, 1992, p.327).  Therefore, a huge fiscal 
deficit emerged with a concurrent drastic increase in government indebtedness to finance 
this deficit.  
 
Table 3.5 Growth in the Nominal Gross Public Debt in Lebanon: 1970-2000 (in millions of US$, 
unless otherwise indicated) 
Years Domestic 
public 
debt 
External 
public 
debt 
Gross 
public 
debt 
Annual growth 
of gross public 
debt (%) 
In percent of GDP 
Domestic 
public debt 
External 
public 
debt 
Gross public 
debt 
1970 38.2 63.6 101.8 -7.8 2.6 4.3 6.8 
1971 34.4 66.6 100.9 -0.8 2.1 3.9 6.0 
1972 54.8 60.8 115.5 14.4 2.6 2.9 5.5 
1973 90.0 54.1 144.2 24.8 3.3 1.9 5.3 
1974 138.2 48.6 186.8 29.6 3.9 1.4 5.3 
1975 65.7 48.1 113.7 -39.1 2.0 1.5 3.5 
1976 282.6 39.7 322.3 183.4 19.8 2.8 22.6 
1977 491.2 38.1 529.3 64.2 18.4 1.4 19.8 
1978 643.9 48.4 692.3 30.8 21.7 1.6 23.3 
1979 818.5 95.4 913.9 32.0 23.8 2.8 26.6 
1980 1304.7 205.7 1510.3 65.3 32.1 5.1 37.1 
1981 1628.5 263.3 1891.9 25.3 41.8 6.8 48.5 
1982 2975.7 171.1 3146.8 66.3 111.9 6.4 118.4 
1983 4799.6 243.0 5042.6 60.2 131.2 6.6 137.8 
1984 4822.7 181.0 5003.7 -0.8 111.4 4.2 115.6 
1985 3313.0 180.0 3493.0 -30.2 91.7 4.9 96.7 
1986 2132.3 206.0 2338.3 -33.1 75.7 7.3 83.0 
1987 861.8 53.0 1414.8 -39.5 26.1 16.8 42.9 
1988 1274.3 449.5 1723.8 21.8 38.5 13.6 55.0 
1989 1978.7 517.3 2495.9 44.8 72.8 19.0 91.8 
1990 2287.9 543.9 2831.8 13.5 80.6 19.2 99.8 
1991 2843.4 576.9 3420.3 20.8 63.9 12.9 76.8 
1992 2959.9 257.0 3216.9 -5.9 53.4 4.6 58.0 
1993 3332.9 327.0 3659.9 13.8 44.2 4.3 48.6 
1994 5563.8 772.0 6335.8 73.1 61.1 8.5 69.5 
1995 7399.2 1343.0 8742.2 37.9 66.5 12.1 78.6 
1996 10963.7 1898.0 12861.7 47.1 84.4 14.6 98.9 
1997 12853.4 2434.0 15287.4 18.9 86.5 16.4 102.9 
1998 14302.9 4199.8 18502.7 21.0 88.5 25.9 114.5 
1999 16833.9 5538.0 22371.9 20.9 102.3 33.6 135.9 
2000 18017.4 6967.5 24984.9 11.7 109.5 42.3 151.8 
Source:  BDL (various years); Ministry of Finance (various years); IMF (1995; 1999); Ayash (1997); Author’s 
calculations. 
 
Furthermore, the average annual growth of gross public debt declined from 66% 
during 1976-1983 to only 4.6% during 1983-1990 (Table 3.5). This happened as a result of 
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money creation (for debt reduction purposes), which was accompanied by high inflation 
and a depreciation of the Lebanese pound during 1983-1992 (see Chapter 2). Moreover, 
due to the outflow of foreign capital, severely damaged infrastructure, the debt service 
(especially interest payment on treasury bills) as a percentage of revenue increased from 
8.7% in 1975 to 374.3% and 238.6% in 1988 and 1989 respectively (Table 3.6). Debt 
service as a percentage of total expenditure increased from only 6.9% in 1975 to 30.5% and 
28.8% in 1988 and 1989 respectively. The debt service to exports ratio increased from 
2.6% in 1975 to 31.2% and 63.2% in 1988 and 1989 respectively (Table 3.6).  In addition, 
as shown in Figure 3.3, the share of external public debt as a percentage of gross public 
debt in Lebanon remained more or less the same during the Civil War (1975-1990). It 
averaged only about 7.5% of GDP, about US$205.2 million (Table 3.5). According to 
Chami (1992) the low level of external debt may not have been the outcome of a deliberate 
decision on the part of policymakers, but rather the inability to borrow when the economy 
is in state of war.  
Hence, by the end of 1990, gross public debt represented 99.8% of GDP. From 
this, 75.2% was domestic public debt and the rest 23.2% was external public debt (Table 
3.1). However, money creation remained the primary method of budget financing with the 
issuance of treasury bills and the selling of them to the private sector. It is worth noting 
here that short-term bills registered a very high average share of 85.2% in total treasury bills 
during the war. 
 
3.3.2 Fiscal Deficits and Public Debt in Lebanon (1990-2000) 
This period is known as the civil peace and reconstruction period. During this 
period, two phases in the evolution of Lebanon’s public debt can be distinguished. During 
1990-92 the overall budget deficit, as a percentage of GDP, declined from about 30% in 
1990 to 13% and 11% in 1991 and 1992 respectively. The ratio of gross public debt to 
GDP decreased to 66% and 49% in 1991 and 1992 respectively (Table 3.5). Debt service as 
a percentage of revenue declined from 168.9% in 1990 to 48.9% in 1992, and the debt 
service to GDP ratio declined from 10.8% in 1990 to 5.5% in 1992 (Table 3.6). The decline 
in the public deficit during the period 1990-1992, occurred as a result of: the gradual 
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reassertion of government authority; government revenues increased from 9.7% of GDP in 
1990 to 12% in 1992 (revenue collection improved especially with respect to customs 
duties and non-tax revenue); fiscal restraint brought total expenditure down to 23% of 
GDP; and interest payments on domestic debt went down to 6.9% of GDP (Table 3.1) as a 
result of increased monetary financing. It is worth noting that the situation above 
happened despite very sizable primary deficits, and the nominal depreciation of the 
Lebanese pound on account of the rapid growth of the money supply and the negative real 
interest rates (see Chapter 2). The negative real interest rates were associated with 
substantial inflation during 1991-93 and the favourable financial market sentiments after 
the appointment of PM Hariri in the Autumn of 1992.  
 
Table 3.6 Key Economic Debt Ratios (%) in Lebanon: 1973-2000 
Years Debt service1 
/revenues 
Debt 
service/GDP 
Debt 
service/exports 
Debt 
service/expenditure 
Net public 
debt/GDP 2 
1973 5.9 0.8 3.6 5.7 n.a. 
1975 8.7 0.9 2.6 6.9 n.a. 
1977 6.5 0.9 3.1 4.2 n.a. 
1981 19.3 3.6 13.9 11.8 n.a. 
1982 39.7 11.2 33.6 22.4 55.2 
1983 35.7 10.9 54.5 21.1 75.5 
1984 34.4 8.6 60.8 22.2 93.5 
1985 153.2 11.2 69.8 26.0 105.8 
1986 179.8 10.1 48.8 31.8 95.1 
1987 122.6 3.3 22.0 17.1 70.5 
1988 374.3 5.9 31.2 30.5 28.3 
1989 238.6 11.3 63.2 28.8 62.6 
1990 168.9 10.8 62.2 27.4 52.9 
1991 39.5 5.0 41.2 17.2 56.0 
1992 48.9 5.5 50.4 23.3 46.1 
1993 42.3 6.0 65.6 25.5 37.8 
1994 66.4 9.7 120.2 27.7 52.2 
1995 61.8 10.4 141.7 29.6 63.1 
1996 66.2 13.0 215.6 34.3 78.3 
1997 84.9 14.9 341.1 39.4 92.3 
1998 75.3 13.7 330.9 42.4 105.6 
1999 74.4 14.6 345.8 42.9 119.9 
2000 92.2 16.9 391.0 40.3 141.2 
Source:  BDL (various years); Ministry of Finance (various years); IMF (1995; 1999); CCIB (various years; 
Ayash (1997); Bolbol (1999); Author’s calculations. 
Note:  1 Debt service includes only interest payments on domestic and foreign loans. 
3 Defined as gross public debt minus public sector deposits with the banking system. 
n.a. not available  
 
The second phase of the evolution of the deficit and public debt in Lebanon was 
during 1993-2000. It should be noted that this period was different from that of the other 
periods, economically and politically, especially regarding the steady appreciation in the 
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value of the Lebanese pound over the years and the causes of the budget deficit. As a result 
of rebuilding the infrastructure (the government’s crucial contribution to the 
reconstruction effort), the acceleration in the growth of government capital expenditure, 
together with large and expanding current expenditure and the slow recovery of the 
revenue-generation capacity, led to sizable fiscal imbalances. Consequently, government 
budget deficits increased from 9.2% of GDP in 1993 to 20.6% and 23.7% in 1996 and 
2000 respectively (Table 3.1). This huge increase in the budget deficit led to a sustained 
growth in government debt during the period 1993-2000 (Figure 3.3). During this period, 
the average annual growth of public debt registered about 31%, gross public debt, as a 
percent of GDP, increased from 48.6% in 1993 to 102.9% and 151.8% in 1997 and 2000 
respectively, net public debt rose from 38% to 92.3% and 141.2% in 1997 and 2000 
respectively (Tables 3.5, 3.6). In addition, as shown in Table 3.6, domestic public debt as a 
percent of GDP increased from 44.2% in 1993 to 86.5% and 109.5% in 1997 and 2000 
respectively. The external public debt as a percent of GDP increased from only 4.3% to 
16.4% and 42.3% in 1997 and 2000. Therefore, the majority of the public debt in Lebanon 
is in the form of domestic public debt. Furthermore, debt service as a percent of revenues 
increased from 42.3% in 1993 to 84.9% and 92.2% in 1997 and 2000 respectively. Debt 
service as a percent of GDP increased from 6% in 1993 to 14.9% and 16.9% in 1997 and 
2000, and as a percent of expenditure it increased from 25.5% in 1993 to 39.4% and 40.3% 
in 1997and 2000 respectively. Finally, as a percent of exports it increased from 65.6% in 
1993 to 341.1% and 391% in 1997 and 2000 respectively (Table 3.6). In nominal terms, the 
gross public debt increased from US$3.7 billion in 1993 to about US$25 billion in 2000. 
The external public debt increased from US$0.3 billion in 1993 to about US$7 billion in 
2000. The domestic public debt, external public debt, and gross public debt as a percent of 
GDP are indicated in Figure 3.3. 
In conclusion, despite the increased GDP growth rates of the early 1990s (38.2% in 
1991), which later fell back to considerably lower levels, the rate of growth in budgetary 
spending has consistently exceeded this growth. As noted earlier, total government 
expenditure as a percent of GDP rose from 23% in 1993 to 37.8% and 42% in 1997 and 
2000 respectively. But revenues as a percent of GDP were only 14.1% in 1993 rising only 
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to 17.5% and 18.3% in 1997 and 2000 respectively. Essa et al. (1999) determined that the 
average growth rate in spending increased in certain years to as much as seven times the 
growth in GDP. The rapid growth in spending was traditionally deemed warranted, as 80% 
of it was compulsory (in the form of salaries and debt servicing). Moreover, various facts 
reveal that such spending was not solely due to political, economic or financial 
emergencies. There was also a lack of government consideration of the dangers associated 
with a rising public debt, especially where increased spending is not accompanied with 
growing revenues. Therefore, debt financing in Lebanon led to a permanent deficit in the 
budget, because interest has to be paid on the debt and because the debt was not 
compensated by higher taxes or reductions in other transfer payments. It is worth noting 
that Lebanon was implementing huge reconstruction during the period 1993-2000, and tax 
revenues as percentage of GDP averaged only 11.7% during this period (Table 3.1) and 
more than 80% of this was from indirect taxes.  
 
Figure 3.3 Public Debt in Lebanon 1970-2000 (in percent of 
GDP)
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              Source: plotted by the author based on data provided by Table 3.5 
 
 
3.3.3 The Mode of Financing the Public Deficit and Debt in Lebanon 
Lebanon initially had only very limited access to either international capital markets 
or official foreign financing, reflecting considerable political and macroeconomic 
uncertainties immediately after the war, and had to resort to domestic capital markets to 
finance its budget deficit. Short-term treasury bills denominated in Lebanese pounds from 
3 to 12 months were the only available instruments. In mid 1991 the authorities also started 
issuing 24-month treasury bonds with semi-annual coupon payments. For a while treasury 
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bills with a maturity of 18 months were also available, but their issue was discontinued 
given the limited interest by the investor community. Reflecting these developments 
Lebanon’s debt structure has been characterized by a high, albeit gradually declining, share 
of short-term treasury bills denominated in Lebanese pounds in domestic public debt 
(Table 3.7).  
As noted earlier the Lebanese deficit has mainly been financed by the issue of 
treasury bills of various maturities. Treasury bills used to finance the budget deficit grew by 
an average of 69.2% during the Civil War period. Short-term bills registered a very high 
average share of 85.2% in total treasury bills during the war. Most treasury bills were 
subscribed to by the commercial banks at an average share of 56.9% during the war (BDL, 
1998). As shown in Table 3.8 the percentage of treasury bills in domestic public debt was 
49.6% in 1970, increasing to 55.2%, 64.3%, and 99.3% in 1980, 1990, and 2000 
respectively. Moreover, the percentage of treasury bills in total public debt was 18.6% in 
1970 increasing to 47.7% in 1980, 48.8%, and 71.6% in 1980, 1990, and 2000 respectively.   
As shown in Table 3.7, during the period 1978-1982, treasury bills issued were mainly of 3 
months maturity, with this maturity registering 77.5% and 69.1% in 1978 and 1982% of 
total subscriptions respectively. Short-term treasury bills, as a percent of total domestic 
public debt, represented 42.9% in 1978 increasing to 71.4% in 1982. The growth of the 
budget deficit resulted in the rapid growth of treasury bills issued during this period. In 
addition, during 1978-1982 treasury bills were again subscribed mainly (between 85% and 
92%) by commercial banks. Special bills for the subscription of commercial banks were 
introduced in 1979, representing 20% of total subscriptions (BDL, 1998). 
In 1983, the Bank of Lebanon entered the financial market as a subscriber of 25% 
of total issues. The biggest share was subscribed to by commercial banks (around 68%) and 
the remaining 7% was subscribed to by the general public. As shown in Table 3.7 long-
term treasury bills, or bonds, only represented 3% of total subscriptions compared to 
short-term treasury bills’ contribution of around 80% of total subscriptions in 1984. This 
was due to political and economic uncertainty.  
As shown in Figure 3.4, during the 1986-1987 currency crisis (see Chapter 2) the 
share of commercial banks in treasury bills holdings dropped significantly to 65% and 40% 
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respectively compared to 72% in 1985. Consequently, the Central Bank covered the issues 
of treasury bills with an increasing share of 21% and 52% in 1996-1987 respectively. 
Commercial banks held 75% of total treasury bills while the share of the Bank of Lebanon 
(BDL) was less than 8% (Figure 3.4). 
 
 
Table 3.7 Treasury Bills (TBs) in Circulation: Nature and Percentage Share in the 
Whole (unless otherwise indicated): 1978-2000  
Years Long-term TBs1 Short-term TBs2 
In percent of 
domestic 
public debt 
In percent of total TBs In percent 
of 
domestic 
public 
debt 
In percent of total TBs 
Short- 
term TBs 
3 
months 
6 
months 
1  
year 
Long-term 
TBs 
24 months 
bonds 
1980 16.5 29.9 6.4 30.1 54.4 54.4 0 0 
1982 1.0 1.1 0 71.4 81.9 69.1 12.8 0 
1984 1.8 3.0 3.0 47.8 79.4 22.4 17.0 36.0 
1987 0 0 0 64.3 97.8 26.9 24.7 46.2 
1988 0 0 0 79.4 97.2 25.5 18.7 53.0 
1990 0 0 0 62.7 97.4 16.5 21.5 59.4 
1991 13.0 14.8 14.8 73.6 83.2 7.3 10.1 63.4 
1992 29.7 31.7 31.7 62.2 66.3 23.6 13.2 24.8 
1993 54.5 47.4 47.4 58.1 50.6 8.9 13.2 26.6 
1994 69.4 60.6 60.6 42.6 37.2 2.5 7.6 27.1 
1995 47.0 40.8 40.8 66.2 57.5 6.3 5.9 45.3 
1996 53.8 54.4 51.9 45.0 45.6 5.3 16.2 24.1 
1997 67.1 67.8 63.5 31.9 32.2 2.1 6.5 23.3 
1998 78.2 79.1 74.3 20.7 20.9 1.6 3.9 15.2 
1999 77.0 77.9 71.1 21.9 21.8 2.3 6.5 13.1 
2000 76.8 77.4 70.4 22.5 22.6 2.9 6.1 13.7 
Source:  BDL (various years), Annual Report and Quarterly Bulletin; Ministry of Finance (various years); Ayash 
(1997); Author’s calculations. 
Note:  1 Maturity greater or equal to 2 years. 
 2 Maturity less or equal to 18 months. 
 
Starting from 1991 there was a redistribution of maturities in favour of long term 
treasury bills, mainly bonds with 24 months to maturity, that accounted for 15% of total 
subscriptions in 1991 (Table 3.7). Since then, increasingly, 24-month treasury bonds have 
become the dominant Lebanese pound debt instrument. This type of treasury bill, on 
average, accounted for 60% of all outstanding treasury bills and bonds during 1993-200037 
(Table 3.7). However, between 1991 and 2000 the share of short-term treasury bills, as a 
                                                 
37 The decomposition of treasury bills and bonds into maturities reported in Table 3.7 is based on the 
maturity of the bills at the time of issue and not on the remaining time to maturity. 
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percent of domestic public debt, declined from 73.6% in 1991 to 31.9% and 22.5% in 1997 
and 2000. The share of long-term treasury bonds increased from 13% in 1991 to 67.1% 
and 76.8% in 1997 and 2000 as a result of the positive events of the post-war period, and 
optimistic expectations regarding the future of Lebanon. As shown in Figure 3.4 the 
commercial banks38 have been the main subscribers to the issue of new treasury bills, 
averaging in the order of some 73.3% during 1991-2000, followed by the non-banking 
system39. This could have a negative impact on private investment and the role of the 
private sector overall, because pouring money into treasury bills “crowds out” the private 
sector by creating a liquidity shortage. Hence, the public sector had become an important 
competitor with the private sector for bank loans. 
Treasury bills have been the main short-term Lebanese pound denominated asset in 
Lebanese financial markets, and, given the role of commercial banks as the principal 
intermediaries, are the main determinants of quasi-monetary Lebanese pound liabilities. 
Treasury bill holdings by nonbank entities have been increasing, in particular, since 1995. 
This change in the structure of treasury bill holdings has been attributed to the unsteady 
interest rate setting by commercial banks (Table 3.9) and the deepening of financial 
markets. The latter has allowed for a larger investor base, including foreign, that is, non-
resident, investors. At the end of 1997 about 7% of the outstanding treasury bills were held 
by non-resident investors (IMF, 1999).  
Furthermore, as shown in Table 3.9, the nominal interest rate on treasury bills with 
a 3 months maturity increased from 3% in 1977 to 18% and 20% in 1986 and 1990 
                                                 
38 Until March 1997, banks had to hold treasury bills equivalent to 40% of Lebanese pound deposits (this 
constraint was not binding as banks held treasury bills far in excess of requirements). The Central Bank 
stands ready to refinance banks through bilateral repurchase agreements involving treasury bills, but this 
facility typically has been used only in periods of tension and effectively constitutes the lender-of-last-
resort facility. 
 
39 This includes financial institutions, general public and public entities. The latter category also includes 
public entities that are not included in the budget (e.g., social security fund), which hold their excess cash 
balances in treasury bills. These holdings amounted to about 5% of all outstanding treasury bills and 
bonds during recent years. 
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respectively, those with 6 months maturity increased from 10.5% in 1982 to 20% in 1990, 
for those with a 12 months maturity it increased from 3.6% in 1977 to 15% and 20% in 
1985 and 1990 respectively, and for those with a 24 months maturity it registered 4.3% in 
1977 increasing to 12% and 24.5% in 1983 and 1992 respectively. This high interest rates 
policy on treasury bills was implemented by the Bank of Lebanon (BDL) during the Civil 
War and early 1990s to reduce the massive increase in the money supply, to control the 
severe depreciation of the Lebanese currency (see Chapter two), and to encourage the 
commercial banks and others (such as financial institutions, general public and public 
entities) to participate in financing the budget deficit. Furthermore, since 1994, Lebanon 
has adopted a tender system to determine the interest rate. Interest paid on treasury bills is 
the generator of the largest item of the debt service burden. Interest rates during the period 
1982-2000 on treasury bills for the short and long-term period are depicted in Figure 3.5.  
 
Table 3.8 Domestic Public Debt (PD): Composition, (1970-2000), In Millions of 
L.L., Unless Otherwise Indicated. 
Years Borrowing 
from the 
Bank of 
Lebanon1 
Borrowing from the 
commercial banks 
Domestic 
public 
debt 
Percentage 
of treasury 
bills in PD 
Percentage 
of treasury 
bills in total 
public debt 
Treasury 
bill rate. 
Annual 
rate (%) 
Treasury 
bills2 
Other 
advances3 
1970 63 62 0 125 49.60 18.62 -3.08 
1975 151 0 0 151 0 0 -100.00 
1980 1954 2476 0 4488 55.23 47.66 112.35 
1985 15600 38200 600 54400 70.22 62.31 99.68 
1990 559980 1023014 7324 1590318 64.33 48.83 30.09 
1991 299136 2333179 7001 2639316 88.40 64.32 128.07 
1992 299888 4754400 15566 5069854 93.78 86.17 103.77 
1993 61800 6016700 3300 6081800 98.93 94.71 26.55 
1994 77700 9212600 4100 9294400 99.12 86.92 53.12 
1995 102800 12815000 56500 12974300 98.77 90.84 39.10 
1996 100400 17053600 106100 17260100 98.80 84.63 33.08 
1997 100600 19575600 108800 19785000 98.94 83.38 14.79 
1998 103800 21436000 145900 21685700 98.85 76.51 9.50 
1999 115000 25113700 157200 25382800 98.94 74.45 17.16 
2000 113900 26964300 83000 27161200 99.28 71.59 7.37 
Source: Source: BDL (various years), Annual Report and Quarterly Bulletin; Ministry of Finance (various years); 
Ayash (1997); Author’s calculations. 
Note:  1 Includes loans to public entities. 
2 Includes treasury bills held by the Central Bank of Lebanon, commercial banks and non-banking 
system. 
 3 Other loans. 
 
According to the Bank of Lebanon, in March 1991 the interest rate paid on treasury 
bills reached a peak ranging from 19.94% to 35.1% in the primary and secondary markets. 
Higher interest yields on treasury bills, by speeding the pace of growth of domestic debt 
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and by leading to a general increase in interest rates, adversely affected private sector 
activity by creating a liquidity shortage. In addition, the discount rate in Lebanon increased 
from 12% in 1982 to 21.84%, 30%, and 25% in 1990, 1998 and 1999 respectively. The 
deposit rate increased from 12.94% in 1982 to 21.96% in 1988 before falling to 12.49% in 
1999. The lending rate increased from 16.83% in 1982 to 40.21% in 1992 before falling to 
19.47% in 1999 (Table 3.9). 
 
Figure 3.4 Distribution of Treasury Bills by Subscriber:
1986-2000, (in percent of total TBs outstanding)
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Source:  BDL (various years); Ministry of Finance (various years); Author’s calculations. 
Note:  TBs = Treasury Bills 
 
Thus, high interest rates on treasury bills led to high discount rates, deposit rates 
and lending rates. This monetary policy, involving high interest rates and financing the 
budget deficit through the private sector, reduced the liquidity available for the private 
sector, which is important for investment and the economy as a whole. Due to the 
depreciation of the Pound during February-March 1992, the fiscal authorities were 
compelled to increase interest rates on treasury bills within a range of 22% and 31.5% by 
August 1992. However, by the fourth quarter of 1992 a wave of optimism reigned as the 
political situation stabilized, which led to an increase in the demand for Lebanese pounds. 
Consequently, interest rates on treasury bills were gradually lowered and ranged between 
12.59% and 26% by the end of the year (BDL, 1992).  
As shown in Table 3.9, and Figure 3.5, the nominal interest rates on treasury bills 
declined significantly in 1993 and 1994 in response to increased domestic and external 
demand for Lebanese pound assets. Since the fourth quarter of 1995 to the end of 2000 
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interest rates on treasury bills experienced a steady decline, reflecting increased confidence 
in the strength and stability of the Lebanese pound. The interest rates on 24-month 
treasury bills, contributing 60% of total treasury bills that were issued during 1993-2000, 
declined from 22.7% in 1993 to 16.08% and 14.14% in 1997 and 2000 respectively. On 3-
month maturities, it declined from 16.51% in 1993 to 12.68% and 10.88% in 1997 and 
2000 respectively. On 6-month maturities, it declined to 11.43% in 2000, and to 11.84% on 
12-month maturities. This happened because the government had implemented, in 
previous years, conversion of some of the public debt into foreign currency instead of 
Lebanese pounds. This enabled the interest rates on treasury bills to drop as mentioned 
earlier on. In addition, this policy led the public debt in foreign currency to increase from 
10.2% of total public debt at the end of 1992 to 15.8% and 27.5% in 1997 and 2000 
respectively (Table 3.10). This also has important economic implications (more details later 
in this study). 
 
Table 3.9 Interest rates in Lebanon: 1970-2000 
Years 3 months 
TBs1 
6 months 
TBs1 
12 months 
TBs1 
24 
months 
TBs1 
Discount rate (end 
of period)2 
Deposit 
rate3 
Lending 
rate4 
1970 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.00 n.a. n.a. 
1975 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.00 n.a. n.a. 
1977 3.00 n.a. 3.60 4.30 6.00 n.a. n.a. 
1980 11.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.00 n.a. n.a. 
1982 10.00 10.50 n.a. n.a. 12.00 12.94 16.83 
1983 9.75 10.25 11.00 12.00 12.00 10.01 14.53 
1984 15.50 15.50 15.50 n.a. 12.00 11.53 15.58 
1985 16.00 16.00 16.00 n.a. 19.70 13.24 17.29 
1986 18.00 20.00 20.00 n.a. 21.85 16.42 22.21 
1987 18.00 20.00 20.00 n.a. 21.85 21.18 36.54 
1988 18.00 20.00 20.00 n.a. 21.84 21.96 44.46 
1989 18.00 20.00 20.00 n.a. 21.84 17.54 39.86 
1990 18.00 20.00 20.00 n.a. 21.84 16.86 39.94 
1991 14.50 15.50 16.30 16.50 18.04 16.76 38.01 
1992 12.59 13.96 17.36 24.50 16.0 17.09 40.21 
1993 16.51 17.90 17.41 22.70 20.22 15.56 28.53 
1994 13.05 13.81 12.84 15.26 16.49 14.80 23.88 
1995 15.40 15.85 15.45 22.16 19.01 16.30 24.69 
1996 13.80 14.95 14.55 19.58 25.00 15.54 25.21 
1997 12.68 13.06 13.20 16.08 30.0 13.37 20.29 
1998 11.43 12.39 12.93 16.02 30.00 13.61 n.a. 
1999 10.88 11.43 11.84 14.14 25.00 12.50 19.48 
2000 10.88 11.43 11.84 14.14 20.00 11.21 18.15 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (2000, pp.630-31); BDL (various years). 
Note:  1 Nominal rate on treasury bills (end of year) 
2 Rate charged by the Bank of Lebanon to discount advances and paper offered by the Commercial 
Banks. Since June 1985, the discount rate has been formally linked to the Treasury bill rates and 
commercial bill rates. 
 3 Average rate offered by commercial banks on fixed-term deposits. 
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 4 Average rate charged by commercial banks on loans and advances. 
 n.a. not available.  
 
 
Figure 3.5 Interest Rates on Treasury Bills in Lebanon: 
1982-2000 (end of period)
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Source: Plotted by the author based on data provided by BDL (various years). 
 
The Central Bank also affects interest rates through its treasury bill discount and 
repurchase operations in the secondary market. It is worth noting that the gradual decline 
in interest rates on treasury bills has been accompanied by a decrease in the spread between 
U.S. dollar and Lebanese pound lending and deposit rates40. 
 
Table 3.10 Distribution of Public Debt According to Currency, Selected Years (as % 
of the total) 
Years Debt in L.L* Debt in foreign currency* 
1992 89.8 10.2 
1993 91.2 8.8 
1994 88.0 12.0 
1995 84.8 15.2 
1996 85.3 14.7 
1997 84.2 15.8 
1998 77.8 22.5 
1999 75.8 24.2 
2000 72.5 27.5 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2001); Meadad (1999); Author’s calculation; * at the end of the periods. 
 
As shown in Table 3.10 the public debt, in terms of foreign currency, has increased 
during the last 9 years, while the public debt in terms of Lebanese pounds has declined 
from 89.9% in 1992 to 77.8% and 72.5% in 1998 and 2000 respectively. It is worth noting 
here that the reconstruction program during the period 1993-2000 also depended, in part, 
on external borrowing. In addition, as shown in Table 3.11, the external public debt of 
Lebanon denominated in U.S. dollars averaged 73% per year of total public sector external 
                                                 
40 See Ministry of Finance (2001) for a detailed discussion. 
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debt during 1995-2000. Other important currencies in which external debt is denominated 
are: Kuwaiti Dinars (8.9%), Euros (5.7%), French Francs (5.6%) and others, which 
averaged 8.9% during the same period. Total external debt stocks, consisting of long-term 
debt as well as short-term debt, increased from a low value of about US$0.5 billion in 1980 
to US$1.3 billion in 1993, and reached US$9.8 billion in 2000 (Table 3.12).  
 
 
Table 3.11 Public Sector External Debt by Type of Currency 
Currency/Years 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Austrian Schillings 4.61 3.14 1.87 1.10 0.95 0.47 
French Francs 8.85 8.13 6.05 4.07 4.11 2.22 
Deutschmark 1.29 2.77 8.48 5.26 4.61 2.43 
Italian Lire 2.78 2.04 1.27 0.72 0.59 0.27 
U.S Dollars 68.68 65.27 62.83 75.34 93.02 73.10 
Kuwaiti Dinars 7.10 12.18 11.71 7.72 8.96 5.94 
Saudi Arabian Riyals 2.40 2.86 3.13 2.31 2.54 1.57 
Euros(1) 0.99 0.68 2.00 1.30 16.14 12.87 
Others 3.56 2.93 2.65 2.16 2.09 1.12 
Source:  Ministry of Finance (2000; 2001); Author’s calculation 
Notes: (1) This category includes external debt incurred in ECUs prior to the introduction of the euro on 
January 1, 1999, at the start of the third stage of European Economic and Monetary Union. 
 
During the period of the 1980s and early 1990s most of the country’s external debt 
was short-term, but after 1994 borrowing was turned into-long term debt owed by the 
government or was government guaranteed. Short-term debt increased from US$0.3 billion 
in 1980 to US$0.9 billion in 1993, and to US$2.5 billion in 2000. Long-term debt increased 
from US$0.21 billion in 1980 to US$0.36 billion in 1993, and to a high level of US$7.3 
billion in 2000 (Table 3.12). This table also shows that the total external debt to gross 
national product rose from 17.5% in 1993 to 56.6% in 2000. The debt-to-exports ratio 
(total debt as a percentage of total exports) rose from a low level of 42.6% in 1993 to a 
high of 238% in 1998. Furthermore, the debt service-to-exports ratio (debt service as a 
percentage of total exports) increased to about 19% in 1998. In other words, the country 
had to spend approximately one fifth of its foreign exchange on servicing its external debt 
in 1998.  
Furthermore, foreign currency debt, as a share of GDP, was relatively low during 
the period 1991-93, but increased thereafter. Initially, the foreign currency debt was largely 
composed of debt owed to commercial banks and to bilateral official creditors (Table 3.12). 
Since 1994, however, the Lebanese government has also been able to tap into international 
 87 
capital markets for budgetary financing. As noted earlier this debt was initially accumulated 
by the government in order to finance the reconstruction programs. It therefore started to 
increase from 1993 with the beginning of the reconstruction period, and especially in 1994 
when the first treasury bills began to be released in foreign currency. This type of treasury 
bill is called a Eurobond, and they are issued by the public and private sectors. These 
issuances started in 1994 with the first US$400 million global issue by the Lebanese 
government41. Since 1997 these releases have been transformed from an instrument to 
finance reconstruction, to an instrument to finance the deficit as with domestic releases. 
This policy was implemented by the government to substitute short-term domestic debt 
with high interest rates (Figure 3.4), with medium and long-term external debt with lower 
interest rates to reduce the overall cost of debt service. In addition, between 1994-2000, the 
public sector issued Eurobonds which amounted to approximately $US5017.3 million, with 
maturities varying between 3 and 10 years and interest rates ranging between 6.5% and 
10.25% (BDL, 2000). It is worth noting here that external public debt accounted for 42% 
of gross public debt in Lebanon in 2000; this ratio was only 8.5% in 1994 (Table 3.5). On 
the other hand the domestic public debt, as a percent of gross public debt, increased from 
61.1% in 1994 to 109.5% in 2000. 
Thus, Lebanon, in the last several years, has increasingly relied on external debt to 
finance its domestic debt, meaning a financing of debt by debt. Furthermore, the large 
public debt, in the context of the overall macroeconomic policy mix, also led to a 
substantial interest rate burden on the budget.  
As shown in Table 3.1 and 3.2 for 1991, interest payments amounted to 17% of 
expenditure (5 % of GDP). Since then, they have been gradually increasing, and amounted 
to 40% of expenditure in 2000 (17% of GDP). 
Foreign currency debt has been associated with much more favourable terms since 
1993, reflecting not only the grant element in some official financing but also the low 
interest rates on international bonds issued by Lebanon relative to debt instruments in 
                                                 
41 It was later followed by several other issues by both the public and private sectors, with maturities 
varying between 3 and 10 years. Some of them being listed on international stock exchanges such as 
those of  Luxembourg and the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
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Lebanese pounds. Since the first issue in 1994 the yield spread, relative to comparable US 
government bonds and bills, has decreased considerably, despite the lengthening of 
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Table 3.12 External Debt Stocks and Debt Indicators: 1970-1999 (US$ million, %). 
Years 1970 1980 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total debt stocks   
(EDT) 
64 510 1779 1806 1345 2118 2966 3996 5033 6725 8441 9856 
Long-term debt 64 216 358 301 368 778 1601 2343 3238 4765 6239 7315 
Short-term debt 0 294 1421 1505 977 1340 1365 1653 1795 1961 2202 2541 
Public and publicly 
guaranteed 
64 216 358 301 368 778 1551 1933 2353 3980 5568 6579 
Official creditors 64 146 188 212 289 295 428 630 710 829 912 931 
Multilateral 18 78 85 48 79 125 198 326 371 476 558 616 
         Bilateral 46 68 104 165 210 170 230 304 339 353 355 315 
Private creditors 0 71 169 88 79 483 1123 1304 1643 3151 4656 5648 
Total debt service 
(TDS) 
4 53 99 138 135 185 224 301 734 528 1010 1469 
  Principal repayments     2 7 27 40 45 96 104 69 438 169 458 876 
Interest payments (INT) 1 45 72 98 90 89 121 231 296 358 552 593 
EDT/XGS a (%) n.a. n.a. 58.9 58.1 42.6 60.9 66.0 84.6 98.7 237.9 n.a. n.a. 
EDT/GNP b (%) n.a. n.a. 51.4 31.2 17.5 22.5 25.7 30.1 32.8 40.8 51.2 56.6 
TDS/XGS c (%) n.a. n.a. 3.3 4.4 4.3 5.3 5.0 6.4 14.4 18.7 n.a. n.a. 
INT/XGS d  (%) n.a. n.a. 2.4 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.7 4.9 5.8 12.7 n.a. n.a. 
INT/GNP e  (%) n.a. n.a. 2.1 1.7 1.2 0.9 1.0 1.7 1.9 2.2 3.4 3.4 
Source:  World Bank , Global Development Finance (2000; 2001; 2003). 
Note: a is total external debt to exports of goods and services. 
 b is total external debt to gross national product. 
 c also called the debt service ratio, is total debt service to exports of goods and services. 
d also called the interest service ratio, is total interest payments to exports of goods and services. 
               e is total interest payments to gross national product; 
  n.a. not available. 
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maturities. Reflecting, in part, increased awareness about Lebanon by foreign investors but 
also the large foreign exchange reserves and the high reconstruction related growth, which 
have been perceived favourably in capital markets. Lebanese pound assets, however, have 
been associated with high nominal and real interest rates, as indicated by the substantial 
interest differential between Lebanese pound and comparable U.S. dollar assets. 
 
3.4 Consequences of the Deficit and Public Debt in Lebanon 
It has been argued that the main effect of the emergence of a huge budget deficit, and 
the way it has been financed, was to increase the money supply at an unprecedented rate; 
and to contribute significantly to a rising inflation rate and depreciation of the Lebanese 
pound during the Civil War and early 1990s (Chami, 1992, p.329). 
As noted earlier the government finances its deficits primarily by issuing treasury bills, 
so Lebanon had faced a heavy domestic public debt burden (see Table 3.5). The increase in 
the money stock was the direct result of financing budget deficits through the central and 
commercial banks. The part of the deficit financed by the central bank of Lebanon is the 
most expansionary, because it leads to an equal increase in the monetary base and to a 
multiple effect on the money stock. Part of the excess money supply was used to acquire 
foreign currency deposits within the Lebanese banking system. This was reflected clearly by 
the difference in the rates of growth of M1 and M2 (which includes deposits in foreign 
currencies). While M1 – the domestic currency-denominated liquidity – grew at an average 
rate of 45% during 1982-1987, M2
 grew at an average of 92% during the same period (The 
series of M1, Quasi-Money, M3 are depicted in Figure 3.6 which shows a sharp increase in 
quasi-money and M3 during the period of the 1980s). The difference reflects the share of 
foreign currency (especially US$) denominated assets. This share has increased considerably 
during the 1980s. For example, it stood at 24% in 1982, rose to 68% in 1986 and to nearly 
90% by the end of 1987 (Towe, 1989). This was the result of a further depreciation of the 
pound and the erosion of the public sector’s confidence in it. This phenomenon of 
dollarization of the Lebanese economy contributed to the severe depreciation of the 
domestic currency (see Chapter 2).  
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In addition, because financing the deficit through the private sector means absorbing 
the resources available for private investment, the continued growth in the deficit 
influences the private sector through a crowding out effect (Makdissi, 1999). Furthermore, 
the policy of money creation used by the authority as a primary method of budget 
financing (just prior to the cessation of hostilities) led inflation to increase from 18.13% in 
1984 to close to 500% in 1987, and the average exchange rate depreciated from LL6.51 per 
1US$ in 1984 to LL224.60 per 1US$ in 1987 (See chapter 2). 
 
Figure 3.6 Monetary Aggregates, 1970-2000, (in millions of 
Lebanese pounds)
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Source: Plotted by the author based on data provided by IMF, International Financial Statistics (2001, pp.648-649). 
Note:  M1 = currency in circulation + demand deposit in domestic currency 
Quasi - Money  = domestic currency time and savings deposits + foreign currency deposits. 
M3 = M1 + Quasi – Money 
 
Furthermore, the policy of financing budget deficits through debt creation would 
increasingly encumber the budget with domestic interest payments. Hence, interest 
payments have become a major burden on public finances. In addition, in Lebanon the 
average real interest rate was between 5 and 11% during 1996-2000, greater than the 
average of economic growth (which was between 1% and 4 %). The real GDP growth rate 
in Lebanon declined from 38.2% in 1992 to 3% and 0% in 1998 and 2000 respectively (see 
Chapter 2). The growth rate of public debt is higher than the rate of economic growth. The 
continuing increase in the level of the budget deficit and debt is argued to have led to lower 
growth in Lebanon (Chami (1994); Makdissi (1998); Bolbol (1999)), especially in the last 
few years, and to increases in the level of real interest rates. In addition, the high deficit in 
the last 10 years reduced the elasticity of economic policies and restricted government 
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freedom to deal with social issues (Makdissi, 1999), especially the high level of 
unemployment in the last 10 years that reached 35% in 1992 and 20% in 1999% (see 
Chapter 2, Table 2.2). 
The debt in Lebanon can also be a burden because of the higher taxes needed for 
debt servicing, and this overall burden is compounded by the current usage of inefficient 
taxes that undermine the tax raising capacity of the authorities. Between 1994 and 1995 
government revenues increased by 64% as a result of a rise in direct stamp duties and fees, 
taxes on built-up property, and customs duties. Hence, this could have adverse effects on 
the economy, by discouraging investment or work effort; such effects would reduce output.  
Furthermore, the government, since 1993, started to increase its reliance on foreign 
loans to finance large reconstruction projects, this led, as discussed earlier, to a significant 
increase in the level of foreign indebtedness and foreign debt servicing during 1993-2000. 
Bolbol (1999) argues that relying on foreign borrowing should not be overdone for several 
reasons. First, the foreign exchange lost as interest payments could be a drag on the 
economy, and Lebanon’s ability to service its foreign debt is limited given that the debt-to-
exports ratio exceeds 300%. Second, although the rates on Eurobonds look low at 9%, 
they are in fact only 1% less than the real yield on domestic bonds since the nominal yield 
is 16% and inflation is 6%; so in real terms, there are no substantial savings in borrowing 
costs. Third foreign debt is a reduction in net worth whereas domestic debt is not42, so the 
positive wealth effects that function as a stimulus to aggregate demand would turn 
negative. Fourth, an exchange rate shock would worsen the foreign debt exposure of the 
country and its ability to service its debt, since all of its revenues would be depreciated in 
local currency terms but total debt would increase in domestic currency terms unless the 
foreign debt is hedged against currency risk. Fifth, foreign borrowing may act as a 
                                                 
42 When Ricardian Equivalence does not hold. Ricardian Equivalence regards net public debt as zero net 
worth, because the former is equal to the present value of future taxes that the government needs to 
impose on the public to pay for its debt. Of course, one possibility that deficits are not “working” is that 
markets have discounted their potential wealth effects via higher expected future inflation and taxes. 
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substitute to much needed fiscal reforms, and the imperative to base government finance 
on a rational and equitable foundation43.  
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
To sum up, this chapter has analysed the public sector deficit and debt in Lebanon 
during the period of 1975-2000, broken down into two distinct phases: the Civil War 
period (1975-1990) and the post-war and reconstruction period (1990-2000). 
The Civil War period was characterised as one of a deepening crisis for the 
Lebanese economy, as evidenced by the marked deceleration in economic growth and 
private investment activity. The budget deficit as a percent of GDP increased to 32.3% in 
1989 (Table 3.1), being one of the highest amongst the Middle East countries. Increased 
government expenditure and reduced government revenues were both responsible for the 
steep increase in the public sector deficits. As a result of large budget deficits during this 
period, the Lebanese public debt started to increase after 1975. By the end of 1990, gross 
public debt represented 99.8% of GDP. Of this, 80.6% was due to domestic public debt 
and the rest, 19.2%, was external public debt (Table 3.1).  
However, money creation remained the primary method of budget financing with 
the issuance and sale of treasury bills to the private sector. It has been argued that the main 
effect of the huge budget deficit, and the way it was financed, was to increase the money 
supply at an unprecedented rate, and to contribute significantly to a rising inflation rate and 
depreciation of the Lebanese pound during the Civil War (Chami, 1992). 
Over the post-war period, two phases in the evolution of Lebanon’s public debt 
can be distinguished. During 1990-1992 the overall budget deficit to GDP ratio declined to 
11%. This happened as a result of: the gradual reassertion of government authority, 
government revenues increased from 9.7% of GDP in 1990 to 12% in 1992 (revenue 
collection improved especially with respect to customs duties and non-tax revenue); fiscal 
                                                 
43 One major drawback, however, from domestic debt financing is a more unequal distribution of income. 
This is because it transfers interest and principal payments to the wealthy holders of net debt. Lebanon 
has a very unequal distribution of income, where the wealthy 5% control more that 40% of income (The 
Economist, 1996). 
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restraint brought total expenditure down to 23% of GDP while at the same time interest 
payments on domestic debt went down to 6.9% of GDP (Table 3.1) as a result of increased 
monetary financing.  
The second phase of the evolution of the deficit and public debt in Lebanon was 
during 1993-2000. This period was different from the other periods, economically and 
politically, especially with the steady appreciation of the value of the Lebanese pound and 
the causes of the budget deficit. As a result of rebuilding the country’s infrastructure (the 
government’s crucial contribution to the reconstruction effort), the acceleration in the 
growth of government capital expenditure, together with large and expanding current 
expenditure and the slow recovery of the revenue-generation capacity, led to sizable fiscal 
imbalances. Consequently, government budget deficits increased from 9.2% of GDP in 
1993 to 20.2% and 23.7% in 1997 and 2000 respectively (Table 3.1). This huge increase in 
the budget deficit led to a sustained growth in government debt. During 1993-2000, the 
average annual growth of public debt registered 31%, gross public debt, as a percent of 
GDP, increased from 48.6% in 1993 to 102.9% and 151.8% in 1997 and 2000 respectively. 
Net public debt rose from 38% in 1993 to 141.2% in 2000 (Tables 3.5, 3.6).  
Hence, the Lebanese government is unable to service its debt from revenues and is 
borrowing to finance its debt servicing obligations and to pay the salaries of civil servants. 
While the public debt in Lebanon accumulated significantly in the last ten years, the 
Lebanese economy has been slowing down since 1996. The annual real GDP growth rate 
in Lebanon declined from 38.2% in 1992 to 4%, 3%, 2%, and 0% in 1996, 1998, 1999, and 
2000 respectively (See chapter 2).  
For all the reasons discussed in this chapter, it is argued that debt financing in 
Lebanon has led to a permanent deficit in the budget, higher interest rates, increases in the 
money supply, rising inflation, a depreciation of the Lebanese pound, stagnation and a 
slowing of economic growth (these hypotheses above will be tested throughout this study). 
Other economists in the region such as Bolbol (1999), Chami (1992, 1994), Makdissi (1998, 
1999), Atia (1998), Ayash (1998) and others believe that the ballooning debt is the cause of 
recession and economic slowdown in Lebanon.  
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The public sector deficits and debt have been analysed in this chapter. The next 
chapter will review the theoretical arguments regarding the relationship between budget 
deficits and economic variables. Empirical studies, econometric models and their results in 
both developed and developing countries will also be discussed. 
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Chapter 4  
 
The Budget Deficit and Economic Performance: A Survey 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chronic government budget deficits and escalating government debt have become 
major concerns in both developed and developing countries. An extensive theoretical and 
empirical literature has been developed to examine the relationship between the budget 
deficit and macroeconomic variables. At a theoretical level, much of the literature [e.g. 
Bailey (1971); Buiter (1977); David and Scadding (1974); Premchand (1984); Yellen (1989); 
Barro (1990); among others] has focused on the relationship between private investment 
and public expenditure mainly because of the crowding out effect of public spending. 
Some of these studies, such as Premchand (1984), assert that financing the budget deficit 
by borrowing from the public implies an increase in the supply of government bonds. In 
order to improve the attractiveness of these bonds the government offers them at a lower 
price, which leads to higher interest rates. The increase in interest rates discourages the 
issue of private bonds, private investment, and private spending. In turn, this contributes to 
the financial crowding out of the private sector. While other literature [e.g. Aschauer, 
(1989); Eisner (1989); Heng (1997); among others] has argued that higher public 
investment may raise the marginal productivity of private capital and, thereby, “crowd-in” 
private investment. Some of these studies, such as Achauer (1989), argue that public 
capital, particularly infrastructure capital such as highways, water systems, sewers, and 
airports, is likely to bear a complementary relationship with private capital. Hence, 
according to Aschauer (1989) higher public investment may raise the marginal productivity 
of private capital, and, thereby, “crowd in” private investment. 
Furthermore, other literature with respect to the impact of budget deficits on 
macroeconomic variables focuses on the relationship between budget deficits and inflation. 
Theoretically, an extensive literature [e.g. Metzler (1951); Patinkin (1965); Friedman (1968); 
Sargent and Wallace (1981); Dywer (1982); Miller (1983); among others] has argued that 
government deficit spending is a primary cause of inflation. Some of these studies, such as 
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Sargent and Wallace (1981), have supported the proposition that the Central Bank will be 
obliged to monetise the deficit either now or in later periods. Such monetisation results in 
an increase in the money supply and the rate of inflation, at least in the long-run period. 
In addition, other studies focus on the relationship between the budget deficit and 
the trade deficit (twin-deficits relationship). The twin deficit hypothesis asserts that an 
increase in the budget deficit will cause a similar increase in the current account deficit. 
Theoretical examinations of this issue have resulted in many contrary views. An extensive 
literature [e.g. Fleming (1962); Mundell (1963); Volcker (1987); Kearney and Monadjemi 
(1990); Smyth et al. (1995); among others] has argued that government deficits may cause 
trade deficits through different channels. For example, in a Mundell-Fleming framework, it 
is argued that an increase in the budget deficit would induce upward pressure on interest 
rates, causing capital inflows and an appreciation of the exchange rate that will increase the 
current account deficit. The Keynesian absorption theory suggests that an increase in the 
budget deficit would induce domestic absorption and thus, import expansion, causing a 
current account deficit. Another contrary view is provided by Barro (1989), known as the 
Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (REH). He states that shifts between taxes and budget 
deficits do not matter for the real interest rate, the quantity of investment, or the current 
account balance. In other words, theoretically, REH negates any relationship between the 
two deficits. 
Moreover, other literature [e.g. Allen (1977); Penati (1983); Bisignano and Hoover 
(1982); Branson (1985); Hakkio (1996); Stoker (1999); among others] has concentrated on 
the relationship between the budget deficit and the exchange rate. Some of these studies, 
such as Bisignano and Hoover (1982), argue that deficits may appreciate or depreciate the 
exchange rate, depending on the relative importance of wealth effects and relative asset 
substitution effects. 
Extensive literature [e.g. Feldstein (1982); Dwyer (1982); Mascaro and Meltzer 
(1983); Plosser (1982; 1987); Kormendi (1983); Aschauer (1985); Evans (1985; 1987); Zahid 
(1988); Monadjemi (1989); Allen (1990); Cebula (1988; 1991); Al-Saji (1993); Knot and de 
Haan (1999); Vamvoukas (2000); among others] has focused on the relationship between 
budget deficits and interest rates. Some of these studies, such as Feldstein (1982); Mascaro 
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and Meltzer (1983); Monadjemi (1989); Cebula (1988); Al-Saji (1993) among others, have 
used the IS-LM model to study the impact of a budget deficit on interest rates. In contrast 
others such as Cebula (1988); Cebula and Rhodd (1993); Modeste (2000); among others 
used the loanable funds model. However, in the economic literature there are two 
conflicting views regarding the effect of government budget deficits on interest rates. The 
first view represents the standard analysis where the impact of increased deficits on interest 
rates operates through the effect of higher spending and increased wealth on the demand 
for money (e.g. Neoclassical and Keynesian models), while the other view (e.g. Ricardian 
model) argues that the value of the new debt is simply perceived as the present value of the 
future tax liabilities. This means that the government debt is not viewed as net wealth, and, 
as a result, money demand would not be affected. Consequently, interest rates remain 
unchanged as well. Finally, it is worth noting here that other researchers [e.g. Eisner and 
Pirper (1987); Nelson and Singh (1994); Karras (1994); Al-Khedair (1996); among many 
others] have focused on the relationship between the budget deficit and the growth of 
GDP. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to conduct an overview, both theoretical and 
empirical, of the relationship between budget deficits and macroeconomic variables (such 
as growth, interest rates, trade deficit, exchange rate, among others). The chapter is divided 
into five sections. Section 4.2 identifies the theoretical debate between budget deficits and 
macroeconomic variables. It will cover topics such as the crowding in and crowding out 
effects of public investment; deficits, wealth and spending effects; deficits and the exchange 
rate; deficits and inflation; and fiscal imbalances and trade deficits. Section 4.3 will review 
some of the previous empirical studies with respect to the impact of budget deficits on a 
host of macroeconomic variables. It will cover the same topics but look at the nature and 
significance of these relationships from an empirical perspective. Some of the most 
substantive and important empirical studies will be identified in this section. Section 4.4 
will review some econometric models (such as budget deficit and interest rate models, the 
IS-LM model, the budget deficit and trade deficit models, the budget deficit and economic 
growth model, and the budget deficit and multivariable model), which have been used in 
some empirical studies to investigate the impact of a budget deficit on some 
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macroeconomic variables. Section 4.5 summarizes some of the most substantive 
conclusions from the studies presented and the major conclusions derivable from this 
chapter. 
 
4.2 Budget Deficit and Macroeconomic Variables: Theoretical Debates 
The purpose of this section is to review some of the major theoretical arguments 
regarding the linkage between a budget deficit and macroeconomic variables.  
 
4.2.1 Budget Deficits, Crowding in and Crowding out Effects 
Schools of Thought  
After analysing the literature on the effects of budget deficits on private investment 
one finds three distinct schools of thought, these are Neoclassical, Keynesian, and 
Ricardian equivalence. Each providing different paradigms. Bernhein (1989) provides a 
brief summary of the three paradigms. The Neoclassical school considers individuals 
planning their consumption over their entire life cycle. By shifting taxes to future 
generations, budget deficits increase current consumption. By assuming full employment of 
resources the Neoclassical school argues that increased consumption implies a decrease in 
saving. Interest rates must rise to bring equilibrium in the capital markets. Higher interest 
rates, in turn, result in a decline in private investment44.  
In addition, there are Keynesians who provide a counter argument to the crowd-in 
effect by making reference to the expansionary effects of budget deficits. They argue that 
usually budget deficits result in an increase in domestic production, which makes private 
investors more optimistic about the future course of the economy resulting in them 
investing more. This is known as the “crowding-in” effect. It is worth noting here that the 
traditional Keynesian view differs from the standard Neoclassical paradigm in two 
fundamental ways. First, it permits the possibility that some economic resources are 
unemployed. Second, it presupposes the existence of a large number of liquidity-
                                                 
44 It should be mentioned that the Neoclassical Economist also believes in the crowding-out effect of 
budget deficits. 
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constrained individuals. The second assumption guarantees that aggregate consumption is 
very sensitive to changes in disposable income. 
Many traditional Keynesians argue that deficits need not crowd out private 
investment. Eisner (1989, p. 83) is an example of this group, who suggests that increased 
aggregate demand enhances the profitability of private investments and leads to a higher 
level of investment at any given rate of interest. Hence, deficits may stimulate aggregate 
saving and investment, despite the fact that they raise interest rates. He concludes that 
“The evidence is thus that deficits have not crowded-out investment. There has rather been 
crowding in”. 
It is worth noting that it is argued that public capital crowds out or crowds in 
private capital, depending on the relative strength of two opposing forces: (1) as a 
substitute in production for private capital, public capital tends to crowd out private capital; 
and (2) by raising the return to private capital, public capital tends to crowd in private 
capital. Therefore, on balance, public capital will crowd out or crowd in private capital, 
depending on whether public and private capital are gross substitutes or gross 
complements (see, for example, Aschauer (1989b)). Furthermore, Aschauer (1989a, 1989b) 
argues, on the one hand, that higher public investment raises the national rate of capital 
accumulation above the level chosen (in a presumed rational fashion) by private sector 
agents; therefore, public capital spending may crowd out private expenditures on capital 
goods on an ex ante basis as individuals seek to re-establish an optimal intertemporal 
allocation of resources. On the other hand, public capital, particularly infrastructure capital 
such as highways, water systems, sewers, and airports, is likely to bear a complementary 
relationship with private capital. Hence, higher public investment may raise the marginal 
productivity of private capital and, thereby, “crowd-in” private investment. 
Finally, there is the Ricardian equivalence approach advanced by Barro (1989) who 
argues that an increase in budget deficits, say due to an increase in government spending, 
must be paid for either now or later, with the total present value of receipts fixed by the 
total present value of spending. Thus, a cut in today’s taxes must be matched by an increase 
in future taxes, leaving interest rates, and thus private investment, unchanged45.  
                                                 
45 For key theoretical objections to the Ricardian Equivalence approach, see Bernhein (1989). 
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Macroeconomists [e.g. Bailey (1971); Buiter (1977); David and Scadding; among 
others] are interested in the relationship between private investment and public 
expenditures mainly because of the crowding out effect of public spending. The 
“crowding-out” effect reduces the ability of the government to influence economic activity 
through fiscal measures. Furthermore, Yellen (1989) argues that in standard Neoclassical 
macroeconomic models, the method selected by the government to finance its spending 
program affects the levels of consumption, investment and net exports. Such models 
assume that aggregate consumption is higher, and national (private plus public) saving 
lower, if a given government-spending program is financed by issuing bonds rather than 
through current taxation. If resources are fully employed, so that output is fixed, higher 
current consumption implies an equal and offsetting reduction in other forms of spending. 
Thus, investment and/or net exports must be fully “crowded out”. It is worth noting that it 
is important to distinguish between “financial” crowding out which has been mentioned 
before and “resource” crowding out which occurs when the government competes with 
the private sector on purchasing certain resources (skilled labour, raw materials and so on). 
When the government sector expands the private sector will contract because of the 
increase in prices on these resources due to an excess demand by the government, hence 
this leads to a fall in investment and consumption by the private sector. Thus the 
government sector’s expansion crowds out the private sector. It is worth noting here as 
well that resource crowding out is an important issue to take into account especially in 
developing countries where resources are scarce even sometimes to the private sector, so 
any excess demand for these resources by the government will severely impinge private 
sector productivity. 
Furthermore, Premchand (1984) asserts that financing the budget deficit by 
borrowing from the public implies an increase in the supply of government bonds. In order 
to improve the attractiveness of these bonds the government offers them at a lower price, 
which leads to higher interest rates. The increase in interest rates discourages the issue of 
private bonds, private investment, and private spending. In turn, this contributes to the 
financial crowding out of the private sector. 
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In addition, Barro (1990; 1991) utilised endogenous-growth models by extending 
them to include tax-financed government services that affect production and utility. He 
studied the effects of tax financed government expenditure on investment and output in a 
cross-sectional study of 98 countries over the period 1960-85. He found that the ratio of 
real government consumption expenditure to real GDP ( yg c / ) had a negative association 
with growth and investment. The argument was that government consumption had no 
direct effect on private productivity, but lowered saving and growth through the distorting 
effects from taxation or government-expenditures programs. It is worth noting that the 
author measured the ratio of real public gross investment to real GDP ( )/ yg i . This public 
investment corresponds to a stock of public capital, ,gk which generates a flow of services 
that he views as comparable to the productive services g. Hence, this empirical measure 
identifies g with “infrastructure services”, such as transportation, water, electric power, and 
so on (although hospitals and schools are also components of public capital). In addition, 
the identification of the flow of services from public capital with productive government 
services is imperfect. It is worth mentioning that the assumptions in this study are that g/y 
is constant over time for a single country, and that public and private capital have the same 
depreciation rates. According to the theory the relationship of the growth rate γ  to ig i /  
depends on how the government behaves. If governments optimise (go close to the point 
of maximal growth), γ  and ig i /  would indicate little cross-sectional correlation. On the 
other hand the association would be positive (or negative) if governments typically choose 
too little (or too much) productive public services. Thus, this study, by dividing tax-
financed government expenditure into spending on unproductive services (e.g., 
consumption, subsidizing food) and spending on productive services (e.g., building 
infrastructure), found that the spending on consumption services affects growth negatively, 
while spending on productive services affects growth positively. The distinction between 
productive and unproductive government services provides vital information for an 
analysis of the effects of the government budget on capital formation and growth. 
Heng (1997) utilised an overlapping-generations (OLG) model to provide a 
theoretical framework to analyse the “crowding in” issue of private capital by public capital. 
The author shows that public capital crowds in private capital through two channels, 
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namely, via its impact on the marginal productivity of labour and savings, and via (gross) 
complementarity/substitutability between public and private capital. Kelly (1997) argues 
that public investment and social expenditures may promote economic expansion by 
reducing social conflict and, hence, creating a climate conductive for investment in human 
and physical capital. He also contends that social expenditures enhance growth by fostering 
welfare and productivity improvements. Kelly (1997) continues to argue that the 
complementarity of public and private action is likely to be important in developing nations 
where such factors as severe income disparity, asset concentration, the disparate nature of 
production in the agricultural and industrial sectors, and fragmented financial markets 
which characterise most developing countries, may warrant substantial public investment 
programs. In such instances, public investment is likely to be a central determinant of 
successful private sector activity and economic growth (e.g. infrastructure capital; social 
expenditures). The complementary hypothesis is crucial because it implies that public 
investment has direct and indirect influences on economic growth. These indirect effects 
may be channelled through private investment and national output. Public investment may 
directly raise growth by adding to the stock of total social capital. Public investment may 
indirectly enhance growth by improving the climate for private investment through public 
good provision. Furthermore, public investment may increase current national output, 
which in turn stimulates higher private investment and higher growth. The author also 
departs from conventional approaches by emphasising that public investment programs 
may assist nations channel saving (and borrowing) to productive use. While even the 
crowding-out literature has recognised that a limited amount of public investment may 
contribute to growth, that literature has tended to view social programmes, with the 
exception of education, as unproductive. Hence, the literature recently has largely ignored 
the effects of social expenditures other than education on economic growth (Kelly, 1997).  
Hence, it can be concluded from the above discussion that at the theoretical level it 
is necessary to take into account, when we are analysing the effects of fiscal policy, both the 
demand and the supply sides of the economy. However, as mentioned earlier, public 
investment is likely to be a central determinant of successful private sector activity and 
economic growth (e.g. infrastructure capital; social expenditures). Therefore, higher public 
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investment may raise the marginal productivity of private capital and, thereby, “crowd-in” 
private investment (Aschauer, 1989). 
 
4.2.2 Deficits, Wealth and Spending Effects 
There are many ways in which a government’s choice of fiscal instruments may 
influence the country’s net wealth (and the current account balance as part of changes in 
that net wealth). The most obvious way in which governments can use fiscal measures to 
affect net wealth and the current account balance is by their own expenditure (this will be 
discussed later in this section). 
Barth et al. (1986) suggests that, as long as the rate of growth of output ( y&) 
exceeds the rate of interest ( i ), public debt is unambiguously net wealth. The reason is that, 
in such circumstances, future taxes are not necessary to service the debt. Economic growth 
will accommodate indefinite deficits without jeopardizing the tax raising capacity of the 
economy. If y& is less than i , then the status of national debt is ambiguous. Government 
debt will be considered “net wealth only to the extent that current generations do not fully 
discount the increase in future tax liability to service the debt, which in this case cannot be 
serviced solely with revenues generated by economic growth” (Barth et al., 1986, p. 28). If 
i  exceeds y&, and there is no primary surplus (revenues less outlays net of interest 
payments), then federal debt will grow more rapidly than the economy (Abizadeh and 
Yousefi, 1996).  
In addition, Aschauer (1985) argues that government spending of various sorts may 
affect employment, output, consumption, and investment by altering the wealth or by 
directly affecting the marginal productivity of labour and private capital. He also pointed 
out that the negative wealth effect associated with the temporary rise in government 
purchases induces the agent to decrease consumption and increase labour supply. 
Barro (1989) argues that the Ricardian results depend on “full employment”, and 
surely do not hold in Keynesian models. In standard Keynesian analysis, if everyone thinks 
that a budget deficit makes them wealthier the resulting expansion of aggregate demand 
raises output and employment and thereby actually makes people wealthier. This result 
holds if the economy begins in a state of “involuntary unemployment”. There may even be 
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multiple, rational expectations equilibria, where the change in actual wealth coincides with 
the change in perceived wealth. This result does not mean that budget deficits increase 
aggregate demand and wealth in Keynesian models. Barro (1989) argues that if we had 
conjectured that budget deficits made people feel poorer, the resulting contractions in 
output and employment would have made them poorer. Similarly, if we had started with 
the Ricardian notion that budget deficits did not affect wealth, the Keynesian results would 
have verified that conjecture. The odd feature of the standard Keynesian model is that 
anything that makes people feel wealthier actually makes them wealthier (although the 
perception and actuality need not correspond quantitatively). This observation raises 
doubts about the formulation of Keynesian models, but says little about the effects of 
budget deficits (Barro, 1989, pp. 47-48). 
Ball and Mankiw (1995) argue that in the long run an economy’s output is 
determined by its productive capacity, which in turn is partly determined by its stock of 
capital. When deficits reduce investment the capital stock grows more slowly than it 
otherwise would. Over a year, or two, this crowding out of investment has a negligible 
effect on the capital stock. But if deficits continue for a decade or more, they can 
substantially reduce the economy’s capacity to produce goods and services. Moreover, 
recall that budget deficits, by reducing national saving, must reduce either investment or 
net exports. As a result, they must lead to some combination of a smaller capital stock and 
greater foreign ownership of domestic assets. If budget deficits crowd out capital, national 
income falls because less is produced; if budget deficits lead to trade deficits, just as much 
is produced, but less of the income from production accrues to domestic residents (Ball 
and Mankiw, 1995). 
In addition to affecting total income, Ball and Mankiw (1995) argue that deficits 
also alter factor prices: wages (the return to labour) and profits (the return to the owners of 
capital). According to the standard theory of factor markets the marginal product of labour 
determines the real wage, and the marginal product of capital determines real profits. When 
deficits reduce the capital stock the marginal product of labour falls, for each worker has 
less capital to work with. At the same time the marginal product of capital rises, for the 
scarcity of capital makes the marginal unit of capital more valuable. Therefore, to the extent 
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that budget deficits reduce the capital stock, they lead to lower real wages and higher rates 
of profit. Hence, according to Ball and Mankiw the accumulated effects of the deficits alter 
the economy’s output and wealth 
Perkins (1997) argues that if a government attempts to improve the current account 
balance by reducing its own spending on useful infrastructure, the consequent decline in 
net wealth is likely to exceed whatever benefit arises from the stronger current account. If 
the government reduces its expenditure overseas-on such items as defence or diplomatic 
activity - that will tend to strengthen the current account (and to that extent increase 
national net wealth) without reducing its outlays within the country, so that there is no 
general presumption that this form of reduction in government outlays will reduce the level 
of activity or domestic real investment. 
In general, government spending on productive capital (including human capital) in 
large and highly industrialized countries, probably has a relatively low import content (apart 
from those forms of capital investment associated with overseas military spending). A 
reduction in the general level of government spending on goods and services will often 
tend to reduce domestic activity more than imports (the UK is probably an example of 
such a country). On the other hand, for countries that have to import much of their capital 
equipment, a rise in government outlays on infrastructure may well be expected to lead to a 
larger current account deficit at any given level of activity (Australia is an example of such a 
country). It is, moreover, possible that the strengthening of the country’s exchange rate 
consequent on the reduction in the government’s claims for foreign exchange, will have 
adverse effects on the profitability of domestic industry. This may reduce output below 
capacity and have adverse consequences for the country in terms of both its level of 
employment and real output, and also of its net wealth (Perkins, 1997, pp. 82-83). 
Furthermore, Perkins points out that the effects on the current account, or national net 
wealth, from different fiscal measures to stimulate investment are likely to vary greatly with 
the extent to which a country produces its own investment goods. This is likely to be a 
much more important consideration than whether the stimulus to investment is brought 
about by higher government infrastructure spending or by an increase in tax concessions to 
private investment.  
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Devereux and Love (1995) investigated the impact of government spending policies 
in a two-sector endogenous growth model developed by King and Rebelo (1990) and  
Rebelo (1991), extended to allow for an endogenous consumption leisure decision. 
Devereux and Love (1995) concluded that there is a positive relationship between lump 
sum financed government spending and growth rates. The explanation of this, as in many 
“endogenous growth” models, is that the rate of growth is positively related to the rate of 
return on human and physical capital accumulation. The return on human capital 
accumulation is higher the greater is the fraction of time spent working, in either sector. A 
higher rate of government spending generates negative wealth effects (as in Aiyagari, 
Christiano, and Eichenbaum, 1992), leading to a reduction in leisure and a rise in hours 
worked. Consequently, the rate of growth rises. Although government spending raises the 
long-run growth rate; it reduces welfare since government spending is a less than perfect 
substitute for private spending (were they perfect substitutes, the growth rate would be 
unaffected) (Devereux and Love, 1995). 
Moreover, when government spending is financed with an income tax, or by a wage 
tax, the negative wealth effect of the rise in spending on labour supply conflicts with a 
substitution effect, which leads to a reduction in labour supply. In this case the spending 
increase always reduces the growth rate. In this literature on the output effects of 
government spending, a temporary spending policy has only temporary effects on the level 
of output (Devereux and Love, 1995). 
 
4.2.3 Deficits and the Exchange Rate Debate 
An extensive literature has examined the relationship between the budget deficit 
and exchange rates. Abstracting from direct spending effects, or transactions crowding-out, 
a central concern of large budget deficits can be stated as the “portfolio Crowding-Out” 
hypothesis. This hypothesis asserts that debt disturbances, associated with large deficits, 
will adversely affect key asset prices, which will induce reductions in aggregate demand46. In 
a closed economy this hypothesis implies a significant positive association between debt 
                                                 
46 For a closed economy discussion of portfolio crowding-out and how it relates to other forms of 
crowding-out, see Friedman (1978). 
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stock disturbances (budget deficits) and real interest rates. Such a relationship is consistent 
with a domestic loanable funds47 approach to interest rate determination. 
In an open economy, portfolio crowding-out can arise through the exchange rate 
affecting the current account. This view stresses the importance of international capital 
movements in response to debt disturbances and the linkage between budget deficits and 
exchange rates (Bundt and Solocha, 1988). An example of “exchange rate crowding-out” is 
found in Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962), who showed that, in a small open economy 
model with fixed prices and static exchange rate expectations, expansionary debt-financed 
fiscal policy is completely crowded out under a flexible exchange rate and perfect capital 
mobility. Dissatisfaction with the flow approach to modelling exchange rates gave rise to 
the portfolio-balance approach and monetary approaches48. The portfolio-balance 
approach follows Floyd (1969), who argued that analysis of international capital 
movements should be formulated in the context of a stock portfolio adjustment model. 
The class of portfolio-balance exchange rate models (Girton and Henderson, 1976; 
Branson, Halttunen, and Masson, 1977; Marston (1980)) follow Tobin (1969) in 
concentrating on short-run impact effects of changes in outside asset stocks on asset 
prices. These models view the exchange rate as an asset price where exchange rate 
expectations play an important role in explaining exchange rate variability49. 
While the literature on the linkage between deficits and exchange rates is small 
compared to the literature on deficits and interest rates, some notable studies have been 
undertaken by Allen (1977) who looks at stability surrounding the deficit in a small, open-
economy dynamic portfolio balance model. Using a small-country setting with static 
                                                 
47 According to the LFT (Loanable Funds Theory) interest rates are determined as a result of interaction 
between supply and demand for loanable funds. Supply of loanable funds includes national saving and 
changes to the stock of money. Demand for loanable funds is composed of investments and changes in 
demand for money balances. An increase in supply or a reduction in demand for funds reduces interest 
rates. On the other hand, a decline in supply or an increase in demand for funds causes higher interest 
rates (Hoelscher, 1983; 1986).  
 
48 See Kouri (1976) for a rigorous exposition on the shortcomings of the flow approach to exchange rate 
determination. 
 
49 See Mussa (1976) for a good discussion of the implications of viewing the exchange rate as an asset 
price, as well as the role of exchange rate expectations in explaining exchange rate volatility. 
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exchange rate expectations, Bisignano and Hoover (1982) show how increases in the deficit 
may appreciate or depreciate the exchange rate depending on the relative importance of 
wealth effects and relative asset substitution effects50. They conclude that the deficit, 
combined with tight monetary policy, will cause the currency to appreciate. Furthermore, 
Barro (1974) argued that, if it is assumed that taxpayers realize that current deficits must be 
paid by future taxes, they will increase their savings by an amount equal to the present 
value of future tax liabilities due to current deficits. Therefore, government deficit 
financing offset by higher saving does not affect interest rates or the exchange rate (Barro, 
1989). 
An outgrowth of the monetary approach to exchange rate determination, the 
currency substitution hypothesis, argues, that the world portfolio demand for currencies of 
developed economies is sensitive to exchange rate expectations. Thus, currency 
substitution exposes economies to international financial disturbances that reverberate 
through international money markets. An important lesson of the currency substitution 
literature is the distinction between currency mobility and capital mobility for issues of 
monetary control in the open economy. Boyer (1978) has shown that currency mobility, as 
distinct from capital mobility, is an important mechanism of international portfolio 
adjustment. McKinnon (1982; 1984) and Cuddington (1983) have shown that currency 
substitution will hamper independent monetary control under flexible exchange rates. 
Similarly, Swanson and How (1986) argue that efficient international cash management 
policies may enhance spot currency market volatility. Daniel (1985), using a two-country 
perfect foresight model, shows how currency substitution acts as a channel for the 
international transmission of monetary disturbances under flexible exchange rates. The 
implication is that monetary effects of fiscal policy are transmitted through international 
money markets, which, outside of international policy coordination, influence the exchange 
                                                 
50 The relationship between an increase in the domestic country debt stock and the domestic country 
currency depends on relative substitutability in wealth between domestic money, domestic bonds, and 
foreign bonds. Intuitively, an increase in the domestic debt stock may produce either excess demand or 
excess supply of foreign bonds, which may require either a depreciation or an appreciation of the 
domestic currency to re-equilibrate this market. Here, the exchange rate serves to revalue domestic wealth 
to bring the demand for foreign assets into line with the supply. See Branson, Halttunen, and Masson 
(1977), Bisignano and Hoover (1982), and Penati (1983) for a more detailed analysis of this relationship. 
 
 
 110 
rate and alter the choice set of policymakers concerning monetary control. Thus, portfolio 
models that ignore currency substitution restrict portfolio behaviour and therefore neglect 
an important channel by which asset prices are determined (Bundt and Solocha, 1988). 
In addition to the flow approach to modelling exchange rates, portfolio balance, 
monetary approach, and currency substitution approaches have, as noted earlier, been 
developed by many researchers. Authors like Allen (1977), Penati (1983), Branson (1985), 
Bisignano and Hoover (1982), Hutchison and Pigott (1984), Hutchison and Throop (1985), 
Evans (1986), Frenkel and Razin (1987), Bundt and Solocha (1988), Abell (1990), and 
Hakkio (1996) have utilised alternative and complementary models of exchange rates to 
investigate whether a budget deficit leads to a currency appreciation or vice versa. Here, we 
limit our discussion to some recent developments. Hakkio (1996) theoretically (empirical 
work relating to this study will be presented in section 4.3) provides a summary of the 
direct and indirect effects of deficits on exchange rates. He analysed the direct impact of a 
deficit reduction within the framework of the crowding-out effect. Lower deficit financing 
by government reduces the demand for loanable funds, which lowers interest rates and 
makes foreign portfolio assets more attractive. Demand for foreign currency rises, and, as a 
result, the domestic currency depreciates. In addition, Hakkio (1996) argues that the 
indirect effects of budget deficits are mainly related to the role of expectations in asset 
allocation. Market expectations of future deficits and exchange rates lead to immediate 
change in exchange rates and higher volatility in the market.  
Hakkio provides a summary of the indirect effects of a deficit on the exchange rate. 
He argues that a deficit reduction can cause a higher demand for loanable funds through 
three major channels: lower expected inflation, lower foreign exchange risk, and a greater 
expected rate of return on domestic assets because of lower inflation. Large-size or out of 
control budget deficits that are financed by printing money lead to higher inflationary 
expectations (Hakkio, 1996). Even if the debt is not monetised, its large size could 
convince the markets that it eventually will be paid through an inflation tax. A credible 
attempt to control the deficit lowers inflationary expectations and the inflation premium on 
long-term interest rates. Based on the Fisher effect, nominal long-term interest rates could 
decline by the same percentage and real rates would remain the same. However, if nominal 
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long-term interest rates do not fall as much as the expected inflation premium has declined, 
then real long-term rates would increase. Thus, a deficit reduction makes domestic assets 
more attractive and causes the currency to appreciate. Furthermore, the overall effect of a 
deficit reduction on the exchange rate is dependent on whether the deficit reduction is 
credible, long-term, and sustainable (Hakkio, 1996).  
Stoker (1999)51 used a two-country cash-in-advance framework with an explicitly 
specified government sector. The cash-in advance constraint will hold for both purchases 
of consumption goods and government debt. This study focuses on the impact of 
government deficit spending on the exchange rate. Stoker concluded that the level of 
deficit spending made by a government affects the exchange rate in two ways. In the short 
term, an increase in deficit spending results in an increase in the value of a country’s 
currency. However, this is not simply due to the deficit - it is caused by the increase in 
government spending this deficit permits. In the long term, the effects of this deficit hinge 
on how the debt is to be paid for. If the debt is paid by taxation, it results in a temporary 
decrease in the value of the currency. If the debt is paid for through money growth, the 
decline is permanent. 
It can be concluded from the discussion presented in this section that the 
theoretical relationship between budget deficits and the exchange rate is ambiguous. For 
example, a deficit can lead to a weaker exchange rate. When the government runs a budget 
deficit, it generally enters financial markets and borrows funds to pay the excess of 
spending over taxes. If the budget falls, hence the government needs to borrow less, this 
causes the demand for funds and thus domestic interest rates to decline. As interest rates 
decline, the exchange rate depreciates. In contrast, a decline in the budget deficit can lead 
to a stronger exchange rate. Suppose that the budget deficit falls, this leads directly to a 
decrease in the demand for funds by the government and it may also indirectly lead to an 
increase in the demand for funds by private investors. The increase in the demand for 
                                                 
51 It is worth noting that three assumptions made in Stoker’s study are important to emphasise. Firstly, 
goods from different countries enter the agents’ utility functions separately in the model, there is no 
purchasing power parity. Secondly, the government explicitly purchases goods from its own country. 
Finally, the cash-in-advance constraint holds for both purchases of consumption goods and government 
debt. For further discussions about the model used in this study and the assumptions, see Stoker (1999). 
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funds may bring about one of three effects, (1) lower expected inflation, (2) a lower foreign 
exchange risk premium, and (3) a greater expected rate of return on domestic securities. 
These indirect effects induce private investors to increase their demand for domestic 
securities relative to foreign securities. As investors switch from foreign to domestic 
securities, the exchange rate could tend to appreciate (Hakkio, 1996). 
 
4.2.4 Deficits and Inflation Debate 
Government deficits and its financing as a primary cause of inflation has received 
serious attention since Friedman (1968). Three different connections between budget 
deficits and inflation are predominant in the literature. The most direct connection between 
government deficits and inflation is that by increasing the real value of outstanding bonds 
and perceived net wealth, a deficit can raise total spending and the price level because the 
economy is operating at full employment (Dwyer, 1982). This connection is also the most 
long-standing, and is suggested, for example, by Metzler (1951) and Patinkin (1965).  
Friedman (1968) argued that the monetary authorities could control the inflation 
rate, especially in the long run, with control of the money supply. Deficits can lead to 
inflation, but only to the extent that they are monetised. Thus, money-financed deficits are 
inflationary; bond-financed deficits need not be52. Whether bond-financed deficits are 
inflationary or not depends upon the current approach to policy of the monetary 
authorities. If they are stabilizing (pegging) interest rates then bond-financed deficits are 
inflationary, because this calls for an expansion in the money supply that ultimately leads to 
rising prices. Sargent and Wallace (1981) have supported the proposition that the Central 
Bank will be obliged to monetise the deficit either now or in later periods. Such 
monetisation results in an increase in the money supply and the rate of inflation, at least in 
the long-run period. An alternative view, expounded by Miller (1983), argues that 
government deficits are necessarily inflationary irrespective of whether the deficits are 
monetised or not. According to Miller, deficit policy leads to inflation through different 
channels. The Central Bank might be forced into monetary accommodation of the deficits 
                                                 
52 Buchman and Wagner (1977) argued that government deficits would be monetised due to political 
pressure; the monetary authorities do not have a true choice. 
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as argued by Sargent and Wallace (1981). But, even if the Central Bank does not monetise 
the deficit, deficits are still inflationary through crowding out. That is, non-monetised 
deficits lead to higher interest rates. Higher interest rates crowd out private investment, and 
hence reduce the rate of growth of real output. Higher interest rates also spur the financial 
sector to innovate in the payment system and make government bonds more substitutable 
for money53.  
Barro (1978; 1979) has put forward a hypothesis that deficits are a result of 
inflation, rather than inflation being a result of deficits. The government deficit is the 
change in the nominal value of outstanding government bonds. If the anticipated inflation 
increases, then the nominal value of bonds must increase to maintain the real value of 
outstanding bonds. In addition, the Monetarists have argued that there is a positive link 
between government deficits and monetary growth, asserting that higher bond-financed 
deficits will put upward pressure on interest rates and on government bonds. Because the 
Central Bank is concerned with smoothing interest rate movements, so it would then tend 
to increase the money supply (Darrat, 1985). 
Furthermore, Sargent and Wallace (1981) showed that if the time paths of 
government spending and taxes are exogenous, bond-financed deficits are non-sustainable 
because it will push interest rate excessively high and the Central Bank would eventually 
have to monetise the deficit. This will increase the money supply and inflation in the long 
run. These findings have subsequently been generalized for the open economy case and for 
alternative forms of financing (see Scarth 1987; Langdana 1990).  
Meltzer (1989) provided a monetarist approach to the budget deficit by arguing that 
deficits have an effect on inflation. He argued that Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil provide 
examples of inflation that was financed by money issued to pay for government spending 
during the 1980s. Furthermore, he argued that the experience in most developed countries 
                                                 
53 Miller (1980) argued that current bond-financed deficits do not imply a future tax liability to society. 
The government will issue more bonds to cover the maturing indebtedness as well as any new addition to 
total indebtedness. Hence, since government bonds are not backed by tangible assets or by future taxes; 
the bonds are in essence a part of the money supply. Cox (undated) argued analogously that if interest 
payments on government bonds are financed by deficits, then government bonds are net nominal wealth. 
An increase in government debt will therefore result in a higher price level as a result of an increase in the 
money supply. 
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does not support the view that deficits must sooner or later increase money growth and 
produce inflation. An example is Italy, which experienced a budget deficit of about 10 
percent of GNP throughout the 1980s. However, inflation was reduced from about 20 
percent to about 5 percent a year during this period. Other examples of persistent deficits 
and declining inflation are noticeable in Japan and the United States. In Japan the inflation 
rate was almost zero while the budget deficit climbed during the 1980s. During the same 
period the inflation rate in the U.S. declined from 10 percent to about 4 percent, despite 
the increasing budget deficit of the 1980s (Meltzer, 1989). The reason for the decline in 
inflation rates can be attributed to the decline of money growth despite borrowing. 
Abizadeh et al. (1986) in their studies focus on the link between deficits and 
inflation. They argue that one way of resolving the controversy over deficits and inflation is 
“to test the possibility of a causal link between the growth of government expenditures and 
inflation. This should be done in light of the fact that governments can grow without 
necessarily generating deficits” (p. 394). The authors’ study led them to conclude that “the 
hypothesis of a direct link between the size of the deficit and the size of government is 
maintained” (p. 408). An implication was that large deficits are caused by increased 
government expenditures. If increased government expenditures result in higher deficits, 
and higher deficits in turn cause inflation, then increased government expenditure can 
cause inflation. 
 It can be concluded from the above discussion that the inflationary effect of 
government deficits depends upon the means by which the deficit is financed, and the 
impact of the deficit on aggregate demand. If the government attempts to finance budget 
deficits through bond issues, this could be justified by the notion that the link between 
budget deficits and inflation (or inflationary expectations) depends on money creation 
(Miller, 1983). Hence inflation is seen as being mainly a monetary phenomenon; in other 
words, expansion of the money supply is considered to be a factor, which, in the medium 
term, determines the rate of price increases. Furthermore, it is worth noting that there is a 
direct link between government borrowing requirements and money creation, to the extent 
that such borrowings are financed by the central bank and the commercial banks (in the 
form of loans to the Treasury or the purchase of government securities). The authorities 
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may, however, attempt to limit the monetary financing of the budget deficit by selling 
government securities to the non-bank private sector (households, companies, and financial 
institutions other than banks). In that case there is no effect on the money supply, as assets 
are transferred from the private sector to the government and vice versa when the money 
is spent by the authorities. Thus, whatever the method of financing considered, the effect 
of the budget deficit on monetary growth will depend mainly on the attitude of the 
monetary authorities (i.e. whether they decide to accommodate the deficit increase, by 
allowing the money supply to expand, or not). Hence, from the analysis discussed in this 
section, it can be said that at the theoretical level there is a close link between deficits and 
monetary growth on the one hand and inflation on the other. 
 
4.2.5 Fiscal Imbalances and Trade Deficits: The Twin Deficits 
A positive association between the government budget and trade balance can be 
shown in the context of a simple Keynesian open-economy model. In an open economy, 
gross domestic product, Y, is the sum of private consumption expenditures, C, gross 
private domestic investment expenditures, I, government expenditures, G, and exports, X, 
over imports, M: 
 
Y = C + I + G + X – M       (4.1) 
 
Alternatively, Y equals private consumption expenditures, C, savings, S, and taxes, T: 
 
Y = C + S +T         (4.2) 
 
Substituting (4.2) in (4.1) and rearranging terms yields: 
 
(X-M) = (S-I) + (T-G)        (4.3) 
Equation (4.3) suggests net exports equal private and public savings. Assuming 
there is a balanced fiscal budget (T-G = 0) and balanced trade (X-M = 0, that, is, net 
exports are 0), then (4.3) suggests that private domestic saving equals private domestic 
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investment. This is necessarily the case in a closed economy where domestic investment is 
constrained by domestic saving. However, in an open economy, such a relationship may 
not always exist. An economy with a foreign sector has access to international financial 
markets. Studies of the twin-deficits relationship generally proceed from one of two 
theoretical bases. The hypothesis that increases in the government’s budget deficit leads to 
an increase in the trade deficit follows directly from the Mundell-Fleming model (Fleming, 
1962; Mundell, 1963). It is worth noting here that the Mundell-Fleming model is an open 
economy extension of the IS-LM model. As such, it is not fully “rational”; the assumptions 
made regarding expectations formation are static. In the Mundell-Fleming framework, an 
increase in the government’s budget deficit can generate an accompanying increase in the 
trade deficit through increased consumer spending. By increasing the disposable incomes 
and the financial wealth of consumers, the budget deficit encourages an increase in 
imports. To the extent that increased demand for foreign goods leads to a depreciation in 
the exchange rate, the effect on net exports is mitigated. However, the larger budget deficit 
also pushes up the interest rate (in large open economies) because this appreciates the 
exchange rate, which encourages a net capital inflow and a larger decline in net exports. 
The size of the effect is an empirical matter (Shojai, 1999, p. 92).  
Volcker (1987) argues that budget deficits lead to trade deficits and both hinder 
economic growth in the long run. Fieleke (1987) provided the theoretical basis for the 
relationship between the budget deficit and the trade deficit. He argued that “the dominant 
theory is that an increase in government borrowing in a country will, other things being 
equal, put upward pressure on interest rates (adjusted for expected inflation) in that 
country, thereby attracting foreign investment. As foreign investors acquire the country’s 
currency in order to invest there, they bid up the price of that currency in the foreign 
exchange market. The higher price of the country’s currency will discourage foreigners 
from purchasing its goods but will conversely encourage residents of the country to use 
their now more valuable currency to purchase foreign goods, so that the country’s current 
account will move toward a deficit (or toward a larger deficit). In addition, any increase in 
the country’s total spending resulting from the enlarged government deficit will go partly 
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for imports and for domestic goods that would otherwise be exported, also worsening the 
current account balance” (pp. 173-174). 
Moreover, the Keynesian absorption theory suggests that an increase in the budget 
deficit would induce domestic absorption and hence import expansion, causing a current 
account deficit. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found that savings and investment are highly 
correlated, causing budget deficits and current account deficits to move together. An 
alternative view is that the “twin deficits” are not related in the simple manner depicted by 
conventional economists. The link from the budget deficit to the current account deficit 
can be weak or nonexistent. Therefore, there may not exist any predictable or systematic 
relationship between the two deficits given that there could be many other factors that 
might serve to make the “twin” relationship doubtful. One such factor concerns the 
stability of saving and investment over time (Khalid et al., 1999).  
Another contrary view is provided by the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (REH) 
(Barro, 1989). He states that shifts between taxes and budget deficits do not matter for the 
real interest rate, the quantity of investment, or the current account balance. In other 
words, the REH negates any link between the two deficits, though empirical evidence is 
mixed (this will be discussed later).  
To sum up, as discussed earlier, economic theory suggests that there is a link 
between the so-called twin deficits in open economies. Increased budget deficits lead to an 
increase in the interest rate. An increase in the interest rate appreciates the exchange rate. 
In turn, exports become relatively expensive and imports cheaper, thus generating a trade 
deficit. Hence, empirical evidence of a relationship between the two would be very 
important to enable economists and policymakers to better understand whether there is a 
causal relationship or merely a correlation between these two variables (this will be 
discussed later).  
 
4.3 Empirical Studies  
While the selection of an appropriate paradigm provides us with some clue as to 
the likely effects of budget deficits, the issue is ultimately an empirical one. Today, there is a 
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vast body of research that examines the relationship between budget deficits and a host of 
economic variables. 
Table 4.154 summarises the results from empirical studies on the relationship 
between budget deficits and macroeconomic variables in both developed and developing 
countries. The majority of these studies regress a macroeconomic variable on the deficit 
variable. These studies are cross-country and utilise time series data. Some of these studies 
appear to provide considerable evidence in favour of a relationship between the budget 
deficit and a certain macroeconomic variable.  
 
4.3.1 Deficits, Crowding-out and Crowding in Effects of Public Expenditure  
 As discussed earlier there are two views on the effects of increased government 
expenditure on investment. The traditional one argues that government expenditure 
crowds out private investment. While the non-traditional view sees government 
expenditure stimulating investment. The crowding in of investment occurs when the 
economy’s resources are un-and underemployed. Much empirical work exists that examines 
the effect of government expenditure on economic growth. Guess and Koford (1984) used 
the Granger causality test to find the causal relationship between budget deficits and 
inflation, GNP, and private investment using annual data for seventeen OECD countries 
for the period 1949 to 1981. They concluded that budget deficits do not cause changes in 
these variables. Furthermore, there are other studies that examine the relationship between 
government spending and economic growth using cross-country data in attempts to explain 
the observed differences in growth rates across countries. For example, Landau (1983), in a 
cross-sectional study of over 100 countries, reported evidence of a negative relationship 
between the growth rate of real per capita GDP and the share of government expenditure 
in GDP. Using data on 47 countries over the 1950-77 period, Kormendi and Meguire 
(1985) found no significant cross-sectional relationship between the growth rate of real 
GDP and the growth rate of government consumption spending on output.  
                                                 
54 Some of the empirical studies presented in this section are not included in Table 4.1. The studies, which 
are included in the Table, were chosen because they appear to provide considerable evidence towards a 
relationship between budget deficits and certain macroeconomic variables in both developed and 
developing countries. 
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Using annual data for the US over the period 1953-1986, Aschauer (1989b) 
empirically examined the effect of public expenditure on private investment and the rate of 
return to private capital. He argues that an increase in public investment may be expected 
to reduce private investment nearly one-to-one as the private sector utilizes the public 
capital for its required purposes rather than expand private capacity. At a deeper level, a 
distinctive feature of public infrastructure capital is that it complements private capital in 
the production and distribution of private goods and services. Hence, public investment 
might be thought to raise private investment as the former raises the profitability of private 
capital stock. The empirical results indicate, “that while both channels appear to be 
operating, the latter comes to dominate, so the net effect of a rise in public investment had 
a positive effect on private investment”(Aschauer, 1989, p. 186). This means that 
government investment had a positive effect on private investment and caused “crowding-
in” rather than “crowding-out”. 
 Barro (1991) examined 98 countries during the period 1960-1985 and reported a 
negative relationship between the output growth rate and the share of government 
consumption expenditures. When the share of public investment was considered; however, 
Barro (1991) found a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between public 
investment and the growth rate. 
 Miller and Russek (1997) consider a sample of developed and developing countries 
from 1975 to 1984. They find that both the method of financing and the component of 
government expenditure can have different effects. Debt-financed increases in defence, 
health, and social security and welfare expenditures negatively affect the growth of real per 
capita GDP in developing countries, while debt-financed increases in education 
expenditure positively affected growth in developed countries. Miller and Russek (1997) 
differ from prior studies in that they separate the effects of government expenditure based 
on the method of financing-tax or debt financing.   
 Argimon et al. (1997) separates private from public investment. Using annual data 
for fourteen OECD countries for the period 1978 to 1989, they consider the effects, if any, 
of public consumption and public investment on private investment. They find that public 
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consumption and public investment are negatively associated with private investment 
although only the public consumption effect is significant. 
 Kelly (1997) investigated the effects of public expenditure on economic growth 
among 73 nations (including developing and developed nations) over the period 1970-89. 
This study used OLS to estimate economic growth as a function of various public 
expenditures (such as social expenditure, educational expenditure and other expenditures) 
and certain variables, which have been prominent in the empirical growth literature such as 
private investment, and the trade openness variable. This study found that public 
investment, and particularly housing expenditure, registers a uniformly positive and 
frequently significant relationship with growth. Although the results do not support a 
robust relationship between public investment and growth, they nevertheless conflict with 
the crowding out thesis that dominates the theoretical literature. Social security 
expenditures are positively related to growth in each specification of the model and 
significantly so in several versions. The results are important because they suggest that 
nations may pursue social welfare and growth simultaneously. The results indicate that 
health expenditures are negatively and sometimes significantly related to growth, while 
those for education vary in sign and significance. 
 Ghali (1997) investigated the relationship between government spending and 
economic growth in Saudi Arabia55 using annual data over the period 1960-1996. It should 
be noted here that this study builds on Barro’s (1990) endogenous growth model, to 
untangle the nature of the relationship between these variables56. The conclusion of this 
study “found no consistent evidence that changes in government spending have an impact 
on per capita real output growth” (Ghali, 1997, p. 171). Ghali and Al-shamsi (1997) utilized 
cointegration and Granger-causality to investigate the effects of fiscal policy on economic 
                                                 
55 Saudi Arabia has the largest budget deficit among the Gulf countries. In 1991 the government deficit 
reached 27 percent of GDP, for a detailed discussion see Ghali (1997). 
56 For more details about the model of government spending and economic growth used in this study, and 
not reported here, see Ghali (1997, pp. 166-168). 
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growth for the small oil producing economy of the United Arab Emirates over the period 
1973:1-1995:4. They decomposed public spending into consumption and investment 
expenditures and show how multivariate cointegration techniques can be used to test for 
the long-run relationships and the intertemporal causal effects between government 
spending and economic growth. This study provides evidence that government investment 
has a positive effect on economic growth, whereas the effect of government consumption 
is insignificant (Ghali and Al-Shamsi, 1997, pp. 530-31). 
 Monadjemi and Huh (1998) utilised the error correction model (ECM) to examine 
the relationship between private investment and government spending in Australia, UK, 
and the US over the period 1970:1-1991:4. Empirical results provide limited support for 
“crowding out” effects of government investment on private investment. The rate of 
interest and corporate profitability showed significant effects on private investment in two 
out of three cases (p. 102). Ghali (1998) used multivariate cointegration techniques to 
develop a vector error-correction model to investigate the long-run effects of public 
investment on private capital formation and economic growth. It is worth noting here that 
this study used a neoclassical production function where the private and public capital 
stocks are treated as separate inputs. They apply their methodology to data from Tunisia57 
over the period 1963-93. This study found that in the long run, public investment is found 
to have a negative impact on growth and private investment. In the short-run, public 
investment had a negative impact on private investment and no effect on growth.  
 Bahmani (1999) investigated the long-run relationship between U.S. federal real 
budget deficits and real fixed investment using quarterly data over the 1947:1-1992:2 
period. The methodology in this study is based on the Johansen-Juselius cointegration 
technique. Their empirical results indicated that real budget deficits have crowded in real 
investment, supporting the Keynesians who argue for the expansionary effects of budget 
deficits, by raising the level of domestic economic activity, “crowd- in” private investment 
(Bahmani, 1999, p. 639). 
                                                 
57 Which is a developing country that has recently embarked on a large-scale process of privatisation and 
deregulation of state-own monopolies based on recommendations from the IMF.  
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 Ahmed and Miller (2000) examined the effects of disaggregated government 
expenditure on investment using OLS, fixed-effect, and random-effect methods. This study 
introduced a government budget constraint; it also distinguished between tax- and debt-
financed expenditure. They used pooled time-series, cross-section data (39 countries, 23 
developing countries and 16 developed ones) over the period 1975-1984. It is worth noting 
here that this study ran two sets of regressions. One set uses total government expenditure 
while the other uses disaggregated expenditure items. The different categories of 
government expenditure include defence expenditure to GDP, education expenditure to 
GDP, health expenditure to GDP, social security and welfare expenditure to GDP, 
economic affairs and service expenditure to GDP, transportation and communication 
expenditure to GDP, and other expenditure to GDP. This study also included a trade 
variable, defined as the import plus export share of GDP, because they argue that trade 
variables (such as the import plus export share of GDP and other measures of openness) 
explain investment robustly. Their empirical results produce several conclusions. First, the 
openness variable has a significantly positive effect on investment only for developing 
countries. For developed countries, openness does not significantly affect investment. 
Second, expenditure on transportation and communication, crowds in investment for 
developing countries only. Third, tax-financed government expenditure, in general, crowds 
out investment more frequently that debt-financed government expenditure. That finding 
may suggest the existence of liquidity constraints within the economy. Finally, expenditure 
on social security and welfare crowds out investment for both tax and debt-financed 
increases and in both developing and developed countries. This is the only category of 
government expenditure that had such a consistent (negative) effect across all 
specifications. 
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Table 4.1 Selected Empirical Studies of Budget Deficits and Macroeconomic Variables 
Study/Relationship tested Estimation  
Period 
Country Methodology/ 
Econometric  
Technique 
Major finding 
1-Budget deficit and 
interest rates 
Feldstein and Eckstein 
(1970) 
1954:1-1969:2 US IV -The relatively slow growth of the public debt has exerted downward pressure on interest rates. 
Hutchison and Pyle (1984) 1973-1982 US-UK-
France-
Japan-Italy-
Canada-
Germany 
OLS -Short-term real interest rates are systematically and positively associated with central 
government budget deficits across countries and across time. 
Evans (1985) 1858-1870 
1912-1922 
1938-1950 
1979-1984 
US 2SLS -Large deficits have never been associated with high interest rates. 
Cebula (1988) 1955:1-1984:4 US IV -The federal budget deficit exercises a positive and significant impact upon the nominal interest 
rate. 
Al-Saji (1993) 1960:1-1990:2 UK 2SLS -Government budget deficits do exert a significant and positive effect on nominal and long-
term interest rates. 
Cebula and Rhodd (1993) 1971-1985 US IV -Budget deficits (net of debt service payments) exercise a positive and significant impact upon 
the nominal long-term rate of interest. 
Liargovas et al. (1997) 1980-1994 Greece Engle-Granger 
Cointegration 
-There is a positive relationship between government deficits and interest rates in Greece. 
Vamvoukas (2000) 1949-1994 
1953-1994 
1957-1994 
Greece Cointegration, 
ECM 
-Support the Keynesian model of a significant and positive relationship between budget deficits 
and interest rates. 
Modeste (2000) 1964-1996 Jamaica Cointegration, 
ECM 
-Budget deficits force up interest rates and cause “crowding out” of private investment. 
Cebula (2000) 1973-1995 US IV -Strong evidence that budget deficits do raise the long-term real ex post rate of interest. 
2-Budget deficit and 
trade balance 
 
Bundt and Solocha (1988) 1973:II-1987:II US-Canada-
Germany 
SUR -There is evidence of a linkage between the budget deficit and the trade deficit arising through 
the exchange rate. 
 
 123 
Table 4.2 Continued 
Study/Relationship tested Estimation  
Period 
Country Methodology/ 
Econometric  
Technique 
Major finding 
Zietz and Pemberton 
(1990) 
1972:4-1987:2 US 2SLS -Budget deficits affect the trade deficit mainly through its impact on domestic absorption and 
income rather than through higher interest and exchange rate. 
Abell (1990b) 1979:02- 
1985:02 
US VAR -Budget deficits influence trade deficits indirectly rather than directly. 
Kearney and Monadjemi 
(1990) 
1972:1-1987:4 Australia-
UK- 
Canada-
France- 
Germany-
Ireland-
Italy-US 
VAR -There is evidence for the existence of a temporary twin deficits relationship that does not 
persist over time. 
Bachman (1992) 1974-1988 US VAR -No evidence of cointegration between the current account and the budget deficit. 
Kasa (1994) 1952-1993 
1962-1992 
1970-1993 
US 
Japan 
Germany 
Joint maximum 
likelihood 
-In all three countries there is a significant link between trade deficits and budget deficits. 
Islam (1998) 1973:1-1991:4 Brazil Granger’s test 
of causality 
-There is bilateral causality between trade deficits and budget deficits. 
Piersanti (2000) 1970-1997 OECD Granger-Sims 
causality; IV 
-Evidence that strongly supports the view that current account deficits have been associated 
with large budget deficits in most industrialised countries. 
3-Budget deficit and 
inflation 
    
Darrat (1985) Post-1960 US OLS -Both monetary growth and federal deficits have had a significant influence on inflation. 
Ahking and Miller (1985) 1950-1980 US Trivariate  
autoregressive 
model 
-For the 1960s, both government deficits and inflation are econometrically exogenous. But for 
the 1950s and the 1970s, government deficits, money growth, and inflation are all causally 
related. 
Hondroyiannis and 
Papapetrou (1994) 
1960-1992 Greece Granger-Sims 
Causality test 
-There is a long-run relationship between the government budget and the price level and 
supports the hypothesis of a bi-directional causality between the two variables. 
Sowa (1994) 1963-90 Ghana ECM -Inflation, either in the long run or short run, is influenced more by output volatility than by 
monetary factors. 
Metin (1995) 1950-88 Turkey ECM -Fiscal expansion dominated the determination of inflation. 
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Table 4.1 Continued 
Study/Relationship tested Estimation  
Period 
Country Methodology/ 
Econometric  
Technique 
Major finding 
Metin (1998) 1950-1987 Turkey OLS -Budget deficits (as well as real income growth and debt monetisation) significantly affect 
inflation in Turkey. 
Darrat (2000) 1957-1993 Greece ECM -Besides money growth, higher budget deficits have also played a significant and direct role in 
the Greek inflationary process. 
4-Budget deficit and 
exchange rate 
    
Burney and Akhtar (1992) 1971-72-1989-
90 
Pakistan OLS -Budget deficits have a significant positive impact on the real exchange rate directly as well as 
indirectly through the price level. 
Humpage (1992) 1973-1991 US Engle-Granger 
Cointegration 
-No evidence of a long-term relationship between common aggregate interest rates, real dollar 
exchange rates, and real net exports. 
Hakkio (1996) 1979-1994 OECD SUR -In all countries under investigation, except Japan, UK, and Australia, deficit reduction through 
cutting government spending causes the currency to appreciate. 
5-Budget deficit/Public 
spending and 
growth/investment 
    
Aschauer (1989b) 1953-1986 US Maximum 
likelihood 
-The net effect of a rise in public investment had a positive effect on private investment. 
Barro (1991) 1960-1985 Cross-
sectional 
(98) 
OLS -A negative relationship between output growth and the share of government consumption 
expenditures. 
Arora and Dua (1993) 1980-1989 US OLS -Higher budget deficits crowd out domestic investment and increase trade deficits. 
Nelson and Singh (1994) 1970-1979 
1980-1989 
Cross-
sectional 
(70) 
OLS -The budget deficit variable exercised little or no impact of any statistical significance on 
economic growth in LDCs during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Kelly (1997) 1970-1989 Cross-
sectional 
(73) 
OLS -Public investment (particularly housing expenditure) registers a uniformly positive and 
frequently relationship with growth. Although the results do not support a robust relationship 
between public investment and growth. 
Argimon et al. (1997) 1978-1989 OECD (14) IV -Evidence found that public consumption and public investment are negatively associated with 
private investment. 
Ghali and Al-Shamsi (1997) 1973:1-1995:4 United Arab 
Emirates 
Cointegration-
Granger-
Causality 
-Evidence that government investment has a positive effect on economic growth, whereas the 
effect of government consumption is insignificant. 
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Table 4.2 Continued 
Study/Relationship tested Estimation  
Period 
Country Methodology/ 
Econometric  
Technique 
Major finding 
Ghali (1997) 1960-1996 Saudi Arabia VAR -No consistent evidence found that changes in government spending have an impact on per 
capita real output growth. 
Ghali (1998) 1963-93 Tunisia Granger 
causality test, 
OLS 
-Public investment is found to have a negative short-run impact on private investment and a 
negative long-run impact on both private investment and economic growth. 
Monadjemi and Huh (1998) 1960-1991 Australia, 
UK, US 
ECM -The empirical results provide limited support for “crowding out” effects of government 
investment on private investment. 
Ahmed and Miller (2000) 1975-1984 Cross 
sectional 
(39) 
OLS -In general, tax-financed government expenditure crowds out more investment than debt-
financed expenditure. Expenditure on social security and welfare reduces investment in all 
samples while expenditure on transport and communication induces private investment in 
developing countries. 
6-Budget deficit and 
macroeconomic variables 
 
Dwyer (1982) 1952-1978 US VAR -No evidence is found that larger government deficits increase prices, spending, interest rates, or 
the money stock. 
Guess and Koford (1984) 1949-1981 OECD (17) Granger 
causality test 
-Budget deficits do not cause changes in inflation, GNP, and private investment. 
Karras (1994) 1950-1980 Cross-
sectional 
(32) 
OLS, GLS -Deficits do not lead to inflation, deficits are negatively correlated with the rate of growth of real 
output and increased deficits appear to retard investment. 
Al-Khedair (1996) 1964-1993 G-7 VAR -Budget deficits led to higher short-term interest rates in the seven countries. The budget deficit 
did not manifest any impact on the long-term interest rates. The trade balance was worsened by 
the budget deficit and economic growth improved in all seven countries. 
Note: In all cross-country studies the number of countries given in parenthesis; OLS=ordinary least squares; IV=instrumental variables; VAR=vector autoregressive model; 
2SLS=two stage least squares; SUR=seemingly unrelated regressions; GLS=generalised least squares; ECM=error correction model.
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 It can be concluded from the empirical studies presented in this section that there 
are some similarities and differences between these studies dealing with the impact of 
public investment on private investment and economic growth. The similarities are that 
some of them focus either on cross-section or static analysis, and used the same estimation 
technique. For example Barro (1991); Arora and Dua (1993); Nelson and Singh (1994); 
Kelly (1997); among others estimated their economic model by using the OLS method. 
Furthermore, many other studies resulted in a similar conclusion in both developed and 
developing countries and lent support to the existence of a significant crowding-in effect of 
private investment by public investment, through the positive impact of infrastructure on 
private investment productivity (e.g. Aschauer (1989b); Kelly (1997); Miller and Russek 
(1997); Argimon et al. (1997); Ghali and Al-shamsi (1997); Bahmani (1999); Ahmed and 
Miller (2000); among others).  
 In contrast other studies suggest different conclusions. Studies such as Landau 
(1983), Barro (1991), Ghali (1998), among others, found support for a negative relationship 
between public investment and economic growth. It is worth noting here that one of the 
important outcomes from these studies indicates that cross-section analysis cannot capture 
the country specific nature of the government spending and growth relationship. 
Moreover, time series analysis allows revealing the causal relationship between variables, 
while cross-section analysis can identify correlation but not causation between variables. It 
is worth noting as well that, in general, the key outcomes from the studies presented in this 
section showed that both the method of financing and the components of government 
expenditure could have different effects. Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between 
current and capital expenditure when evaluating the impact of fiscal policy on private 
investment and output growth. Thus, overall results from the empirical literature with 
respect to the impact of public investment on private investment and growth are 
ambiguous, but the bulk of the empirical literature finds a significantly negative effect of 
public consumption expenditure on growth while the effects of public investment 
expenditure are found to be positive although less robust. 
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4.3.2 Deficits and Inflation 
As discussed earlier, an extensive theoretical literature [e.g. Metzler (1951); Patinkin 
(1965); Friedman (1968); Sargent and Wallace (1981): Dywer (1982); Miller (1983); among 
others] has argued that government deficit spending is a primary cause of inflation. 
However, the inflationary effect of government deficits depends upon the means by which 
the deficit is financed and the impact of that on aggregate demand. 
Empirical investigations examining the relationship between inflation and budget 
deficits have not reached a consensus on the possible relationship between the rate of 
inflation and deficits. The empirical evidence is fraught with contradictory results as well. 
Dwyer (1982) utilized a vector autoregression model to test the linkage between 
government deficits and macroeconomic variables (such as prices, spending, interest rates 
and the money stock) in the U.S. over the period 1952-1978. The results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that there are no perceived wealth effects of predictable changes in 
government debt held by the public and, as a result, no effects of the debt on inflation. No 
evidence is found that larger government deficits increase prices, spending, interest rates, or 
the money stock.  
Crozier (1976) also concluded that there was not a causal relationship between 
deficits and the Canadian inflationary surge in the 1970s. Hamburger and Zwick (1981) 
examined the influence of deficits on monetary growth in the U.S. They found that the 
effect of deficits on the growth of money was operative from 1961 to 1974 and again in 
1977 and 1978. Hamburger and Zwick concluded that a combination of an expansionary 
fiscal policy and the Federal Reserve’s attempts at moderating interest rate movements, 
begun in the mid-1960s, had principally caused a persistent drift toward higher U.S. 
inflation rates. McMillan and Bread (1982), in their re-examination of Hamburger and 
Zwick’s study, suggested that their results did not support the position that monetary 
policy is strongly influenced by the U.S. federal government’s fiscal policy actions. 
Darrat (1985) examined empirically the link between deficits and inflation in the 
U.S. during the post-1960 period. The estimation results, using the OLS technique, 
suggested that both monetary growth and federal deficits significantly influenced inflation 
during the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, he concluded that federal deficits bore a stronger 
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and more reliable relationship to inflation than monetary growth. McCallum (1984) used a 
perfect foresight version of the competitive equilibrium model to investigate the theoretical 
validity of a “monetarist hypothesis” – one that asserts “that a constant, per capita budget 
deficit can be maintained without inflation if it is financed by the issue of bonds rather than 
money.” He found the hypotheses to be valid under a conventional definition but invalid if 
the deficit is defined to be exclusive of interest payments (Shojai, 1999, p. 69). Ahking and 
Miller (1985) modelled deficits, money growth, and inflation in the U.S. over the period 
1950-1980 as a trivariate autoregressive process. It is also worth noting that their results 
treated government deficits, base-money growth, and inflation as endogenous variables in 
the trivariate autoregressive model. This study found that, a two-way causal relationship 
occurs for the 1950s and the 1970s between government deficits and inflation. Thus, 
government deficits appear to be inflationary in the 1950s and 1970s but not in the 1960s. 
Using a rational-expectations macro model of Peruvian inflation, Hafer and Hein (1988) 
tested the temporal relationship between inflation and privately held federal debt. They 
found that neither the par value nor the market value of debt were related to inflation 
(p.239). Eisner (1989) examined the impact of deficits on inflationary pressure to see if 
structural deficits contribute to inflation. He found that there is no support for the 
proposition that the federal budget deficit, by any measure, contributes to inflation. If 
anything the opposite appears to be true (p.87).  
Dua (1993) examined the relationship between long-term interest rates, 
government spending, and deficits within the context of a rational expectations model. He 
found that inflation uncertainty and the expected rate of growth of the money supply are 
important determinants of changes in long-term interest rates. Giffen et al. (1982) argue 
that the data offers little support for the traditional Keynesian or for the monetarist views 
on the cause of inflation. They suggest that the investigators might alternatively use some 
post-Keynesian approach (administered pricing or cost-push analysis) to determine the 
cause of inflation.  
Furthermore, Dornbusch and Fischer (1981), Bhalla (1981), Siddiqui (1989), 
Choudhary and Parai (1991), Buiter and Patel (1992), Dogas (1992), Sowa (1994), 
Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1994), and Metin (1995; 1998), Darrat (2000), among 
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many others conducted empirical studies of the relationship between the budget deficit and 
inflation in developing countries. Specifically, Choudhary and Parai (1991) used the rational 
expectations macro model of inflation to examine the impact of the anticipated budget 
deficits on inflation rates by using the quarterly data of Peru for the period 1973-:1 to 
1988:1. They found that budget deficits, as well as the growth rate of money supply, have 
significant impacts on inflation. Similarly, Dogas (1992) found that the public deficit affects 
inflation in Greece.  
Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1994) used bivariate cointgrated systems to test the 
hypothesis of a relationship between the budget deficit and inflation using annual data for 
Greece for the period 1960-1992. This study employed as a measure of the budget deficit 
the public sector net borrowing requirement as a percentage of gross domestic product 
(PSBR), and investigated the direction of causality between the growth of the PSBR and 
the inflation rate. The major findings of this study suggested that there is a long-run 
relationship between the PSBR and the price level in the Greek economy. In addition, it 
observed, using the Granger-causality test, that there is a bi-directional causality between 
the two variables. The results of the error-correction model suggest that an increase in the 
public sector net borrowing requirement results in an increase of the inflation rate with a 
lag of one period.  
Using an error-correction model, Sowa (1994) estimated an inflation equation for 
Ghana over the period 1963-90. This study found that inflation in Ghana is influenced 
more by output volatility than by monetary factors, both in the long run and in the short 
run. For Turkey, Metin (1995) analysed the inflationary process in Turkey covering the 
period of 1950-88, using a general framework of sectoral relationships. It is worth noting 
here that the government in Turkey shifted from monetisation of the deficit to bond 
financing in the mid-1980s. The short annual sample on Treasury bonds precluded sorting 
out the effects of this alternative means of deficit financing. However, this study found that 
fiscal expansion was a determining factor for inflation. The excess demand for money 
affected inflation positively, but only in the short run. On the other hand, imported 
inflation, the excess demand for goods, and the excess demand for assets in the capital 
markets had little or no effect on inflation. A key policy implication of Metin (1995) is that 
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Turkish inflation could be reduced rapidly by eliminating the budget deficit. Metin (1998) 
examines the relationship between the public sector deficit and inflation using a 
parsimonious, conditional, single-equation model for inflation, in which inflation depends 
on the budget deficit, the real growth rate of income, and base money. He found (using 
annual data for Turkey over the period 1950-1987) that budget deficits (as well as real 
income growth and debt monetisation) significantly affect inflation in Turkey58.  Darrat 
(2000) utilised an error correction model (ECM) to investigate if high budget deficits have 
any inflationary consequences in Greece over the period 1957-1993. Their empirical results 
found that the deficit variable exerts a positive and statistically significant impact upon 
inflation in Greece. They conclude that “besides money growth, higher budget deficits 
have also played a significant and direct role in the Greek inflationary process” (Darrat, 
2000, p. 635). 
It can be concluded from the studies reported in this section that there are 
commonalities and controversies relating to the estimation technique, variables underlying 
the model specification, and the results. However, overall the empirical evidence on the 
inflationary effects of deficits is inconclusive. This stems from different theories of deficits 
and inflation. These studies started from Darrat (1985), Ahking and Miller (1985), 
Choudhary and Parai (1991), Dogas (1992), Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1994), Metin 
(1998), Darrat (2000), among others, which find that the budget deficit exerted a significant 
impact on inflation. In contrast, other studies (e.g. Dwyer (1982), Karras (1994), among 
others) find that deficits do not lead to inflation. But the major outcomes from the 
empirical studies presented in this section, indicated strong evidence that a budget deficit 
financed through monetisation and a rising money supply could lead to inflation. However, 
the inflationary effect of government deficits depends upon the means by which the deficit 
is financed and the impact of that on aggregate demand. 
  
4.3.3 Budget Deficits and Trade Deficits 
                                                 
58 See Metin (1998) for more details about the economic framework, and the single-equation modelling 
approach used in this study 
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  Empirical examinations of the twin-deficits relationship have taken many forms, 
ranging from single-equation ordinary least squares (OLS) models to two-stage least 
squares models to small-scale structural models to unconstrained vector-autoregression 
(VAR) models to cointegration and vector-error-correction (VEC) models. Each of these 
approaches has shortcomings, but some approaches are clearly superior to others. The 
results obtained are quite sensitive to the modelling technique chosen (Shojai, 1999, pp. 93-
94).  
As Tallman and Rosensweig (1991, p. 5) note, ”Some studies using a Mundell-
Fleming framework indicate that the twin deficit notion is consistent with the data. In 
contrast, other studies, finding no underlying relationship between government and trade 
deficits, are consistent with the predictions of Ricardian equivalence.” Moreover, results 
also depend upon the data chosen; the choice of variables to include in estimated equations 
is important, as is the form (levels, first differences, or percentage of gross national product 
[GNP]) in which variables enter the equations. Furthermore, the form in which variables 
are entered in equations also appears to be an important determinant of empirical results. 
Tallman and Rosensweig (1991, p. 7) note that the chances of finding a twin-deficits 
relationship appear to be greater if variables are entered as levels or as ratios to GNP, 
rather than as first differences (their empirical results will be presented later). 
Early studies of the twin deficits (from the mid-1980s) typically relied on single-
equation OLS or two-stage least squares models (e.g. Eisner, 1986; 1991; Summers, 1986). 
Such studies often found that changes in some measures of the budget deficit are 
correlated with changes in some measures of the trade deficit. For example, Eisner (1991) 
estimates an OLS equation using the ratio of net exports to GNP as the dependent variable 
and including the price-adjusted high-employment deficit as a percentage of GNP as an 
explanatory variable. He finds, using U.S. data over the period 1957-1988, a positive effect 
of the budget deficit on the trade deficit, although the estimated coefficient is only 
marginally statistically significant. While Eisner’s simple model avoids the non-stationarity 
problem inherent in using data in levels, its very simplicity – the only other explanatory 
variable is the change in the real interest rate – argues against taking the findings seriously.  
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Darrat (1988) used Granger causality to test the hypothesis that large budget 
deficits cause rising trade deficits. He used data from the U.S. covering the period 1960-
1984. Darrat (1988) found that “the empirical results only partially support the 
conventional view that a rising budget deficit caused the 1980s escalation in the U.S. trade 
deficit”. He continued to say, “I do find evidence of a budget-to-trade deficit causality, but 
also find, perhaps stronger, evidence of trade-to-budget deficit causality” (Darrat, 1988, p. 
886). Zietz and Pemberton (1990) estimate a multi-equation, structural, open economy 
model of the U.S. economy over the period 1972:4-1987:2. Their model includes equations 
for short-term interest rates; the real trade-weighted exchange rate; domestic absorption; 
exports; imports; the domestic inflation rate; and trend absorption. They derive two-stage 
least squares estimates for each equation. Simulations of the model indicate a strong effect 
of budget policy on net exports, primarily through the effect of domestic absorption on 
imports. The effect through rising interest and exchange rates is minor. Despite the sizable 
effects of fiscal policy on net exports, Zietz and Pemberton concluded that less than half of 
the trade deficits of the 1980s could be explained by government policy. This study also 
concluded that the budget deficit affects the trade deficit mainly through its impact on 
domestic absorption and income rather than through higher interest and exchange rates 
(Zietz and Pemberton, 1990, p.33). 
A number of researchers have estimated VAR models in an attempt to account for 
the pervasive endogeneity among variables. Abell (1990b) estimated a seven-variable VAR 
model using monthly data for the period 1979.02-1985.02, which corresponds to the period 
of dollar appreciation in the early 1980s. The variables included in the system are the 
federal government budget deficit, the U.S. merchandise trade balance, the M1 money 
supply, Moody’s AAA bond yield, the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank’s 101-country trade-
weighted dollar exchange rate, real disposable personal income, and the consumer price 
index (CPI). In a second paper, Abell (1990a) excluded disposable income and lengthened 
the sample period to 1977.01-1985.02 but used the same techniques. Abell (1990b) 
concluded that budget deficits influence trade deficits indirectly rather than directly. He 
contended, however, that indirect causation running from the budget deficit through the 
interest rate and the exchange rate to the trade deficit exists. His reported impulse response 
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functions showed a positive response of the trade deficit to a one-standard-deviation shock 
to the budget deficit. Bachman (1992) tested the twin-deficits hypothesis in the U.S. using 
quarterly data for the period 1974-1988. He also tested the relationship between the trade 
deficit and three other “causal variables”: gross domestic investment, relative productivity, 
and the exchange rate risk premium. All of his analysis is bivariate. Finding no evidence of 
cointegration between the current account and the budget deficit, Bachman estimated 
bivariate VARs. His results suggested unidirectional Granger causation from the federal 
deficit to the current account.  
Kearney and Monadjemi (1990) utilised the vector autoregressive (VAR) technique 
to examine international evidence from eight countries (Australia, Britain, Canada, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the United States) using quarterly data over the period of 
floating exchange rates from 1972:1-1987:4. They estimated five variable VARs for these 
countries. They did not include the government budget deficit as a separate variable, 
choosing instead to include government expenditures and tax revenues. Their VAR 
equations include “monetary creation” and the (real, effective) exchange rate but not 
income or an interest rate. The findings that emerge from their empirical analysis of eight 
countries can be summarised as indicating the existence of a temporary twin deficits 
relationship between the stance of fiscal policy and performance on the current account of 
the balance of payments, which does not persist overtime. Examination of the impulse 
response functions confirms that fiscal expansions will lead to prolonged periods of 
improved current account performance as the economy adjusts towards its long run 
equilibrium. They concluded that the twin deficits relationship varies internationally in 
magnitude and duration, and it is not independent of the government’s financing decision 
(Kearney and Monadjemi, 1990, p.  216).  
Tallman and Rosensweig (1991) investigated the relationship between government 
deficits and trade deficits in the U.S. over the period 1971-1989. They estimated a four-
variable VAR system that includes measures of the real interest rate and the real exchange 
rate. They found that the government deficit (as a ratio to GNP) Granger causes the trade 
deficit (as a ratio to GNP) but not vice versa. They reported no variance decompositions or 
impulse response functions. Their findings reinforce those of Darrat (1988), who examined 
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the existence of Granger causality between the real federal budget deficit and the “real 
trade deficit” using a system of unconstrained multivariate equations for both the budget 
deficit and the trade deficit. Enders and Lee (1990) also estimated a VAR system, which 
they derived from a consumer optimisation model of the economy consistent with the 
Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis (REH). They estimated a six-variable unconstrained 
VAR for the post-war period (1974.III-1987.I), covering both fixed and flexible exchange 
rate regimes. Their model contains government expenditures and changes in the federal 
debt as separate variables. Variance decompositions show a small but significant effect of 
both government spending shocks and debt shocks on net exports (15.9 percent and 12.9 
percent, respectively). Plots of impulse response functions show a sustained decrease in net 
exports in response to both a government spending shock and a government debt shock. 
The latter result is, of course, contradictory to the REH. However, when Enders and Lee 
imposed theoretical restrictions drawn from the Ricardian theory on the model and tested 
their validity, they were unable to reject Ricardian Equivalence (Shojai, 1999, pp. 97-98). 
Finally, Volcker (1984), Laney (1986), and Tallman and Rosensweig (1991) find that budget 
deficits and trade deficits are positively associated. However, in his study of Canada, 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, Evans (1988) maintains that 
current accounts are unrelated to budget deficits. Feldstein (1992) holds a similar view. 
Islam (1998) examined empirically the causal relationship between budget deficits and the 
trade deficits for Brazil from 1973:1 through 1991:4. This relationship is investigated in the 
context of Granger’s test of causality. Empirical results suggested the presence of bilateral 
causality between trade deficits and budget deficits. 
Khalid and Guan (1999) utilised cointegration techniques to examine the causal 
relationship between budget and current account deficits as well as the direction of such 
causality. They used a selected sample of five developed countries (US, UK, France, 
Canada and Australia) and five developing countries (India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt and 
Mexico) over the period 1950-1994 for developed countries and 1955-1993 for developing 
countries. It can be noted that the time series variables involved in their studies are the 
current account deficit, budget deficit, trade-weighted exchange rate and nominal GNP. 
Their empirical results show that the causal relationship between budget and current 
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account deficits exists in four out of five developing countries, while no developed country 
exhibits such a relationship. The results suggest that a high correspondence between the 
two deficits in the long run is more likely to occur in developing countries than in 
developed ones (Khalid and Guan, 1999, p. 399). Egwaikhide (1999) used a 
macroeconomic model to examine the effects of budget deficits on the trade balance in 
Nigeria over the period 1973-93 by using the OLS method. Evidence from policy 
simulations indicate that budget deficits arising from increased government spending 
adversely affects the balance of trade irrespective of whether it is money-financed or by 
external borrowing.  
 Piersanti (2000) utilized the Granger-Sims causality technique to investigate the 
relationship between the current account deficits and budget deficits for seventeen OECD 
countries over the period 1970-1997. He used the budget and current account balance as a 
percentage of GDP, rather than their absolute levels. From the empirical investigation, this 
study obtained evidence that strongly supported the view that current account deficits have 
been associated with large budget deficits during the 1970-1997 periods in most industrial 
countries (Piersanti, 2000, p. 268).  
 Thus, overall, the empirical evidence on the trade deficit effects of budget deficits is 
inconclusive. This occurred for many reasons. For example, the methodology used to 
analyse the above issue varied from well-specified theoretical models to using simple one-
to-one relationships between the budget deficit and current account deficit. For instance, 
studies such as Abell (1990); Tallman and Rosensweig (1991); Khalid and Guan (1999); 
among others used a simple identity to analyse the linkage between the budget deficit and 
current account deficit (this identity states that the government budget surplus is equal to 
the current account surplus plus the excess of investment over private savings). While 
other studies such as Bundt and Solocha (1988); Egwaikhide (1999); Piersanti (2000); 
among others used a complicated dynamic macroeconomic model such as standard 
portfolio models and general equilibrium models. Furthermore, the empirical findings 
investigating the relationship between budget deficits and trade deficits are ambiguous, as 
are the theoretical ones in both developed and developing countries. Studies such as Volker 
(1984), Laney (1986), Bundt and Solocha (1988), Abell (1990b), Kearney and Monadjemi 
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(1990), Arora and Dua (1993), Kasa (1994), Al-Khedair (1996), Islam (1998), Khlalid and 
Guan (1999), Piersanti (2000), among others found evidence to support the view that there 
is a significant link between trade deficits and budget deficits mainly through the 
transmission mechanisms of interest rates and exchange rates. In contrast, other studies 
which were presented in this chapter such as Evans (1988), Bachman (1992), among others 
found no evidence for the link between the two deficits. Even though the overall results 
are inconclusive the majority of these studies have found evidence supporting the twin 
deficit relationship arising through the exchange rate.  
 
4.3.4 Budget Deficit and The Exchange Rate 
  It is worth noting here that economic models of exchange rates that incorporate 
fundamental economic variables such as measures of the money supply, income, and prices 
have performed poorly compared to random walk models. Many researchers have 
concluded that there is no significant relationship between exchange rates and fundamental 
economic variables (Melzer, 1993). In 1983, Meese and Rogoff  in a major study, concluded 
that a random walk model of exchange rates performs as well as any structural model. 
Other studies have concentrated on the stationarity of real and nominal exchange rates and 
whether exchange rates and fundamental economic variables are cointegrated (Chinn, 
1991). These studies have attempted to establish the existence of a long-run relationship 
between exchange rates and economic aggregates. Many studies reject that there exists 
cointegration, suggesting that there is no long-run relationship between these variables. 
Earlier support of non-stationarity of exchange rates has been challenged by many more 
studies such as Huizinga (1987), Engel and Hamilton (1990), Hakkio and Joines (1990). 
Meltzer (1993) provides evidence as to why trade-weighted nominal and real 
exchange rates move together. This had already been supported by studies done by Mussa 
(1986) and Edwards (1989) for developed and developing economies. Bundt and Solocha 
(1988) estimated a general two-country portfolio balance model of exchange rates with 
currency substitution over the period 1973-1987 for the United States, Canada, and 
Germany. They found that increases in the U.S. debt stock caused an appreciation of the 
U.S. dollar against the German mark and the Canadian dollar. This study also presented 
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evidence on the linkage between the budget deficit and the trade deficit arising through the 
exchange rate.  
Moreover, Bohn’s (1992) measure of government net worth, which includes 
principal government assets and liabilities as a measure of the deficit, was utilized, and it 
was concluded that changes in net worth have no significant effect on the exchange rate. 
Humpage (1992) utilized the Engle-Granger Cointegration technique to test for the 
existence of a long-run relationship between the level of the U.S. federal budget deficit and 
the exchange rate during the period 1973-1991. Unlike many other studies, Humpage used 
the level of the deficit instead of deficit as a percentage of GDP. He argues that when the 
level of the deficit is very large, it could have substantially different effects on the exchange 
rate. This study found no evidence of a long-term relationship between common aggregate 
measures of U.S. fiscal policy and real long-term interest rates, real dollar exchange rates, 
and real net exports. Burney and Akhtar (1992) empirically examined the effects of budget 
deficits on the exchange rate for Pakistan over the period 1971-72 to 1989-90. The 
estimated results using the OLS method indicate that in the case of Pakistan, government 
budget deficits have a significant direct impact on the real exchange rate through the price 
level. Hakkio (1996) used pooled annual data during the period 1979-1994 for eighteen 
OECD countries and regressed the real exchange rate on the budget deficit as a percentage 
of GDP. To estimate the indirect impact of a deficit reduction on the exchange rate, a 
country’s inflation rate relative to the average OECD inflation rate, the stock of 
government debt (as a percentage of GDP) relative to the OECD average, and the change 
in government spending as a share of GDP are included in the regression line to proxy the 
impact of expected inflation, risk premium, and the expected rate of return effect on the 
exchange rate. Hence, the way the government chooses to use these tools (cutting 
government spending or increasing tax rates) have important effects on the expected rate 
of return of domestic assets, thereby leading to changes in the demand for domestic assets 
and in turn to changes in the exchange rate. 
The estimated results indicate that the direct impact of a deficit reduction in 
thirteen countries leads to a stronger currency, but in five countries the currency weakens 
as the deficit is reduced. Also, in all cases the indirect impacts of deficit reduction have the 
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correct sign and are statistically significant. The overall conclusions indicate that a deficit 
reduction leads to a stronger currency in the United States, Germany, France, Italy, and 
Canada. However, deficit reductions through tax increases and spending reductions have 
different effects on the currency of different countries. In general, in all countries under 
investigation, except for Japan, the UK, and Australia, cutting the deficits by spending cuts 
causes the currency to appreciate more than when taxes are increased. In Italy, revenue 
increases have a small impact on the exchange rate, but spending cuts are more effective. 
In Portugal and Norway, deficit reduction through tax increases weakens the currency, but 
spending cuts strengthen the currency (Shojai, 1999, pp. 61-62).  
In conclusion, the theoretical models provide an ambiguous picture of how a 
deficit reduction affects a currency. The direct impact of such actions can lead to currency 
depreciation; however, the indirect impacts can overwhelm such exchange rate changes in 
the opposite direction. Many researchers have estimated the overall impact of fiscal 
imbalances on the value of a currency. Ironically, the empirical works do not shed any 
better light on the issue than theoretical models. It seems that depending on the measures 
of the deficit, the econometric model, and the period of study, different conclusions can be 
reached. 
 
4.3.5 Budget Deficit and Interest Rates 
  As discussed earlier in this chapter, in the literature there are two conflicting views 
regarding the effect of government budget deficits on interest rates. The discussions are 
centred on the efficacy of the Neoclassical and Keynesian models, on the one hand, and 
the Ricardian model on the other. The Keynesian models and neoclassical models 
represent the standard analysis where the impact of increased deficits on interest rates 
operates through the effects of higher spending and increased wealth on the demand for 
money. In the Ricardian model, however, the value of the new debt is simply perceived as 
the present value of the future tax liabilities. This means that the government debt is not 
viewed as net wealth and, as a result, money demand would not be affected. Consequently, 
interest rates remain unchanged as well59.  
                                                 
59 For a detailed analysis of these three paradigms see Bernheim (1989). 
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Turning to the empirical studies, Dwyer (1982), Plosser (1982; 1987), Makin (1983), 
Hoelscher (1983), Kormendi (1983), Mascaro and Meltzer (1983), Dewald (1983), Aschauer 
(1985), Evans (1985; 1987a; 1987b), Monadjemi (1989), Giannaros and Kolluri (1989), 
Darrat (1989; 1990), and Findlay (1990) have provided empirical evidence suggesting that 
government budget deficits have no significant effect on interest rates. In contrast, 
Feldstein (1982), Hutchinson and Pyle (1984), Brath et al. (1985), Tanzi (1985), Hoelscher 
(1986), Tran and Swahney (1988), Wachtel and Young (1987), Kolluri and Giannaros 
(1987), Zahid (1988), Holloway (1988), Thomas and Abderrazak (1988a; 1988b), Allen 
(1990), Cebula (1990a; 1990b; 1991), and Al-Saji (1991; 1992), Liargovas et al., (1997) have 
found that large government budget deficits cause high interest rates. Part of the 
conflicting results can be explained by differences in the choice of variables, methodology 
and the sample period. 
Furthermore, several researchers have attempted to find an association between 
nominal interest rates and the U.S. deficit using post-war data such as Feldstein and 
Eckstein (1970), Hoelscher (1986), and Cebula (1988; 1991), who show that federal deficits 
have a positive effect on nominal long-term interest rates, cause the slope of the yield curve 
to increase, and crowd out private investment. Bernhein (1987; 1989) argues that the 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis does not hold. On the other hand, Carroll and Summers 
(1987) find evidence to support the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis and report that there 
is a one-to-one link between the government deficit and private saving.  
More recently, Knot and de Haan (1999) utilised the deficit announcement effect 
methodology to examine the relationship between budget deficits and interest rates in 
Germany over the period 1987-93. Their results suggested that the positive relationship 
between budget deficits and interest rates is due to fear that government debt may crowd 
out private investment (Knot and de Haan, 1999, p. 570).  Ewing and Yanochik (1999) 
examined the impact of federal budget deficits on the term structure of interest rates in 
Italy over the period 1977:1-1991:3. Using the cointegration technique, this study suggested 
that budget deficits increase the yield spread between long-term government bonds and the 
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three-month Treasury bill rate. Further tests reveal the absence of any ‘reverse causality’, 
supporting the hypothesis of this study. Their findings are consistent with those of Cebula 
(1991) who found that US deficits exhibit a significant effect upon the term structure of 
interest rates. This finding suggests that budget deficits may hinder long-term economic 
growth in Italy, via the crowding out effect, by increasing long-term interest rates relative to 
short-term interest rates. 
Vamvoukas (2000) examined the linkage between budget deficits and interest rates 
in Greece over the time periods 1949-1994, 1953-1994 and 1957-1994. Within the 
methodological framework of cointegration, ECM strategy, and several diagnostic and 
specification tests, the empirical findings support the Keynesian model of a significant and 
positive relationship between budget deficits and interest rates. Modeste (2000) utilised the 
loanable funds model of interest rate determination to investigate the relationship between 
budget deficits and interest rate movements. A basic tenet of that model is that interest 
rates would rise (fall) as economic forces either increase (decrease) the demand for loanable 
funds or reduce (increase) the supply of such funds. They apply their methodology 
(loanable funds framework and error correction) for Jamaica over the period 1964-1996. 
This study has found that the government’s budget deficits have exerted a significant 
positive effect on the long-term interest rate. Adding to this result, a major implication of 
this study is that budget deficits, to the extent that they force up interest rates, can cause 
“crowding out” of private investment. As a result, as the previous event occurs, one can 
expect capital formation to be retarded and long-term growth to be inhibited (Modeste, 
2000, pp. 676-677). 
However, the next section will explain some of the econometric models used in 
various studies, and will be accompanied by the results of that study with respect to the 
relationship between the budget deficit and some macroeconomic variables. 
 
4.4 Econometric Models 
This section will review some econometric tests of economic models with respect 
to the impact of budget deficits on some macroeconomic variables using the IS-LM model, 
the budget deficit and trade deficit models, the budget deficit and economic growth model, 
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and the budget deficit and multivariable model. It is worth noting here that the models 
selected in this section were chosen because the results they obtained suggested a 
significant conclusion across a section of countries and time series; some of them used an 
open economy IS-LM model; they also used an important estimation technique such as 
VAR, and the error correction model among others.  
 
4.4.1 The IS-LM and Interest Rate Models 
 Some researchers have used the IS-LM model to study the impact of a budget 
deficit on interest rates. It should be noted here that in the simplest and most naïve 
Keynesian model, increasing the budget deficit by $1 causes output to expand by the 
inverse of the marginal propensity to save. In the standard IS-LM analysis of monetary 
economies, this expansion of output raises the demand for money. If the money supply is 
fixed (that is the deficit is bond-financed), interest rates must rise, and private investment 
falls. This in turn reduces output and partially offsets the simple Keynesian multiplier effect 
(Bernheim, 1989, p. 60).  
 The standard IS-LM model for an open economy is used by Feldstein (1982), 
Mascaro and Meltzer (1983), Evans (1985), Wachtel and Young (1987), Monadjemi (1989), 
Al-Saji (1993) among others to analyse the impact of government budget deficits upon 
interest rates. Evans (1985) used the IS-LM model to examine the relationship between 
budget deficits and interest rates. Evans surveyed U.S. economic history and analysed data 
from four periods; the civil war, WWI, WWII, and post WWII. He used the following IS-
LM model: 
 
R = a0 + a1G + a2D + a3(M/P) + a4π + a5US + a6UM   (4.4) 
 
Where, R is the nominal interest rate, G is real government spending, D is the real deficit, 
M/P is the real money stock, π is the expected inflation rate, U.S. is an error term that 
measures autonomous private spending, and UM is an error term that measures 
autonomous money demand. Evans (1985, p. 86) concluded that “in over a century of U.S. 
history, large deficits have never been associated with high interest rates”. 
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Hutchison and Pyle (1984) investigated the link between deficits and real interest 
rates by pooling annual time series data over the period 1973 to 1982. The data covered the 
seven major industrial countries (the U.S., the U.K., France, Japan, Italy, Canada, and 
Germany). They used the following model: 
 
∑ +++++= +
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33210 titiititititi DbUbMbBbbr µ     (4.5) 
                 
Where, tir  is the short term interest rate at time t in country i, tiB  is the government 
budget deficit (percent of GNP) at time t in country i, tiM  is money growth at time t in 
country i, tiU  is the unemployment rate at time t in country i, tiD  is 1 for country i for all t, 
this dummy variable is introduced to take into account some of the institutional and 
structural diversity, such as tax rates, non-homogeneous inflation measures, and political 
instability among the industrial countries. tiµ  is a random error term. It is worth noting 
here that their methodology (formulation of their model) is consistent with both the 
familiar IS-LM framework and a simple loanable funds flow model of the bond and money 
market. Using the OLS method, the estimation results of equation (3.5) are reported in 
Appendix 4.1 (See Table 4.1, A4.1.1). Their results indicate that “short term real interest 
rates are systematically and positively associated with central government budget deficits 
across countries and across time” (Hutchison and Pyle, 1984, p. 26). 
 Cebula (1988) tested the conventional view that large deficits cause higher interest 
rates in the U.S. He regressed the nominal interest rate on Moody’s Aaa-rated corporate 
bonds (RA) against the contemporaneous values of a number of variables, including federal 
deficits. Cebula argued that when examining the interest rate impact of the federal deficit, it 
is important to distinguish between the cyclical deficit, which is the counter-cyclically 
endogenous component of the total deficit, and the structural deficit, which is the 
exogenous component of the deficit. According to conventional macroeconomic theory 
the structural deficit and the cyclical deficit are both supposed to generate upward pressure 
on the rate of interest. Given the above remarks, he used the IS-LM based model, which is 
given by: 
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( )ttttttttttt RTRPYGYMYCDYSDfNR ,,//,/,/ ,=    (4.6) 
 
Where, NR is the nominal interest rate yield on Moody’s Aaa-rated corporate bonds, SD is 
the real structural deficits, Y is trend real GNP, CD is the real cyclical deficits, M is the 
change in monetary base approximated by the average of the current and preceding 
quarters’ values of the net acquisition of credit market instruments by the Federal Reserve 
System, G is real federal government purchases of goods and services, P is the expected 
inflation rate during quarter t, expressed as a percent, RTR is the ex ante real three-month 
treasury bill rate, and t stands for time. 
 Cebula (1988) estimated equation (4.6) using seasonally adjusted data over the 
period 1955:1-1984:4 for the U.S. The estimation results using the instrumental variables 
(IV) technique are reported in Appendix 4.1 (See A4.1.2). The empirical results indicated 
that the federal budget deficit exercises a positive and significant impact upon Moody’s 
nominal Aaa-rated corporate bond rate. This finding contradicts most of the related 
literature, including Evans (1985), Makin (1983), and Hoelscher (1983). However, these 
findings are consistent with Barth, Iden, and Russek (1984; 1985), the study by Hoelscher 
(1986), and Feldstein and Eckstein (1970). He also concluded that the empirical results 
presented imply the actual existence of a mechanism for the transmission of crowding out. 
Moreover, this empirical result provides some degree of renewed confidence in standard 
macro-models, such as the IS-LM paradigm and the loanable funds model (Cebula, 1989, p. 
209).  
 Al-Saji (1993) explored the impact of government budget deficits on the U.K. 
nominal and ex ante real long-term interest rates over the period from 1960:1 to 1990:2, 
utilising an open economy IS-LM model as shown below60: 
 
ttttt
e
tt eXPaGDaDFaMPaPaaR ++++++= 543210    (4.7) 
 
                                                 
60 Al-Saji also used a closed economy IS-LM model, but this will not be reported here. For a more 
detailed discussion see Al-Saji (1993). 
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Where, R is the nominal long-term interest rate, etP  is the expected rate of inflation, MP is 
the real money stock, DF is the real government budget deficit, GP is real government 
spending, XP is the real balance of trade, and te  is the usual error term. The empirical 
results, as shown in Appendix 4.1 (See A4.1.3), suggest that the variables of the expected 
rate of inflation, etP , the real money stock, tMP , and the real balance of trade, tXP , have 
insignificant effects on nominal long-term interest rates. The results also reveal that the real 
government budget deficits variable, tDF , exerts a significant and positive impact on 
nominal long-term interest rates. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient on the real 
government spending, tGP , is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 This study found that the expected rate of inflation variable had an insignificant 
impact on nominal and ex ante real long-term interest rates. It was also concluded that 
government budget deficits, within the context of an open and closed economy IS-LM 
model, exert a significant and positive effect on nominal and ex ante long-term interest 
rates. This implies that rising nominal and ex ante real long-term interest rates, may cause 
“crowding out” of private investment in the U.K. and adversely affect capital formation 
and long-term economic growth (Al-Saji, 1993, p. 76). 
 Zahid (1988) studied the relationship between deficits and interest rates using 
quarterly data for the U.S. from 1971- to 1982. He used the following single equation 
technique: 
 
uCYCLEaTRENDaHaDaar +++D+D+=D 43210    (4.8) 
 
Where, r is the real 3-month T-bill rate, D is the budget deficit, alternative measures (the 
author used changes in outstanding publicly held government debt (i.e., borrowings from 
the public) as the deficit measure), TREND is the trend in nominal GNP, CYCLE is the 
ratio of real GNP to its trend value, and H is high-powered money. 
 Zahid found that “when the government budget deficit is defined appropriately to 
reflect the government excess demand for funds from the nongovernmental public, and 
the countercyclical variations in the deficit figures are adjusted for, then there has been a 
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significant positive impact of deficits on the change of the real interest rate in the U.S. 
during the period 1971-80” (Zahid, 1988, p. 730). 
 Cebula and Koch (1989) examined the impact of the budget deficit on the interest 
rate using the following functional model: 
 
R = R (P, RSR, B, M, CI)   (4.9) 
 
Where, R is the nominal long-term interest rate, P is the expected future inflation rate, RSR 
is the expected real short-term interest rate, B is real borrowing by the U.S. Treasury, M is 
the real purchases of securities by the Federal Reserve System, and CI is the real net capital 
inflows into the U.S. The authors arrived at the conclusion that “federal budget deficits in 
the United States exercise a positive and significant influence over long-term rates of 
interest” (Cebula and Koch, 1989, p. 125). 
 Cebula and Rhodd (1993) examined the effect of budget deficits on the nominal 
long-term interest rates in the United States over the period of 1971:4-1985:4. They used 
the following functional model: 
 
R = R (P, RSR, B, M, C)     (4.10) 
 
Where, R is the nominal long-term rate of interest, P is the expected future inflation rate, 
RSR is the expected (ex ante) real short-term interest rate, B the real net borrowing by the 
federal government, M is real net purchases of securities by the central bank, and C is real 
net capital flows into the nation from other nations. The model adopted in this study 
regards the long-term nominal rate of interest as being determined by the loanable funds 
equilibrium of the following form: 
 
D – S = B – M – C 
 
Where, D is real domestic private sector demand for long-term bonds, S is real domestic 
private sector supply of long-term bonds, M is real net purchases of securities by the 
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central bank, B is real net borrowing by the federal government, and C is real net capital 
flows into the nation from other nations. 
 Based upon the model summarized in equation (4.10), the following equation was 
estimated: 
 
Rt = a0 + a1Pt + a2RSRt + a3Bt/Yt + a4Mt/Yt + a5Ct/Yt + u   (4.11) 
 
Where, Rt is the nominal average interest rate yield in quarter t on ten-year U.S. Treasury 
notes, expressed as a percent per annum, a0 is the constant term, Pt is the expected inflation 
rate in quarter t, expressed as a percent per annum, RSRt is the ex ante real average interest 
rate yield in quarter t on three-month U.S. Treasury bills, expressed as a percent per 
annum, Bt/Yt is the ratio of the seasonally adjusted total federal budget deficit in quarter t, 
net of (less) debt service payments on the national debt in quarter t, to the seasonally 
adjusted middle-expansion trend GNP in quarter t, expressed as a percent, Mt/Yt is the 
ratio of Mt, which is defined as the average of the seasonally adjusted current and preceding 
quarters’ values of the net acquisitions of credit market instruments by the Federal Reserve 
System, to the seasonally adjusted middle expansion trend GNP in quarter t, expressed as a 
percent, Ct/Yt is the ratio of the seasonally adjusted net flow of foreign capital into the 
United States in quarter t to the seasonally adjusted middle-expansion trend GNP in 
quarter t, expressed as a percent, and u is the stochastic error term. It should be noted that 
the estimation results of equation (4.11) by the instrumental variable (IV) technique are 
reported in Appendix 4.1 (See A4.1.4). These results indicate that the federal budget deficit 
(net of debt service payments) exercises a positive and significant impact upon the nominal 
long-term rate of interest. 
 They concluded that “the federal budget deficit, net of debt service payments, 
elevates the nominal long-term rate of interest” (Cebula and Rhodd, 1993, p. 444). 
 Al-Khedair (1996) studied the relationship between the budget deficit and the 
short-term interest rate, and the long-term interest rate in the seven major industrial 
countries (G-7)61 over the period of 1964-1993.  
                                                 
61 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
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 This study used the following short-term and long-term interest rate models: 
 
143210 −++++= tIRSTaTBGDPaMSaBDGDPaaIRST    (4.12) 
 
143210 −++++= tIRLTaTBGDPaMSaBDGDPaaIRLT    (4.13) 
 
Where equation (4.12) represents the following, IRST is the short term interest rate, 
BDGDP is the nominal budget deficit, MS is the money supply, TBGDP is the trade 
balance, and IRST t-1 is the short term interest rate, lagged one period. The model (4.13) 
was obtained by substituting the short-term interest rate and lagged short-term interest rate 
as specified in the first model with the long-term interest rate and the lagged long-term 
interest rate. Where equation (4.13) represents the following, IRLT is the long term interest 
rate, BDGDP is the budget deficit, MS is the money supply, TBGDP is the trade balance, 
and IRLT t-1 is the long term interest rate, lagged one period. The estimation results for the 
short-term interest rate model (3.8), and for the long-term interest rate model (4.13) is 
presented in Appendix 4.1 (See Table 4.2, A4.1.5 and Table 4.3, A4.1.6 respectively). 
 This study found that the budget deficit leads to higher short-term interest rates in 
Japan and the United States. With respect to the long-term interest rate, the budget deficit 
led to an increase of this rate in France, Germany, and the United States (Al-Khedair, 1996, 
p. 132). 
  Liargovas et al. (1997) examined the relationship between government budget 
deficits and interest rates in Greece over the period 1980 to 1994 by using the error 
correction model as follows. 
 
ttttttt GDEBTRTBRPGDPM µαααααα ++++++= 543210    (4.14) 
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Where, M is the real demand for broad money (M3), GDP is the real Gross Domestic 
Product, P is the Consumer Price Index, TBR is the real T-Bill Rate reflecting the 
opportunity cost of holding money, R is the “own rate of return” representing the real 
Deposit Rate, and GDEBT is the real Debt of the Central Government, λ is the error-
correction coefficient and µ  and ε are random disturbance terms. The Treasury bill rate 
refers to the 12-month bill rate, while the deposit rate is the maximum rate offered by 
banks to deposits with a maturity of three to twelve months. The variables M, TBR, R and 
GDEBT are deflated using the CPI index. Furthermore, all variables (except for the two 
interest rates) are expressed in logarithms and D  is the first-difference operator. 
 The author used M3, a broad measure of liquidity, as the dependent variable. 
Equation (4.14) is a long-run equilibrium money-demand function, where the parameters 
are largely the long-run elasticities. It is expected 1α , 2α and 4α to be positive, 3α  to be 
negative, while 5α  might be either positive or negative. Equation (4.15) is a dynamic error-
correction model (ECM) of the short-run behaviour of money demand, where kn (k = 1 to 
6) measures the response of real money balances to changes in the regressors.  
 Estimates of the error correction model are given in Table 4.4 which is presented in 
Appendix 4.1 (See A4.1.7). The author includes in the equation an impulse dummy variable 
D91Q1 for the first quarter of 1991, to take account of the sharp decline in broad money 
in that quarter as a result of the imposition of a withholding tax on interest rates from bank 
deposits. The deregulation of the banking system after 1992 was captured by the dummy 
variable D92 that takes the value of zero prior to the first quarter of 1992 and one 
thereafter. As can been seen from Table 4.4, all coefficient estimates have the expected 
signs. The variable GDEBT has a positive coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 
10% level. This finding supports the Keynesian and Neoclassical hypotheses that in Greece 
government debt does influence interest rates via money demand. The results contradict 
those of Gulley (1994) for the 1980s, but are similar to Deravi’s, Hegji’s and Moberly’s 
(1990) results for the period 1954:1 to 1972:4 in the U.S. 
 The authors arrived at the conclusion that interest rates are positively affected, both 
in the short-run and in the long-run (via money demand) by changes in the market value of 
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government debt. This finding does not lend support to the Ricardian equivalence 
hypothesis. It is in accordance to the Neoclassical and Keynesian models, according to 
which government debt is viewed as net wealth (Liargovos, et al., 1997, p. 815). 
 Cebula (2000) investigated the impact of budget deficits on ex post real long-term 
interest rates in the U.S. over the period 1973-1995. The following equation was estimated: 
 
µ+++++= ttttttt YCaYBaEARSRaPCYaaEPRLR // 43210    (4.16) 
 
Where, 0a is constant; tEPRLR is the ex post real average interest rate yield in year t on 
ten-year Treasury notes, as a percentage per annum; tPCY  is the change in the per capita 
real GDP in year t, expressed in 1987 dollars; tEARSR  is the ex ante real average interest 
rate yield in year t on three-month US Treasury Bills, as a percentage per annum; tt YB / is 
the ratio of the structural federal budget deficit in year t to the potential GDP in year t, as a 
percentage; tt YC / is the ratio of the net flow of foreign capital into the US in year t to the 
potential GDP in year t as a percentage, and µ  is a stochastic error term. 
 They estimated equation (4.16) using instrumental variables (IV). Their empirical 
results are reported in Appendix 4.1 (See A4.1.8). Their results provide strong evidence 
that budget deficits do raise the long-term real ex post rate of interest. 
 
4.4.2 The Budget Deficit and Trade Deficit Models 
 Zietz and Pemberton (1990) investigated the impact of the budget deficit on the 
trade deficit in the U.S. They utilized a simultaneous equation model and used data from 
1972:4 to 1987:2. This model is specified as below: 
 
S (r, ms, ep , df, y) = D (r, k, ep , y)   (4.17) 
 
Where, S is the supply of bonds, D is the demand for bonds, r is the interest rate, ms is the 
money supply, k is the accumulated balance on current account, ep is the expected 
inflation rate, and df is the federal government budget deficit. They found that the budget 
deficit had a positive impact on the trade deficit. 
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 Abell (1990b) empirically studied the linkage between the budget and trade deficits 
in the U.S. using data from 1979 to 1985. A vector autoregressive model (VAR) was used 
to test the relationship between the variables. The following national income accounting 
identity was used to analyse the relationship between the budget deficit and the trade 
deficit: 
 
NCF = CA = (G-T) + (I-S)   (4.18) 
 
Where, NCF is net foreign capital inflows into the U.S., CA is the current account of the 
balance of payments, G is government spending, and T is government tax revenue, I is 
domestic private investment spending, and S is domestic private saving. This study 
concluded that budget deficits influence trade deficits indirectly rather than directly. 
Evidence is obtained through causality testing and impulse response functions that the 
“twin deficits” are connected through the transmission mechanisms of the interest rate and 
exchange rate. The model indicates that reducing the size of the budget deficit may prove 
to be at least as effective as exchange rate intervention for the purpose of reducing the size 
of the merchandise trade deficit (p. 81). 
 Kearney and Monadjemi (1990) analysed international evidence on the impact of 
the budget deficit on the trade deficit from eight industrial countries over the period of 
1972:1-1987:4. The primary technique used was vector autoregressive (VAR) models. The 
following equations were used in constructing the model: 
The first equation is: 
 
FIMEXICICY ggpp +−++++=    (4.19) 
 
 The equation above explains how domestic output (Y) is divided between private 
consumption ( pC ), private investment ( pI ), government expenditure for consumption and 
investment purposes ( gC  and gI  respectively), exports and imports of goods and services 
( EX and IM , respectively), and the interest that is payable on the country’s net ownership 
of foreign assets ( F ). 
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 This identity was rewritten by defining the government’s fiscal deficit (DEF) as the 
sum of its expenditures less tax revenue (T), and the current account balance deficit of the 
balance of payments (CUR), together with private savings (Sp), which shows the following: 
 
 DEF = Cg + Ig –T 
  CUR = -(EX – IM + F) 
 Sp = Y - T - Cp 
 
 Substituting these definitions into the first identity yields the following twin deficit 
relationship: 
 
CUR = (Ip – Sp) + DEF   (4.20) 
 
 This relationship describes the current account deficit in terms of the difference 
between private investment and savings (Ip – Sp) plus the government’s fiscal deficit. The 
findings that emerge from their empirical analysis62 of eight countries can be summarised as 
indicating the existence of a temporary twin deficits relationship between the stance of 
fiscal policy and performance on the current account of the balance of payments, which 
does not persist overtime. In addition, “substantial international evidence of reverse 
causation is uncovered, along with the existence of complex short-term adjustment 
dynamics that are not invariant to the government’s financing decisions, and are capable of 
inverting the twin deficits relationship for substantial periods of time”(Kearney and 
Monadjemi, 1990, 217). 
 Al-Khedair (1996) examined the relationship between the budget deficit and trade 
balance in the seven major industrial countries (G-7) over the period of 1964-1993 using 
the following trade balance model: 
 
                                                 
62 See Kearney and Monadjemi (1990, pp. 207-208) for details about the empirical results for the twin 
deficits equations for the VAR model used in their study. 
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TBGDP = b0 + B1BDGDP + B2NER + b3MS + B4TT   (4.21) 
 
Where, TBGDP is the trade balance, BDGDP is the budget deficit, NER is the nominal 
exchange rate, MS is the money supply, and TT is the terms of trade. The estimation result 
for the trade balance model (4.21) is shown in Table 4.5, which is presented in Appendix 
4.2 (See A4.1.9).  
 This study found that the budget deficit appeared to worsen the trade balance in 
Canada. In Italy and the U.S., the trade balance improved with the budget deficit. But, 
overall, the results indicated that the increase in the budget deficit seemed to lead to an 
increase in the trade balance deficit (Al-Khedair, 1996, p.132). 
 Mohammadi (2000) examined the empirical validity of the conventional and the 
Ricardian views regarding the potential impact of budget deficits on the foreign trade 
balance. According to the conventional view, given the path of government expenditures, 
substitution of budget deficits for current taxes increases the foreign trade balance deficit. 
In contrast, the Ricardian view suggests that the higher budget deficit is offset by an equal 
increase in desired private saving. Hence, the trade balance remains unaffected. The author 
uses cross-sectional data for a sample of 67 countries over the period 1975-95. He used the 
following empirical model, which captures the distinguishing features of the two theories, 
 
,543210 iiiiiii ugyagmaeagsabsaatb ++++++=    (4.22) 
 
Where tb  is a measure of the trade surplus, bs  is the government budget surplus, gs  is 
government expenditure, e  is the real exchange rate, gm  is the growth in money stock, 
gy  is growth in real income, u  is an error term, and i (i = 1, …, n) is a country subscript. 
Using the OLS method, the estimation results of equation (4.22) are reported in Appendix 
4.1 (See Table 4.6, A4.1.10). Their empirical results indicate a positive and significant long-
run link between the government budget surplus and the trade balance. Therefore, the data 
seem to strongly support the neoclassical and Keynesian prediction.  
 
4.4.3 Economic Growth and Other Macroeconomic Variables Models 
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 The impact of the budget deficit on economic growth is theoretically explained 
through the effect of the deficit on the flow of money into the economy and through the 
supply side (infrastructure, education, etc). The more that government expenditures exceed 
revenue the more money will be circulated in the economy, which leads to higher 
employment and output (McCandless, 1991). 
 Recent studies, for example the World Economic Outlook (IMF, 1996); concluded 
that during the mid-1980s a group of developing countries with high fiscal imbalances had 
significantly lower economic growth than countries with low to medium budget deficits. 
According to Shojai (1999), deficit spending that is financed by the central bank can also 
lead to inefficiencies in financial markets and cause high inflation in the developing 
countries. In addition, budget deficits distort real exchange rates and the interest rate, 
which in turn undermines the international competitiveness of the economy. Nevertheless, 
in the face of market failures, some studies have pointed to the beneficial effects of 
government spending on infrastructure, health, education, and productive development 
projects. The pioneering work of Rao (1953) indicates that government spending on 
productive development projects in developing countries is not as inflationary as it might 
be assumed because of the greater output growth. Eisner and Pieper (1987) report a 
positive impact of cyclically and inflation-adjusted budget deficits on economic growth in 
the United States and other Organization for Economic Cooperation and development 
(OECD) countries. 
 More recently, Nelson and Singh (1994) used data on a cross section of 70 
developing countries during two time periods, 1970-1979 and 1980-1989, to investigate the 
effect of budget deficits on GDP growth rates. The GDP growth rate is used as the 
dependent variable. Among the explanatory variables in this study are government budget 
deficits, government revenue, defence spending, domestic private and public investment, 
population growth rate, per capita income, education, and the inflation rate. They used the 
following equation to estimate the relationship between growth and the public policy 
variables: 
 
PUBINVPVTINVGREVDFEXDFCTGDPG 543210 ββββββ +++++=  
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εβββββ ++++++ PCGNPDOILINFLEDUCPOPG 109876    (4.23) 
  
 The estimation results of the growth model (4.23) by using the OLS method are 
reported in Appendix 4.1 (See Table 4.7, A4.1.11 and Table 4.8, A4.1.12 respectively). 
These results suggest that defence spending and private investment have had a significant 
positive impact on economic growth both in the 1970s and the 1980s for the countries 
analysed. Government revenue had a negative impact on growth. The education variable 
provides no conclusive effects. Public investment had a positive impact on economic 
growth in the 1980s but had no impact in the 1970s. This study concludes that the budget 
deficit had no significant effect on the economic growth of these nations in the 1970s and 
1980s (Nelson and Singh, 1994, 183-184). 
 Burney and Akhtar (1992) empirically examined the effects of budget deficits on 
the exchange rate in Pakistan over the period 1971-72 to 1989-90 by using the following 
functional real exchange rate model: 
 
( )BDiiYTOTfe fdfd ,,,, −−= ππ  0,0,0,0,0 54321 ><>>> fffff  … … (4.24) 
 
Where e is the real exchange rate; dπ and fπ are, respectively, domestic and foreign 
inflation rates; TOT is the international terms of trade, i.e. export prices relative to import 
prices; Y is level of economic activity (national income); di and fi are, respectively, 
domestic and foreign interest rates; and BD is the budget deficit. The equation (4.24) is 
estimated in linear form using the OLS method. The estimated results are reported in 
Appendix 4.1 (See Table 4.8, A4.1.13). 
 The results of this study indicate “that in the case of Pakistan, government budget 
deficits have influenced the real exchange rate directly as well as indirectly through the 
price level” (Burney and Akhtar, 1992, 879). 
 Roubini and Sachs (1989) studied the effects of the growth slowdown, the rise in 
unemployment, and the higher interest rates on the increased budget deficits after 1973 in 
OECD countries. They estimated a pooled cross-section time-series regression model 
expressed as below: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ititititittiit vParbdandaUdabdaabd +∗+∗+∗+∗+∗+= − 54321,10    (4.25) 
 
Where, ( )itbd  is the annual deficit (measured as the change in the debt-GDP ratio), 
( )1, −tibd  is the lagged deficit, ( )itUd  is the change in the unemployment rate, ( )itnd  is the 
change in the GDP growth rate, ( )ttit nrdb −∗  is the change in the real interest rate minus 
the growth rate, multiplied by the lagged debt-GDP ratio, itP  is a political variable (an 
index for country i at time t, that measures the degree of political cohesion of the national 
government), itv  is an error term, i denotes country, t denotes time, and d(x) denotes the 
change in variable x. 
 The results of this study suggested “ the shocks that hit the macroeconomies of the 
industrial countries, particularly slower growth and higher unemployment after 1973, and 
higher real interest rates in the 1980s, all contributed to a jump in the budget deficits of the 
industrial countries” (Roubini and Sachs, 1989, p. 922). 
 Arora and Dua (1993) studied the effects of budget deficits on investment and on 
trade deficits during the period from 1980 to 1989. They utilized the following functional 
model: 
 
Xt = f (D/Y, m, y, e)   (4.26) 
 
Where, Xt is the dependent variable, D/Y is the ratio of the budget deficit to GNP, Y is 
GNP, m is the percentage change from the previous period in real GNP, and e is the 
percentage change from the previous period in the real exchange rate. This study suggests 
that “higher budget deficits crowd out domestic investment and increase trade 
deficits”(Arora and Dua, 1993, p. 42). 
 Karras (1994) studied the effects of budget deficits on money growth, inflation, 
investment, and real output growth. He used pooled annual data from 32 countries 
covering periods from the 1950s to the 1980s. This study concludes that deficits do not 
lead to inflation through monetary expansion; deficits are negatively correlated with the 
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rate of growth of real output; and increased deficits do appear to retard investment usually 
after one or two years. 
 Al-Khedair (1996) studied the relationship between the budget deficit and 
economic growth in the seven major industrial countries (G-7). The data utilized in this 
study covered the period from 1964 to 1993. He used the following economic growth 
model: 
 
EG = c0 + c1BDGDP + c2MS + c3NER + C4TT + c5FDIGDP   (4.27) 
 
Where, EG is economic growth, BDGDP is the budget deficit, MS is the money supply, 
NER is the nominal exchange rate, and FDIGDP is foreign direct investment. He found 
that the budget deficit has a significant positive impact on economic growth in France, 
Germany, and Italy. The estimation results for the economic growth model (4.27) are 
presented in Appendix 4.1 (See Table 4.9, A4.1.14).  
 Overall results concluded that the budget deficit seems to positively and 
significantly affect economic growth in all the seven major industrial countries (Al-Khedair, 
1996, p. 132). 
 Finally, in the context of this study, no empirical studies have been conducted for 
Lebanon regarding the relationship between the budget deficit and macroeconomic 
variables. The only studies conducted in this area are theoretical works. 
  Bolbol (1999a) develops a theoretical framework63 to explain the phenomena of  
seigniorage, dollarisation and public debt; and applies this to the Lebanese macroeconomic 
situation over the period of 1982-1997. This study concluded that budget deficits were only 
one of the reasons behind the inflation and exchange rate depreciations during the civil 
war.  
Bolbol (1999b) analysed the Lebanese deficits and debts over the post-war period. 
He developed certain equations for the rate of growth of net debt-to-GDP and net debt 
interest payments-to-GDP ratios, and studied their determinants. He concluded that the 
                                                 
63 For a detailed discussion of the theoretical framework developed in this study, see Bolbol (1999a). 
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budget deficits are a symptom of a weak economy (Bolbol, 1999b, p. 442). Chami (1992) 
theoretically analysed the macroeconomic performance in Lebanon during 1975-1990 (civil 
war). He argues that “the central government has become completely paralysed and unable 
to collect tax revenue but continues to spend in order to maintain essential services, pay 
wages and salaries and subsidize some basic imported goods”. As a result, this led to 
substantial budget deficits financed by the central bank and commercial banks. This study 
concluded that the budget deficit led to a massive increase in the money supply, high 
inflation rates and a severe depreciation of the Lebanese currency. Only empirical testing of 
the theoretical models would give credence to such conclusions. 
 
4.5 Summary and Conclusions 
 In summary, this chapter has reviewed the extensive literature examining the 
relationship between budget deficits and economic variables, concentrating on theoretical 
debates, empirical studies, and econometric models. It can be concluded from the empirical 
studies (e.g. Barro (1991); Arora and Dua (1993); Nelson and Singh (1994); Kelly (1997); 
Aschauer (1989b); Argimon et al. (1997); Ghali and Al-Shamsi (1997);  Bahmani (1999); 
Ahmed and Miller (2000); among others) presented in this chapter dealing with the impact 
of public investment on private investment and economic growth, that one of the 
important outcomes from these studies showed that cross-section analysis cannot capture 
the country specific nature of the government spending and growth relationship. 
Moreover, time series analysis reveals the causal relationship between variables, while cross-
section analysis can identify correlation but not causation between variables.  
In general the key outcomes from the studies presented in this chapter indicated 
that both the method of financing and the components of government expenditure could 
have different effects. Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between current and capital 
expenditure when evaluating the impact of fiscal policy on private investment and output 
growth. Thus, overall results from the empirical literature with respect to the impact of 
public investment on private investment and growth are ambiguous but the bulk of the 
empirical literature finds a significantly negative effect of public consumption expenditure 
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on growth, while the effects of public investment expenditure are found to be positive 
although less robust. 
The major outcomes from the empirical studies (e.g. Dwyer (1982); Darrat (1985); 
Ahking and Miller (1985); Choudhary and Parai (1991); Dogas (1992); Hondroyiannis and 
Papapetrou (1994); Karras (1994); Metin (1998), Darrat (2000); among others) examining 
the relationship between budget deficits and inflation, showed strong evidence that the 
budget deficit financed through monetisation and a rising money supply could lead to 
inflation. However, the inflationary effect of government deficits depends upon the means 
by which the deficit is financed and the impact of that on aggregate demand. 
 The evidence from a range of detailed studies (e.g. Volker (1984); Laney (1986); 
Bundt and Solocha (1988); Evans (1988); Abell (1990b); Kearney and Monadjemi (1990); 
Tallman and Rosensweig (1991); Bachman (1992); Arora and Dua (1993); Kasa (1994); Al-
Khedair (1996); Islam (1998); Khalid and Guan (1999); Egwaikhide (1999); Piersanti 
(2000); among others) with respect to the impact of the budget deficit on the trade deficit 
(the twin-deficit), reported in this chapter, has been mixed. The methodology used to 
analyse the above issue varies from well-specified theoretical models to using a simple one-
to-one relationship between the budget deficit and current account deficit. Furthermore, 
the empirical findings investigating the relationship between budget deficits and trade 
deficits are ambiguous, as are the theoretical ones, in both developed and developing 
countries. Even though the overall results are inconclusive, it is worth noting here that the 
majority of these studies found evidence towards supporting the twin deficits relationship 
arising through the exchange rate. Thus the key outcome from all of these studies indicated 
strong evidence towards supporting the Keynesian proposition (conventional view) which 
suggests that an increase in the budget deficit would induce domestic absorption and, 
hence import expansion, causing a current account deficit. 
 Empirical investigations (e.g. Bundt and Solocha (1988); Burney and Akhtar (1992); 
Bohn (1992); Meltzer (1993); Hakkio (1996); Stoker (1999); among others) of the impact of 
budget deficits on the exchange rate are as inconclusive as the theoretical arguments. The 
major conclusion from the empirical studies examining the relationship between the budget 
deficit and the exchange rate showed strong evidence, in both developed and developing 
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countries, generally supporting the conventional macroeconomic theory, rather than the 
Ricardian equivalence proposition which holds that large deficits have no real adverse 
macroeconomic effects. It can also be concluded from the empirical findings that the 
effects of budget deficits on exchange rates depends on the way of funding the deficits, 
whether through taxation or through money growth.    
 In addition, as we have seen in this chapter, many studies examined the relationship 
between the budget deficit and interest rates by using an IS-LM framework among other 
models such as the loanable funds model. The evidence from a range of detailed studies 
(e.g. Feldstein (1982); Dwyer (1982); Evans (1985); Makin (1983); Aschauer (1985); 
Mascaro and Meltzer (1983); Hutchison and Pyle (1984); Monadjemi (1989); Cebula (1988); 
Giannaros and Kolluri (1989), Findlay (1990); Al-Saji (1993); Cebula and Rhodd (1993); Al-
Khedair (1996); Liargovas et al. (1997); Knot and de Haan (1999); Vamvoukas (2000); 
Modeste (2000); Cebula (2000); among others) with respect to the impact of the budget 
deficit on interest rates are mixed. Part of the conflicting results can be explained by 
differences in the choice of variables, methodology and the sample period. Thus, the key 
outcomes from the empirical studies investigating such a relationship indicated strong 
evidence towards supporting the Keynesian model of a significant and positive relationship 
between budget deficits and interest rates. 
 Thus, it can be concluded from this chapter that, ironically, the empirical evidence 
does not shed any definitive light on the relationship between the budget deficit and 
economic variables, as with the theoretical analysis. Overall, from the studies presented in 
this chapter, with respect to the relationship between the budget deficit and economic 
variables, the evidence is inconclusive. It seems that, depending on how the budget is 
measured, the econometric model adopted, the econometric technique/methodology 
adopted, and the period/country of study, different conclusions can be reached. 
 Hence, this chapter has reviewed from the literature the significance of budget 
deficits for key macroeconomic variables. The results, while inconclusive for some 
variables, clearly indicate that budget deficits, and by implication their funding, do exert an 
important impact on macro outcomes. Given that the budget deficit and its funding is the 
key issue in Lebanon it is important, therefore, to explicitly include the budget deficit and 
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its funding in any macro model for Lebanon. Furthermore, this chapter has indicated from 
the existing literature that budget deficits and the way they are funded have important 
macroeconomic implications. Its omission from any macroeconomic model for Lebanon 
would represent a major deficiency. Hence, in the next chapter a macroeconomic model 
for Lebanon is developed to incorporate the role and importance of the budget and its 
funding in a macro model for Lebanon, as well as distinguishing between the role and 
contribution of government capital and current expenditure. These represent a significant 
and important contribution to the literature and particularly so for the case of Lebanon. 
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Appendix 4.1 
Regression Results from Some Empirical Studies 
 
Hutchison and Pyle (1984) estimated the real interest rate equation (4.5) by using the 
OLS method for the major industrial countries over the period 1973-1982. Their 
estimation results are reported as below: 
 
Table 4.1 Real Interest Rate Equations: Pooled Regression for seven Major Industrial Countries, 
1973-1982 Annual Observations.       (A4.1.1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant .007 .031 .014 
 (0.73) (2.83) (1.22) 
Central Government 
Budget Deficit 
.010 .008 .004 
 (4.72) (4.09) (1.85) 
Nominal Money Growth  -.003 -.003 
  (-3.81) (4.11) 
Unemployment Rate   .007 
   (3.15) 
Dummy Variables:    
U.K. -.052 -.039 -.061 
 (-3.94) (-3.16) (-4.50) 
France -.016 -.005 -.022 
 (-1.17) (-0.42) (-1.74) 
Japan -.059 -.044 -.023 
 (-4.06) (-3.22) (-1.56) 
Canada -.031 -.032 -.057 
 (-2.31) (-2.59) (-4.08) 
Italy -1.04 -.063 -.065 
 (-5.69) (-3.19) (-3.55) 
U.S. -0.03 -.034 -.057 
 (-2.48) (-2.85) (-4.27) 
R 2  .39 .51 .58 
Observations 70 70 70 
Standard Error .029 .027 .025 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; OLS regressions 
 
 Cebula (1988) estimated the IS-LM model (4.6) for the U.S. over the period 1955:1-
1984:4 by using an IV technique. The estimation results are as follows (t-values are in 
parentheses): 
ttttttttt RTRPYMYCDYSDNR 65.082.0/49.0/89.0/48.042.2 ++−++=     (A4.1.2) 
                         (+7.60)          (+7.28)                (-1.73)     (+13.74)   (+14.63),  
 D-W=1.70 
Where terms in parentheses are t-values. 
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 Al-Saji (1993) estimated equation (4.7) using a 2SLS technique. The regression 
results are as follows (t-values are in parentheses): 
ttttt
e
tt eXPGPDFMPPR ++++−+= 071.1097.0143.1016.0452.2441.7  (A4.1.3) 
       (1.769) ∗  (0.205)     (-1.011)      (2.116) ∗     (1.828) ∗       (1.192) 
 ,024.0,945.1..,842.02 === RhoWDR  
Where ∗ indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
Cebula and Rhodd (1993) estimated equation (4.11) by instrumental variable (IV). 
The results are as below: 
 
ttttttttt YCYMYBRSRPR /20.0/69.1/58.090.059.016.2 −−+++=  (A4.1.4) 
         (+5.32)        (+10.18)         (+3.11)            (-1.16)                (-3.42) 
 
  ,71.1=DW  ,10.0=Rho  .50=DF  
Where terms in parentheses are t-values. 
 
Al-Khedair (1996) estimated equation (4.12) and (4.13). The regression results are 
as follows: 
 
Table 4.2 Estimation Results for the Short-Term Interest Rate (4.12) (A4.1.5) 
Country Independent variables    
 BDGDP MS TBGDP IRST 1−t  R
2  F SIG.F 
Canada 0.1343 -0.0588 -0.1641 0.8465 0.6519 11.2365 0.0000 
 (0.37) (-.89) (-.42) (4.641) ∗     
France 0.1728 -0.0545 -1.7208 0.5216 0.7754 20.7165 0.0000 
 (0.62) (-.87) (-4.64) ∗  (3.55) ∗     
Germany 0.4911 -0.1963 -0.3652 0.5965 0.5245 6.6193 0.0010 
 (1.708) (-2.26) ∗  (-1.66) (4.02) ∗     
Italy 0.09402 -0.0378 -1.355 0.8266 0.9011 54.6626 0.0000 
 (.55) (-.68) (-6.99) ∗  (6.17) ∗     
Japan 0.2716 -0.0897 -1.2744 0.426 0.6652 11.9197 0.0000 
 (2.08) ∗  (-1.90) (-5.59) ∗  (3.42) ∗     
U.K. 0.0211 -0.0226 -0.3551 0.724 0.5516 7.3821 0.0005 
 (.14) (-.35) (-1.62) (5.04) ∗     
U.S. 0.8842 -0.0229 -0.6971 0.9776 0.7741 20.5580 0.0000 
 (3.69) ∗  (-.21) (-2.40) ∗  (8.58) ∗     
t-values are in parenthesis. 
∗ Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 4.3 Estimation Results for the Long-Term Interest Rate (4.13) (A4.1.6) 
Country Independent variables    
 BDGDP MS TBGDP IRLT 1−t  R
2  F SIG.F 
Canada 0.1593 -0.0601 0.0322 0.9601 0.8484 33.565 0.0000 
 (.832) (-2.05) ∗  (.164) (6.766) ∗     
France 0.3267 -0.0033 -0.118 0.7443 0.9000 53.84 0.0000 
 (1.75) (-.078) (-4.15) ∗  (6.51) ∗     
Germany 0.2944 -0.0671 -1528 0.66 0.514 6.3464 0.0012 
 (1.92) (-1.45)  (-1.3) (4.284) ∗     
Italy 0.0567 -0.0437 -0.644 0.8677 0.871 40.44 0.0000 
 (0.372) (-0.77) (-3.262) ∗  (7.07) ∗     
Japan 0.0562 -0.015 -0.7054 0.667 0.851 34.26 0.0000 
 (2.08)  (-1.90) (-5.59) ∗  (3.42) ∗     
U.K. 0.0232 -0.0762 -0.278 0.9629 0.832 29.62 0.0000 
 (0.238) (-1.93) (-2.303) ∗  (8.43) ∗     
U.S. 0.4457 -0.1013 -0.0953 1.0961 0.852 34.5150 0.0000 
 (2.268) ∗  (-1.231) (0.418)  (9.416) ∗     
t-values are in parenthesis. 
∗ Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
 Liargovas (1997) estimated equation (4.15), which is a dynamic error-
correction model (ECM) of the short-run behaviour of money demand, and the results are 
as shown in Table 4.4 below: 
 
Table 4.4 Regression Resultsa Logarithmic Change of M   (A4.1.7) 
Estimate of Coefficient t-value 
Constant 0.028 2.50 ∗  
tP  -0.589 -2.60 ∗  
tGDP  0.080 3.40 ∗  
tTBR  -0.021 -1.77 +  
tR  0.026 2.19 ∗  
tGDEBT  0.100 1.68 +  
D92 -0.013 -2.24 ∗  
D91Q1 -0.048 -3.22 ∗  
1−tM  0.432 3.79 ∗  
2−tM  0.236 2.59 ∗  
1−tµ  -0.279 -3.29 ∗  
Statistics   
S.E 0.013  
Adj. 2R  0.841  
Q 9.36  
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JB 27.1 ∗   
ARCH 8.0  
a M, GDP, P and GDEBT are differences of logs. TBR and R are first differences of the corresponding rates. 
S.E. is the standard error of the OLS regression. Q is the Godfrey (1978) LM test for autocorrelation in the 
residuals, which is asymptotically distributed as ( )42X . JB is the Jaque-Bera (1980) test for deviation from 
normality in the residual, which is asymptotically distributed as ( )22X . ARCH is Engle’s (1982) statistic for 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedaticity in the residuals, which has an asymptotic ( )42X  distribution. ∗  
and +  indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
 
Cebula (2000) estimated the interest rate equation (4.16) using the IV method for 
the U.S. over the period 1973-95. The estimation results are reported as follows: 
 
ttt EARSRPCYEPRLR 09.100006.065.4 ++−= )/(29.0)/(86.0 tttt TCYB −+  
                                 (+3.05)            (+6.50)              (+4.10)          (-3.15)   (A1.4.8) 
 
 DW = 1.98, Rho = -0.03, D = 6.40 
Where all numbers in parentheses are t-values. 
 
Al-Khedair (1996) estimated equation (4.21). The regression results are as follows: 
 
Table 4.5 Estimation Results for the Trade Balance Model (4.21) (A4.1.9) 
Country Independent variables    
 BDGDP NER MS TT R 2  F SIG.F 
Canada -0.4615 0.0016 -0.022 0.0726 0.3265 3.0303 0.0363 
 (-2.922) ∗  (0.074) (-0.69) (0.991)     
France 0.1345 0.0222 -0.0542 0.1183 0.532 7.103 0.0006 
 (1.136) (2.146) ∗  (-2.024) ∗  (3.814) ∗     
Germany 0.4297 0.0283 -0.0324 0.1026 0.241 1.99 0.1275 
 (1.683) (1.868)  (-0.433) (1.634)     
Italy 0.2852 -0.009 0.0397 0.22 0.560 7.832 0.0003 
 (2.261) ∗  (-1.374) (1.482)  (5.351) ∗     
Japan 0.0292 0.0178 0.0049 0.0709 0.67 12.631 0.0000 
 (0.36)  (2.13) ∗  (0.13)  (4.711) ∗     
U.K. -0.0785 0.0203 0.0144 0.1776 0.32 2.894 0.0426 
 (-0.684) (2.107) ∗  (0.262) (2.569) ∗     
U.S. 0.5076 0.0083 -0.0769 0.0563 0.6 9.2000 0.0001 
 (3.877) ∗  (0.711) (-1.096)  (1.141)     
t-values are in parenthesis. 
∗ Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
Mohammadi (2000) used OLS method to estimate the trade balance model (4.22) 
for a sample of 67 countries over the period 1975-95. The estimation results are reported as 
follows: 
 165 
 
Table 4.6 Estimation Results for the Trade Balance Model (67 countries)  (A4.1.10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant -0.183 -0.217 -0.213 0.128 0.177 
 (0.978) (0.921) (0.808) (0.739) (0.729) 
D bs 0.824 0.778 0.777 0.762 0.735 
 (0.316) ∗  (0.349) ∗  (0.347) ∗  (0.347) ∗  (0.352) ∗  
D gs  -0.263 -0.263 -0.055 -0.114 
  (0.433) (0.445) (0.320) (0.325) 
D e   0.027 -1.751 -2.380 
   (3.036) (2.869) (2.806) 
D gm    -0.331 -0.331 
    (0.104) ∗  (0.101) ∗  
D gy     -0.793 
     (0.972) 
Corrected R 2  0.158 0.157 0.143 0.299 0.298 
Breusch-Pagan 0.398 7.792 11.358 7.567 10.172 
D.F. (1) ∗ ∗ ∗  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Note: D  is the first difference operator. Values in parentheses below parameter estimates are 
heteroscedasticity-corrected Standard errors of estimates. Significance at 5% and 10% levels are reported by 
∗ and ∗ ∗ respectively. Degrees of freedom for Breusch-Pagan chi-squared tests of homoscedasticity in 
residuals are denoted by ∗ ∗ ∗ . 
 
 Nelson and Singh (1994) estimated the growth model (4.23) for two time 
periods, 1970-79 and 1980-89 for approximately 70 developing countries. It is worth noting 
that the variables of the model were constructed by taking the mean values of the annual 
observations for the 10-year interval. Using the OLS estimation method, their estimation 
results are as follows:  
 
Table 4.7 Results of the Estimation Equations of the Growth 
 Model: 1970-79   (A4.1.11) 
 Low-income countries Middle-income countries All LDCs 
Explanatory Variable Model (1) 
(1) 
Model (2) 
(2) 
Model (1) 
(3) 
Model (2) 
(4) 
Model 
(1) 
(5) 
Model (2) 
(6) 
Mean DFCT -.103 -.093 -.164 -.118 -.110 -.093 
 (.47) (.42) (1.46) (.99) (1.39) (1.16) 
Mean PVTINV a  .010 .030 .083** .097*** .085*** .095*** 
 (.11) (.34) (2.60) (2.81) (2.99) (3.17) 
Mean PUBINV … … .201 .210 .083 .114 
   (1.05) (1.10) (.59) (.80) 
Mean DFEX -.049 .012 .359** .379** .295** .304** 
 (.12) (.03) (2.30) (2.42) (2.20) (2.26) 
Mean GREV .040 .064 -.193*** -.219*** -.157*** -.179*** 
 (.33) (.54) (2.97) (3.15) (2.97) (3.15) 
POPG 2.072** 2.160** -.043 .128 .223 .209 
 (2.19) (2.05) (.07) (.21) (.51) (.48) 
DOIL … … .718 .522 .647 .475 
   (.76) (.54) (.70) (.51) 
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Mean EDUC .020 .017 .15*** .010 .016*** .011 
 (1.74) (1.51) (2.85) (1.47) (4.01) (1.89) 
Mean INFL -.211** -1.191** -.014* -.014 -.015* -0.015* 
 (2.44) (2.18) (1.73) (1.66) (1.88) (1.90) 
Log of mean 
PCGNP 
… -2.279 … .935 … .640 
  (1.09)  (1.05)  (1.04) 
Constant -.098 9.798 3.556 -2.241 2.555 -.697 
 (.27) (.93) (1.37) (.37) (1.44) (.19) 
R 2  .60 .66 .65 .66 .58 .59 
F-statistic 1.72 1.69 4.85 4.49 5.27 4.86 
No. of observations 17 16 34 34 45 45 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. 
a  For the low-income countries, this variable reflects total (public or private) investment expenditures. 
Separate data on public capital expenditure were unavailable for many of these countries, and the remaining 
sample size would be too small to estimate the full model. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 4.7 Results of the Estimation Equations of the Growth 
 Model: 1980-89   (A4.1.12) 
 Low-income countries Middle-income countries All LDCs  
Explanatory 
Variable 
Model (1) 
(1) 
Model (2) 
(2) 
Model (1) 
(3) 
Model (2) 
(4) 
Model (1) 
(5) 
Model (2) 
(6) 
Mean DFCT -.103 -.093 .009 -.088 -.021 -.099 
 (1.28) (1.13) (.09) (.99) (.28) (1.26) 
Mean PVTINV a  .081 .063 .310*** .346*** .239*** .257*** 
 (1.33) (.98) (3.64) (4.65) (3.83) (4.37) 
Mean PUBINV … … .350** .400*** .228** .261** 
   (2.36) (3.09) (2.15) (2.61) 
Mean DFEX 1.159*** 1.238*** .138 .141 .227 .266* 
 (4.95) (4.93) (.71) (.83) (1.52) (1.90) 
Mean GREV -.195*** -.200*** -.020 -.013 -.043 -.041 
 (3.60) (3.64) (.35) (.27) (.95) (.96) 
POPG -.850 -.820 -.962 -.804 -.858 -.863* 
 (1.49) (1.42) (1.43) (1.38) (1.60) (1.72) 
DOIL … … -.863 -.070 -.852 -.039 
   (.75) (.07) (.88) (.04) 
Mean EDUC .021*** .024*** -.004 .005 -.006 .002 
 (3.36) (3.41) (.54) (.68) (1.14) (.34) 
Mean INFL .002 .002 -.002 -.002 -.004 -.002 
 (.21) (.15) (.25) (.26) (.62) (.42) 
Log of mean 
PCGNP 
… -.785 … -2.036*** … -1.333** 
  (.92)  (2.98)  (2.50) 
Constant 2.814 6.947 -.256 10.937 2.390 9.169 
 (1.49) (1.43) (.07) (2.24) (.99) (2.60) 
R 2  .85 .87 .47 .62 .41 .50 
F-statistic 6.62 5.79 2.23 3.59 2.86 3.57 
No. of 
observations 
16 16 33 33 47 47 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses. 
a  For the low-income countries, this variable reflects total (public or private) investment expenditures. 
Separate data on public capital expenditure were unavailable for many of these countries, and the remaining 
sample size would be too small to estimate the full model. 
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* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Burney and Akhtar (1992) estimated the real exchange rate function (3.24) for 
Pakistan in linear form using OLS method. The estimated results are reported as follows: 
 
Table 4.8 OLS Estimates of Real Exchange Rate Function (3.20) for Pakistan period 1971-72-1989-90
          (A4.1.13) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 
Constant -47.928 -58.381 -28.734 -48.960 -14.561 
 (-2.243) ∗   (-3.576) ∗  (-2.990) ∗  (-5.090) ∗  (-2.212) ∗  
fd ππ −  0.127 0.130 0.091 0.059 0.038 
 (3.174) ∗  (3.307) ∗  (2.792) ∗  (2.206) ∗  (1.649) ∗  
fd ii −  0.625 - - - - 
 (0.777)      
Explanatory 
Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 
BD (as % of 
GDP) 
0.705 1.294 1.064 0.684 0.633 
 (0.728)  (2.180) ∗  (2.252) ∗  (1.881) ∗ ∗  (2.100) ∗ ∗  
Y (per capita 
GNP) 
0.077 0.078 - 0.097 - 
 (4.353) ∗   (4.515) ∗    (9.085) ∗    
GNP - - 0.0005 - 0.0005 
   (6.357)    (11.229) ∗  
Remittances 
(as % pf GNP) 
- - - -1.634 -1.200 
    (-4.995) ∗  (-4.644) ∗  
TOT  0.061 0.108 0.102 0.016 0.030 
 (0.580)  (1.261) (1.528) (0.305) (0.686) 
D  3.364 4.235 3.146 1.924 2.874 
2R  0.936 0.932 0.958 0.979 0.986 
2R (Adjusted) 0.901 0.904 0.941 0.968 0.978 
..WD  1.519 1.499 1.531 2.167 2.242 
F -Statistic 26.715 33.026 54.920 86.617 127.799 
∗     Implies significant at 5% level. 
∗ ∗  Implies significant at 10% level. 
       Figures within the parenthesis are ‘t’ ratios. 
 
Al-Khedair (1996) estimated equation (4.27). The regression results are reported as 
below: 
 
Table 4.9 Estimation Results for the Economic Growth (4.27)   (A4.1.14) 
Country Independent variables    
         
CANADA BDGDP MS NER TT FDIGDP R 2  F SIG.F 
 0.5058 0.1554 0.076 0.169 -0.6493 0.46 4.14 0.0075 
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 (1.707) (2.611) ∗  (1.753)  (1.194)  (-1.108)     
FRANCE 0.9132 -0.0013 0.036 0.0938 -0.6493 0.57 6.31 0.0007 
 (3.44) ∗  (-0.02)  (1.421)  (1.343)  (-0.881)     
GERMANY 0.9402 0.2123 -0.0603 -0.16 -2.412 0.51 4.96 0.0029 
 (2.9) ∗  (2.165) ∗  (-1.6)  (-1.96)  (-1.47)     
ITALY 0.587 0.163 -0.018 -0.038 2.292 0.65 8.73 0.0001 
 (3.168) ∗  (3.899) ∗  (-1.565)  (-0.607)  (1.261)     
JAPAN 0.576 -0.0329 -0.0979 0.088 -1.498 0.50 4.55 0.0047 
 (1.981)  (-0.245)  (-2.731) ∗  (1.597)  (-0.836)     
U.K. 0.13446 0.1341 0.028 -0.102 -1.417 0.50 4.25 0.0066 
 (0.968)  (1.861)  (2.398) ∗  (-1.211)  (-2.702) ∗     
U.S. 0.418 0.2116 0.0315 0.123 -0.278 0.21 1.30 0.2940 
t-values are in parenthesis. 
∗ Denotes significance at the 5% level. 
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Chapter 5  
Theoretical Framework and the Macroeconomic Model for Lebanon 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the existing theoretical models concerned 
with identifying macroeconomic adjustments arising from the effects of monetary and 
fiscal policy. The theoretical framework, and the assumptions of these models, will be 
analysed with the aim of developing a dynamic macroeconomic model for Lebanon. This 
will then be used to examine the macroeconomic effects arising from budget deficits and 
its funding (e.g. by monetary accommodation or bond financing), and to analyse, as well, 
exogenous shocks arising from increased government expenditures (capital expenditure or 
consumption expenditure) and their impact on macroeconomic variables such as output, 
private investment, prices, interest rates, amongst others. This model will also be used to 
analyse the government’s policy approach in response to the Lebanese fiscal crisis. 
As mentioned in previous chapters the major problem facing the Lebanese 
economy in the last two decades has been fiscal deficits. The main concern are the effects 
arising from public deficits on macroeconomic variables such as output, interest rates, 
inflation, exchange rates, and the performance of the private sector as a whole. Such effects 
directly influence the whole country’s economic performance. 
The theoretical frameworks investigated in this chapter for analysing the effects of 
monetary and fiscal policy, are the Dornbusch model (DB) (1976), and the portfolio 
balance model (PBM) (Branson (1977, 1984)) including the work of Dornbusch and Fisher 
(1980). The model developed combines the contributions of these general models with that 
of the Harvie and Kearney model (HKM) (1996). 
 The model developed focuses upon the main aspect of the current Lebanese 
economic crisis, which is the size and growth of the public sector deficit. The model will 
remedy the deficiencies in both the DB and PBM models regarding their neglect of the 
supply side of the economy, the funding of the budget deficit, and the composition of 
government expenditure. However, many amendments are required of the existing models 
in order to make them applicable to the case of Lebanon, especially in regard to analysing 
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the impact of the composition of budget funding and the composition of government 
expenditure shocks on macroeconomic variables. 
First, the model developed distinguishes between two types of public expenditure, 
capital expenditure and current expenditure. Second, the model developed explicitly 
incorporates the funding of the budget deficit via bond financing (pure fiscal policy), via 
money accommodation (pure monetary policy) or a mixture of the two. Third, it 
incorporates exogenous shocks arising from the increase in the budget deficit, such as 
through an increase in government expenditure, and the impact of this on macroeconomic 
variables such as output, prices, the exchange rate, and the interest rate among others.  
The model developed assumes that the Lebanese economy operates under a 
flexible exchange rate and perfect capital mobility. Under a flexible exchange rate regime 
the nominal exchange rate adjusts so that the balance of payments is in equilibrium, and 
there will be no effect upon foreign exchange reserves. Hence, the money supply is 
exogenous and the nominal exchange rate is endogenous. Furthermore, the model is 
dynamic and focuses upon long run adjustment; and economic agents possess rational 
expectations (as with the HK model). This is equivalent to the case of perfect foresight 
(this will be discussed in detail later). The model developed also assumes that there are four 
financial assets, domestic money, domestic bonds, foreign bonds, and equities. Assets 
denominated in domestic currency and foreign exchange are assumed to be perfect 
substitutes, with arbitrage between them resulting instantaneously in the same expected real 
rate of return.  
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 5.2 identifies the theoretical 
contributions (main assumptions) underlying the DB and PBM models, pointing out a 
number of deficiencies in these models. Section 5.3 will review the effects of monetary and 
fiscal policy in the PBM and DB models. Section 5.4 identifies key extensions to the 
existing literature. Section 5.5 specifies the macroeconomic model in the case of Lebanon 
and main assumptions underlying this model. Section 5.6 summarises the major substantive 
conclusions derivable from this chapter. 
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5.2 Theoretical Contributions of the DB and PBMs 
This section will analyse the key theoretical contributions and ingredients 
underlying each theoretical model. It is worth mentioning here that the main assumptions 
underlying each model are summarised in Table 5.1, which will be presented in this section. 
The analytical solutions of the DB and PBM models are presented in Appendices 5.1 and 
5.2 respectively. 
 
5.2.1 Sticky Price Model and Exchange Rate Overshooting 
It is worth mentioning in this section that the DB model (1976) is an extension and 
amendment of the Mundell-Fleming (MF) model, incorporating rational expectations and 
sticky price adjustment. The DB model, in common with the MF model, consists of a small 
open economy which produces domestically a good which is, in the short run, an imperfect 
substitute for a foreign-produced good, faces a given price of foreign output, and a given 
foreign interest rate. In addition, the DB model also explicitly models the adjustment of 
macro variables over time. Therefore, it is not limited to a comparison of stationary-state 
equilibria as in the Mundell-Fleming model. Instead, it can trace the adjustment path of 
variables from one steady state equilibrium to another.  
In the DB model the price level is assumed to be sticky, adjusting over time at a 
rate proportional to excess demand. Since the aggregate supply curve is not perfectly 
elastic, with output fixed at the full employment level, goods prices are assumed 
proportional to the excess of demand over full employment output. Hence, the aggregate 
supply curve is vertical in the DB (original) model. The goods market, therefore, adjusts 
slowly and remains in disequilibrium during the adjustment process, while the exchange 
rate and interest rate adjust instantaneously to maintain continuous asset market 
equilibrium. Differential adjustment speeds in the goods and asset markets contribute to 
the existence of exchange rate overshooting. The PBM model, because it is a partial and 
not a general equilibrium model, does not have much to say about price adjustment. 
 Moreover, since capital is perfectly mobile in the DB model, the uncovered 
interest parity (UIP) condition holds continuously, that is )(* eErr &+= , where r is the 
domestic interest rate, *r  is the world interest rate, and )(eE & is the expected rate of 
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depreciation of the domestic currency. The return on domestic assets (bonds) equals the 
domestic interest rate. While the expected return on foreign assets (bonds) equals the 
foreign interest rate plus the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency. In 
addition, in the DB model, a disturbance such as an increase in the money supply will, for a 
given price level, lead to a lower domestic interest rate, a capital outflow and exchange rate 
depreciation. The exchange rate will depreciate by more than the long-run depreciation, in 
order to give the expectation of an exchange rate appreciation so that the UIP is 
continually maintained: the exchange rate ‘overshoots’ its equilibrium value. Therefore, in 
the DB model a monetary disturbance can lead to exchange rate overshooting (on impact), 
meaning that PPP does not hold in the short-run but holds in the long-run.  
In the PBM model, asset shocks arising from a monetary disturbance can result in 
exchange rate overshooting. This overshoot is reversed overtime as the country 
accumulates or decumulates foreign bonds (F) via the current account (this will be 
discussed later). In addition, a monetary disturbance in this model can result in a long run, 
as well as short run, departure from PPP (more details later). 
 
5.2.2 Rational Expectations and Capital Mobility 
 In the DB model assets denominated in terms of domestic and foreign currency are 
assumed to be perfect substitutes, hence uncovered interest parity holds continuously. In 
addition, in the DB 1976 model, capital movements are not solely dependent on the 
interest rate differential, but also exchange rate expectations.  
 The differential between the domestic and the world interest rate will reflect the 
expected depreciation or appreciation of the domestic currency (( )(* eErr &=− ). If the 
domestic currency is expected to depreciate, interest rates on assets denominated in terms 
of domestic currency will exceed those abroad by the expected rate of depreciation. 
 The above relationship (( )(* eErr &=− ) is a representation of perfect capital 
mobility, so it is assumed that incipient capital flows will ensure that the relationship holds 
at all times. Exchange rate expectations in the DB model are confirmed to be regressive 
and hence there is a distinction between the long-run exchange rate, to which the economy 
will ultimately converge, and the current exchange rate. Denoting the logarithms of the 
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current and long-run rate by e and e  respectively, then )()( eeeE −=θ& . The latter 
equation states that the expected rate of depreciation of the spot rate is proportional to the 
discrepancy between the long-run rate and the current spot rate. The coefficient of 
adjustment θ  is, for the present, taken as a parameter. In addition, if e exceeds the 
equilibrium value then there is an expectation that e will appreciate (fall) back to the 
equilibrium value. If the current value is below the equilibrium value it is expected that the 
rate will depreciate (rise) back to equilibrium. 
 The relaxation of the static expectations assumption in the DB model allows 
policymakers to examine the effect of policy shocks in different time periods (e.g. short-
term or long-term). In the short run, for instance on impact, the level of prices is given; an 
increase in money supply (hence an increase in real money supply) requires a decline in the 
domestic interest rate (r) to clear the money market. The fall in the interest rate leads to a 
capital outflow, hence the exchange rate will depreciate because there is the recognition of 
an increase in both the long-run equilibrium exchange rate and the long-run price level. 
Accordingly, the exchange rate immediately depreciates by ( θλ/11/ +=dmde ) (see 
A5.1.16), noting that dmpded ==  because of the presumed long-run neutrality of 
money. Hence the nominal exchange rate in the short run overshoots, or rises by more 
than the increase in the long-run equilibrium rate. In the short run the price level is given 
and, thus, to obtain asset market equilibrium the exchange rate has to overshoot. 
Overshooting results from the requirement that the interest rate differential equals the 
anticipated rate of appreciation. Therefore, the spot rate must go beyond the long-run 
equilibrium rate to yield an expectation of an appreciation. The extent of overshooting is 
larger the smaller are price and interest elasticities of aggregate demand and the smaller is 
the interest elasticity of money demand (See A5.1.16). 
 The assumption of rational expectations in the DB model is important for 
distinguishing between policies which are anticipated and those which are unanticipated, 
and the impact of such policies for the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies. 
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 In contrast to the DB model, domestic and foreign bonds are not assumed to be 
perfect substitutes in the PBM64. There are many other factors (such as differential tax risk, 
liquidity considerations, political risk, default risk and exchange rate risk), which implies 
that non-money assets issued in different countries are unlikely to be viewed as perfect 
substitutes. Therefore, just as international transactors are likely to hold a portfolio of 
currencies to minimise exchange risk, risk-averse international investors like to hold a 
portfolio of non-money assets. In addition, the proportions of particular assets held 
depends on risk/return factors. This suggests that uncovered interest parity will not hold 
and should be replaced with an equation that is λ=−− )(* eErr , where λ is equal to the 
risk premium. Hence, if international investors decide that a currency has become riskier, 
they are likely to reallocate their portfolios in favour of the less risky assets. However, the 
model developed in this study assumes that assets are perfect substitutes. 
 In addition, exchange rate dynamics in the PBM implies the specification of a 
wealth accumulation equation and a hypothesis about exchange rate expectations. Wealth 
accumulation is assumed to occur only through the accumulation of foreign currency 
denominated assets, since domestic asset stocks are assumed fixed and the government 
budget is in balance (Pentecost, 1993). It is worth noting here that the examples of the 
PBM in which expectations are assumed rational include Dornbusch and Fisher (1980)65. 
Furthermore, the PBM offers a rationale for exchange rate overshooting which does not 
depend on the somewhat disputed notion of sticky prices. Overshooting is as a result of 
                                                 
64 This model has its origins and development in research conducted by McKinnon and Oates (1966), 
Branson (1968, 1975, 1977, 1984), Allen and Kenen (1987), Dornbusch and Fisher (1980), among others. 
 
65 They used the PBM in a classical framework. They concentrated on the association between the current 
account and the exchange rate. One of the developments in this study is the distinction between 
anticipated and unanticipated disturbances to the economy. They extended this model by giving an 
important role to the accumulation of assets over time through the current account. Asset accumulation, 
together with expectations, dominates the dynamic behaviour of the exchange rate. Furthermore, also in 
this version of the model, there is overshooting not because prices are sticky, but because in the short run 
external assets are predetermined. This model has the important shortcoming of a very restricted menu of 
assets, and of short run price flexibility and continuous full employment. The compensation is the 
introduction of the current account as a vital element in open economy macroeconomics and exchange 
rate determination. Therefore, this study introduced a theoretical rationale for the popular view that there 
is an association between the current account and the behaviour of the exchange rate. Such a view must 
be qualified because anticipated disturbances that will ultimately depreciate the exchange rate can, 
initially and in contrast to the conventional view, lead to the combination of a current account deficit and 
appreciating exchange rate. For a further detailed discussion see Dornbusch and Fisher (1980). 
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the fact that wealth accumulation through current-account surpluses takes time. Moreover, 
stock-flow interactions are introduced into the PBM by making the demand for domestic 
money and assets depend upon the level of non-bank private wealth. Private-sector wealth 
is accumulated and decumulated through current account surpluses and deficits, which in 
turn feed back into private expenditures and the demand for money. 
 
5.2.3 Supply Side Considerations 
 As mentioned earlier, the DB model assumes a small open economy that trades in 
goods and securities with the rest of the world. The model focuses on the demand side of 
the economy with output fixed at the full employment level. Therefore, fluctuations in 
goods demand only results in changes in price but not in output. This model neglects the 
supply side of the economy, similar to that of the Mundell-Fleming model66. 
 The PBM model does not directly incorporate supply side effects, but it could be 
extended to permit private capital stock accumulation, as well as in the public sector, which 
in turn influences the production function and hence aggregate supply.  
 
5.2.4 Wealth Effects and Current Account Equilibrium 
 Firstly, it is worth mentioning that the principal differences between the PBM 
model and the DB model are the assumptions of imperfect asset substitutability and the 
explicit consideration of wealth effects. As mentioned earlier, PBM incorporates stock-flow 
interactions (e.g. changes in the exchange rate, the current account, the level of wealth, and 
expenditure) and also allows for the imperfect substitutability of assets. Moreover, this 
model assumes that there are three financial assets, that is M (money stock), B (domestic 
bonds) that are denominated in home currency, and F* (foreign assets) which are 
denominated in foreign currency. The demand for each asset (e.g. by the private sector) 
depends on wealth, that is *eFBMW ++= (A5.2.1). As wealth rises, the total increase in 
                                                 
66 The Mundell-Fleming model (Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962)) only emphasises the demand side 
of the economy, neglecting the supply side. This model has had a fundamental impact on international 
monetary economics, especially the part dealing with floating exchange rates. The basic assumptions of 
this model are a small open economy with unemployed resources, a perfectly elastic aggregate supply 
curve, static exchange rate expectations and perfect capital mobility. For a detailed discussion of this 
model see MacDonald (1988); Copeland (1994); and Gartner (1993). 
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asset demand must equal the increase in wealth according to the homogeneity assumption 
and Walras Law. The demands for B and F depend positively on their own rates of return 
and negatively on those of the other assets. The demand for money depends negatively on 
both the domestic interest rate r and er &+*  (where *r  is the rate of return on *F  and e& 
is the expected rate of increase in the exchange rate); as either rises, asset holders attempt 
to shift from money into the asset whose return has gone up. 
 In addition, the PBM model considers, among a number of possibilities, the impact 
effect on asset markets of an open market purchase of domestic bonds for money. Initially, 
the open market purchase of bonds leaves asset holders with an excess supply of domestic 
money and excess demand for bonds. In their attempt to buy domestic bonds investors 
will push the domestic interest rate down and this in turn will lead to an increased demand 
for foreign assets, which will depreciate the nominal exchange rate until the excess demand 
for foreign assets is eliminated. If it is assumed that the domestic interest elasticity of 
demand for money is less that the domestic interest elasticity of the demand for foreign 
assets, then the percentage change in the demand for foreign assets will be greater than the 
percentage increase in the money stock. This requires that the nominal exchange rate 
change will be larger that the money supply change. That is, the exchange rate will 
overshoot. 
 Moreover, although the valuation effect of the exchange rate change on foreign 
assets will, on impact, result in an increase in nominal wealth, in the short run period this 
will be offset by the effect the exchange rate overshoot has on the price index and hence 
real wealth (actual real wealth in the short-run period will fall short of desired real wealth). 
So this mismatch of desired and actual real wealth implies that agents have to be saving and 
therefore running a current account surplus during the adjustment period. Hence, the 
desire to restore the initial value of desired wealth can only be realised by the country 
running a current account surplus and accumulating the foreign asset. This is possible since 
in the impact period relative prices have moved in favour of the traded goods sector, 
including a switch in production from non-traded goods. So the current account surplus 
over time pushes the price of foreign currency downwards (that is, F* is rising so e has to 
be falling), leading to a fall of the savings rate until equilibrium is restored. Therefore, 
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during the adjustment period the appreciating exchange rate will be continuously 
diminishing the relative price of traded to non-traded goods.  
 If, in the initial equilibrium, the price of traded goods equalled the price of non-
traded goods, in the new equilibrium the relative price of traded goods will have decreased: 
the increase in the money supply has not led to a proportionate rise in the price level. This 
follows due to the fact that during the adjustment period the home country has been 
accumulating foreign assets and in the new equilibrium interest receipts on the foreign 
assets has to be larger than the initial equilibrium. Since the current account is the sum of 
the trade balance plus interest earnings, and since a zero current balance is a condition of 
steady-state equilibrium, the positive interest earnings has to be offset by a trade balance 
deficit. The latter is induced by an appreciation in the real exchange rate. Isard (1977) has 
described this effect as the knockout punch to purchasing power parity. 
 Therefore, the accumulation of the foreign asset during the adjustment period will 
require an appreciation of both the nominal and real exchange rate for the maintenance of 
foreign asset equilibrium. The accumulation of F* over time increases the size of financial 
assets and hence the demand for bonds and money will rise. It is worth noting here that 
over time the effect of the appreciating exchange rate means that the country will be 
running a trade account deficit. In the new long-run equilibrium the country runs a trade 
deficit, which is financed by the interest rate earnings from the foreign asset. Since the 
condition of long-run equilibrium is that the current account be equal to zero, the capital 
account also has to be balanced. So that, in contrast to the Mundell-Fleming model, the 
expansionary monetary policy only has a transitory effect on the capital account: the stock-
flow nature of the model ensures that this must be so67.  
 Furthermore, consider, for example, an increase in the supply of bonds (this is 
shown in Figure 5.1). This leads to an increase in wealth, and, for a given domestic interest 
rate r, requires an increase in the exchange rate e to maintain foreign exchange market 
equilibrium. Therefore, the FF schedule moves rightwards to FF’. For a given value of the 
                                                 
67 The stability of the model in terms of the movement from the initial to the new equilibrium, depends on 
the Marshall-Lerner condition holding (e.g. the initial exchange rate depreciation leads to a current 
account surplus: an accumulation of F*) and requires that the trade effect of increasing F* outweighs the 
investment income effect. See Branson (1977), for more detailed discussions. 
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exchange rate the increased supply of domestic bonds will imply an increase in the 
domestic interest rate to maintain domestic bond market equilibrium: the BB schedule 
moves rightwards and the new equilibrium is at Y. The increased bond supply exceeds any 
wealth induced increase in bond demand and the domestic interest rate is unambiguously 
raised. Furthermore, the new equilibrium point Y, as shown in Figure 5.1, indicates a 
depreciation in the exchange rate e, however the effect on the exchange rate of an increase 
in the stock of domestic bonds is in fact ambiguous. This is as a result of the increase in the 
domestic interest rate inducing a reduced demand for foreign assets, and this will tend to 
offset the increased demand for foreign bonds because of the wealth effect. The 
depreciation of the exchange rate shifts CTCT (consumption of traded goods) leftwards and 
the asset schedules downwards. 
 
 Figure 5.1 An Increase in the Supply of Bonds 
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Source: MacDonald (1988)  
 
Moreover, as mentioned before, asset shocks arising from a monetary disturbance 
in the PBM can result in exchange rate overshooting. This overshoot is reversed over time 
as the country accumulates, or decumulates, F via the current account. Asset shocks can 
affect the long-run terms of trade, or real exchange rate, because of the existence of at least 
one outside asset. Moreover, a current account surplus (which increases the stock of 
foreign bonds and thus increases domestic wealth) is associated with an appreciating 
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exchange rate. Furthermore, the nominal exchange rate influences the real exchange rate 
and real wealth. Changes in these variables in turn have implications for the current 
account and this in turn will change the stock of foreign assets, which will feed into asset 
stocks and wealth. This again will affect prices and so on until a new steady-state 
equilibrium is achieved.  
In addition, the PBM model requires that the current account must be balanced in 
long-run equilibrium, to do so implies an appreciation in the real exchange rate. In the DB 
model it is not required that the current account be balanced in long run equilibrium. This 
is considered to be one of the deficiencies of the DB model. If the current account is not in 
equilibrium it will affect the stock of foreign assets and wealth, which in turn has 
implications for expenditure on goods and asset demand. Therefore, the DB model 
equilibrium can only be considered as a temporary one (in fact it represents equilibrium 
only in the short run before these additional adjustments take place). 
Thus, the PBM model, relative to the DB model, includes more assets available to 
portfolio holders, domestic and foreign bonds, and uses the stock-flow framework to 
analyse the effects of various asset market changes. The PBM model emphasises that the 
holding of financial assets adds to wealth and this wealth affects expenditure on goods and 
financial assets. The stock-flow interactions arise through the accumulation of assets (via 
the current account and the funding of deficits) and the impact of this on expenditure 
(flow) on goods and assets. Furthermore, as shown in this section, the PBM is developed 
to give explicit recognition of the current account through wealth effects, which affect the 
demand for assets and output that is not considered in the DB model and other models 
such as the Mundell-Fleming model. There are no stock-flow interactions in these models. 
However, the PBM model requires, as an explicit equilibrium condition, that the current 
account and budget deficits be in balance, otherwise there will be continual asset 
accumulation, specifically foreign and domestic bonds, which will contribute to rising 
private sector wealth with resulting implications for expenditure on goods, services and 
other financial assets. Hence the model cannot achieve steady state equilibrium without 
these conditions being achieved. 
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Table 5.1 Main Assumptions Underlying the DB and PBM Models (Summary) 
ASSUMPTION DB MODEL PBM MODEL  
Economy Small open economy (that trades in 
goods and securities with the rest 
of the world) with output at full 
employment (in the 1976 version 
of the model).  
Small open economy often assumed to be at full 
employment  
Prices and AS curve. Prices are assumed to be sticky, 
adjusting over time at a rate 
proportional to excess demand. 
Aggregate supply (in the 1976 
version of the model) is fixed; 
hence the supply curve is vertical. 
Prices may be assumed to be continuously flexible in 
this comparative static framework (Branson, 1977). 
Little discussion in the Branson model regarding 
price adjustment. Effectively regarded as fixed No 
mention of AS curve. 
Expectations The DB model assumes forward-
looking expectations (rational 
expectations). 
The Branson model does not assume one particular 
type of expectations formation mechanism. 
Purchasing Power 
parity (PPP)  
PPP holds in the long run but not 
in the short run.  
PPP does not hold in the long run or the short run. 
Asset Substitutability 
and uncovered interest 
parity (UIP) 
Domestic and foreign assets are 
perfect substitutes (which can only 
be the case if there is perfect capital 
mobility) so UIP holds 
continuously. That is 
)(* eErr &+= where 
)()( eeeE −=θ& . 
Domestic and foreign bonds are not assumed to be 
perfect substitutes because they carry different risk-
return characteristics (such factors as default risk, 
exchange rate risk, political risk and so on) UIP will 
not hold and is replaced with an equation that is 
λ=−− )(* eErr where λ  is a risk premium. 
Hence capital mobility is not perfect. 
Wealth effects Not mentioned. No role to play in 
the model. 
Explicit consideration of Wealth effects and the 
stock of foreign assets arising from developments in 
the current account and through the funding of 
budget deficits. 
Current Account Not required to be in balance in 
the long run equilibrium. With 
perfect capital mobility there is 
always enough capital inflow to 
offset any deficit. 
Requires being in balance in the long run so this 
implies an appreciation of the real exchange rate as a 
result of a monetary shock. Hence money is no 
longer neutral 
Note: r = domestic nominal interest rate; r* = foreign interest rate; e = exchange rate; )(eE &  = expected rate of 
depreciation/appreciation; e& is the actual rate of depreciation/appreciation; e = equilibrium exchange rate.  
 
5.3 Effects of Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the PBM and DB Models 
It is important in this section to review the impact of monetary policy as well as 
fiscal policy in existing theoretical models, to identify their deficiencies in the context of 
developing a long-term macroeconomic model for Lebanon.  
 
5.3.1 Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the DB Model 
5.3.1.1 Monetary Policy in the DB Model 
It is worth mentioning here that in the DB model68 the exchange rate is a critical 
channel through which the effects of monetary policy are transmitted to aggregate demand 
for domestic output. The model is explained in Figure 5.2. Goods market equilibrium is 
                                                 
68 The solution of the DB model is presented at the end of this chapter in Appendix 5.1. 
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shown by equation (A5.1.12) and diagrammatically in Figure 5.2 by the locus 0=p& , which 
indicates the equilibrium values of e and p that clear the goods market. The schedule has a 
positive slope since a depreciation of the exchange rate will be associated with higher levels 
of demand and thus higher prices to maintain goods market equilibrium. Formally, the 
slope of this schedule is given by  ( [ ] 1/1/ >+=∂∂ λδσpe ) (A5.1.13). This equation 
indicates that the slope of the 0=p&  line is greater that unity. An exogenous increase in the 
price level lowers demand, both by a relative price effect and a higher interest rate. The 
latter is required in order to maintain money market equilibrium (A5.1.3), necessitating a 
more than proportionate increase in the exchange rate to restore equilibrium. Points to the 
right of the 0=p&  locus are points of excess demand for goods and are associated with a 
rising price level.  
Asset market equilibrium is shown by equation (A5.1.9) and by the line MM in 
Figure 5.2. The slope of this line is negative, )/1(/ λθ−=∂∂ pe (A.5.1.10), and is obtained 
from the money market equilibrium condition. An increase in p above p  means that real 
money balances have fallen, requiring a rise in the interest rate to maintain money market 
equilibrium. This, in turn, requires the expectation of an exchange rate depreciation, hence 
e has to appreciate relative to e . This will worsen the trade balance but will be offset by a 
large capital inflow. 
A vital feature of the adjustment process is that the asset market adjusts 
instantaneously and is in equilibrium throughout. As shown in Figure 5.2, starting from the 
initial equilibrium at E, an increase in the money supply will move the MM line to the right, 
since a higher value of p is implied, for every value of the nominal exchange rate, to clear 
the market given that y is fixed. Since the money market equilibrium schedule requires that 
both m and p are homogenous of degree one, then the price level has to rise in proportion 
to the money supply in the long run. Hence at G (the final equilibrium) we will have equi-
proportionally higher levels of e and p (the line e=p indicates the purchasing power parity 
condition). If prices are fixed on impact the exchange rate will depreciate instantly to F to 
clear the money market following an increase in the money supply, thereby allowing 
expectations of a future appreciation to allow r to fall below its initial level. The extent of 
this short-run overshooting is given by totally differentiating the price level equation. Since  
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pddmed ==  and y and r* are constant, then )/11(/ λθ+=dmde (A5.1.16) where 
o<λθ <1. That is, a 1% increase in the money supply has a larger that 1% effect on the 
exchange rate on impact. Furthermore, the extent of overshooting depends upon the 
interest elasticity of the demand for money, λ , and the regressive expectation coefficient 
θ . Therefore, if the interest elasticity of money demand is low, any change in the money 
supply will lead to a relatively large change in the interest rate and will be mirrored by a 
large overshoot of the exchange rate.  
After the impact effect the fall in the interest rate and depreciation of the nominal 
and real exchange rates, there is an excess demand for goods (output remains unchanged) 
which raises prices and reduces the real money supply. The lower supply of real balances 
permits the interest rate to increase, which produces an incipient capital inflow and 
simultaneously leads to an appreciation in the exchange rate allowing interest rate parity to 
be maintained continuously.  Hence during the remainder of the adjustment process in the 
DB model there is a fall in the real money supply, rising prices, increasing interest rates, 
and an appreciating nominal and real exchange rate. Note that the rise in prices and 
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate are in direct contrast to what would be expected 
under PPP. In the long run p and e increase in proportion to the increase in the money 
supply, hence PPP is restored, and the domestic interest rate returns to its original level. 
In the above analysis of the DB model, it has been assumed that capital is perfectly 
mobile. However, with imperfect capital mobility the exchange rate is not determined 
solely in asset markets: the trade account and the capital account both have an important 
role to play, so the UIP equation ( )(* eErr &+= ) in the case of perfect capital mobility 
should be replaced with the familiar balance of payments equation69 
)(*( eErrCAB &−−+= β ). If the degree of capital mobility is sufficiently low, 0→β , 
then the relationship between e and p for asset market equilibrium will be positive (so the 
MM line will be positively sloping in this case). An increase in the price level, by reducing 
real money balances, raises r, but with very low capital mobility this leads to a small 
improvement in the capital account; To maintain balance of payments equilibrium the 
                                                 
69 For a more detailed discussion, see Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982). 
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exchange rate would have to improve in the same direction as the price level in order to 
prevent a deterioration in the current balance. On the other hand the degree of capital 
mobility does not change any of the parameters underlying the 0=p& schedule. 
 
Figure 5.2 Monetary Expansion in the DB Model (Perfect Capital Mobility) 
           e 
       0=p&  01 =p&      e = p  
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0                                   0p          1p                                P    
Source: Pentecost (1993) 
 
An increase in the money supply in the case of imperfect capital mobility in the DB 
model, as in the case of perfect capital mobility, will result in an equi-proportional change 
in the price level in the long run. In the case of imperfect capital mobility, in contrast to the 
perfect capital mobility case, the exchange rate undershoots its long run equilibrium value. 
From the above discussion it can be concluded that one of the important features 
of the adjustment process in the DB model is that the asset market clears instantaneously 
while the goods market adjusts slowly. Furthermore, conducting an expansionary monetary 
policy in the DB model, with the assumption of sticky prices and perfect capital mobility, 
results in overshooting of the exchange rate relative to its long run equilibrium. In contrast, 
in the case of imperfect capital mobility, the exchange rate undershoots relative to its long 
run equilibrium. But, in common with the perfect capital mobility version of the DB 
model, the adjustment process (the transition from F to G) is characterised by a rising price 
level, falling real money balances, increasing interest rate and an appreciating real exchange 
rate. 
 184 
If the change in monetary policy is announced, agents start to adjust portfolios at 
the time of the announcement. Then full adjustment occurs when there is the actual pre-
announced change. This may still lead to overshooting, although the extent of this is 
usually less than for the unanticipated case. 
 
5.3.1.2 Effect of Fiscal Policy in the DB Model 
 The DB model focuses mainly on monetary policy effects and its impact on the 
price level (p), exchange rate (e) and interest rate (r). As discussed in the previous section p 
and e both rise in proportion to the increase in the money supply in the long run, and the 
domestic interest rate returns to its original level. The DB model, however, gives little 
attention to fiscal policy effects. The DB model has many deficiencies, in addition to its 
neglect of the supply side of the economy. This model does not focus on the issue of fiscal 
deficits and their funding, and does not focus on the composition of government 
expenditure (consumption expenditure or investment) and the impact of that on other 
macroeconomic variables. Hence, fiscal policy in its wider aspects, such as government 
deficits and their funding whether via monetary accommodation, via issuing bonds, or via 
borrowing from abroad, all considered crucial when analysing the effects of fiscal policy on 
the demand and supply side of the economy, are effectively ignored. 
 An increase in government expenditure in the DB model (sticky price and perfect 
capital mobility) does not lead to exchange rate overshooting. This is shown in Figure 5.3. 
At point E (the initial equilibrium) the fiscal expansion shifts the 0=p& schedule to the 
right. For a given level of the money supply the rate of interest has to rise, to persuade 
non-bank private sector investors to buy bonds to finance the higher level of spending. 
This stimulates a capital inflow, which causes the exchange rate to appreciate until a future 
depreciation is expected. The appreciation of the exchange rate lowers the demand for 
domestic money balances, thus generating an excess supply. To maintain money market 
equilibrium, given that m, y and p are all fixed, implies that the long run equilibrium 
exchange rate, e , falls (appreciates). The fall in e results in the money market equilibrium 
locus moving to the left, to MM1 as seen in Figure 5.3. It also implies a long run 
appreciation in the real exchange rate and so the e-p locus also swivels round to the right. 
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The new short equilibrium is reached at F, where the fiscal expansion is completely 
crowded out by the appreciation of the exchange rate. Point F is also the new long run 
equilibrium position, with both money and goods markets in equilibrium. In this case the 
exchange rate does not overshoot in the short run, but adjusts instantaneously and 
monotonically.  
 
Figure 5.3 Fiscal Expansion (Perfect Capital Mobility) in the DB Model 
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 Source: Pentecost (1993) 
 
5.3.2 Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the PBM Model 
The main feature of the PBM, as mentioned previously, is that domestic and 
foreign bonds are assumed to be imperfect substitutes, rather than perfect substitutes as in 
other models such as the DB model and in one variant of the Mundell-Fleming model.  
A later version of the PBM (Branson, 1977; 1984) analysed the effects of monetary 
and fiscal policy more deeply than that of the DB (especially the fiscal policy effects) 
model. In addition, the PBM analysed monetary policy by way of an open market operation 
(purchasing domestic bonds), and by foreign exchange market intervention. This model 
also analysed the impact of monetary policy (e.g. an increase in money supply) on the 
interest rate, exchange rate and wealth. In addition, the PBM gives more attention to the 
effects of fiscal policy on the variables mentioned before, and analyses the way in which 
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funding the fiscal deficit, through issuing debt or by creating money, impacts on the 
exchange rate and interest rate.  
 But one of the criticisms of the PBM, from the perspective of this thesis, is that it 
does not focus on the composition of government expenditure and its impact on output 
and other macroeconomic variables. The model is a partial equilibrium one that neglects 
the effect of fiscal deficits and their funding on output and other macroeconomic variables 
(it only focuses on the impact of fiscal deficits on financial markets and variables, more 
specifically the interest rate and exchange rate). 
 
5.3.2.1 Monetary Policy in the PBM 
 The effect of monetary policy in the PBM model depends upon the way that the 
central bank expands the money supply70. First, suppose that the central bank expands the 
money supply by buying domestic bonds (open market operation). In the short run the 
excess supply of money, and the equivalent excess demand for domestic bonds, drives the 
interest rate down (and the price of bonds up). This also stimulates the demand for foreign 
bonds, because overall wealth has increased and causes the exchange rate to depreciate 
until all asset markets clear at the new short-run equilibrium point B as shown in Figure 
5.471. It can be shown that the net effect is to cause both money and bond market lines to 
move to the left, as in Figure 5.4.  
Now consider the long run impact of the expansionary monetary policy. To achieve 
long run equilibrium it is critical for the current account to be explicitly taken into account. 
In this context a rise in the money supply raises the long-run equilibrium price level equi-
proportionally (but the real exchange rate must appreciate in the long run due to the higher 
interest income so as to maintain current account balance), so that the real money stock is 
unchanged. However, the domestic currency depreciates, so the real exchange rate ends up 
                                                 
70 Via the creation of money by means of open-market operations (this means that the central bank 
purchases domestic bonds with domestic money) or via the creation of money by intervention in the 
foreign exchange market (implies that the central bank buys foreign bonds with domestic money). 
 
71 This is a standard way of explaining the model’s short-run properties with the help of portfolio balance 
lines: MM, BB and FF for the money, bond and foreign asset markets respectively. Each curve indicates 
equilibrium combinations of e and r, and point A is an initial short run equilibrium in the PBM. 
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lower as a result of the accumulation of foreign assets, higher foreign interest income, 
hence the trade balance needs to be in deficit. Therefore, the net effect is to decrease the 
competitiveness of domestic goods production. 
It is worth noting that the impact effect of an open market purchase would be an 
increase in the price of the foreign currency. With the price level still at its pre-disturbance 
level, the domestic currency’s depreciation has to be real as well as nominal: the numerator 
of the ratio e/p rises at time 0, before the denominator can react.  
Suppose that the economy was in equilibrium prior to the open market operation, 
the result will be an incipient current account surplus as the improved competitiveness 
results in increased net exports and hence a build up of foreign asset stocks. Hence the 
accumulation of the foreign asset during the adjustment period will require an exchange 
rate appreciation. The accumulation of F over time also increases the size of the portfolio  
(wealth) and hence the demand for bonds and money will increase. The increase in the 
demand for the former will lead to a leftward shift of the BB’ curve and the increased 
demand for money will shift MM’ to the right over time.  
 
Figure 5.4 Expansionary Monetary Policy  
(Open Market Purchase of Domestic Bonds) 
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Source: Copeland (1994) 
 
It can be concluded from the above discussion that the exchange rate needs to 
continue appreciating until it has appreciated overall in comparison to its initial level The 
system will only be back in full equilibrium when (at some time, T) the real appreciation 
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relative to time 0 is sufficient to generate an excess of imports over exports equal to the 
value of the interest accrued on the foreign assets accumulated over the period from o to 
T. Therefore, by the time the economy is back in long run equilibrium at time T, its 
competitive position will have been eroded (compared to before the monetary shock) and 
it will be paying for net imports with higher net foreign interest income. 
 
5.3.2.2 Fiscal Policy in the PBM 
 The PBM gives more attention to the effects of fiscal policy than the DB model. As 
mentioned before this model analyses the funding of deficits via issuing debt or by creating 
money, and the impact of this on the exchange rate and interest rate. 
 Consider the impact of a fiscal expansion by issuing bonds to the private sector. 
This leads to a rise in the volume of domestic bonds and domestic wealth by the same 
amount72. As shown in Figure 5.5 this reflects an excess supply of domestic bonds, but 
excess demands for money and foreign bonds. In order to stimulate the demand for 
domestic bonds the interest rate has to rise. Hence, the BB curve shifts to the right. In 
order to dampen the demand for foreign bonds, the domestic interest rate has to rise. 
Hence the FF curve moves to the right as well. Finally, this holds for the money market 
equilibrium schedule MM, since the existing excess demand for money can only be reduced 
by a higher opportunity cost of holding money through a higher interest rate. The new 
point of equilibrium has to be to the right of A. Therefore, fiscal stimulation financed by 
issuing debt to the domestic private sector in any case increases interest rates, but could 
cause the domestic currency to appreciate or to depreciate. Now consider the case when 
the government borrows from the central bank to finance its deficit. This is shown in 
Figure 5.6. In the case of money financing both M (money) and W (wealth) increase by the 
                                                 
72 The view that private holdings of government debt are considered wealth in not undisputed. In 
particular, the Ricardian equivalence theorem revived by Barro (1974) takes strong issue with this view. 
According to this theorem rational economic actors know that when the government sells bonds to 
finance budget deficits the private sector will at some time in the future face higher taxes to cover the 
interest payments, and to eventually repay the debt. Therefore, government deficit spending by issuing 
debt to the public neither influences permanent income nor aggregate wealth. Tobin and Buiter (1978) 
argue that government bonds are considered net wealth as long as economic agents discount future tax 
burdens to some degree. However, empirical evidence on the Ricardian equivalence theorem remains 
inconclusive, see (Aschauer, 1985) 
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amount of the deficit. Since the supply of neither domestic bonds nor foreign bonds is 
increased, point A is characterised by a situation of excess demand in the markets for 
domestic and foreign bonds. For a given exchange rate, excess demand for domestic bonds 
can only be reduced if the interest rate drops and, hence, the BB curve shifts down to the 
left. In the market for foreign bonds demand is reduced if the interest rate rises, that is the 
FF curve shifts to the right. The simultaneous new equilibrium in both markets (and, in the 
money market as well) occurs at A’, with a depreciation in the exchange rate and lower 
interest rate. 
  
 
Figure 5.5. Expansionary fiscal policy        Figure 5.6 Expansionary Fiscal Policy 
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       Source: Gartner (1993)                          
 
The current assumption of a constant supply of foreign bonds on the domestic 
market, implies that the current account is in equilibrium during the period under 
consideration. With a current account surplus both the domestic supply of foreign bonds 
and domestic wealth will increase. The initial equilibrium point A (as shown in Figure 5.7) 
now reflects an excess supply of foreign bonds and excess demand for domestic bonds and 
domestic money. In fact, a change of the interest rate by itself cannot equilibrate both 
markets at the same time, since the interest rate would have to rise in order to equilibrate 
the money market and would have to fall to equilibrate the market for domestic bonds. 
Hence, since both cannot happen at the same time, and since there is excess supply of 
foreign assets and excess demand for domestic wealth at A, the exchange rate starts to 
appreciate. Therefore, foreign bonds lose value since they are denominated in foreign 
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currency. Wealth falls and hence also the demand for all three categories of assets. Since 
the supply of foreign bonds decreases, the falling exchange rate reduces disequilibrium in 
all three markets. 
In order to restore a new general equilibrium the exchange rate has to fall to where 
the new BB curve and the new MM curve intersect. If this point of intersection produced 
an interest rate higher than r0, wealth would have to be higher than at A in order to 
equilibrate the money market. It would have to be lower, in order to equilibrate the market 
for domestic bonds. Since these two equilibrium requirements are incompatible, B’B’ and 
M’M’ have to intersect at the old interest rate. At the old interest rate r, general equilibrium 
is only possible if wealth is the same as in A. This is the case if the appreciation exactly 
eliminates the rise in F produced by the current account surplus, hence eF stays constant. 
Therefore, any imbalance of the current account leaves the interest rate and domestic 
wealth unchanged. However, it triggers an exchange rate reaction, which normally (that is 
the Marshall-Lerner condition holds) induces a reduction of the prevailing disequilibrium in 
asset markets. Table 5.2 summarises the comparative static effects of both monetary and 
fiscal policy in the PBM, which has been discussed in this chapter. 
 
   Figure 5.7 Interest and Exchange Rate Reactions to  
    A Current Account Surplus 
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Source: Gartner (1993)        
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It can be concluded from the above discussion that the PBM model in its later 
version (Branson, 1977; 1984), analysed the effects of monetary and fiscal policy more 
deeply than that for the DB (especially the fiscal policy effects) model. The PBM analyses 
the effects of monetary policy by way of an open market operation (purchasing domestic 
bonds); and by foreign exchange market intervention. This model also analysed the impact 
of monetary policy (e.g. an increase in money supply) on the interest rate, exchange rate 
and wealth. In addition, the PBM gives more attention to the effects of fiscal policy on 
variables such as the interest rate, exchange rate, and wealth than the DB model. The PBM 
analysed the way of funding the deficit (whether via issuing debt or by creating money), 
and the impact of that on the exchange rate and interest rate. But, unlike the DB model, it 
is a partial equilibrium model and says nothing about output and prices. Such effects have 
to be inferred from the model. 
 
Table 5.2 Summary of Short Run Effects in the PBM 
 Interest rate Nominal exchange 
rate 
Wealth 
Expansionary monetary policy    
    Open-market operations falls rises rises 
Expansionary fiscal policy    
    Financed by issuing debt rises rises/falls rises 
    Financed by creating money falls rises rises 
Current account surplus exogenous unchanged falls unchanged 
Source: Gartner (1993) 
 
5.4 Developing a Macroeconomic Model for Lebanon 
The model to be developed for Lebanon combines the contributions of these 
general models (DB model and the PBM model), and also that of Harvie and Kearney 
(1996). It will be a long-run macroeconomic model, the foundations of which are based on 
the general models mentioned previously. As discussed earlier on in this chapter the DB 
and PBM models have a number of deficiencies, especially the neglect of the supply side of 
the economy; distinguishing between government capital and current expenditure; and, in 
the case of the DB model, the implications arising from alternative means of funding the 
budget deficit. However, many amendments need to be made to these existing models in 
order to make them applicable to the case of Lebanon, especially to analyse the impact of 
the composition of budget funding (e.g. monetary accommodation or bond financing) and 
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the composition of government expenditure shocks on macroeconomic variables (such as 
output, prices, interest rates, among others). This section will focus upon the deficiencies 
of existing models, extensions to these models, and from this develop a macroeconomic 
model for Lebanon. 
The model developed focuses upon the main aspects of the current Lebanese crisis, 
which is the public sector deficit. First, the model developed distinguishes between two 
types of public expenditure, capital and consumption. Second, the model developed 
incorporates various ways of funding the deficit whether via bond financing (pure fiscal 
policy), via money accommodation (pure monetary policy) or a mixture of the two. Third, 
it incorporates exogenous shocks arising from increased government expenditures (capital 
or consumption) and their impact upon key macroeconomic variables such as output, 
private investment, interest rates, and prices amongst others. 
 
5.4.1 Extension to the Existing Literature 
5.4.1.1 The Supply Side of The Economy 
As mentioned earlier both the DB and PBM models focus on the demand side of 
the economy, and upon the role of financial markets in transmitting the effects of 
exogenous changes including that of monetary and fiscal policies. Therefore, these general 
models neglect the supply side and the determination of the supply and demand for labour 
and therefore aggregate supply. This is remedied in the HK model, because they 
incorporate capital stock accumulation and the wage-price nexus and aggregate supply. 
However, the PBM model does not mention the role of physical capital stock accumulation 
during the adjustment process. The main contribution of the HK model is that they permit 
endogenous capital stock accumulation in influencing output supply. The HK model also 
gives particular attention to the role of capital stock accumulation in expanding total 
output. Furthermore, the model to be developed incorporates exogenous shocks arising 
from an increase in the budget deficit such as from an increase in government expenditure 
(capital or consumption) and the impact of this on macroeconomic variables. 
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5.4.1.2 Composition of Public Expenditure 
 As seen in chapter 4 one of the important outcomes from the empirical studies 
examining the impact of public expenditure on private investment and economic growth, is 
the need to distinguish between consumption expenditure and capital expenditure when 
evaluating the impact of fiscal policy on private investment and economic growth because 
each of these categories of expenditure could have different impacts on private investment 
and economic growth. Therefore, the model developed takes into account these two 
categories of public expenditure, by separating them into consumption expenditure 
(government consumption such as on wages and salaries, interest payments, subsidies, 
among others) and capital expenditure (such as on infrastructure, among others).  
 
5.4.1.3 Fiscal Policy and Alternative Funding Options for the Budget Deficit 
As noted previously, one of the criticisms of the PBM is that it does not give much 
attention to the composition of government expenditure and the importance of this for the 
adjustment of macroeconomic variables (such as output, prices, among others). This model 
also does not focus on the effect of fiscal deficits and their funding on output and other 
macroeconomic variables, and only focuses on the impact of fiscal deficits on the interest 
rate and exchange rate. 
However, the model to be developed will incorporate three alternatives funding 
options: pure fiscal policy (bond financing); pure monetary policy (money 
accommodation); and a mixture of these two policies. The aim being to study the impact 
these alternative funding options have on output, prices, interest rates, and other 
macroeconomic variables as well. The model developed will then be used to conduct a 
simulation analysis to compare the macroeconomic consequences of these funding options 
on macroeconomic variables, with the aim of identifying which of these produces more 
desirable outcomes for output and for the Lebanese economy as a whole. 
 
5.5 The Macroeconomic Model in the Case of Lebanon 
The model developed for Lebanon is based upon a number of important 
assumptions, including the following. 
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First, the model assumes that the Lebanese economy operates under a flexible 
exchange rate and perfect capital mobility. Lebanon is a small open economy that operates 
with a flexible exchange rate and no capital controls. Under a flexible rate regime the 
nominal exchange rate adjusts so achieve balance of payments equilibrium and capital 
inflows or outflows will have no effect upon foreign exchange reserves and hence the 
domestic money supply. Therefore, the money supply is exogenous, and the nominal 
exchange rate is endogenous. An appreciation/depreciation of the exchange rate adjusts 
the balance of payments to equilibrium. Furthermore, under perfect capital mobility two 
assumptions need to be addressed. First, freedom of capital movement implies an absence 
of impediments to capital flows in the form of capital controls, taxes and so on. Second, 
there is perfect substitutability of assets denominated in domestic currency and foreign 
currency. Therefore, the uncovered interest parity condition holds ( *rre −=& ).  This is the 
case where capital is freely mobile and assets are assumed to be perfect substitutes.  
Second, the model is dynamic and concentrates upon long run adjustment; 
economic agents possess rational expectations and possess complete information (as with 
the HK model). This is equivalent to the case of perfect foresight. Such an assumption 
implies that economic agents are rational and do not make consistent forecasting errors. 
Alternative assumptions can be made regarding the way in which economic agents form 
their expectations, but these would imply irrationality and consistent errors in economic 
forecasts (such as with the assumptions of adaptive expectations). Third, financial markets 
are assumed to be in continual equilibrium. On the other hand non-financial markets do 
not clear continuously, because they are subject to sticky price and quantity adjustment. 
Globalisation of financial markets, the sheer volume of international capital flows, and 
advances in information and communications have results in very rapid adjustments of 
financial variables such as exchange rates and domestic interest rates. Financial market 
disequilibrium produces arbitrage opportunities that are quickly, in fact instantaneously, 
eliminated. In non-financial markets the existence of wage and price contracts and time 
involved an adjusting output quantities indicates that, in such markets, there is stickiness of 
adjustment of prices and quantities. Consequently, such markets can be in disequilibrium. 
For a small economy such as Lebanon, such conditions are likely to hold. 
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Fourth, the model also emphasises the supply side of the economy, wealth effects, 
capital stock accumulation, budget deficits and their funding. In addition, there are 
assumed to be four financial assets, domestic money, domestic bonds, foreign bonds, and 
equities, which determine the q ratio. Assets denominated in either domestic currency and 
foreign exchange are assumed to be perfect substitutes, with arbitrage between them 
resulting instantaneously in the same expected rate of return. In the case of Lebanon with 
open financial markets and important role of government through its expenditure and 
financing of its budget deficits, financial investors can choose how best to hold their wealth 
– bonds issued by government, domestic money, foreign bonds (assets) and domestic 
stocks and shares. Portfolio adjustment by investors will trigger developments in financial 
variables (for example stock prices) that will impact upon non-financial markets, such as 
business investment decisions that will also affect the economy’s supply capacity. 
Government capital expenditure on infrastructure will also affect the economy’s productive 
capacity. For Lebanon these developments are important, and need to be explicitly 
incorporated in any macro model for this economy. 
The equations of the model are now presented. The model is divided into four sub 
headings: product market, assets market, wage-price nexus, and definitions. As shown in 
Table 5.3, all equations in the model, except the domestic nominal interest rate and the 
world interest rate, are reported in log-linear form. 
Equilibrium in the model depends upon simultaneous equilibrium in the product 
market, assets market and external balance. Firstly, equilibrium in the product market will 
be outlined. 
The product market consists of nine equations, which are presented by equations 
(1)-(9). The demand for real output ( dy ) is given by equation (1). So the demand for real 
output in this study comprises private consumption, private investment, government 
expenditure (which is given by equation (6) and is comprised of a weighted average of both 
government consumption and government capital spending), and the trade balance 
consisting of exports less imports. Equation (2) describes private consumption, which 
depends positively on the level of real income (aggregate supply) and real private sector 
wealth. Equation (3) describes private investment, which equals the change in the stock of 
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private capital, and depends on Tobin’s q. Equation (4) describes government consumption 
spending as being an exogenously determined variable, whilst government investment 
spending (equation (5)) arises from a gradual adjustment of the actual public capital stock 
to its policy-determined level. Identification of the role and importance of government 
expenditure, in the case of the Lebanese economy, is an important objective of this study.  
Equation (6), as mentioned before, describes total government expenditure, which 
depends positively on two components of expenditures: government consumption 
expenditure ( gc ) (exogenous) and government capital spending; and depends negatively on 
the supply of output. It is worth mentioning here as well that there is another part of 
government consumption expenditure (endogenous), which depends on the supply of 
output ( sy ). This arises due to welfare/unemployment expenditure. When output is high, 
unemployment is low and hence welfare expenditure in this area is low and vice versa. 
Equation (7) describes the budget deficit, which is government expenditure less tax 
revenues. The budget deficit as shown in this equation can be financed in three ways, 
through an expansion in the money supply and/or domestic bonds, or a combination of 
the two. Equation (8) is tax revenue, which depends positively on the supply of output. 
Equation (9) describes the trade balance, which depends positively upon the real exchange 
rate (the nominal exchange rate deflated by the domestic price (e-p)), negatively on 
aggregate demand for domestic real output, and positively on world real income. 
 
Table 5.3 The Macroeconomic Model 
 
Product Market 
Tgicy ppd 4321 αααα +++=        (1) 
psp wcycc 21 +=          (2) 
qki pp η== &           (3) 
gg cc =           (4) 
)( gggg kkki −== ∗ψ&         (5) 
gsg iycg 321 βββ +−=         (6) 
)()( 21 pbapmatgbd &&&& −+−=−=        (7) 
syt t=            (8) 
*)( 321 yypeT
d µµµ +−−=        (9) 
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Assets Market 
rypm d 21 σσ −+=                    (10) 
gps kkyR 321 ggg +−=                   (11) 
[ ])(2113 πδδδ −+−= − rRqq&                   (12) 
)()()()( 4321 pbpmqkpefw
pP −Ω+−Ω++Ω+−+Ω=    (13) 
))(1(* 221 pefrTf −−−+= eee&                  (14) 
 
Wage/Price Nexus  
ewp )1( δδ −+=          (15) 
πφφ 21 )( +−=
sd yyw&         (16) 
)(321 pwkky
gps −−+= λλλ        (17) 
 
Definitions etc 
wec −=           (18) 
wml −=                      (19) 
π=m&                       (20) 
*rre −=&                      (21) 
wbB −=           (22) 
A dot (.) above a variable signifies its rate of change. 
 
     
Table 5.4 Explanation of Symbols Used in the Model 
 
Endogenous Variables 
 
dy  Aggregate demand for real output 
pc  Private consumption 
pi  Private investment 
g  Total government expenditure 
T  Trade balance 
t  Total tax revenues 
r  Domestic nominal interest rate 
R  Real profit 
f  Foreign asset stocks 
e  Nominal exchange rate 
b  Nominal Domestic bonds (this variable is endogenous with the condition that 
0=b&  in the long run) 
p  Domestic price level 
w  Domestic nominal wage 
sy  Aggregate supply of output 
pw  Real private sector wealth 
pk  Private capital stock 
gk  Actual public capital stock 
q  Tobin’s q 
c  Real exchange rate 
l  Real money balances 
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π  Inflationary expectations 
B  Real domestic bonds 
 
Exogenous variables 
 
gc  Government consumption 
*gk  Desired public capital stock 
*y  World real income 
*r  World nominal interest rate (also the world real interest rate since world prices (and 
hence inflation) is assumed exogenous (constant) 
m  Nominal money supply  
 
 
 
Asset market equilibrium is given by equations (10)-(14). Four financial assets 
should be addressed here, domestic money, domestic bonds, foreign bonds, and equities 
which determines the q ratio. Assets denominated in domestic currency and foreign 
exchange are assumed to be perfect substitutes, with arbitrage between them resulting 
instantaneously in the same expected rate. Equation (10) identifies the demand for real 
money balances, which depends positively on the level of aggregate demand and domestic 
real wealth, and negatively on the domestic interest rate.  
Equation (11) represents the real return on private capital, which depends positively 
on the level of real income (measured by output supply), negatively on the stock of private 
capital due to diminishing marginal returns, and positively on the stock of public capital. 
The latter holds because public capital and private capital are assumed here to be 
complementary in nature. The productivity of private capital rises as the government 
provides more public investment such as in the form of infrastructure (Aschauer, 1989).  
Equation (12) identifies the change in Tobin’s q ratio. It comes from the arbitrage 
condition equating the returns on domestic and foreign bonds and equities. Equation (13) 
describes private sector wealth, which depends positively on the real domestic currency 
value of domestically held foreign assets (f), on the value of the private capital stock 
)( qk p + , on real money balances )( pm − , and on holding of real bonds )( pb − . 
Equation (14) defines the current account of the balance of payments, which is equivalent 
to the change in domestic holdings of foreign assets, which depends positively on the trade 
balance, foreign interest income ( fr * ), and negatively on the real exchange rate. In long 
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run steady state the current account balance must be zero, otherwise further wealth effects 
will increase which in turn implies further macroeconomic adjustment. 
The wage-price nexus and aggregate supply of output is given by equations (15)-
(17). Equation (15) describes the domestic price level, which is a weighted average of 
domestic nominal wages and the world price of the imported good. Equation (16) 
describes nominal wage adjustment, which adjusts in line with a simple inflation 
expectations augmented Phillips curve. Equation (17) identifies aggregate supply, derived 
from a simple production function relationship, and depends positively on the private 
capital stock, public capital stock, and negatively on the real wage rate.  
Finally, equations (18)-(22) define the following. Equations (18)-(19), define two 
variables used in this model, the real exchange rate and real money balances respectively. 
Equation (20) shows that inflationary expectations depend upon the monetary growth rate. 
Equation (21) identifies the characteristic of a flexible exchange rate and perfect capital 
mobility. With a flexible nominal exchange rate the money stock is exogenously determined 
in the model. With perfect capital mobility the risk premium does not exist. Assets are 
assumed to be perfect substitutes, and arbitrage between them implies the same expected 
rate of return. Equation (22) defines real bonds. These definitions are useful for the 
solution of the model. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 In summary, this chapter has reviewed existing theoretical models (such as the DB, 
PBM, and HK models) concerned with identifying macroeconomic adjustments arising 
from the effects of monetary and fiscal policy. Furthermore, the theoretical framework and 
assumptions of these models has been analysed. But the main focus of this chapter has 
been upon the development of a dynamic macroeconomic model for Lebanon, aimed at 
analysing the macroeconomic effects from budget deficits and its funding (e.g. monetary 
accommodation or bonds financing), as well as to analyse the effects arising from 
exogenous shocks from an increase in the budget deficit, such as from an increase in 
government expenditures (capital expenditure or consumption expenditure), and the 
impact of this on key macroeconomic variables. 
 200 
The model developed in this chapter can be used to conduct policy analysis 
through a simulation analysis aimed at comparing the macroeconomic effects of different 
budget funding options, with the objective of identifying which of these options provide a 
better result for the Lebanese economy as a whole. 
In the next chapter the model will be empirically estimated by using appropriate 
Lebanese data wherever possible. The estimated parameters will then be used to conduct a 
simulation analysis to examine the macroeconomic effects arising from a budget deficit and 
its funding, and to analyse as well exogenous shocks arising from an increase in 
government expenditure and its impact on macroeconomic variables (such as output, 
prices, interest rates, among others). The details of the properties of this estimation and 
simulation procedure will be addressed in the next two chapters. 
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Appendix 5.1 Solution of the DB Model1 
 
The equations of the DB model are as follows 
)( ydp −= π&    Phillips curve     (A5.1.1) 
rypeud σgδ −+−+= )(  aggregate demand    (A5.1.2) 
rypm λφ −+=   money demand    (A5.1.3) 
)(* eErr &+=    asset market equilibrium (UIP)   (A5.1.4) 
)()( eeeE −=θ&   expectations formation (regressive)  (A5.1.5) 
 
Notes: Lower-case variables are in natural logarithms, an exception being the domestic and world nominal 
interest rates. A dot above a variable signifies its rate of change over time. Greek letters denote positive 
parameters. E(.) is the expectations operator. 
 
p&domestic inflation rate     m domestic money supply 
d aggregate demand for domestic goods   r* foreign nominal (and real) interest rate 
(exogenous) 
y aggregate supply of domestic goods (exogenous)  e&actual rate of depreciation 
e nominal exchange rate     p domestic price level 
e equilibrium exchange rate    r domestic nominal interest rate 
  
u shift parameter 
 
The money market and the asset market are the building blocks of the monetary 
sector. In order to obtain the equilibrium condition for the entire monetary sector, we 
combine the known equilibrium conditions for the two constituent markets.  
Substituting (A5.1.5) into (A5.1.4), and substituting into (A5.1.3), we obtain 
)(* eeiypm −−−=− λθλφ        (A5.1.6) 
or, after solving for p, 
)(* eeiymp −++−= λθλφ        (A5.1.7) 
Therefore, we obtain our overall asset market equilibrium condition. Hence 
(A5.1.7) ensures that money demand equals money supply (money market equilibrium), 
that net international yields are equalised (international bond market equilibrium), and that 
expectations are regressive. 
In long run steady state the actual and equilibrium exchange rates are equal ( ee = ), 
which implies that the long run price level will equal 
*iymp λφ +−=         (A5.1.8) 
                                                 
1 Dornbusch (1976); MacDonald (1988). 
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Substituting (A5.1.8) in (A5.1.7) gives us the relationship between the exchange rate and 
the price level: 
))(/1( ppee −−= λθ           (A5.1.9) 
with a negative slope, that is )/1(/ λθ−=∂∂ pe     (A5.1.10) 
Equation (A5.1.9) indicates that if the actual price level exceeds its long-run level 
then the actual exchange rate falls short of its long-run level. These relations reflect the 
simultaneous condition of money market equilibrium, given the expectations formation 
process. A higher price level requires a lower level of real balances, a higher interest rate 
and hence with equalised yields, the expectation of an exchange rate depreciation. An 
expectation of a depreciation has to imply that the spot rate falls short of the long-run 
equilibrium rate. 
Substituting equation (A5.1.2) into (A5.1.1), we obtain the goods markets 
equilibrium as: 
[ ]rypeup σgδπ −−+−+= )1()(&       (A5.1.11) 
Setting p&= 0 in (A5.1.11) and substituting for the domestic interest rate from 
(A5.1.3), yields the equation of the goods market equilibrium: 
[ ] [ ] [ ])/()/()/( σδλλσδλσσδλδλ +++++= mep [ ]λφσg /)1( yyu −−+   (A5.1.12) 
with a positive slope that is, [ ] 0/1/ >+=∂∂ δλσpe    (A5.1.13) 
Setting p&= 0 and r = r* in (A5.1.11), as is appropriate for the long run where 
markets clear and the exchange rate is in equilibrium, we can obtain the long run exchange 
rate implied by (A5.1.12) as: 
[ ]uyrpe −−++= )1(*)/1( gσδ       (A5.1.14) 
Substituting (A5.1.8) in (A5.1.14) and rearranging, we obtain: 
δδgδσλφ /)/1()/( uyyme −−+++−=      (A5.1.15) 
Finally, by totally differentiating equation (A5.1.7), and noting that pddmed ==  
(because of the long run neutrality of money) and that y and r* are constant, we obtain a 
formal expression for the impact effect of a monetary expansion on the spot exchange rate: 
λθ/11/ +=dmde  where 0 < λθ  <1     (A5.1.16) 
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Equation (A5.1.16) confirms that in the short run the exchange rate will overshoot 
its equilibrium value. The extent of the overshooting will depend on the interest response 
of money demand, λ , and the expectations coefficient θ . 
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Appendix 5.2 Solution of the PBM Model2 
 
The equations of the PBM model are as follows: 
 
*eFBMW ++=     wealth constraint  (A5.2.1) 
WeErrmM ))(*,( &+=    money market equilibrium (A5.2.2) 
 0,0 21 << mm   
 
WeErrbB ))(*,( &+=     domestic bonds market  (A5.2.3) 
0,0 21 <> bb     equilibrium 
 
))(*,( eErrfeF &+=     foreign bonds market  (A5.2.4) 
 0,0 21 >< ff     equilibrium 
 
 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: 
 
M  domestic money supply  e  nominal exchange rate 
B  supply of domestic bonds  W  domestic wealth 
F  supply of foreign bonds   r  interest rate 
 (in foreign currency) on the  *r  foreign interest rate 
 domestic market   )(eE &  expected exchange rate depreciation 
 
 
Exchange Rate Dynamics 
 The PBM model exchange rate dynamics imply the specification of a wealth 
accumulation equation, and a hypothesis about exchange rate expectations. 
 Wealth accumulation is assumed to occur only through the purchase of foreign 
currency assets, since domestic asset stocks are assumed fixed and the government budget 
is in balance. Hence, with domestic output omitted for simplicity, the current account 
balance (CAB, in foreign currency) can be written as: 
 
**),,/(/ FriWpeTCABdtdF +==      (A5.2.5) 
 0,,0 321 <> TTT  
Where T  represents the trade balance which depends directly upon the (real) exchange rate 
and inversely upon the level of domestic non-bank private sector wealth, W , and an 
                                                 
2 The PBM model has its origins in the Keynesian tradition of fixed prices (McKinnon and Oates, 1966; 
Branson, 1968), it also has been used in a Classical framework by Dornbusch and Fisher (1980). Here the 
former approach is employed. The model used here largely assumes away the real side of the economy. 
The goods markets can be introduced, as demonstrated by Allen and Kenen (1978) and Branson and 
Buiter (1983). For a detailed discussion about the solution of the PBM model, see Pentecost (1993). 
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exogenous import shock parameter, i . The term ** Fr  represents net interest income 
from domestic holdings of foreign currency assets. If the economy has traditionally been a 
net capital exporter, so that ** Fr  is positive, then a trade deficit is needed to give current 
account balance and zero wealth accumulation in the long-run equilibrium. 
 Linearising (A5.2.5), with *r  assumed constant, gives a slope for 0* =F&  of: 
 
0*)/(*)(*/ 212 ><++−= FTTreTdFde      (A5.2.6) 
 
 The denominator will be positive if the Marshall-Lerner condition holds, although 
the numerator can be either positive or negative depending upon the relative size of 2eT  
and *r . If 2eT  is large relative to *r  then the 0* =F&  line has a positive slope. This 
requires that any rise in wealth is spent, in significant proportion, on foreign goods, which 
causes the trade balance to deteriorate and the exchange rate to depreciate. If, on the other 
hand, any increase in domestic residents’ wealth is only spent on domestic goods, then 
02 =T , and the 0* =F&  schedule has a negative slope. It is worth mentioning here that the 
slope of the 0* =F&  is not vital for stability, providing that, if negatively sloped, the 
0* =F&  schedule is flatter than the 0=E& schedule in the neighbourhood of the 
intersection (see Figure A5.1).  
 
  Figure A5.1 Equilibrium in the PBM with perfect foresight 
 
    E                                                                       E 
 
                                                             0* =F&  
 
 
                                                                                                                              0* =F&    
                                                         0=E&                                                             0=E&                                        
         0                                                             r*         0                                                F* 
 Source: Pentecost (1993) 
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 Agents are assumed to form their expectations of exchange rate changes according 
to the perfect foresight expectations hypothesis, in which case eeE && =)( (Pentecost, 1993) 
(This is a special case of the PBM model. Branson himself originally assumed static 
exchange rate expectations). 
 Linearising equations (A5.2.2) and (A5.2.4) give solutions for r  and  e& as follows, 
assuming that *r  is constant: 
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which implies that 
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so that e& is given by 
 
[ ])/(),/*( WMWEFe φ=&    where 0,0 21 <> φφ     (A5.2.9) 
 
The linearised versions of  (A5.2.5) and (A5.2.9) give the following second-order dynamic 
system: 
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 It is worth noting that the saddle path equilibrium implies that the determinant of 
the 2 *2 matrix be negative (stability condition). Hence, a saddle path equilibrium exists if 
**1 FrET > ; that is, if the wealth effect on the trade balance exceeds the foreign interest 
rate effect. As shown in Figure 5.8 the plausible slopes of the 0* =F  line with their 
respective directions of movement are given by the arrows. 
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 Furthermore, the reason behind the stability condition mentioned earlier on is that 
when there is a surplus on the current account this results in an appreciation of the 
exchange rate, which in turn will generate a fall in net exports. Furthermore, in the case of 
the current account surplus, this means that domestic residents accumulate foreign assets 
and this increases interest receipts which in turn improves this surplus. Hence, it is vital for 
the appreciation of the exchange rate to reduce the surplus and that the fall in net exports 
exceed the increased receipts. 
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Chapter 6  
Estimation of the Macroeconomic Model and Empirical Results 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to empirically estimate some of the equations of the 
macroeconomic model developed in Chapter 5. The model will be estimated using the 
Microfit 4 package. The data utilised for the estimation are yearly data for the period 1970-
2000. The estimated parameter values will be used in Chapter 7 to conduct a simulation 
analysis of the macroeconomic effects of exogenous shocks arising from the budget deficit 
and the funding of it (e.g. monetary accommodation or bond financing; to analyse as well 
exogenous shocks arising from increased government expenditure (consumption and/or 
investment expenditures) and their impact upon key macroeconomic variables such as 
output, private investment, prices, the interest rate, trade balance, the real exchange rate, 
among others. Furthermore, and most importantly, a simulation analysis will also be used 
in the following chapter to examine the government policy approach in response to the 
Lebanese fiscal crisis. 
However, it is important, before performing any empirical estimation of the 
macroeconomic model to analyse the time series data in this study. Analysis of the data 
involves determining whether the series are stationary or non-stationary. Stationary data 
refers to the condition in which the mean and variance of the data series stay about the 
same over the length of the series. Firstly, to test if a time series is stationary or 
nonstationary, this study used the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test73, which examines 
the hypothesis that the variable in question has a unit root. If the series is found to have a 
unit root, differencing the data may be appropriate before performing the regression 
analysis, to avoid the problem of spurious regression arising from nonstationary time series. 
Secondly, this study uses the preferred method of testing for cointegration using Johansen’s 
full information maximum likelihood (FIML) approach (Johansen, 1988; 1991; 1995) to 
detect for the existence of long run relationships between the variables included in this 
                                                 
73 The Dickey-Fuller test used here is augmented to allow for a serially correlated error term. See Dickey 
and Fuller (1979) for a detailed discussion.  
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study. To investigate the short-run dynamics of the system with the information of the 
cointegration relationship, an error-correction model (ECM) (Engle and Granger (1987)) is 
estimated (if a long-run cointegrating relationship exists). In the cases where the 
relationships are not initially found to be cointegrated, dummy variables will be introduced 
to capture the effects of structural breaks on the possibly cointegrated relationship. 
 This chapter will be divided into 5 sections. Section 6.2 describes the data sources 
and definitions of all the variables used in this study. Section 6.3 examines the time series 
data by using the ADF test and reports its results. The parameters to be used in Chapter 7 
will be derived in section 6.4, some of the behavioural equations of the model are estimated 
by using Johansen’s full information maximum likelihood (FIML) approach to detect for 
the existence of a long run relationship between the variables involved in this study. An 
error correction model is then estimated to investigate the short run dynamics of the 
system with the information of the cointegration relationship. The main conclusions are 
summarised in Section 6.5. 
 
6.2 Data Collection Procedures 
The definitions and sources of all variables employed in this study are given in 
Table 6.1. This study used annual data for the sample period 1970-200074. Different 
sources for the relevant data were extensively researched (Lebanese government, private 
sector, and international organisation) to find out its nature and availability. It was found 
that some variables are available as a complete series, while others variables are not 
available in official statistics and they are not a complete series, there are some gaps in 
some years (See Table 6.1) because of the civil war period during 1975-1990 which made 
the task of issuing Lebanese data by the government very difficult during that time75. 
                                                 
74 This study has chosen annual figures because the data for the whole time series from 1970 to 2000 is 
only available in this form. It is worth noting here that this period includes the pre-civil war period (1990-
1974), the civil war period (1975-1991), the civil peace and the reconstruction period (1992-2000). 
 
75 Furthermore, the absence of public agencies which are responsible for issuing official Lebanese data (e.g. 
Central administration for Statistics (CAS), among others), and the problems which have occurred to those 
agencies as a result of the Lebanese war during 1975-1990, made the availability of the Lebanese data very 
difficult and in some cases it was not available at all. But, some private agencies (depending on data provided 
by the Central Bank of Lebanon which still issued some data during that time) have issued Lebanese data to 
fill some of the gaps during the civil war period. 
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All the annual data which was used in this study cover the sample period of 1970-
2000, and was taken from the following sources:  
1- IMF, the International Financial Statistics Yearbook (IFS), various issues. 
2- World Bank (WB), World Tables, various issues. 
3- United Nations, National Accounts Statistics (NAS), various issues. 
4- Eken, et al., IMF Occasional Papers (1995; 1999). 
5- Ministry of Finance, Lebanon, various years 
6- Central Bank of Lebanon or Banque du Liban (BDL), Annual and quarterly 
reports, various issues 
7- The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Profile, (1998-2000). 
8- Banque Audi (BA), Economic Research Unit (2000). 
 
6.3 Testing for Stationarity 
 This section examines the time series data to determine whether the series are 
stationary or non-stationary by using the popular Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. 
 
6.3.1 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test 
In order to ascertain the time-series properties of the data sample the ADF test is 
used. The regression results are shown in Tables 6.2 and Table 6.3 respectively. The 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) (maximum SBC value) is used to select the 
optimum ADF lag76. These optimum lags are shown in parentheses beside each test 
statistic value (See Tables 6.2 and 6.3 respectively). Table 6.2 computes the ADF 
statistics for models with an intercept term but excluding a trend; Table 6.3 gives the 
ADF statistics for models with an intercept and a linear deterministic trend. However, 
these findings show that the only variables that may be stationary are real private 
consumption expenditure ( pc ), real government investment spending ( gi ), the rate of 
change of real bond stocks )( pb &&− , real government expenditure )(g , and real private 
investment ( pi ) when the trend is excluded from the ADF test (see Table 6.2). 
                                                                                                                                               
 
76 The maximum lag is set to be three because of the small sample constraining the degrees of freedom. 
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However, real private investment may be non-stationary I(1) when the trend is included 
in the test. The variable therefore appears non-stationary around the trend but stationary 
around the intercept. The test statistic is close to the cointegrating vector for pc , gi , and 
)( pb &&−  which may be I(0) or I(1) when the trend is included. 
The calculated test statistics unambiguously show that the following fourteen 
variables: namely, real trade balance (T ), real government consumption expenditure 
( gc ), rate of change of domestic nominal wages ( w&), domestic real wage ( pw − ), 
inflationary expectations (π ), rate of change of real net foreign assets ( f&), domestic 
nominal interest rates ( r ), foreign interest rate ( *r ), real money stock ( pm − ), real 
output demand ( dy ), foreign interest payments ( fr * ), real domestic bond 
stocks )( pb − , real budget deficit )(bd , and foreign income ( *y ) are non-stationary I(1) 
whether a trend is included or not (see Table 6.2 and 6.3 respectively).  
 
Table 6.1 Definition and Sources of Variables 
 Variables Sources Definition of variables 
1. Demand for real output 
expenditure ( dy ) 
1970-1996 (IMF) 
1997-2000 (MF) 
GDP in millions of L.L. at constant 1974 prices 
2. Real private consumption  
expenditure ( pc ) 
1970-73 (NAS) 
1974-75 (gap)(1) 
1976-82 (NAS) 
1983-86 (gap)(1) 
1987 (BDL) 
1988-1998 (WB) 
1999-2000 (EIU) 
Private consumption in millions of L.L. deflated by 
consumer price index at constant 1974 prices. 
3. Real private investment 
expenditure ( pi ) 
 
1970-72 (WB) 
1973-82 (BDL) 
1983-86 (gap)(2) 
1987 (BDL) 
1988-1998 (WB) 
1999-2000 (EIU) 
Private investment in millions of L.L. deflated by 
consumer price index at constant 1974 prices. 
4. Real government consumption 
spending ( gc ) 
1970-73 (NAS) 
1974-75 (gap)(3) 
1976-82 (NAS) 
1983-86 (gap)(3) 
1987 (BDL) 
1988-1998 (WB) 
1999-2000 (EIU) 
General government consumption expenditure in 
millions of L.L. deflated by consumer price index at 
constant 1974 prices. 
5. Real government investment 
spending ( gi ) 
1970-72 (WB) 
1973-2000 (BDL) 
 
Government investment is equivalent to capital 
expenditure in millions of L.L. deflated by consumer 
price index at constant 1974 prices. 
6. Real trade balance (T ) 1970-2000 (BDL) Trade balances (fob) in millions of L.L. deflated by 
consumer price index at constant 1974 prices. 
7. Real private sector wealth 
( pw ) 
1970-2000 (BDL) Data is not available. Hence it is calculated as the 
sum of real net foreign assets, private capital stock, 
money balances and bonds. 
8. Real private capital stock ( pk )  Calculated from private investment in millions of L.L. deflated by consumer price index at constant 
1974 prices. 
9. Real public capital stock ( gk )  Calculated from government investment in millions of L.L. deflated by consumer price index at constant 
1974 prices. 
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10. Tobin’s q ( q )  The data is not available. Hence the variable is 
derived from existing studies. 
11. Nominal exchange rate ( e ) 1970-2000 (BDL) Defined as the nominal exchange rate of the 
Lebanese pound against the US dollar. An increase 
in the exchange rate implies a nominal depreciation 
of the Lebanese pound. 
12. Domestic price level ( p ) 1970-2000 (BA) Measured by CPI (consumer price index) 
13. World real income ( *y ) 1970-2000 (IFS) Measured by real GDP in millions of U.S.$ for 
major world trading countries with Lebanon (USA, 
France, Italy, Switzerland, and Germany)*.  
14. Nominal money supply ( m ) 1970-2000 (IFS) Defined as currency in circulation plus demand 
deposits in millions of L.L (end of period). 
15. Aggregate supply of real output 
( sy ) 
1970-1996 (IMF) 
1997-2000 (MF) 
The data on GDP at current factor cost is not 
available. Hence this variable is proxied by real GDP 
(6). 
16. 
Current account (
.
f ) 
IMF (IFS) Rate of change of real net foreign assets. 
17. Domestic nominal interest rate 
or bond rate of interest ( r ) 
1970-1971(gap)(4) 
1972-2000 (BDL) 
Proxied by interest rates (average lending rate on 
Lebanese pounds). 
 
18. Real profit or the return on 
private capital ( R ) 
 Data not available. Therefore, the variable is derived 
from existing studies. 
19. Real net foreign assets stock 
( f ) 
IMF (IFS) Foreign assets net in millions of Lebanese pounds 
(end of period) deflated by consumer price index at 
constant 1974 prices. 
20. Domestic nominal wage ( w ) 1970 (gap)(5) 
1971-75 (BDL) 
1976 (gap)(5) 
1977 (BDL) 
1978-79 (gap)(5) 
1980-2000 (BDL 
Proxied by annual minimum wages of employees at 
current prices. 
21. Inflationary expectations (π )  Calculated from the domestic price level (lagged one 
period). 
22. Foreign interest rate ( *r ) IMF (IFS) Proxied by USA’s deposit interest rate. 
23. Budget deficit ( bd ) 1970-2000 (BDL) Real budget deficit in millions of Lebanese pounds 
(6). 
24 Government expenditures ( g ) 1970-2000 (BDL) Real government expenditure in millions of 
Lebanese pounds (6). 
25. Total tax revenues ( t ) 1970-2000 (BDL) Real total tax revenues in millions of Lebanese 
pounds (6). 
26. Domestic bonds )(b  1970-2000 (BDL) Defined as real treasury bills plus bonds in millions 
of Lebanese pounds (6). 
(1) Missing values are calculated as an average proportion of GDP. 
(2) Average of the private investment values for the years 1982 and 1987. 
(3) Average of the government consumption values for the years 1973 and 1976, and for the years 1982 and 1987. 
(4) Missing values for the year 1970 and 1971 extrapolated from the year 1972, consistent with unchanged discount 
rate. 
(5) Average for the wage values for the years 1969 and 1971, for the years 1975 and 1977, and for the years 1977 
and 1980 respectively.  
(6) Real values calculated using the CPI at constant 1974 prices. 
* These countries have been chosen because some of them such as Italy, France, Germany and USA are major 
trading partners with Lebanon mainly in terms of imports. The share of these countries’ imports in Lebanon’s 
total imports averaged 37.5% during 1989-2000 (Italy (12.5%), France (8.7%), Germany (8.2%), and USA 
(8.1%)), but nevertheless these countries also are important as a source of exports for Lebanon. However, in 
terms of export direction, Switzerland is the major industrial trading partner with Lebanon absorbing an 
average 7.2% of Lebanon’s total exports during 1989-2000, followed by France (6%) and USA (4.9%). Overall 
these five industrial countries absorbed an average 24.9% of Lebanon’s total exports during 1989-2000 (for 
more detailed discussions, see Chapter 2, section 2.4.3 structure and direction of trade). 
IMF=International Monetary Fund; MF=Ministry of Finance, Lebanon; WB=World Bank; NAS=National Account 
Statistics; EIU=Economist Intelligence Unit; BDL=Banque du Liban; BA=Banque Audi, Lebanon; 
IFS=International Financial Statistics 
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Table 6.2 ADF Test for Stationarity (includes an intercept but not a trend) 
Variable(1) I(0) I(1) I(2) Result 
 Test statistic(2) Critical value Test statistic Critical value Test statistic Critical value  
Real private consumption (
pc ) -3.5446[1] -2.9750     I(0) 
Real trade balance (T ) -2.2781[0] -2.9750 -6.0524[0] -2.9798   I(1) 
Nominal exchange rate ( e ) -1.0367[1] -2.9750 -2.5152[0] -2.9798 -6.0534[1] -2.9850 I(2) 
Domestic price level ( p ) -.92839[1] -2.9750 -2.2834[0] -2.9798 -5.8031[0] -2.9850 I(2) 
Real government investment (
gi ) -3.3565[0] -2.9750     I(0) 
Real private investment (
pi ) -3.1934[0] -2.9750     I(0) 
Real government consumption (
gc ) -1.8847[0] -2.9750 -4.1476[0] -2.9798   I(1) 
Domestic nominal wage ( w ) -.75025[1] -2.9750 -2.6221[0] -2.9798 -6.6542[0] -2.9850 I(2) 
Rate of change of domestic nominal wage ( w&) -2.6673[0] -2.9750 -6.7969[0] -2.9798   I(1) 
Real private sector wealth (
pw ) -2.1781[1] -2.9750 -3.2361[0] -2.9798   I(1) 
Domestic real wage ( pw − ) -.84581[0] -2.9750 -5.8114[1] -2.9798   I(1) 
Inflationary expectations (π ) -2.3475[1] -2.9750 -5.9255[0] -2.9798   I(1) 
Real public capital stock (
gk ) -1.4982[1] -2.9750 -3.4225[0] -2.9798   I(1) 
Real private capital stock (
pk ) -2.1824[1] -2.9750 -3.5304[0] -2.9798   I(1) 
Real net foreign assets ( f ) -1.1863[1] -2.9750 -2.2897[0] -2.9798 -4.5573[2] -2.9850 I(2) 
Rate of change of real net foreign assets ( f&) -2.3870[0] -2.9750 -4.6173[2] -2.9798   I(1) 
Domestic nominal interest rate ( r ) -1.6947[0] -2.9750 -5.3432[0] -2.9798   I(1) 
Foreign interest rate ( *r ) -2.7564[1] -2.9750 -4.0289[0] -2.9798   I(1) 
Real exchange rate  ( pe − ) -.41195[2] -2.9750 -3.4923[1] -2.9798   I(1) 
Foreign asset stock ( pef −+ ) -1.4179[1] -2.9750 -2.2738[0] -2.9798 -4.8013[2] -2.9850 I(2) 
Real money stock ( pm − ) -.61534[0] -2.9750 -4.2238[0] -2.9798   I(1) 
Demand for real output (
dy ) -2.9349[0] -2.9750 -6.9244[0] -2.9798   I(1) 
World real income ( *y ) .14516[0] -2.9750 -4.6144[0] -9.9798   I(1) 
Foreign interest income ( )fr *  -2.7535[1] -2.9750 -3.8448[0] -2.9798   I(1) 
Real bonds stock )( pb −  -1.7549[0] -2.9750 -5.0567[0] -2.9798   I(1) 
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Table 6.2 Continued 
Variable(1) I(0) I(1) I(2) Result 
 Test statistic(2) Test statistic Critical value Test statistic Critical value Test statistic  
Rate of change of real money stock )( pm &&−  2.7217[0] -2.9750 -1.6007[1] -2.9798 -11.5378[0] -2.9850 I(2) 
Real budget deficit )(bd  -2.4892[0] -2.9750 -6.1702[0] -2.9798   I(1) 
Real government expenditure )(g  -3.6073[3] -2.9750     I(0) 
Rate of change of real bonds stock )( pb &&−  -5.0719[0] -2.9750[0]     I(0) 
(1) All variables in the Table are in logs except r , *r , bd , and T . (2) Figures in square brackets beside each test statistic represent optimum lags, selected using the maximal SBC value. 
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Table 6.3 ADF Test for Stationarity (includes an intercept and a linear trend) 
Variable(1) I(0) I(1) I(2) Result 
 Test statistic (2) Critical value Test statistic Critical value Test statistic Critical value  
Real private consumption (
pc ) -3.6077[0] -3.5867     I(0) 
Real trade balance (T ) -2.2507[0] -3.5867 -6.0584[0] -3.5943   I(1) 
Nominal exchange rate ( e ) -1.9087[1] -3.5867 -2.4765[0] -3.5943 -6.008[0] -3.6027 I(2) 
Domestic price level ( p ) -1.9929[1] -3.5867 -2.2247[0] -3.5943 -5.7807[0] -3.6027 I(2) 
Real government investment (
gi ) -3.9123[0] -3.5867     I(0) 
Real private investment (
pi ) -3.1287[0] -3.5867 -6.2892[0] -3.5943   I(1) 
Real government consumption (
gc ) -1.9968[0] -3.5867 -4.1108[0] -3.5943   I(1) 
Domestic nominal wage ( w ) -1.8486[1] -3.5867 -2.5605[0] -3.5943 -6.6057[0] -3.6027 I(2) 
Rate of change of domestic nominal wage ( w&) -2.5955[0] -3.5867 -6.7359[0] -3.5943   I(1) 
Real private sector wealth (
pw ) -2.0878[1] -3.5867 -3.2185[0] -3.5943 -5.8816[0] -3.6027 I(2) 
Domestic real wage ( pw − ) -2.3165[0] -3.5867 -5.6866[0] -3.5943   I(1) 
Inflationary expectations (π ) -2.2212[0] -3.5867 -5.9112[0] -3.5943   I(1) 
Real public capital stock (
gk ) -1.5870[1] -3.5867 -3.5821[0] -3.5943 -6.5156[0] -3.6027 I(2) 
Real private capital stock (
pk ) -2.0677[1] -3.5867 -3.5346[0] -3.5943 -6.4894[0] -3.6027 I(2) 
Real net foreign assets ( f ) -2.0612[1] -3.5867 -2.2892[0] -3.5943 -4.5844[2] -3.6027 I(2) 
Rate of change of real net foreign assets ( f&) -2.3841[0] -3.5867 -4.5664[2] -3.5943   I(1) 
Domestic nominal interest rate ( r ) 
 
-1.4020[0] -3.5867 -5.3932[0] -3.5943   I(1) 
Foreign interest rate ( *r ) -2.8623[1] -3.5867 -3.8998[0] -3.5943   I(1) 
Real exchange rate  ( pe − ) -2.9099[1] -3.5867 -3.4533[1] -3.5943 -4.4478[1] -3.6027 I(2) 
Foreign asset stock ( pef −+ ) -2.2040[1] -3.5867 -2.2839[0] -3.5943 -4.7899[2] -3.6027 I(2) 
Real money stock ( pm − ) -1.5785[0] -3.5867 -4.1306[0] -3.5943   I(1) 
Demand for real output (
dy ) -2.7658[0] -3.5867 -5.8985[1] -3.5943   I(1) 
World real income ( *y ) -1.9412[0] -3.5867 -4.6184[0] -3.5943   I(1) 
Foreign interest income ( )fr *  -3.5329[1] -3.5867 -4.0728[3] -3.5943   I(1) 
Real  bonds  stock )( pb −  -2.1589[0] -3.5867 -5.0166 -3.5943   I(1) 
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Table 6.3 Continued 
Variable(1) I(0) I(1) I(2) Result 
 Test statistic (2) Critical value Test statistic Critical value Test statistic Critical value  
Rate of change of real money stock )( pm &&−  -0.7736[0] -3.5867 -5.7005[0] -3.5943   I(1) 
Real budget deficit )(bd  -2.6142[0] -3.5867 -6.0848[0] -3.5943   I(1) 
Real government expenditure )(g  -3.8948[3] -3.5867     I(0) 
Rate of change of real bonds stock )( pb &&−  -4.9902[0] -3.5867     I(0) 
(1) All variables in the Table are in logs except r , *r , bd , and T . (2) Figures in square brackets beside each test statistic represent optimum lags, selected using the maximal SBC value.
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Furthermore, the ADF regression results indicate that the following four variables: 
namely, real private sector wealth ( pw ), real public capital stock ( gk ), real private capital 
stock ( pk ), and the real exchange rate ( pe − ) are non-stationary. However, they may be 
either I(1) or I(2) because the test is sensitive to the inclusion of the trend. When the trend 
is excluded from the ADF test these variables are non-stationary I(1), but when the trend is 
included in the test these variables become non-stationary I(2). In addition, the rate of 
change of real money stock )( pm &&−  also seems to be either I(1) or I(2). When the trend is 
included this variable becomes non-stationary I(1), when the trend is excluded it becomes 
I(2). 
 Furthermore, the ADF regression results show that the following five variables: 
nominal exchange rate ( e ), domestic price level ( p ), domestic nominal wage ( w ), real net 
foreign assets ( f ) and foreign assets stock ( pef −+ ) are non-stationary I(2) regardless of 
whether a trend is included or not. 
These tests may be biased towards higher orders. According to Perron (1989) 
this is because of the presence of structural breaks, which occurred during the 1980s 
(Israeli invasion in 198277). 
 
6.4 Estimation Results 
 Some of the behavioural equations of the model are estimated by applying the 
cointegration and error-correction techniques, to the yearly data from 1970-2000. It is 
worth noting here that a preliminary analysis of the data was conducted using an OLS 
estimation for variables which were made stationary by differencing according to the ADF 
test results. The results are not reported here due to space limitations and because the 
cointegration estimation, being FIML (full information maximum likelihood), is a preferred 
systems procedure. These cointegration and error-correction techniques permit the 
possible determination of both long run and short run relationships among the variables 
involved (which will be discussed later). 
                                                 
77 The different orders of integration for the selected variables have important implications for the 
specified relationships in chapter 5. 
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These results for the ten behavioural equations of the model (1), (2), (6), (7), (9), 
(10), (13), (14), (15), (17) are presented in Tables 6.4 to 6.13 in Appendix 6.1 at the end of 
this chapter. It is worth noting here that each individual equation was evaluated using 
descriptive statistics such as t-test, F test, Durbin-Watson (DW) test, R2  (coefficient of 
determination) and the LM test for serial correlation. 
Equation (1) identifies the determinants of the demand for real output. Both the 
AIC and SBC measures suggest a VAR with lag of order 2. It is vital when implementing 
the Johansen analysis to determine an appropriate lag length for use in the VAR model. 
Hence, this study performed a related test78  to choose the optimal lag length for the VAR 
according to the AIC, SBC and the likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic. There is no evidence 
of cointegration for all the variables (not shown here) irrespective of whether a trend is 
included or excluded in the cointegration analysis. This is probably due to the structural 
changes, which occurred during the civil war period of 1975-1990, causing the variables to 
drift apart. For this reason we include two dummy variables in the equation D1 and D2. 
The dummy variable D1 to take account of the sharp decline in the demand for real output 
which occurred in 1976 as shown in Figure 6.1 below.  
 
Figure 6.1 Demand for Real Output (in millions of L.L at constant 1974 prices)
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Source: IMF (1995; 1999); and Ministry of Finance (2001). 
 
                                                 
78 Test statistics and choice criteria for selecting the order of the VAR lag are not reported here. 
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The sharp decline in the demand for real output in 1990 was captured as well by 
the dummy variable D2 that takes the value of zero prior to the year of 1990 and one 
thereafter. The results of the Johansen cointegration test, with trend excluded and included, 
are reported in Tables 6.4A and 6.4B respectively. The results for the tests for the number 
of cointegrating variables are ambiguous according to Table 6.4B. They range from 2 
cointegrating vectors according to the trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics at both the 
95% and 90% significance levels, and up to 5 cointegrating vectors if the LL measure can 
be believed. With this wide range in mind, perusal of the eigenvalues indicates that, whilst 
there are many possible vectors, there are at least two. In order to keep the analysis 
tractable the number was chosen at two whilst admitting it could be as high as five. Panel E 
in Table 6.4B reports the coefficient estimates of the two possible cointegrating vectors, 
with their standard error in brackets. The first cointegrating vector was estimated using the 
Johansen FIML by identifying the vector with the normalising restriction on the demand 
for real output, plus the additional restriction on the coefficient of private consumption to 
be 179. The second cointegrating vector was identified by the usual normalising restriction 
on the demand for real output, plus the elasticity of private investment to be 0.1 (as 
reported in Harvie and Kearney (1996)). The first vector seems to have good magnitudes 
and signs. As can be seen from Panel E in Table 6.4B the long run estimated parameter for 
private consumption has the correct positive sign (1). The estimated parameter for private 
investment is statistically insignificant. The long run estimated coefficient of the 
government expenditure has the expected positive sign (1.2) but is also not significant. The 
estimated parameter of the real trade balance is statistically insignificant (0.11). The results 
without trend are reported in Table 6.4A but are not discussed further because the results 
with a trend give better results in terms of magnitudes. 
We are able to formulate the short-run adjustment process in terms of an ECM for 
the cointegrating VAR model. The results for the demand for real output variable 
(estimated by an OLS based cointegration VAR (2)) is represented in Table 6.4C. As can be 
seen from this table the coefficient of the error-correction term, -1.1081 (-3.9597), has the 
                                                 
79 This was the estimated elasticity of private consumption as reported in Harvie and Kearney (1996). 
    Two identifying restrictions are required because the rank was determined as two. 
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correct sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level. It is quite large showing that there 
is a very strong and significant tendency for the real trade balance to return back to long 
run equilibrium, when shocked in the short run.  Furthermore, this equation has an 
appropriate value for R2 as well as appropriate values for the DW, F test and LM test. The 
short run estimated coefficient for private investment has the correct sign (0.16) and is also 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The short run estimated coefficient for government 
expenditure is statistically insignificant. However, both the short run estimated coefficients 
for the real trade balance (0.35) and for private consumption (0.99) have the wrong sign 
but are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 Equation (2) shows the private consumption function. Both the AIC and SBC 
suggest a VAR lag of order 1 (not shown here). The results of the Johansen cointegration 
test, whether a trend is excluded or included, are reported in both Tables 6.5A and 6.5B 
respectively. As seen from Table 6.5A both the maximum eigenvalue and trace statistic 
suggest r=1 at the 90% significance level. Turning to the model selection criteria, the SBC 
favours r=1, but the same is not true of the HQC which favours r=2. However, in what 
follows it seems reasonable to set r=1 in order to keep the analysis tractable whilst 
admitting it could be as high as three according to the LL measure. The cointegrating 
vector was estimated using Johansen’s FIML, by identifying the vector with the normalising 
restriction on real private consumption. As can be seen from Panel E in Table 6.5A the 
long run estimated coefficient for private wealth is 0.2, which is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The long run estimated coefficient of the real income elasticity has the correct 
positive sign (0.4) and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The results with trend is 
reported in Table 6.5B, but are not discussed here because the results without trend give 
better results in terms of magnitudes and in terms of t-values. 
From the findings of the relations in the cointegration VAR model, we are able to 
formulate the short-run adjustment process in terms of an error-correction model (ECM). 
The results of the ECM for variable private consumption is presented in Table 6.5C. As 
can be seen from this table the coefficient of the error-correction term, -0.5811 (-2.5996), 
has the correct sign and is statistically significant, and is quite large showing that there is a 
very strong and significant tendency for private consumption to return back to long run 
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equilibrium when shocked in the short run. However, the estimated equation suffers from 
residual serial correlation. These unsatisfied diagnostic tests might result in misleading 
statistical and hence economic inferences. However, the model is well specified in terms of 
the F test and DW. As shown in Table 6.5C the short run effect of real private wealth on 
private consumption is positive and has a reasonable magnitude of 0.2, and is statistically 
insignificant at the 10% level (but is statistically significant at the 20% level). However, the 
short run elasticity of real income is statistically significant with the wrong sign. 
Equation (6) identifies government expenditure. Because there is no evidence of 
cointegration for all the variables (not reported here), the structural change dummy variable 
D1 was included to take account of the sharp decline in the demand for real output which 
occurred in 1976. The test results for the number of cointegrating relationships, whether a 
trend is excluded or included, are presented in both Tables 6.6A and 6.6B respectively. As 
can be seen from Table 6.7B the maximum eigenvalue suggests r=2 at the 90% significance 
level, but the trace statistic suggests r=1 at the 95% and 90% significance levels 
respectively. Turning to the model selection criteria, both the SBC and AIC favour r=2. 
However, following this, we assume r=2. Panel E in Table 6.6B reports the coefficient 
estimates of the two possible cointegrating vectors with their standard errors in brackets. 
The first cointegration vector was estimated using the Johansen FIML by identifying the 
vector with the normalising restriction on the government expenditure, plus the elasticity 
of the real demand for output was fixed at 0.8370 (as reported in Panel D in Table 6.6B). 
The second cointegration vector was identified by the usual normalising restriction on 
government expenditure, plus the elasticity of government investment was set to zero. 
However, the second vector seems to have the correct signs and good magnitudes. As 
shown in Table 6.6B (Panel E) the long run estimated coefficient of government 
investment is 0.6 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The long run estimated 
coefficient of the real demand for output has the correct negative sign (-0.8). The long run 
estimated coefficient of government consumption has the expected positive sign as well.  
From the findings of the relations in the cointegration VAR model, we are able to 
formulate the short-run adjustment process in terms of an error-correction model (ECM). 
The results of the ECM for variable government expenditure (estimated by OLS based on 
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cointegration VAR (2)) is reported in Table 6.6C. As shown in this table the coefficient of 
the error-correction term, -0.0953 (-3.6870) has the correct sign and is statistically 
significant. However, the model is well specified in terms of diagnostic tests, these include 
the LM test for first order serial correlation, the F test and DW. The short rum estimated 
coefficient of government investment has the correct positive sign (0.8). However, the 
short run elasticity of real demand for output is statistically insignificant. 
Equation (7) describes the budget deficit and the funding of it (through monetary 
accommodation or through bond financing). Both the SBC and the AIC suggest a VAR lag 
of order 1. The results of the Johansen cointegration test (whether a trend is excluded or 
included) are reported in Tables 6.7A and 6.7B respectively. It is worth noting here that we 
include a dummy variable D75 in the VAR model to capture the structural changes, which 
occurred during the civil war period of 1975-1990. The optimal lag structure for the VAR 
is one and the eigenvalue and trace statistic suggest r=2 at the 95% significance level (Table 
6.7B). According to the model selection criteria (given in Panel C of the Table), the AIC 
and SBC select r=3. In order to keep the analysis tractable the number was chosen at two. 
In this case two identifying restrictions are required because the rank was determined as 
two. The first cointegration vector was identified by normalising the restriction on the 
budget deficit, plus the elasticity of the real bonds was set to zero. The second one was 
identified by the usual normalising restriction on the budget deficit, plus the additional 
restriction on the coefficient of the real bonds to be 1.2 (as reported in Panel D of the 
Table 6.7B). The second vector seems to have the correct signs and interpretable 
magnitudes consistent with the model employed here. The real money elasticity with 
respect to the budget deficit is estimated to be 0.5 while the real bonds elasticity is 
estimated to be 1.2. 
We are able to formulate the short run adjustment process in terms of an ECM for 
the cointegrating VAR model. The results of ECM for variable budget deficits are 
presented in Table 6.7C. However, the coefficient of the error correction term, -0.3, has 
the correct sign but is statistically insignificant. The econometric model is well specified, 
satisfying a range of diagnostic tests for model adequacy. Both the short run estimated 
coefficients for real money balances and real bonds are statistically insignificant. 
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 Equation (8) describes the trade balance. There is no evidence of cointegration for 
all the variables (not shown here). This is probably due to the structural changes, which 
occurred during the civil war period of 1975-1990, causing the variables to drift apart. For 
this reason we include two dummy variables in the equation, D1 and D2. The dummy 
variable D1 takes account of the sharp decline in the trade balance, which occurred in 1976 
and is shown in Figure 6.2 below: 
 
Figure 6.2 Real Trade Balance (in millions of L.L at constant 1974 
prices)
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Source: Banque du Liban, Annual Report (various years). 
 
The sharp increase in the trade balance during 1979-2000 was captured by the 
dummy variable D2, which takes the value of zero prior to the year of 1979 and one 
thereafter. As can be seen from both Tables 6.8A and 6.8B the results are reversed, from 
no cointegration to cointegration. The results for the tests of the number of cointegrating 
vectors are reported in Tables 6.8A and 6.8B. As can be seen from Table 6.8B (the results 
included trends) the maximum eigenvalue suggests r=2 at both the 95% and 90% 
significance levels, while the trace statistic suggests r=1 at the 95% significance level and 
r=2 at the 90% level. Turning to the model selection criteria, the SBC favours r=2 but the 
same is not true of the AIC and LL which favours r=3. However, in what follows it seems 
reasonable to set r=2.  
The coefficient estimates of the two possible cointegrating vectors are presented in 
Panel E in Table 6.8B with their standard error in brackets. The first cointegrating vector 
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was estimated using the Johansen FIML by identifying the vector with the normalising 
restriction on the trade balance, plus the additional restriction on the coefficient of the real 
exchange rate being set equal to zero. The second cointegrating vector was identified by the 
usual normalising restriction on the trade balance, plus the elasticity of the world real 
income was fixed at 0.3445 (this number was adopted from the results in panel D in Table 
6.8A). The second vector seems to have good signs and magnitudes. As can be seen from 
Panel E in Table 6.8B the long run parameter of the real exchange rate has the expected 
positive sign (1.5233) and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The long run estimated 
parameter of domestic real output is statistically insignificant (0.4385) at the 10% level (but 
is statistically significant at the 20% level). The long run estimated coefficient of world real 
income has the expected positive sign (0.3445).  
With regard to the ECM equation for the trade balance the error correction 
coefficient for VAR (2), estimated at -1.3537, has the correct sign and is statistically 
significant at 1%  (See Table 6.8C), and it is quite large suggesting that it would take less 
time for the equation to return to its equilibrium once it has been shocked. Furthermore, 
the estimated equation passes all diagnostic tests. These include the LM test for first order 
serial correlation, the F test and DW. The short run estimated coefficient of the real 
exchange rate is statistically insignificant (0.6185) and the short run estimated coefficient 
for the aggregate demand for domestic real out put has the expected negative sign but is 
also statistically insignificant.  
 Equation (9) identifies the demand for real money balances. The SBC suggests a 
VAR of 1. The results of the Johansen cointegration test, whether a trend is excluded or 
included, are presented in Tables 6.9A and 6.9B respectively. The results for the tests for 
the number of cointegrating variables are ambiguous according to Table 6.9B. They range 
from 1 to 2 cointegrating vectors according to the trace and maximum eigenvalue at both 
the 95% and 90% significance levels, and up to 3 cointegrating vectors if the AIC and the 
HQC measures can be believed. With this range, perusal of the eigenvalues shows that 
there is at least one. With the aim to keep the analysis tractable the number was chosen to  
be two whilst admitting it could be as high as three. The coefficient estimates of the two 
possible cointegrating vectors, with their standard errors in brackets, are presented in Panel 
 225 
E in Table 6.9A. The first cointegrating vector was estimated using the Johansen FIML by 
identifying the vector with the normalising restriction on the demand for real money 
balances, plus the additional restriction on the coefficient of aggregate demand being set to 
zero. The second cointegrating vector was identified by the usual normalising restriction on 
the demand for real money balances, plus the elasticity of the aggregate demand was fixed 
at 0.2280. The second vector seems to have the correct signs and good magnitudes. As can 
be seen from Panel E in Table 6.9A, the long run estimated parameter of the domestic 
interest rate has the correct negative sign (0.2263) and is not significant at the 10% level 
(but is significant at the 20% level). However, when the trend is included as shown in Table 
6.9B, Panel E, the long run estimated coefficient of the domestic interest rate becomes 
significant at the 10% level with a smaller magnitude and having the correct negative sign 
as well (0.0941). 
 From the cointegration VAR model, we are able to formulate the short-run 
adjustment process in terms of an ECM. The results of the ECM for the demand for real 
money balances variable are presented in Table 6.9C. As can be seen from this Table, the 
coefficient of the error-correction term is a relatively small value of -0.2390 (-1.7142), and 
has the correct sign and is statistically significant at the 10% level. Moreover, this equation 
has an appropriate value for R2 as well as appropriate values of the DW, F test and LM test. 
The short run estimated coefficient of aggregate demand has the correct sign (0.2803) and 
is statistically significant at the 5% level, but the short run estimated coefficient of the 
domestic interest rate is statistically insignificant. 
Equation (13) represents private sector wealth, which depends on the foreign asset 
stock, on the value of the private sector capital stock, on the real money stock, and on the 
real bonds stock. The optimal order of the VAR lag is 2. The test results for the number of 
cointegrating relationships, whether a trend is excluded or included, are reported in both 
Tables 6.10A and 6.10B respectively. As shown in Table 6.10A both the maximum 
eigenvalue statistic and trace statistic does not reject r=1 at the 95% significance level. 
Turning to the model selection criteria, the SBC selects r=1 but the same is not true for the 
HQC which favours r=2. However, in what follows it seems reasonable to set r=1. The 
                                                 
80 This was the estimated elasticity of aggregate demand as reported in Auepiyachut (2000). 
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cointegrating vector was estimated using the Johansen FIML method by identifying the 
vector with the normalising restriction on private sector wealth. The results are reported in 
Panel E in Table 6.10A. As can be seen from this table the long run estimated parameter 
for the private capital stock (0.2549) is statistically significant at the 1% level and has the 
expected positive sign. The long run parameter of the real domestic currency value of 
domestically held foreign assets is statistically significant at the 1% level, and has the 
expected positive sign (0.6427). The real money elasticity has a positive sign as expected 
and is statistically significant at the 1% level, but the real bonds elasticity is statistically 
significant at the 1% level with the wrong sign.  
With regard to the ECM equation for real private sector wealth, the coefficient of 
the error-correction term, 0.7557 (3.4402), has the correct sign and is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The equation passes all diagnostic tests. The results of the short run 
estimated elasticities are presented in Table 6.10C. However, the short run estimated 
coefficient of the private sector capital stock has a correct positive sign (0.4108) and is 
statistically significant at the 10% level, but the short run estimated coefficient of the real 
domestic currency value of domestically held foreign assets is statistically insignificant. The 
estimated short run elasticity of real money is statistically significant at the 5% level but 
with a wrong sign, while the real bonds elasticity has a correct sign but is not significantly 
different from zero.  
Equation (14) defines the current account of the balance of payments. Both the 
AIC and SBC suggest a VAR lag of order 2. The results of the Johansen cointegration test, 
whether a trend is excluded or included, are reported in both Tables 6.11A and 6.11B 
respectively. The results for the number of cointegrating vectors are ambiguous according 
to Table 6.11A. They range from 1 according to both the maximum eigenvalue and trace 
statistic at the 95% significance level, and up to 4 cointegrating vectors if the AIC measure 
can be believed. With this wide range, perusal of the eigenvalues shows that, whilst there 
are many possible vectors, there is at least one. In order to maintain tractable analysis the 
number was chosen at two, whilst admitting it could be as high as four.  The cointegration 
vector was estimated using the Johansen FIML by identifying the vector with the 
normalising restriction on the domestic holdings of foreign assets. As can be seen from 
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Panel E in Table 6.11A the long run estimated coefficient of foreign net interest income 
gives a correct positive sign as expected (0.0121), and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The long run estimated coefficient of the real trade balance gives a correct positive 
sign (0.2119) but it is statistically insignificant. The long run estimated coefficient of the 
real exchange rate has the expected positive sign (0.4516) and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level.  
From the findings of the cointegration VAR model, we are able to formulate the 
short-run adjustment process in terms of an error-correction model (ECM). The results of 
the ECM for the change of domestic foreign assets are reported in Table 6.11C. As seen 
from the table the coefficient of the error-correction term, -0.8022 (-2.3941), has the 
correct sign and is statistically significant. However, the model is well specified in terms of 
diagnostic tests, these include the LM test for first order serial correlation, the F test and 
DW. The short run effect of the real exchange rate on the change of domestic holdings of 
foreign assets is positive and is statistically significant at the 5% level. However, the short 
run elasticities of the trade balance and for foreign net interest income are statistically 
insignificant.  
 Equation (15) describes the domestic price level. Both the AIC and SBC suggests a 
VAR of order 2. The test results for the number of cointegrating relationships are 
presented in Tables 6.12A and 6.12B respectively. As seen from Table 6.12B (these results 
include restricted trends) the maximum eigenvalue suggests r=1 at the 95% and r=2 at the 
90% significance levels, while the trace statistic suggests r=2 at the 95% significance level. 
Turning to the model selection criteria, the SBC favours r=3 and the same is true of AIC 
and HQC which select r=3. However, following this, we assume r=2. Panel E in Table 
6.12B reports the coefficient estimates of the two possible cointegrating vectors with their 
standard errors in brackets. The first cointegrating vector was estimated using the Johansen 
FIML by identifying the vector with the normalising restriction on the price level, plus the 
additional restriction on the coefficient of the nominal wage set to zero. The second 
cointegrating vector was identified by the usual normalising restriction on the price level, 
plus the elasticity of the nominal wage was fixed at 0.3664 (this number was calculated by 
Johansen estimation, Panel D in Table 6.12B). The second vector seems to have the correct 
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signs and good magnitudes. As can be seen from Panel E in Table 6.12B the long run 
parameter of the nominal wage has the expected positive sign (0.3664) and the estimated 
parameter of the exchange rate also has the expected positive sign (0.6141), and both are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. However, when the trend is excluded, as shown in 
Panel E in Table 6.12A, both the long run estimated coefficients of the nominal wage and 
the exchange rate have the expected positive sign and are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Both the domestic wage and nominal exchange rate significantly explain the domestic 
price level at the 99% confidence level. 
Turning to the ECM equation for the domestic price level variable, for VAR (2), 
the error-correction term, -0.4107 (-1.6419), has the correct sign and is statistically 
significant at around the 11% level. Furthermore, this equation has an appropriate value for 
R2 as well as appropriate values of the DW, F test and LM test. The short run estimated 
coefficient of the exchange rate has the correct sign (0.6698) and is statistically significant at 
the 10% level. But the short run estimated coefficient of the nominal wage has the correct 
sign (0.3414), and is statistically insignificant.  
 Equation (17) identifies aggregate supply. Both the AIC and SBC suggest a VAR 
lag of order 1 (results not shown here). The test results for the number of cointegrating 
relationships, whether a trend is excluded or included, are presented in Tables 6.13A and 
6.13B respectively. However, these results are ambiguous according to Table 6.13B. As can 
be seen from the table both the maximum eigenvalue and trace statistic suggest r=1. The 
hypothesis that r=0 is rejected against r=1, but the hypothesis that r=1 cannot be rejected 
against r=2. The Schwarz Bayesian (SBC) favours r=1 but the same is not true of AIC and 
HQC which selects r=4. In what follows we assume r=1 in order to keep the analysis 
tractable whilst admitting it could be as high as 4. The cointegration vector was estimated 
using Johansen FIML by identifying the vector with the normalising restriction on the 
supply of output. As can be seen from panel E in Table 6.13B the long run estimated 
parameter of the private capital stock has the expected positive sign (0.5478), and is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The long run estimated parameter of the public 
capital stock has a correct positive sign (0.2360) but is statistically insignificant (it is 
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significant at the 20% level). The long run estimated parameter of the real wage rate has the 
wrong sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 With regard to the ECM equation for the supply of output variable the error-
correction coefficient for VAR (2), estimated at 0.8427 (2.3727), has the correct sign and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level (See Table 6.13C), suggesting that it would take less 
time for the equation to return to its equilibrium once it has been shocked. This equation is 
well specified in terms of diagnostics tests (LM test, F test, and DW). However, the short 
run estimated coefficient of the private capital stock has a correct positive sign but is not 
significant, while the short run estimated coefficient of the public capital stock (0.5644) is 
statistically insignificant (but it is significant at the 20% level). The real private capital stock 
elasticity is statistically insignificant.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the empirical estimations for some of the model 
equations developed in Chapter 5. Data collection procedures and definition of variables 
used in the macroeconomic model developed have been explained. This chapter examined 
the time series data to determine whether the series are stationary or non-stationary by 
using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The results show that only real private 
consumption expenditure ( pc ), real government investment spending ( gi ), rate of change 
of real bond stocks )( pb &&− , and real government expenditure may be stationary I(0). The 
rest of the variables included in the model are found to be non-stationary of different 
orders either I(1) or I(2). Allowing for the possibility that all variables are non-stationary, 
testing for cointegration is important and involves using Johansen’s full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) approach (Johansen, 1988; 1991; 1995) to detect for the 
existence of long run relationships between the variables included in this study. The results 
indicate the existence of a long run relationship, or cointegration, for all the equations 
employed (many equations included dummy variables to capture the effects of structural 
breaks on the possibly cointegrating relationships).  
The findings of cointegration relationships allows us to investigate the short-run 
dynamics of the system with the information of the cointegration relationship, and an 
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error-correction model (ECM) (Engle and Granger (1987)) is estimated (if there is a long-
run cointegrating relationship).  
These estimates (the long run and short run estimated coefficients from 
cointegration and the error correction model) as shown in Table 6.4 below, providing a 
range of possible parameters values which will be used to conduct a simulation and policy 
analysis in the next chapter. This is conducted in order to reduce the macroeconomic 
consequences arising from shocks with the aim of improving the macroeconomic 
performance of Lebanon.  
 
Table 6.4 Estimated Parameters for the Ten Behavioural Equations of the Model 
Equation Variables LR 
estimated 
coefficients 
(a) 
SR 
estimated 
coefficients 
(b) 
Equation Variables LR 
estimated 
coefficients 
(a) 
SR 
estimated 
coefficients 
(b) 
(1) pc  1.0000 -0.9979*** (13) )( pef −+  0.6427*** -0.1695 
 pi  -0.0855 0.1690*  )( qk p +  0.2549*** 0.4108* 
 g  1.2320 -2.8730  )( pm −  0.6741*** -1.0507** 
 T  -0.1103 -0.3549***  )( pb −  -0.0565*** 0.0100 
(2) sy  0.4152*** -0.4933*** (14) T  0.2119 -0.1521 
 pw  0.1739*** 0.2848  fr *  0.0121*** -1.0651 
(6) gc  0.0204   )( pe −  0.4216*** 2.7270** 
 sy  -0.8370 -0.0038     
 gi  0.6577*** 0.8619     
(7) )( pm &&−  0.5364 -0.1859 (15) w  0.3664 0.3414 
 )( pb &&−  1.2634 -0.0472  e  0.6141*** 0.6698* 
(9) )( pe −  1.5233*** -0.6185 (17) pk  0.5478* 0.2744 
 dy  0.4385 -0.2225  gk  0.2360 -0.5644 
 *Y  0.3445   )( PW −  -0.9298*** 0.1675 
(10) dy  0.2200 0.2803**     
 r  -0.2263 0.0084     
Note: (a) Estimated coefficients obtained from the FIML approach 
 (b) Estimated coefficients obtained from the ECM approach 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
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Appendix 6.1 The Estimation Results of the Ten Behavioural Equations 
 
 
Table 6.4A Johansen and Juselius cointegrating (JJ) tests with restricted intercepts and no trends in 
the VAR. Equation (1) Tgicy ppd 4321 αααα +++= . (Variables included in the cointegrating 
vector: dy , pc , pi , g  , T . Variables I (1) included in the VAR: gc . Variables I (0) included in 
the VAR: D1 and D2. 
Eigenvalues: (0.8146, 0.6506, 0.4671, 0.3203, 0.0201, 0.0000); 30 observations. Order of VAR = 1 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 48.8861 34.4000 31.7300 
r<=1 r=2 30.5021 28.2700 25.8000 
r<=2 r=3 18.2578 22.0400 19.8600 
r<=3 r=4 11.1974 15.8700 13.8100 
r<=4 r=5 0.5895 9.1600 7.5300 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 109.4328 75.9800 71.8100 
r<=1 r>=2 60.5467 53.4800 49.9500 
r<=2 r>=3 30.0446 34.8700 31.9300 
r<=3 r>=4 11.7869 20.1800 17.8800 
r<=4 r=5 0.58951 9.1600 7.5300 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 38.7604 3.7604 -20.1673 -3.7335 
r=1 63.2034 18.2034 -12.5607 8.5685 
r=2 78.4545 25.4545 -10.7789 14.1066 
r=3 87.5834 28.5834 -11.7519 15.9509 
r=4 93.1820 30.1820 -12.8878 16.6931 
r=5 93.4768 28.4768 -15.9603 14.5596 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables 
included 
in the 
cointegrating 
vector 
dy  pc  pi  g  T  Intercept 
Vector 1 0.2496 
[-1.0000] 
-1.9312 
[7.7362] 
0.3277 
[-1.3129] 
1.5775 
[-6.3193] 
-0.2499 
[1.0014] 
8.2703 
[-33.1294] 
Vector 2 -0.2314 
[-1.0000] 
0.9251 
[3.9974] 
-0.1794 
[-0.7752] 
1.4636 
[6.3241] 
-0.0867 
[-0.3747] 
-7.6991 
[-33.2676] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with restricted intercepts and 
no trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction(s) on cointegration vectors: A1=--1; 
A5=1.0014 B1=-1; B2=3.9974 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
7.7363    
(1.8003)*** 
-1.3129      
(0.37600)*** 
-6.3196 
(3.0426)*** 
1.0014 
(*None*) 
-33.1294 
(11.7575)*** 
Vector 2 -1.0000 
None 
3.9974 
None 
-0.7752 
(0.3313)*** 
6.3242 
(9.7633) 
-0.37471 
(1.2731) 
-33.2676 
(21.3049) 
Note:  The dummy variable D1 takes account of the sharp decline in the demand for real output which occurred in 
1976, and D2 takes account of  the sharp decline in the demand for real output in 1986. 
None indicates that there is no SE because the coefficient was restricted to identify the cointegrating vector. 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6.4B Johansen and Juselius cointegrating (JJ) tests with unrestricted intercepts and restricted 
trends in the VAR. Equation (1) Tgicy ppd 4321 αααα +++= . (Variables included in the 
cointegrating vector: dy , pc , pi , g ,T . Variables I (1) included in the VAR: gc . Variables I (0) 
included in the VAR: D1 and D2. 
Eigenvalues: (0.8646, 0.6830, 0.4621, 0.3128, 0.0638, 0.0000); 29 observations. Order of VAR = 2 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 57.9879 37.8600 35.0400 
r<=1 r=2 33.3208 31.7900 29.1300 
r<=2 r=3 17.9840 25.4200 23.1000 
r<=3 r=4 10.8817 19.2200 17.1800 
r<=4 r=5 1.9120 12.3900 10.5500 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 122.0864 87.1700 82.8800 
r<=1 r>=2 64.0984 63.0000 59.1600 
r<=2 r>=3 30.7777 42.3400 39.3400 
r<=3 r>=4 12.7937 25.7700 23.0800 
r<=4 r=5 1.9120 12.3900 10.5500 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 42.9739 2.9739 -24.3720 -5.5905 
r=1 71.9679 21.9679 -12.2145 11.2624 
r=2 88.6283 30.6283 -9.0233 18.2099 
r=3 97.6203 33.6203 -10.1332 19.9172 
r=4 103.0611 35.0611 -11.4269 20.5016 
r=5 104.0171 34.0171 -13.8383 19.0294 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating vector 
dy  pc  pi  g  T  Trend 
      Vector 1 0.5249 
[-1.0000] 
-2.0899 
[3.9809] 
0.2860 
[-.54493] 
1.9342 
[-3.6843] 
-0.2424 
[0.4617] 
-0.0328 
[0.0626] 
      Vector 2 -0.3592 
[-1.0000] 
-0.0867 
[-0.2413] 
0.0379 
[0.1057] 
1.128 
[3.1253] 
-0.1252 
[-0.3485] 
0.0355 
[0.0990] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and 
restricted trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration vectors: 
A1=-1; A3=0.1; B1=-1; B5=0.1 
Vector1  -1.0000    
None 
1.0000     
None 
-0.0855 
(0.1345) 
1.232 
(2.0582) 
-0.1103 
(0.2305) 
0.0883 
(0.0238) 
Vector 2 -1.0000    
None 
-0.2042 
(1.2103) 
0.1000 
None 
3.0655 
(3.6248) 
-0.3414 
(0.4329) 
0.0987 
(0.0327) 
Note:  None indicates that there is no SE because the coefficient was restricted to identify the cointegrating vector. 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6.4C ECM for variable dy estimated by OLS based on cointegration VAR (2) 
Dependent variable is dy  
Regressor Coefficient and t-ratio 
d pc 1 -0.9979 
(-2.4035)*** 
d pi 1 0.1690 
(1.8149)* 
d g 1 -2.8730 
(-1.6207) 
dT 1 -0.3549 
(-2.1853)*** 
)1(1 −ecm  -1.1081 
(-3.9597)*** 
adjustedR −2  0.4880 
DW 1.9071 
Serial correlation, LM(1) 0.0695 
F(9, 19) 3.9659 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 6.5A  Johansen and Juselius cointegrating tests with restricted intercepts and no trends in the 
VAR. Equation (2) psp wcycc 21 += . (Variables include in the cointegrating vector: 
pc , sy , 
pw . 
Eigenvalues: (0.5568, 0.3575, 0.1337, 0.0000); 30 observations. Order of VAR = 1 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 24.4150 25.4200 23.1000 
r<=1 r=2 13.2745 19.2200 17.1800 
r<=2 r=3 4.3083 12.3900 10.5500 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 41.9978 42.3400 39.3400 
r<=1 r>=2 17.5828 25.7700 23.0800 
r<=2 r>=3 4.3083 12.3900 10.5500 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 -9.9497 -12.9497 -15.0515 -13.6221 
r=1 2.2578 -6.7422 -13.0476 -8.7593 
r=2 8.8951 -4.1049 -13.2127 -7.0186 
r=3 11.0492 -3.9508 -14.4598 -7.3127 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating vector 
pc  sy  pw  Intercept 
 
Vector 1 -0.6074 
[-1.0000] 
0.2522 
[0.4152] 
0.1056 
[0.1739] 
1.9598 
[3.2261] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with restricted intercepts 
and no trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration vectors: 
A1=-1 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
0.4152 
(0.1513)*** 
0.1739 
(0.0600)*** 
3.2261 
(1.7085)* 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6.5B  Johansen and Juselius cointegrating tests with unrestricted intercepts and restricted 
trends in the VAR. Equation (2) psp wcycc 21 += . (Variables include in the cointegrating vector: 
pc , sy , pw  and Trend. 
Eigenvalues: (0.6430, 0.3982, 0.0888, 0.0000); 29 observations. Order of VAR = 1 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 31.5550 25.4200 23.1000 
r<=1 r=2 9.2609 19.2200 17.1800 
r<=2 r=3 0.0680 12.3900 10.5500 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 40.8839 42.3400 39.3400 
r<=1 r>=2 9.3289 25.7700 23.0800 
r<=2 r>=3 0.0680 12.3900 10.5500 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 10.2213 4.2213 0.0176 2.8765 
r=1 25.9988 13.9988 5.5916 11.3092 
r=2 30.6292 14.6292 3.4196 11.0432 
r=3 30.6632 12.6632 0.0524 8.6289 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating vector 
pc  sy  pw  Trend 
 
Vector 1 0.7286 
[-1.0000] 
-0.3001 
[0.4119] 
-0.1540 
[0.2114] 
0.051 
[-0.0700] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with unrestricted intercepts 
and restricted trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration 
vectors: A1=-1 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
0.4119 
     (0.1616)*** 
0.2114       
(0.1324) 
-0.00700      
(0.0150) 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 6.5C ECM for variable pc  estimated by OLS based on cointegration VAR (2) 
Dependent variable is d pc  
Regressor Coefficient and t-ratio 
d sy 1 -0.4933 
(-2.8256)*** 
d pw 1 0.2848 
(1.4917) 
)1(1 −ecm  -0.58114 
(-2.5996)*** 
adjustedR −2  0.2121 
DW 2.5859 
Serial correlation, LM(1) 10.0888 
F(3, 25) 3.5137 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6.6A  Johansen and Juselius cointegrating tests with restricted intercepts and no trends in the 
VAR. Equation (6) gsg iycg 321 βββ +−= . (Variables include in the cointegrating vector:, 
g , sy ,  gi , gc and Intercept. (Variables I (1) included in the VAR: gc Variables I (0) included in 
the VAR: D1) 
Eigenvalues: (0.8146, 0.65069, 0.4671, 0.3203, 0.0201, 0.0000); 29 observations. Order of VAR = 2 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 50.2672 25.5400 22.9800 
r<=1 r=2 19.1713 18.8800 16.7400 
r<=2 r=3 3.1708 12.4500 10.5000 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 72.6092 42.4000 39.1200 
r<=1 r>=2 22.3420 25.2300 22.7600 
r<=2 r=3 3.1708 12.4500 10.5000 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 22.7973 7.7973 -2.4574 4.5856 
r=1 47.9309 25.9309 10.8906 21.2205 
r=2 57.5165 30.5165 12.0580 24.7355 
r=3 59.1019 29.1019 8.5924 22.6786 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating vector 
g  gc  sy  gi  Intercept 
Vector 1 0.1805 
[-1.0000] 
0.23238 
[-1.2868] 
-0.1724 
(0.9551) 
-0.0372 
(0.2060) 
-1.0792 
(5.9758) 
Vector 2 3.6539 
[-1.0000] 
-0.2465 
[0.0674] 
-0.0375 
[0.0102] 
-0.0450 
[0.0123] 
-4.3458 
[1.1894] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with restricted intercepts 
and no trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration vectors: 
A1=-1; A2=0; B1=-1; B2=1.4139 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
(*None*) 
-1.2868 
(0.3163)*** 
0.9551 
(*None*) 
0.2060 
(0.1782) 
5.9756 
(2.7554)** 
Vector 2 -1.0000 
None 
0.00 
None 
0.0573 
(0.0265)** 
0.0219 
(0.0212) 
1.4279 
(0.2199)*** 
Note:  the dummy variable D1 to take account the sharp decline in the demand for real output which occurs in 
1976. 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 236 
Table 6.6B  Johansen and Juselius cointegrating tests with unrestricted intercepts and restricted 
trends in the VAR. Equation (6) gsg iycg 321 βββ +−= . (Variables include in the cointegrating 
vector:, g , sy ,  gi , gc and Trend. (Variables I (1) included in the VAR: gc Variables I (0) included 
in the VAR: D1) 
Eigenvalues: (0.8036, 0.5314, 0.1114, 0.0000, 0.0000); 29 observations. Order of VAR = 2 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 47.2107 28.7200 26.1000 
r<=1 r=2 21.9875 22.1600 19.7900 
r<=2 r=3 3.4274 15.4400 13.3100 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 72.6256 49.3600 46.0000 
r<=1 r>=2 25.4149 30.7700 27.9600 
r<=2 r=3 3.4274 15.4400 13.3100 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 24.9759 6.9759 -5.3297 3.1219 
r=1 48.5813 23.5813 6.4901 18.2285 
r=2 59.5750 29.5750 9.0656 23.1517 
r=3 61.2887 28.2887 5.7283 21.2231 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating vector 
g  gc  sy  gi  Trend 
Vector 1 -0.3389 
[-1.0000] 
0.0069 
[0.0204] 
-0.2837 
[-0.8370] 
0.2229 
[0.6578] 
-0.0051 
[-0.0151] 
Vector 2 3.2150 
[-1.0000] 
0.0598 
[-0.0186] 
-0.1424 
[0.0442] 
-0.1067 
[0.0332] 
0.0141 
[-0.0044] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with restricted intercepts 
and no trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration vectors: 
A1=-1; A2=-0.8370, B1=-1; B3=0 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
(*None*) 
0.0204 
(0.1406) 
-0.8370 
(*None*) 
0.6577 
(0.1313)*** 
-0.0151 
(0.0136) 
Vector 2 -1.0000 
None 
-0.0206 
(0.0309) 
0.0911 
(0.0416)** 
0.00 
None 
-0.0038 
(0.0028) 
Note:  the dummy variable D1 to take account the sharp decline in the demand for real output which occurs in 
1976. 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 6.6C ECM for variable g estimated by OLS based on cointegration VAR (2) 
Dependent variable is d g  
Regressor Coefficient and t-ratio 
d dy 1 -0.0038 
(-0.2548) 
d gi  0.8619 
(0.1598) 
)1(1 −ecm  -0.0953 
(-3.6870)*** 
D1 -0.1008 
(-3.7308)*** 
adjustedR −2  0.6285 
DW 2.2616 
Serial correlation, LM(1) 3.7174 
F(5, 23) 10.4768 
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Table 6.7A  Johansen and Juselius cointegrating tests with restricted intercepts and no trends in the 
VAR. Equation (7) )()( 21 pbapmabd &&&& −+−= . (Variables include in the cointegrating vector: 
bd , )( pm &&− , )( pb &&−  and Trend). Variables I (0) included in the VAR: D75). 
Eigenvalues: (0.5948, 0.5222, 0.3138, 0.00); 30 observations. Order of VAR = 1 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 26.4534 22.0400 19.8600 
r<=1 r=2 21.4573 15.8700 13.8100 
r<=2 r=3 5.4702 9.1600 7.5300 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 53.3809 34.8700 31.9300 
r<=1 r>=2 26.9275 20.1800 17.8800 
r<=2 r>=3 5.4702 9.1600 7.5300 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 -75.7653 -78.7653 -80.8671 -79.4377 
r=1 -62.5386 -71.5386 -77.8440 -73.5558 
r=2 -51.8100 -64.8100 -73.9178 -67.7237 
r=3 -49.0749 -64.0749 -74.5839 -67.4368 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating vector 
bd  )( pm &&−  )( pb &&−  Trend  
Vector 1 -0.1762 
[-1.0000] 
0.9395 
[5.3310] 
-0.0413 
[-0.2345] 
-0.1070 
[-0.6073] 
Vector 2 0.0565 
[-1.0000] 
-0.2393 
[4.2347] 
-0.1413 
[2.500] 
0.0305 
[-0.5398] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with unrestricted intercepts 
and restricted trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration 
vectors: A1=-1; A3=0; B1=-1; B2=4.2347 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
5.2370 
(1.8878)*** 
0.00 
None 
-0.6015 
(0.2254)*** 
Vector 2 -1.0000 
None 
4.2347 
None 
2.5000 
(18.1747) 
-0.5398 
(0.9358) 
Note: D75 is a dummy variable captured the structural changes in the civil war period 1975-1990 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6.7B  Johansen and Juselius cointegrating tests with unrestricted intercepts and restricted 
trends in the VAR. Equation (7) )()( 21 pbapmabd &&&& −+−= @ (Variables include in the 
cointegrating vector: bd , )( pm &&− , )( pb &&−  and Trend). Variables I (0) included in the VAR: D75). 
Eigenvalues: (0.5948, 0.5222, 0.3138, 0.00); 30 observations. Order of VAR = 1 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 27.1066 25.4200 23.1000 
r<=1 r=2 22.1597 19.2200 17.1800 
r<=2 r=3 11.2978 12.3900 10.5500 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 60.5641 42.3400 39.3400 
r<=1 r>=2 33.4575 25.7700 23.0800 
r<=2 r>=3 11.2978 12.3900 10.5500 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 -75.7426 -81.7426 -85.9462 -83.0874 
r=1 -62.1893 -74.1893 -82.5965 -76.8789 
r=2 -51.1095 -67.1095 -78.3191 -70.6955 
r=3 -45.4606 -63.4606 -76.0714 -67.4949 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating vector 
bd  )( pm &&−  )( pb &&−  Trend  
Vector 1 0.2554 
[-1.0000] 
-0.9252 
[3.6226] 
0.0207 
[-0.0813] 
0.0052 
[-0.0206] 
Vector 2 -0.1157 
[-1.0000] 
0.0620 
[0.5363] 
0.1462 
[1.2634] 
-0.0057 
[-0.0496] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with unrestricted intercepts and restricted 
trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration vectors: A1=-1; A3=0; B1=-1; 
B3=1.2634 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
3.4359 
(1.4917)** 
0.00 
(*None*) 
-0.0223 
(0.0159) 
Vector 2 -1.0000 
None 
0.5364 
(4.3494) 
1.2634 
None 
-0.0496 
(0.0442) 
Note: @ Consistent with the dynamic analysis the budget deficit is deflated using the inflation rate, p&, rather than 
the price level, p . In addition, m& and p&were calculated as the first difference between naperian log of the 
m  and p values respectively. These values were then used to calculate )( pm &&− . 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 6.7C ECM for variable  bd  estimated by OLS based on cointegration VAR (2) 
Dependent variable is d g  
Regressor Coefficient and t-ratio 
d )( pm &&− 1 -0.1859 
(-0.4702) 
d )( pb &&− 1 -0.0472 (-0.7498) 
)1(2 −ecm  -0.3006 
(-0.6995) 
D75 -0.1502 
(-0.8246) 
adjustedR −2  -0.1215 
DW 1.9731 
Serial correlation, LM(1) 0.0452 
F(6, 22) 0.4941 
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Table 6.8A  Johansen and Juselius cointegrating tests with restricted intercepts and no trends in the 
VAR. Equation (9) *)( 321 YypeT
d µµµ +−−= . (Variables include in the cointegrating vector: 
)( pe − , dy , *Y  and Trend. Variables I (1) included in the VAR: *Y  Variables I (0) included in 
the VAR: D1 and D2) 
Eigenvalues: (0.6209, 0.4455, 0.2125, 0.0000); 29 observations. Order of VAR = 2 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 28.1309 25.5400 22.9800 
r<=1 r=2 17.1032 18.8800 16.7400 
r<=2 r=3 6.9313 12.4500 10.5000 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 52.1654 42.4000 39.1200 
r<=1 r>=2 24.0345 25.2300 22.7600 
r<=2 r>=3 6.9313 12.4500 10.5000 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 1.8012 -16.1988 -28.5044 -20.0528 
r=1 15.8667 -9.1333 -26.2245 -14.4861 
r=2 24.4183 -5.5817 -26.0912 -12.0050 
r=3 27.8839 -5.1161 -27.6764 -12.1817 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating vector 
T  )( pe −  dy  *Y  Intercept 
Vector 1 -0.0956 
[-1.0000] 
0.7375 
[7.7099] 
0.0685 
[0.7164] 
2.7779 
[29.0408] 
-22.6036 
[-236.3027] 
Vector 2 0.1036 
[-1.0000] 
-0.1464 
[1.4139] 
-0.5111 
[4.9332] 
 
0.0343 
[-0.3313] 
3.9940 
[-38.5490] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegartion with restricted intercepts 
and no trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration vectors: 
A1=-1; A2=0; B1=-1; B2=1.4139 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
0.00 
None 
5.8802 
(17.1404) 
-6.9275 
(24.4465) 
5.8611 
(67.2246) 
Vector 2 -1.0000 
None 
1.4139 
None 
4.9332 
 (13.8841) 
-0.3313 
(19.8026) 
-38.5485 
(54.4444) 
Note:  the dummy variable D1 takes account of the sharp decline in the trade balance which occurs in 1976, and 
D2 takes account of the sharp increase in the trade balance during 1979-2000.           
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6.8B Johansen and Juselius cointegrating tests with unrestricted intercepts and restricted 
trends in the VAR. Equation (9) *)( 321 YypeT
d µµµ +−−= . (Variables included in the 
cointegrating vector: )( pe − , dy , *Y  and Trend. (Variables I (1) included in the VAR: *Y . 
Variables I (0) included in the VAR: D1 and D2) 
Eigenvalues: (0.8180, 0.5490, 0.2266, 0.0000); 30observations. Order of VAR = 2 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 49.4165 28.7200 26.1000 
r<=1 r=2 23.0935 22.1600 19.7900 
r<=2 r=3 7.4532 15.4400 13.3100 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 79.9631 49.3600 46.0000 
r<=1 r>=2 30.5467 30.7700 27.9600 
r<=2 r>=3 7.4532 15.4400 13.3100 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 4.0900 -16.9100 -31.2666 -21.4063 
r=1 28.7983 0.79825 -18.3439 -5.1968 
r=2 40.3450 7.3450 -15.2154 0.2793 
r=3 44.0716 8.0716 -16.5397 0.3636 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating vector 
T  )( pe −  dy  *Y  Trend 
Vector 1 -0.4503 
[-1.0000] 
0.6860 
[1.5233] 
0.1975 
[0.4385] 
0.1551 
[0.3445] 
0.0841 
[0.1867] 
Vector 2 -0.1282 
[-1.0000] 
-0.4366 
[-3.4050] 
0.2011 
[1.5685] 
-2.9208 
[-22.7785] 
0.0365 
[0.2849] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with unrestricted 
intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on 
cointegration vectors:A1=-1; A2=0; B1=-1; B4=0.3445 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
0.00 
None 
0.7878 
(0.7994) 
-6.8027 
(3.8849) 
0.2171 
(0.0884) 
Vector 2 -1.0000 
None 
1.5233 
(0.3565)*** 
0.4385 
(0.2673) 
0.3445 
(*None*) 
0.1867 
(0.0317)*** 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 6.8C ECM for variable  T  estimated by OLS based on cointegration VAR (2) 
Dependent variable is dT  
Regressor Coefficient and t-ratio 
d )( pe − 1 -0.6185 
(-1.3583) 
d dy 1 -0.2225 
(-1.0786) 
)1(1 −ecm  -1.3537 
(-3.7288)*** 
D1 1.5182 
(4.0438)*** 
D2 0.6795 
(3.6579)*** 
adjustedR −2  0.4748 
DW 1.8355 
Serial correlation, LM(1) 0.50 
F(5, 23) 6.0637 
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Table 6.9A Johansen and Juselius cointegrating tests with restricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR. 
Equation (10) rypm d 21 σσ −=− . (Variables included in the cointegration vector: pm − , 
dy , r ). 
 
Eigenvalues: (0.7266, 0.4176, 0.1206, 0.0000); 30 observations. Order of VAR = 1 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 38.9138 22.0400 19.8600 
r<=1 r=2 16.2195 15.8700 13.8100 
r<=2 r=3 3.8566 9.1600 7.5300 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 58.9899 34.8700 31.9300 
r<=1 r>=2 20.0761 20.1800 17.8800 
r<=2 r>=3 3.8566 9.1600 7.5300 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 -90.0970 -90.0970 -90.0970 -90.0970 
r=1 -70.6401 -76.6401 -80.8436 -77.9848 
r=2 -62.5303 -72.5303 -79.5363 -74.7716 
r=3 -60.6020 -72.6020 -81.0092 -75.2915 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating 
vector 
pm −  dy  r  Intercept 
 
Vector 1 -0.0250 
[-1.0000] 
-0.4246 
[-16.9686] 
-0.0029 
[-0.1163] 
3.6688 
[146.6080] 
Vector 2 -0.1270 
[-1.0000] 
-0.3419 
[-2.6910] 
-0.0263 
[-0.2077] 
3.6274 
[28.5460] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with restricted intercepts 
and no trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration vectors: 
A1=-1; A2=0; B1=-1; B2=0.22 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
0.0000 
None 
-0.2249 
(0.1360) 
6.2940 
(2.2570) 
Vector 2 -1.0000 
None 
0.2200 
None 
-0.2263 
  (0.1390) 
4.4748 
(2.3071)* 
 * significant at the 10% level 
 ** significant at the 5% level. 
 *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6.9B Johansen and Juselius cointegrating tests with unrestricted intercepts and restricted 
trends in the VAR. Equation (10) rypm d 21 σσ −=− . (Variables included in the cointegration 
vector: pm − , dy , r ). 
Eigenvalues: (0.7087, 0.4358, 0.2337, 0.0000); 30 observations. Order of VAR = 1 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 37.0040 25.4200 23.1000 
r<=1 r=2 17.1751 19.2200 17.1800 
r<=2 r=3 7.9878 12.3900 10.5500 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 62.1670 42.3400 39.3400 
r<=1 r>=2 25.1630 25.7700 23.0800 
r<=2 r>=3 7.9878 12.3900 10.5500 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 -88.5320 -91.5320 -93.6337 -92.2043 
r=1 -70.0299 -79.0299 -85.3353 -81.0471 
r=2 -61.4424 -74.4424 -83.5501 -77.3560 
r=3 -57.4484 -72.4484 -82.9574 -75.8104 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating vector 
pm −  dy  r  Trend 
 
Vector 1 -0.0607 
[-1.0000] 
-0.4712 
[-7.7538] 
-0.0046 
[-0.0772] 
-0.0025 
[-0.0411] 
Vector 2 0.3198 
[-1.0000] 
0.3745 
[-1.1708] 
0.0291 
[-0.0912] 
0.0170 
[-0.0532] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegartion with unrestricted 
intercepts and resricted trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on 
cointegration vectors: A1=-1; A2=0; B1=-1; B2=0.22 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
0.00 
None 
-0.0936 
(0.0518) 
-0.0554 
(0.0255) 
Vector 2 -1.0000 
None 
0.2200 
None 
-0.0941 
  (0.0543)* 
-0.0558 
(0.0270)** 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 6.9C ECM for variable pm −  estimated by OLS based on cointegration VAR (2) 
Dependent variable is d ( pm − ) 
Regressor Coefficient and t-ratio 
d dy 1 0.2803 
(2.6644)** 
d r 1 0.0084 
(1.0498) 
)1(1 −ecm  -0.2390 
(-1.7142)* 
adjustedR −2  0.5466 
DW 1.8587 
Serial correlation, LM(1) 0.546 
F(3, 25) 12.2532 
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Table 6.10 Johansen and Juselius cointegrating tests with restricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR. 
Equation (13) )()()()( 43
@
21 pbpmqkpefw
pp −Ω+−Ω++Ω+−+Ω=  (Variables 
included in the cointegration vector: pw , )( pef −+ , )( qk p + , )( pm − , )( pb − ).  
 
Eigenvalues: (0.7677, 0.5800, 0.3122, 0.2929, 0.1445, 0.0000); 29 observations. Order of VAR = 2 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 42.3393 34.4000 31.7300 
r<=1 r=2 25.1590 28.2700 25.8000 
r<=2 r=3 10.8558 22.0400 19.8600 
r<=3 r=4 10.0513 15.8700 13.8100 
r<=4 r=5 4.5272 9.1600 7.5300 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 92.9326 75.9800 71.8100 
r<=1 r>=2 50.5933 53.4800 49.9500 
r<=2 r>=3 25.4343 34.8700 31.9300 
r<=3 r=4 14.5785 20.1800 17.8800 
r<=4 r=5 4.5272 9.1600 7.5300 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 -20.1963 -45.1963 -62.2875 -50.5490 
r=1 0.9733 -34.0266 -57.9543 -41.5205 
r=2 13.5529 -29.4471 -58.8440 -38.6539 
r=3 18.9808 -30.0192 -63.5180 -40.5106 
r=4 24.0064 -28.9936 -65.2269 -40.3414 
r=5 26.2700 -28.7300 -66.3306 -40.5060 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables 
included 
in the 
cointegrating 
vector 
pw  )( pef −+  )( qk p +  )( pm −  )( pb −  Intercept 
Vector 1 -0.9715 
[-1.0000] 
0.6244 
[0.6427] 
0.2477 
[0.2549] 
0.6549 
[0.6741] 
-0.0549 
[-0.0565] 
0.8886 
[0.9146] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with restricted intercepts 
and no trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration vectors: 
A1=-1 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
0.6427 
(0.0992)*** 
0.2549 
(0.0717)*** 
0.6741 
(0.3122)*** 
-0.0565 
(0.0169)*** 
0.9146 
(1.8770) 
@ Tobin’s q  was set to unity, to reflect consistency with long run steady state. Data were available 
separately for the pw , f , e , p , pk , m , and b variables. However, total real private sector wealth 
was not a simple sum of the wealth components. The Ω  coefficients could have been estimated by the 
relative shares of the wealth components. It was decided that it was more appropriate to estimate the 
equation to obtain the Ω̂ . 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6.10B Johansen and Juselius cointegrating tests with unrestricted intercepts and restricted trends in the 
VAR. Equation (13) )()()()( 43
@
21 pbpmqkpefw
pp −Ω+−Ω++Ω+−+Ω=  (Variables 
included in the cointegration vector: pw , )( pef −+ , )( qk p + , )( pm − , )( pb − ).  
Eigenvalues: (0.7752, 0.5796, 0.4930, 0.3096, 0.2721, 0.0000); 29 observations. Order of VAR = 2 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 43.2858 37.8600 35.0400 
r<=1 r=2 25.1327 31.7900 29.1300 
r<=2 r=3 19.6991 25.4200 23.1000 
r<=3 r=4 10.7465 19.2200 17.1800 
r<=4 r=5 9.2114 12.3900 10.5500 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 108.0755 87.1700 82.8800 
r<=1 r>=2 64.7897 63.0000 59.1600 
r<=2 r>=3 39.6570 42.3400 39.3400 
r<=3 r=4 19.9579 25.7700 23.0800 
r<=4 r=5 9.2114 12.3900 10.5500 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 -18.0184 -48.0184 -68.5279 -54.4417 
r=1 3.6245 -36.3755 -63.7214 -54.4417 
r=2 16.1908 -31.8092 -64.6243 -42.0865 
r=3 26.0404 -27.9596 -64.8766 -39.5216 
r=4 31.4136 -26.5864 -66.2380 -39.0048 
r=5 36.0193 -23.9807 -64.9995 -36.8273 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating 
vector 
pw  )( pef −+  )( qk p +  )( pm −  )( pb −  Trend 
Vector 1 -1.0030 
[-1.0000] 
0.6166 
[0.6147] 
0.1389 
[0.1385] 
0.7891 
[0.7868] 
-0.0776 
[-0.0774] 
0.0232 
[0.0232] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with restricted intercepts and no 
trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration vectors: A1=-1 
Vector 1 1.0000 
None 
0.6147 
(0.0974)*** 
0.1385 
(0.1353) 
0.7868 
(0.3097)*** 
 
-0.0774 
(0.0263)*** 
0.0232 
(0.0229) 
 
Table 6.10C ECM for variable pw estimated by OLS based on cointegration VAR (2) 
Dependent variable is d pw  
Regressor Coefficient and t-ratio 
d )( pef −+ 1 -0.1695 
(-1.0366) 
d ( qk p + )1# 0.4108 (2.0368)* 
d )( pm − 1 -1.0507 
(-2.5997)** 
 d )( pb − 1 0.0100 
(0.2923) 
)1(1 −ecm  0.7557 
(3.4402)*** 
adjustedR −2  0.3251 
DW 1.7608 
Serial correlation, LM(1) 1.1848 
F(5, 23) 3.6986 
 # q =1 which is consistent with the long run equilibrium and inconsistent with the ECM. However, because 
we do not know the value of q  in the short run, because it may be greater or less than one, we will take the 
average of one. 
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Table 6.11A Johansen and Juselius cointegrating (JJ) tests with restricted intercepts and no trends in 
the VAR. Equation (14) ))(1(* 221 pefrTf −−−+= eee& . (Variables included in the 
cointegrating vector: f&, T , fr * , )( pe − ) 
Eigenvalues: (0.6783, 0.3548, 0.2703, 0.0000); 29 observations. Order of VAR = 2 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 32.8962 28.2700 25.8000 
r<=1 r=2 12.7077 22.0400 19.8600 
r<=2 r=3 9.1393 15.8700 13.8100 
r<=3 r=4 5.6670 9.1600 7.5300 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 60.4102 53.4800 49.9500 
r<=1 r>=2 27.5140 34.8700 31.9300 
r<=2 r>=3 14.8063 20.1800 17.8800 
r<=3 r>=4 5.6670 9.1600 7.5300 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 -130.4378 -146.4378 -157.3762 -149.8636 
r=1 -113.9897 -137.9897 -154.3973 -143.1284 
r=2 -107.6359 -137.6359 -158.1453 -144.0592 
r=3 -103.0662 -137.0662 -160.3103 -144.3460 
r=4 -100.2327 -136.2327 -160.8441 -143.9407 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating 
vector 
f& T  fr *  )( pe −  Intercept 
Vector 1 0.4516 
[-1.0000] 
-0.0957 
[0.2119] 
-0.0055 
[0.0121] 
-0.1904 
[0.4216] 
-0.5627 
[1.2460] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with restricted intercepts and 
no trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration vectors: A1=-1 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
0.2119 
(0.1959) 
0.0121 
(0.0038)*** 
0.4216 
(0.1305)*** 
1.2460 
(0.6115)** 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6.11B Johansen and Juselius cointegrating (JJ) tests with unrestricted intercepts and restricted 
trends in the VAR. Equation (14) ))(1(* 221 pefrTf −−−+= eee& . (Variables included in the 
cointegrating vector: f&, T , fr * , )( pe − ). 
Eigenvalues: (0.7033, 0.3594, 0.2364, 0.1280,  0.0000); 29 observations. Order of VAR = 2 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 35.2416 31.7900 29.1300 
r<=1 r=2 12.9162 25.4200 23.1000 
r<=2 r=3 7.8240 19.2200 17.1800 
r<=3 r=4 3.9749 12.3900 10.5500 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 59.9567 63.0000 59.1600 
r<=1 r>=2 24.7151 42.3400 39.3400 
r<=2 r>=3 11.7989 25.7700 23.0800 
r<=3 r>=4 3.9749 12.3900 10.5500 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 -124.9668 -144.9668 -158.6398 -149.2490 
r=1 -107.3460 -135.3460 -154.4881 -141.3411 
=2 -100.8879 -134.8879 -158.1319 -142.1676 
r=3 -96.9759 -134.9759 -160.9545 -143.1121 
r=4 -94.9885 -134.9885 -162.3344 -143.5529 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating 
vector 
f& T  fr *  )( pe −  Trend 
Vector 1 -0.7173 
[-1.0000] 
0.0266 
[0.0370] 
0.0041 
[0.0057] 
0.5225 
[0.7283] 
0.0295 
[0.0412] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with unrestricted intercepts 
and restricted trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration 
vectors: A1=-1 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
0.0370 
(0.1282) 
0.0057 
(0.0031) 
0.7283 
(0.1495) 
0.0412 
(0.0163) 
 
 
 
Table 6.11C ECM for variable f&estimated by OLS based on cointegration VAR (2) 
Dependent variable is f& 
Regressor Coefficient and t-ratio 
dT 1 -0.1521 
(-1.1499) 
d fr * 1 -0.0031 
(-1.0651) 
d )( pe − 1 1.1642 
(2.7270)** 
)1(1 −ecm  -0.8022 
(-2.3941)** 
adjustedR −2  0.2921 
DW 1.9212 
Serial correlation, LM(1) 0.593 
F(4, 24) 3.8890 
 * significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6.12 A Johansen and Juselius cointegrating tests with restricted intercepts and no trends in the 
VAR. Equation (15) ewp )1( δδ −+= . (Variables included in the cointegration vector: p , w , 
e ). 
Eigenvalues: (0.5854, 0.3584, 0.1127, 0.0000); 29 observations. Order of VAR = 2 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue tesr Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 25.5331 22.0400 19.8600 
r<=1 r=2 12.8734 15.8700 13.8100 
r<=2 r=3 3.4686 9.1600 7.8300 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 41.8752 34.8700 31.9300 
r<=1 r>=2 16.3420 20.1800 17.8800 
r<=2 r>=3 3.4686 9.1600 7.53 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 39.7352 30.7352 24.5823 28.8082 
r=1 52.5017 37.5017 27.2470 34.2901 
r=2 58.9384 39.9384 26.9491 35.8703 
r=3 60.6727 39.6727 25.3161 35.1764 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating vector 
p  w  e  Intercept 
Vector 1 2.0088 
[-1.0000] 
-2.0777 
[1.0343] 
-0.4338 
[0.2159] 
7.9608 
[-3.9630] 
 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with restricted intercepts 
and no trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration vectors: 
A1=-1 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
1.0343 
(0.0702)*** 
0.2159 
(0.0691)*** 
-3.9630 
(0.5409)*** 
 * significant at the 10% level 
 ** significant at the 5% level. 
 *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 6.12 B Johansen and Juselius cointegrating tests with unrestricted intercepts and restricted 
trends in the VAR. Equation (15) ewp )1( δδ −+= . (Variables included in the cointegration 
vector: p , w , e ). 
Eigenvalues: (0.6179, 0.4597, 0.2620, 0.0000); 29 observations. Order of VAR = 2 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue tesr Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 27.9062 25.4200 23.1000 
r<=1 r=2 17.8583 19.2200 17.1800 
r<=2 r=3 8.8107 12.3900 10.5500 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 54.5752 42.3400 39.3400 
r<=1 r>=2 26.6690 25.7700 23.0800 
r<=2 r>=3 8.8107 12.3900 10.5500 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 43.4682 31.4682 23.2644 28.8989 
r=1 57.4213 39.4213 27.1156 35.5673 
r=2 66.3505 44.3505 29.3102 39.6400 
r=3 70.7558 46.7558 30.3483 41.6172 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating vector 
p  w  e  Trend 
Vector 1 1.2399 
[-1.0000] 
-2.0181 
[1.6277] 
0.1695 
[-0.1367] 
0.0959 
[-0.0773] 
 
Vector 2 1.9680 
[-1.0000] 
-0.7211 
[0.3664] 
-1.2087 
[0.6141] 
-0.1703 
[0.0865] 
 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with unrestricted 
intercepts and restricted trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on 
cointegration vectors: A1=-1; A2=0; B1=-1; B2=0.3664 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
0.00 
None 
0.8323 
(0.0527) 
0.1342 
(0.0173) 
Vector 2 -1.0000 
None 
0.3664 
None 
0.6141 
(0.0398)*** 
0.0865 
(0.0131)*** 
 * significant at the 10% level 
 ** significant at the 5% level. 
 *** significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
Table 6.12C ECM for variable p  estimated by OLS based on cointegration VAR (2) 
Dependent variable is p  
Regressor Coefficient and t-ratio 
d w 1 0.3414 
(0.9015) 
d e 1 0.6698 
(1.9425)* 
)1(1 −ecm  -0.4107 
(-1.6419) 
adjustedR −2  0.5527 
DW 2.4253 
Serial correlation, LM(1) 0.156 
F(3, 25) 12.5348 
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Table 6.13A Johansen and Juselius cointegrating (JJ) tests with restricted intercepts and no trends in 
the VAR. Equation (17) )(321 PWkky
gps −−+= λλλ . (Variables included in the cointegrating 
vector: sy , pk , gk , )( PW − ). 
Eigenvalues: (0.7258, 0.3999, 0.3011, 0.2008, 0.0000); 30 observations. Order of VAR = 1 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 38.8202 28.2700 25.8000 
r<=1 r=2 15.3222 22.0400 19.8600 
r<=2 r=3 10.7494 15.8700 13.8100 
r<=3 r=4 6.7248 9.1600 7.5300 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 71.6166 53.4800 49.9500 
r<=1 r>=2 32.7964 34.8700 31.9300 
r<=2 r>=3 17.4742 20.1800 17.8800 
r<=3 r>=4 6.7248 9.1600 7.5300 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
r=0 -9.9723 -9.9723 -9.9723 -9.9723 
r=1 9.4378 1.4378 -4.1670 -0.3552 
r=2 17.0989 3.0989 -6.7094 -0.0388 
r=3 22.4736 4.4736 -8.1371 0.4393 
r=4 25.8360 5.8360 -8.1759 1.3535 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating 
vector 
sy  pk  gk  )( PW −  Intercept 
Vector 1 -2.2278 
[-1.0000] 
0.3020 
[1.3257] 
-0.0797 
[-0.3502] 
-0.0153 
[-0.0674] 
-0.1873 
[-0.8224] 
 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with restricted intercepts and no trends 
in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration vectors: A1=-1 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
1.3257 
(0.8362) 
-0.3502 
(0.3851) 
-0.0674 
(0.2479) 
-0.8224 
(4.3931) 
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Table 6.13B Johansen and Juselius cointegrating (JJ) tests with unrestricted intercepts and restricted 
trends in the VAR. Equation (17) )(321 PWkky
gps −−+= λλλ . (Variables included in the 
cointegrating vector: sy , pk , gk , )( PW − ). 
Eigenvalues: (0.7442, 0.4309, 0.3090, 0.1584, 0.0000); 30 observations. Order of VAR = 1 
A-Johansen maximum likelihood maximal eigenvalue tesr Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r=1 40.9111 31.7900 29.1300 
r<=1 r=2 16.9144 25.4200 23.1000 
r<=2 r=3 11.0909 19.2200 17.1800 
r<=3 r=4 5.1754 12.3900 10.5500 
B-Johansen maximum likelihood trace test Critical Values 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% 90% 
r=0 r>=1 74.0918 63.0000 59.1600 
r<=1 r>=2 33.1807 42.3400 39.3400 
r<=2 r>=3 16.2663 25.7700 23.0800 
r<=3 r>=4 5.1754 12.3900 10.5500 
C- Choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria 
Rank Maximized LL AIC SBC HQC 
R=0 -3.2206 -7.2206 -10.0230 -8.1171 
R=1 17.2350 5.2350 -3.1722 2.5454 
R=2 25.6922 7.6922 -4.9186 3.6579 
R=3 31.2376 9.2376 -6.1756 4.3068 
R=4 33.8253 9.8253 -6.9890 4.4463 
 
D- Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation (Normalised in Brackets) 
Variables included 
in the cointegrating 
vector 
sy  pk  gk  )( PW −  Trend 
Vector 1 -0.4728 
[-1.0000] 
0.2590 
[0.5478] 
0.1116 
[0.2360] 
-0.4397 
[-0.9298] 
-0.0414 
[-0.0875] 
E- ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restrictions (s)- cointegration with unrestricted intercepts 
and restricted trends in the VAR - (SEs in brackets)- List of imposed restriction (s) on cointegration 
vectors: A1=1 
Vector 1 -1.0000 
None 
0.5478 
(0.3130)* 
0.2360 
(0.1668) 
-0.9298 
(0.2929)*** 
-0.0875 
(0.0233)*** 
* significant at the 10% level 
** significant at the 5% level. 
*** significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 6.13C ECM for variable sy  estimated by OLS based on cointegration VAR (2) 
Dependent variable is sy  
Regressor Coefficient and t-ratio 
d pk 1 0.2744 
(0.6792) 
d gk 1 -0.5644 
(-1.3328) 
d )( PW − 1 0.1675 
(0.4113) 
)1(1 −ecm  0.8427 
(2.3727)** 
adjustedR −2  0.1751 
DW 2.1872 
Serial correlation, LM(1) 0.206 
F(4, 24) 2.4868 
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Chapter 7  
Simulation and Policy Analysis 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 The macroeconomic model developed in Chapter 5, and estimated in Chapter 6, is 
now used to analyse alternative government policy responses to the fiscal crisis in Lebanon, 
and the potential effects upon the macroeconomy arising from these policy responses. This 
is conducted by means of a numerical simulation analysis. The analysis will enable a 
rigorous comparison of the effects from alternative policy options arising from fiscal 
related shocks, in order to improve the macroeconomic performance in Lebanon.  In the 
case of Lebanon such an approach to policy analysis has never been conducted, and hence 
this research makes a major contribution to the literature. 
It is impossible to derive analytically unambiguous conclusions for the steady-state 
and dynamic properties of the macroeconomic model. As a consequence the steady state 
and dynamic properties of the model will be obtained by means of a numerical simulation 
procedure81. 
This chapter will be divided into 5 sections. Section 7.2 describes the dynamic 
stability properties of the model. The simulation analysis is conducted in Section 7.3, 
analysing the macroeconomic consequences arising from three exogenous shocks. First, an 
increase in government investment expenditure (capital expenditure) for two cases 
(unanticipated/and gradual increase) and assuming that the budget deficit is financed 
through a temporary increase in the monetary growth rate, and through bond financing as 
well (bond financing is assumed to be endogenously determined). Second, an increase in 
government consumption expenditure for two cases (unanticipated/ and gradual increase); 
and third the government’s actual policy approach to deal with the budget deficit and 
financial crisis in Lebanon. The policies, or government plan, to deal with the crisis, as 
assumed in this study are: 1. tightening fiscal policy by reducing public capital expenditure 
                                                 
81 The numerical algorithm utilised is known as ‘Saddlepoint’. This was developed by Austin and Buiter 
(1982) for solving systems of linear differential equations with constant coefficients, and is based upon 
the solution provided by Blanchard and Khan (1980) for the case of systems of linear difference 
equations. 
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as well as government consumption expenditure for two cases (unanticipated/ and gradual 
decline). 2. an expansionary monetary policy by assuming an instantaneous and 
unanticipated increase in the monetary growth rate. 3. increasing government revenues 
through an increase in taxes. This study will also simulate the separate impact from each of 
these government policies (such as reduce public capital expenditure; reduced consumption 
expenditure; and an increase in the money) for the two presumed cases (unanticipated and 
gradual), to identify the contribution of each of these to the overall effect. The analysis will 
focus upon the adjustment of six key macroeconomic variables which are: the real 
exchange rate, foreign asset stocks, private capital stock, public capital stock, aggregate 
supply, the trade balance, and the q ratio. These key variables were chosen because they 
indicate the role of capital formation, aggregate supply and the balance of payments 
position. Private capital stock )( pk  and the q ratio are major drivers of economic growth 
since they reflect the demand side conditions of capital formation and the supply side 
effects via the production function. The foreign assets stocks )( f , the real exchange rate 
)(c  and the trade balance are important indicators of external developments. Key policy 
implications derived from the simulation analysis will be discussed in section 7.4. The main 
conclusions are summarised in section 7.5. 
 
7.2 Dynamic Stability of the Model 
 There is only one unique dynamic saddlepath adjustment consistent with the 
underlying behavioural assumptions of the model. The stable saddlepath ultimately takes 
the system to a new equilibrium steady state. The macroeconomic model developed in 
Chapter 5 assumes that economic agents possess rational expectations (forward looking). 
This type of model is characterised by a stable saddlepath property, hence long run 
equilibrium can only be achieved if the economy is on the relevant stable saddlepath. The 
model has to exhibit properties that are consistent with the underlying behavioural 
assumptions of it. The dynamic equations of the model consist of a set of dynamic 
endogenous control variables, namely real money balances )(l , foreign assets stocks )( f , 
private capital stock )( pk , public capital stock )( gk , Tobin’s q )(q  and the real exchange 
rate )(c . Tobin’s q and the real exchange rate are assumed to be jump variables, they make 
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discrete jumps, arising from exogenous shocks in order to put the economy on its unique 
new stable saddlepath, which will then take the economy to its long-run steady state.  
 The macroeconomic model operates under the assumptions of a flexible exchange 
rate and perfect capital mobility. The two jump variables, Tobin’s q and the nominal 
exchange rate, are perfectly flexible and capable of adjusting on impact in order to maintain 
financial market equilibrium. In addition, the model assumes that financial markets clear 
instantaneously while non financial markets clear gradually and hence will be in 
disequilibrium during the adjustment process. 
The macroeconomic model developed in this study can be written as a linear 
approximation of deviations around its equilibrium solution: 
BzAxx += '&   
where z is a vector of exogenous variables, 'x  represents the deviation of x  around its 
equilibrium value, and x& is its time derivative. A and B represent parameter matrices. 
The stability of the model depends upon the properties of the ‘state’ matrix (A). 
Stability of the model depends upon the determinant of matrix A being a particular sign. 
The determinant of A gives the product of the roots of the system. The long run 
macroeconomic model developed in this study with six endogenous control variables, will 
produce six roots, two (Tobin’s q, and the nominal exchange rate) of the six control 
variables are jump variables and will be associated with positive characteristic roots that 
impart instability into the system. Hence the determinant of A must be positive. The 
remainder of the dynamic control variables are non-jump variables which are associated 
with negative characteristic roots that impart stability to the system. These conditions are 
satisfied for the simulation results, which will be presented. 
Analysis of the mathematical solution for solving the saddlepath in rational 
expectations models is presented in Appendix 7.1 at the end of this chapter, as is a 
technical analysis of steady state equilibrium and the dynamic stability of the model. 
 
7.3 Simulation Results 
As previously indicated the analysis of the steady state and dynamic properties of 
the model is calibrated through the use of the numerical values of the parameters of the 
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model. The parameter values utilised are those obtained from the estimation procedure 
conducted in Chapter 6 (FIML approach, and ECM techniques), as well as those imposed 
due to data limitations or in order to ensure model stability. 
The parameter values used are those reported in Table 7.182. Three scenarios arising 
from exogenous shocks and their impact upon six macroeconomic variables are presented 
in this section.  
The results of each shock upon the adjustment of key macroeconomic variables are 
presented in Figures 7.1 to 7.3. The horizontal axis contains the time period and the 
vertical axis indicates the percentage deviation of that variable from baseline, its initial 
value. Each diagram is divided into four adjustment periods. The impact period occurs 
immediately on the occurrence of the exogenous shocks. The short run period, which is 
assumed to occur over a period of two years83, the medium run period is assumed to occur 
from two to four years and the long run period is assumed to occur from four years 
onwards until steady state is achieved. 
 
Table 7.1 Estimated and Imposed Parameters for the Simulations 
Equation Parameters LR estimated 
coefficients 
(1) 
SR 
estimated 
coefficients 
(2) 
Confidence intervals Chosen 
parameter 
from (1) 
or (2)  
Chosen/ 
imposed 
parameters 
Sources for 
imposed 
parameters 
(1) 
4
3
2
1
α
α
α
α
 
1.0000 
 
-0.0855 
 
1.2320 
 
-0.1103 
-0.9979 
 
0.1690 
 
-2.8730 
 
-0.3549 
 
 
-0.3632 
 
-3.1249 
 
-0.5862 
 
 
0.1920 
 
5.3713 
 
0.3655 
1 
 
0.1 
 
1 
 
0.1 
  
(2) 
2
1
c
c
 
0.4152 
 
0.1739 
-0.4933 
 
0.2848 
0.1047 
 
0.0506 
0.7257 
 
0.2972 
0.4 
 
0.2 
  
(3) η       0.7 * 
(5) ψ       0.7 * 
(6) 
3
2
1
β
β
β
 
0.0204 
 
-0.8370 
 
0.6577 
 
 
-0.0038 
 
0.8619 
-0.2640 
 
-3.8170 
 
-1.5274 
0.3048 
 
2.1429 
 
2.8430 
0.02 
 
0.8 
 
0.6 
  
(7) 
2
1
a
a
 
0.5364 
 
1.2634 
-0.1859 
 
-0.0472 
-0.9989 
 
-0.6024 
0.6270 
 
0.0823 
0.2 
 
0.1 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 Parameters were selected from within the confidence intervals of the estimated coefficients. Some 
parameters had to be adjusted in order to calibrate the model. 
83 Assumed here to be equivalent to 8 time periods – each time period assumed to be a quarter of a year. 
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Table 7.1 Continued 
Equation Parameters LR estimated 
coefficients 
(1) 
SR 
estimated 
coefficients 
(2) 
Confidence intervals Chosen 
parameter 
from (1) 
or (2)  
Chosen/ 
imposed 
parameters 
Sources for 
imposed 
parameters 
(8) τ       0.8 @ 
(9) 
3
2
1
µ
µ
µ
 
1.5233 
 
0.4385 
 
0.3445 
-0.6185 
 
-0.2225 
 
 
0.7889 
 
-0.1122 
2.2576 
 
0.9893 
0.6 
 
0.4 
 
0.4 
  
(10) 
2
1
σ
σ
 
0.2200 
 
-0.2263 
0.2803 
 
0.0084 
 
 
 
 
-0.5116 
 
 
0.0590 
0.2 
 
0.2 
  
(11) 
3
2
1
γ
γ
γ
 
     0.5 
 
0.5 
 
0.5 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
(12) 
3
2
1
δ
δ
δ
 
     0.5 
 
0.5 
 
0.5 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
(13) 
4
3
2
1
Ω
Ω
Ω
Ω
 
0.6427 
 
0.2549 
 
0.6741 
 
-0.0565 
-0.1695 
 
0.4108 
 
-1.0507 
 
0.0100 
0.4380 
 
0.1067 
 
0.0297 
 
-0.0913 
0.8474 
 
0.4030 
 
1.3184 
 
-0.0216 
0.7 
 
 
 
0.6 
 
0.1 
 
 
0.6 
 
 
 
 
@ 
 
 
 
(14) 
2
1
ε
ε
 
0.2119 
 
0.5784 
-0.1521 
 
-0.0031 
-0.1917 
 
0.1527 
0.6156 
 
0.6904 
0.2 
 
0.6 
  
(15) δ  0.3664 0.3414 -0.4372 1.1200 0.4   
(16) 
2
1
φ
φ
 
     0.7 
 
1.0 
* 
 
* 
(17) 
3
2
1
λ
λ
λ
 
0.5478 
 
0.2360 
 
-0.9298 
0.2744 
 
-0.5644 
 
0.1675 
-0.3525 
 
-0.1070 
 
-1.5280 
1.1914 
 
0.5790 
 
-0.3276 
0.2 
 
0.2 
 
0.2 
  
Note: (1) Estimated coefficients obtained from Chapter 6 by using FIML approach. 
 (2) Estimated coefficients obtained from Chapter 6 by using ECM. 
* Harvie and Kearney (1996). 
@ Author’s calculation; LR long run; SR short run 
 
7.3.1 Simulation Results Arising from an Expansion in Public Capital Expenditure 
 The purpose of this section is to analyse the effects of an expansion in capital 
expenditure on the Lebanese macroeconomy, for two cases: 
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Case 1. An instantaneous and unanticipated increase in public capital expenditure 
by 3%, which occurs immediately in the impact period (0’). 
Case 2. A gradual increase in public capital expenditure. The presumed increase in 
public capital expenditure is that of a 1% increase from its baseline on impact, then it is 
assumed to increase to 2% from its baseline in period 8 (the end of the short run period), 
and then an increase to 3% from baseline in period 12. 
In both cases it is assumed that the budget deficit in Lebanon is financed partly 
through a temporary increase in the monetary growth rate by 2% (monetary growth is 
assumed to rise to 2% on impact, and then gradually declines and ends in period 12), and 
through an endogenous expansions of bonds.  
The results of both cases are presented in Figure 7.1. All results for each variable 
are expressed as percentage deviations from their baseline values. Table 7.2 summarises the 
steady state properties of each variable under consideration in percentage deviation terms 
from their initial base values. 
 
 
Table 7.2 Steady State Results: Expansion in Public Capital Stock (Case 1 and Case 
2) 
(percentage deviation from base value) 
 Variables 
 f  pk  q  c  sy  t  
Instantaneous impact 
Case 1 
Case 2 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
29.7808 
20.3136 
 
10.9511 
15.7174 
 
1.3141 
1.8861 
 
1.6427 
2.3577 
Short run impact 
Case 1 
Case 2 
 
4.1617 
2.7746 
 
-2.2592 
3.8889 
 
-3.7456 
-2.048 
 
2.6177 
1.0435 
 
0.46 
1.1022 
 
0.3927 
0.1566 
Medium run impact 
Case 1 
Case 2 
 
3.3425 
3.4284 
 
1.7969 
2.5851 
 
0.0652 
-0.9778 
 
0.3079 
0.1886 
 
0.9963 
1.1267 
 
0.0462 
0.0283 
Long run impact 
Case 1 
Case 2 
 
3.4173 
3.4173 
 
0.6752 
0.6752 
 
0 
0 
 
0.7886 
0.7886 
 
0.8297 
0.8297 
 
0.1183 
0.1183 
 
As indicated in Table 7.2 both cases produce identical effects in the long run steady 
state. Only during the adjustment process are these effects quite different in terms of 
magnitude. However, the major long run benefits from such a policy is that the private 
capital stock increases by 0.68% from base value, indicating that there is a crowding in 
effect. Hence aggregate supply/demand rises by 0.83% from its baseline. The trade balance 
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improves by 0.12% due to the depreciation in the real exchange rate, which improves net 
exports. Furthermore, there is no long run effect on the nominal interest rate and the rate 
of inflation (not shown here) because there is no sustained increase in the growth rate of 
the money supply. This is due to the fact that the monetary growth rate is assumed to stop 
in period 12, and thereafter it is assumed that there is only bond financing with no 
monetary accommodation.  
 In addition to the overall effects, it is also important to identify the adjustment 
process towards long run steady state. As previously indicated, and as shown in Figure 7.1, 
the explanation of the simulation results is divided into four periods. 
 The effects, on impact, in these two cases are very similar in direction with only a 
slight difference in terms of magnitude. The instantaneous impact effect of an increase in 
public capital expenditure is felt immediately in asset markets, where the q ratio, the 
nominal interest rate, and nominal exchange rate (not shown here), are the relevant 
variables. The q ratio immediately increases in both cases from its base value, consistent 
with an increase in equity prices and hence an increase in the market valuation of the 
capital stock in relation to its replacement value, and consequently also increasing the 
market value of private companies. Aggregate demand immediately increases, resulting 
from the increase in public sector investment. Aggregate supply also increases in both cases 
with a larger magnitude in case 2. However, this increase is as a result of the increase in 
public capital spending in line with an increase in the monetary growth rate in financing the 
budget deficit. The inflation rate in both cases (not shown here) declines on impact, 
because the initial increase in aggregate supply is greater than the increase in aggregate 
demand. The interest rate declines as well in both cases consistent with expectations of an 
exchange rate appreciation and as a result of the increase in the monetary growth rate in 
financing the deficit. The real exchange rate depreciates on impact contributing to an 
improvement in the trade balance in both cases, with a larger magnitude in case 2, with 
foreign asset stocks remaining initially unchanged. 
During the short run period, developments in some variables under consideration 
are different in magnitude and in direction from one case to the other. The magnitudes of 
adjustment of the private capital stock and aggregate supply in case 2 are larger and less 
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volatile than in case 1. The initial rise in q has a positive impact on private sector 
investment, resulting in a big accumulation in private capital stock in both cases. The 
increase in public spending stimulates aggregate demand for output and also for money, 
with the latter pushing up the interest rate. Hence aggregate supply increases in both cases 
throughout the short run period with a larger magnitude in case 1. The increase in public 
investment spending stimulates aggregate demand, while the consequential impact of this 
on the public capital stock directly stimulates aggregate supply. It also indirectly improves 
aggregate supply through the increase in real profit on capital services. Because the increase 
in aggregate demand is more than aggregate supply, in addition to financing the deficit 
through monetary growth, the rate of inflation in both cases is pushed up towards the 
baseline after an initial downturn. However, by the end of the short run period aggregate 
supply declines from its initial increase but it is still above the baseline and by a larger 
magnitude in case 2 (1.1%). This is due to a further increase in the public capital stock, 
which occurs in period 8 (end of the short run period). The private capital stock by the end 
of the short run period slightly deteriorates in case 1, due to the deterioration in the q ratio, 
but in case 2 the private capital stock is still above the base line as a result of a further 
increase in the public capital stock in period 8. In terms of external developments the real 
exchange rate in both cases appreciates after its initial depreciation, in line with a large 
deterioration in the trade balance. But then the trade balance and the foreign asset stock in 
both cases improve as a result of a subsequent depreciation in the real exchange rate 
towards the end of the short run period. By the end of the short run period both the rate 
of interest and the rate of inflation decline towards the baseline, due to the decline in 
aggregate supply and to the smaller increase in monetary growth which occurs in period 8.  
Over the medium run the magnitudes of adjustment for the private capital stock 
and aggregate supply in case 2 are smaller and less volatile than in case 1. The q ratio 
slightly increases from baseline in case 1 (slightly declines in case 2) encouraging private 
sector investment, and contributes to an increase in the private capital stock to 2.6% above 
baseline in case 2 and 1.8% above baseline in case 1 towards the end of this period. Private 
sector investment contributes to a further increase in capital stock, which favourably affects 
both aggregate demand and supply. This period is characterised by falling inflation due to 
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the assumption that the monetary growth in financing the deficit in period 12 comes to an 
end, while maintaining the assumption that the deficit is financed through an endogenous 
expansion of bonds. External developments during this period suggest an appreciation in 
the real exchange rate (Table 7.2), and this contributes to a slight deterioration in the trade 
balance as well as current account balances in case 1 as reflected in the fall in the stock of 
foreign assets; the current account balance improves in case 2 throughout as reflected in 
the rise in the stock of foreign assets (Table 7.2). 
Over the long run to ultimate steady state the q ratio and real profit fall in case 1 
but rise in case 2 to steady state, and eventually return to their base level. Aggregate supply 
and the private capital stock decrease to their long run steady state (still above their 
baseline), with a slightly larger magnitude in case 2. Inflation and the nominal interest rate 
decline to steady state, having then returned to their base level. In terms of external 
developments the real exchange rate continues to depreciate and improve the trade 
balance; and foreign asset stocks rise slightly only in case 1. In case 2 foreign asset stocks 
decline very slightly. 
 
 
7.3.2 Simulation Results Arising from an Expansion in Government Consumption 
Expenditure 
 This subsection will examine the effects of an expansion in government 
consumption expenditure on key Lebanese macroeconomic variables, by assuming the 
same cases as for the previous expansion in public capital expenditure. In both cases it is 
also assumed that the budget deficit in Lebanon is financed through a temporary increase 
in the monetary growth rate and through bond financing. 
The simulation results in both cases are reported in Figure 7.2. Table 7.3 reports 
the steady state properties of the six variables under consideration, as percentage deviations 
from their initial values. 
As shown in Table 7.3, both cases have the same effects in long run steady state. 
The only difference occurs during the adjustment process. In this simulation scenario the 
effects in the two cases are very similar in terms of direction, with only slight differences in 
magnitude. However, the major long run benefits (as shown in Table 7.3) from such a 
policy is that the private capital stock increases by 0.37% from its base value, hence 
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aggregate supply/demand increases by 0.06% from its baseline. As shown in this Table the 
trade balance deteriorates by 0.01% due to the appreciation in the real exchange rate, which 
worsens net exports. Foreign asset stocks also fall by 0.33% from baseline indicating 
deficits in the current account balance towards the end of the adjustment process. 
However, there is no long run effect on the nominal interest rate, the rate of inflation and 
the q ratio. This result is due to the assumption that the monetary growth rate ends in 
period 12, and hence thereafter it is assumed that there is only bond financing with no 
monetary accommodation. 
 
Table 7.3 Steady State Results: Expansion in Government Consumption 
Expenditure (Case 1 and Case 2) 
 (Percentage deviation from the base value) 
 Variables 
 f  pk  q  c  sy  t  
Instantaneous impact 
Case 1 
Case 2 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
10.6974 
8.9031 
 
18.6234 
14.7496 
 
2.2348 
1.7699 
 
2.7935 
2.2125 
Short run impact 
Case 1 
Case 2 
 
-0.2347 
-0.1993 
 
0.4613 
-0.2581 
 
-0.2923 
-0.2295 
 
-0.0983 
0.0158 
 
0.0804 
-0.0498 
 
-0.0147 
0.0024 
Medium run impact 
Case 1 
Case 2 
 
-0.3271 
-0.3368 
 
0.3492 
0.4225 
 
-0.0029 
0.0361 
 
-0.0677 
-0.1049 
 
0.0617 
0.0719 
 
-0.0101 
-0.0157 
Long run impact 
Case 1 
Case 2 
 
-0.3286 
-0.3286 
 
0.3677 
0.3677 
 
0 
0 
 
-0.0759 
-0.0759 
 
0.0644 
0.0644 
 
-0.0113 
-0.0113 
  
The effects (on impact) in these two cases, as shown in Table 7.3, are very similar in 
terms of direction, with only slight differences in magnitude. The effects of such a policy in 
both cases is to have a positive impact on the q ratio, consistent with an increase in equity 
prices and therefore an increase in the market valuation of the capital stock in relation to its 
replacement value, and consequently also increasing the market value of private companies. 
Hence aggregate supply increases on impact by 2.2% in case 1 (1.8% in case 2) as a result 
of the increase in government consumption expenditure. This increase in aggregate supply 
has a positive impact on aggregate demand. The increased government consumption 
expenditure contributes to an increase in aggregate demand. The nominal interest rate 
declines in both cases because of the increase in the monetary growth rate in financing the 
deficit. The interest rate (not shown here) declines on impact, consistent with expectations 
of an exchange rate appreciation. The trade balance improves in both cases with a larger 
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magnitude in case 1, in line with the larger depreciation of the real exchange rate, with 
foreign asset stocks unchanged. 
During the short run period the expansionary fiscal policy (expansion in 
government consumption expenditure) gradually affects the product market. However, 
developments in some variables under consideration appear to be different in magnitude 
and in direction from one case to the other. As shown in Figure 7.2, during the first year of 
the short run period the increase in the q ratio pushes up private sector investment 
resulting in an accumulation of private capital stock; aggregate supply also increases. 
Furthermore the rate of inflation in both cases is pushed up, and is due to the eventual 
change in government expenditure in addition to financing the deficit through monetary 
accommodation. The interest rate is higher as well during the first year of the short run 
period as a result of the increase in public spending, consistent with its  funding through 
bond sales; this increase in public spending stimulates aggregate demand for output and for 
money. In terms of external developments the real exchange rate in case 1 appreciates 
during most of the short run period, resulting in a slight deterioration in the trade balance, 
but in case 2 the trade balance slightly improves towards the end of the short run period 
due to the depreciation in the real exchange rate which occurs in the second year of the 
short run period. However, by the end of the short run period aggregate supply declines 
from its initial increase, but it is still above the baseline in case 1 (with a slight decline from 
base line in case 2). The private capital stock declines from its initial increase but it is still 
above the base line by the end of the short run period (0.46%), but in case 2, despite a 
further increase in government consumption expenditure which occurs in period 8, the 
private capital stock deteriorates slightly from the baseline due to the deterioration in the q 
ratio resulting in a decumulation in the private capital stock. The trade balance in case 2 
slightly improves by the end of the short run period, due to the depreciation in the real 
exchange rate. In case 1 the trade balance slightly deteriorates by the end of the short run 
period as a result of an overall appreciation in the real exchange rate. The rate of interest 
declines towards its base value as a result of a smaller increase in monetary growth which 
occurs in period 8. The rate of inflation declines as well from its increase towards the base 
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line, and this is due to the decline in aggregate supply which occurs during the end of the 
short run period. 
Over the medium run the magnitudes of adjustment for the private capital stock 
and aggregate supply in case 2 are larger and less volatile than in case 1. This is due to a 
further increase in government consumption expenditure, which takes place in period 8 
and contributes to an increase in both the private capital stock and aggregate supply. The q 
ratio slightly increases from the base line in case 2 (slightly declines in case 1) encouraging 
private sector investment, and contributes to an increase in both the private capital stock 
and aggregate supply. This increase in case 2 is due to the fact that there is another increase 
in government consumption expenditure, which takes place in period 12 and this further 
stimulates aggregate demand. Despite the slight decline in the q ratio aggregate supply and 
the private capital stock increase in the second year of the medium run period. This period 
is characterised by falling inflation due to the assumption that the monetary growth in 
financing the deficit in period 12 comes to an end while maintaining the assumption that 
the deficit is financed through an endogenous expansion of bonds. External developments 
suggest a continual appreciation in the real exchange rate in case 2 but deterioration in case 
1 and a worsening in the trade balance in case 2 but very slight improvement in case 1, in 
line with a deterioration in foreign assets stocks as a result of current account deficits. 
Over the long run period to ultimate steady state the q ratio slightly rises to steady 
state in case 1, but declines in case 2 and returns to its base level. The private capital stock 
and aggregate supply increase to their long run steady state. The nominal interest rate and 
the rate of inflation return to steady state and to their base level, due to aggregate demand 
catching up with aggregate supply. In terms of external developments, the real exchange 
rate appreciates slightly to steady state in case 1 and depreciates in case 2. This 
development occurs in line with a slight deterioration in the trade balance to the steady 
state in case 1, while slightly improving in case 2. Foreign asset stocks deteriorate slightly to 
steady state in case 1, but in case 2 they slightly increase. 
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7.3.3 Simulation Results Arising from the Lebanese Government’s Approach to 
Dealing with the Financial Crisis 
 This scenario, which is importantly distinct from the previous two shocks, focuses 
upon the Lebanese government’s policy approach in response to the development of the 
financial crisis in Lebanon. The policies, or government plan, to deal with this crisis, as 
assumed here, are as follows. 
First, tightening fiscal policy by reducing public capital expenditure as well as 
government consumption expenditure by assuming a 3%84 decline. This reduction could 
occur by assuming two cases: case 1 - an instantaneous and unanticipated decline in capital 
expenditure as well as government consumption expenditure which occurs immediately in 
the impact period; case 2 – a gradual decline in these expenditures (1% decline from its 
baseline on impact, then a further decline by 2% from baseline in period 8, and then a 3% 
decline from baseline in period 12. 
 Second, an expansionary monetary policy by assuming an instantaneous and 
unanticipated increase in the monetary growth rate by 3% (case 1), as well as gradual 
increase in the monetary growth rate (case 2). The presumed increase in the monetary 
growth in case 2 is that of a 1% increase from its baseline on impact, then it is assumed to 
increase to 2% from baseline in period 8, and to further increase to 3% from baseline in 
period 12 
Third, increasing government revenues through increased taxes by assuming an 
increase in the parameter value for the tax revenue equation (equation 8 in the 
macroeconomic model developed in Chapter 5) from τ = 0.5 to τ = 0.8. 
The results of this overall policy, for these two assumed cases, are reported in 
Figure 7.3. The results for the separate government policies (increase in the money supply; 
decrease in government capital expenditure; decrease in government consumption 
expenditure) are reported in Figure 7.4-7.6. All results are in percentage deviations from 
baseline. Table 7.4 summarises the steady state properties of each variable under 
consideration. 
                                                 
84 This study has chosen 3% for the simulation because it is in the middle of the feasible range of 1% to 
5%. 
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As shown in Table 7.4 there are no long run benefits from such an approach for 
the Lebanese economy. However, the major long run loser from such an approach is the 
private capital stock which deteriorates by 0.60% from its base value, indicating that there 
is a crowding out effect. Hence aggregate supply/demand declines by 0.82% from its 
baseline. The trade balance, as shown in the Table, deteriorates by 0.12% due to the 
appreciation in the real exchange rate. Foreign asset stocks decline by 3.5% from their base 
level as a result of current account deficits, thereby exacerbating external borrowing. 
Moreover, the nominal interest rate and the rate of inflation are higher in long run steady 
state, this is due to the assumption of a permanent increase in the monetary growth rate.  
 
 
Table 7.4 Steady State Results: Government Policy Approach (Case 1 and Case 2) 
 (Percentage deviation from the base value) 
 Variables 
 f  pk  q  c  sy  t  
Instantaneous impact 
Case 1 
Case 2 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
-10.6165 
-8.0319 
 
16.8035 
3.7833 
 
2.0164 
0.454 
 
2.5206 
0.5675 
Short run impact 
Case 1 
Case 2 
 
-4.0316 
-2.7852 
 
1.4779 
-4.0036 
 
3.1168 
1.7145 
 
-2.2019 
-0.7476 
 
-0.5665 
-1.0897 
 
-0.3302 
-0.1121 
Medium run impact 
Case 1 
Case 2 
 
-3.4139 
-3.4139 
 
-1.5038 
-2.3652 
 
-0.118 
0.8859 
 
-0.4064 
-0.2499 
 
-0.9495 
-1.0901 
 
-0.0609 
-0.0374 
Long run impact 
Case 1 
Case 2 
 
-3.4830 
-3.4830 
 
-0.6017 
-0.6017 
 
0 
0 
 
-0.8038 
-0.8038 
 
-0.8168 
-0.8168 
 
-0.1205 
-0.1205 
 
 In addition to these overall effects, it is vital to identify, as well, the adjustment 
process towards the long run steady state over the four periods (Impact, short run, medium 
run and long run). 
 For the whole adjustment process the effects in case 1 and 2 are very similar in 
direction, but different in magnitude. On impact both cases have a positive impact effect 
on aggregate supply which increases by 2.02% in case 1 but by a smaller magnitude in case 
2. The q ratio immediately declines sharply in both cases from its baseline arising from a 
decline in equity prices, and therefore a fall in the market valuation of the capital stock in 
relation to its replacement cost. This is due to the decline in government consumption 
expenditure as well as capital expenditure. The nominal interest rate declines in both cases 
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as a result of the increase in the monetary growth rate in financing the budget deficit. The 
rate of inflation declines on impact because the initial increase in aggregate supply is greater 
than the increase in aggregate demand. The trade balance improves in both cases, but with 
a larger magnitude in case 1 as a result of the larger depreciation in the real exchange rate 
with foreign asset stocks remaining unchanged. 
 Over the short run, there are some important differences between case 1 and case 2 
in terms of developments in the six key variables concerned. The magnitudes of adjustment 
for private capital stock and aggregate supply in case 1 are larger and more volatile than 
that in case 2. During the short run period the q ratio increases after a noticeable decline, 
pushing up the private capital stock (by the end of the short run period) only in case 1. In 
case 2 the private capital stock deteriorates below its base value throughout the short run 
period due to the reduction in government expenditure and a smaller increase in monetary 
growth in the impact period (1%). Hence in case 1 the economy produces a larger 
accumulation of private capital stock. This accumulation mainly comes from an increase in 
the q ratio as previously identified. Aggregate supply in both cases declines below base 
value during the short run period with a larger decline in case 1 during the initial period, as 
a result of the deterioration in the private capital stock. The rate of inflation in both cases is 
pushed up from its initial decline as a result of a further increase in the monetary growth 
rate in period 8.  In terms of external developments, the real exchange in both cases 
depreciates on impact with a larger depreciation in case 1. During the remainder of the 
short run period the real exchange rate appreciates with a larger appreciation occurring in 
case 1. These developments initially improve the trade balance but it then weakens with the 
real exchange rate appreciation. 
By the end of the short run period aggregate supply in both cases has declined 
below the base line, with a larger decline apparent in case 2. The private capital stock 
improves by the end of the short run period by 1.45% for case 1, but in case 2 it has 
deteriorated noticeably due to the reduction in government expenditures. Furthermore, by 
the end of this period the trade balance deteriorates in both cases because of the 
appreciation in the real exchange rate, which occurs by the end of the short run period. It is 
noticeable that the decline in the trade balance in case 1 is slightly larger than that in case 2, 
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as a result of the larger appreciation which is apparent by the end of this period in case 1. 
However, this deterioration in the trade balance in either case results in a deterioration in 
foreign asset stocks and current account balances in both cases, hence increasing external 
borrowing.  
 Over the medium run, aggregate supply and the private capital stock in both cases 
have deteriorated relative to base value (despite the slight increase in the q ratio in case 2), 
because of the further decline in both government consumption expenditure as well as 
capital expenditure which takes place in period 8. The deterioration in case 2 remains larger 
because of this further reduction. This period is also characterised by rising inflation (not 
shown here) due to the permanent increase in the monetary growth rate. External 
developments suggest that the real exchange rate appears to depreciate in both cases by the 
end of the medium run period compared to that at the end of the short run period. The 
trade balance appears to improve by the end of the medium run period relative to the 
decline, which occurred by the end of the short run period. Foreign asset stocks appear to 
slightly improve only in case 1, in case 2 they have declined further relative to the decline 
by the end of the short run period. 
Over the long run period, to ultimate steady state, the q ratio slightly declines to 
steady state and to its base value in case 2 only, it increases slightly in case 1. The private 
capital stock and aggregate supply increase to their long run steady state (still below the 
baseline). The rate of inflation (not shown here) increases to long run steady state as a 
result of the permanent increase in the monetary growth rate. However, the real exchange 
rate continues to appreciate slightly to steady state, in line with a further deterioration in 
the trade balance as well as foreign asset stocks. 
In addition to these overall effects, as discussed, this study also simulates the 
separate government policies for the assumed cases. The major findings derivable from the 
separate government policy scenario of an increase in the money supply is that this policy 
has some positive effects upon Lebanon’s economy as well as some negative effects. 
The major benefits from such a policy are in regard to an increase in the q ratio, 
which has a positive impact on private sector investment. As shown in Figure 7.4 the 
private capital stock and aggregate supply increase in both cases during the adjustment 
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process, but with larger volatility in case 1. This policy of an expansionary monetary policy 
has other advantages for the Lebanese economy, implying a gain of competitiveness and 
better external performance on the trade and current accounts (due to a depreciation of the 
real exchange rate). Moreover, this policy has some disadvantages especially in terms of 
inflation; the rate of inflation in both cases is pushed up during the adjustment process due 
to the increase in the money supply to finance the budget deficit. 
The main findings from the separate government policy scenario of a decrease in 
government capital expenditure is that this policy has a negative effects on almost all the 
key macroeconomic variables under investigation. This policy produces the largest negative 
impact during the short run period in terms of private capital stock, aggregate supply and 
foreign asset stocks. Moreover, as shown in Figure 7.5 the private capital stock and 
aggregate supply decline in both cases but with less volatility in case 2. Another cost of this 
policy is that the trade balance worsens in both cases during the adjustment process after 
showing an initial improvement, because of the appreciation in the real exchange rate after 
an initial depreciation. This deterioration in both cases also results in a deterioration in 
foreign asset stocks and current account balances, thereby adding to foreign debt. 
Implementing the separate government policy scenario of a decrease in government 
consumption expenditure will produce some adverse effects on Lebanon’s economy. It is 
noticeable from the simulation results (Figure 7.6) that the private capital stock and 
aggregate supply generally decline in both cases during the adjustment process but with less 
volatility in case 2. The minor advantage of this policy is that the private capital stock 
increases during the short run periods resulting in a slight increase in aggregate supply 
during the short run period for the gradual case only. This policy resulted in a slightly 
better performance in terms of the trade and current accounts especially after the impact 
period (due to a depreciation in the real exchange rate) as well as an accumulation in 
foreign asset stocks, hence decreasing external borrowing. 
 
7.4 Policy Implications 
 The major findings and policy implications derivable from the simulation results, in 
each simulation scenario, are as follows: 
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1. For the simulation scenario of an expansion in government capital expenditure 
the main finding from the simulation results, for the two cases assumed 
(unanticipated/gradual increase in public capital expenditure), is that this policy has some 
positive effects upon Lebanese economic development. The major benefits from such an 
approach are in regard to an increase in the q ratio, which has a positive impact on private 
sector investment, resulting in a large accumulation of private capital stock during the 
adjustment process. This also stimulates the supply side of the economy (crowding in 
effect). It is noticeable that the simulation results indicate that the private capital stock and 
aggregate supply increase in both cases during the adjustment process, but with larger 
volatility in case 1.  
This policy has other advantages for the Lebanese economy, implying a gain of 
competitiveness and a better external performance on the trade and current accounts (due 
to a depreciation in the real exchange rate) and hence decreasing external borrowing. It is 
worth noting here as well that during the adjustment process the real exchange rate 
depreciates in both cases, but with less volatility in case 2. The disadvantage of this policy 
appears to be in the first year of the short run period. Here the rate of inflation in both 
cases is pushed up towards the baseline after an initial downturn due to the increase in 
aggregate demand being more than aggregate supply, in addition to the financing of the 
deficit through monetary growth.  
The interest rate is higher as well during the first year of the short run period 
because of the increase in public spending arising from the funding component through 
bond sales; this increase in public spending stimulates aggregate demand for output and for 
money. But over the long run period, and where the monetary growth rate ends in 
financing the deficit in period 12 while maintaining the assumption that the deficit is 
financed through endogenous expansions on bonds, the rate of inflation falls back towards 
the baseline. The interest rate falls back as well towards the baseline, and shows little 
sensitivity to bond financing after period 12. Another important conclusion from this 
policy, in the context of the Lebanese economy, is that money deficit financing is 
inflationary, and shows large sensitivity in terms of interest rates. Bond financing a deficit is 
non inflationary and shows little sensitivity in terms of interest rates. Furthermore, it can be 
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concluded from the simulation results that this policy produces a positive impact upon 
almost all the key macroeconomic variables under consideration during the adjustment 
process towards the long run steady state. But it is noticeable that this policy produces the 
largest positive impact during the first year of the short run period in terms of domestic 
improvements as well as external improvements. Hence if the government gives priority to 
short-term policy outcomes this simulation result supports such a policy. The preferred 
approach by the government should be case 2  (gradual approach), because this produces 
considerably less volatility in terms of the major macro outcomes. 
2. The simulation results arising from an expansion in government consumption 
expenditure for the two cases assumed, suggests that it could have some advantages and 
some disadvantages for Lebanese economic development. The advantage of this policy 
appears to be during the first year of the short run period in terms of domestic 
improvement, where both the private capital stock and aggregate supply increase. But by 
the end of the short run period the private capital stock and aggregate supply decline from 
their initial increase in both cases (to below the baseline in case 2, but above the baseline in 
case 1). The disadvantage of this policy appears to be during the adjustment process, where 
the trade balance deteriorates in both cases because of the appreciation in the real exchange 
rate. This deterioration in the trade balance implies a loss of competitiveness and a 
deterioration in the external performance, trade and current account balance, hence 
exacerbating foreign debt. However, as can be seen from these simulation results, this 
policy appears to have some positive effects in terms of domestic improvements during the 
adjustment process towards long run steady state. But in terms of external developments 
this policy produces adverse effects during the adjustment process towards long run steady 
state. It is noticeable, as well, that this policy produces a large positive impact during the 
first year of the short run period in terms of domestic developments. The rate of inflation 
falls on impact but subsequently rises as aggregate demand increases faster than aggregate 
supply. Hence, if the government considers a short-term policy in order to improve only 
domestic developments such as private investment and aggregate supply, this simulation 
suggests support for such an approach. However, the government should pay particular 
attention to the adverse effects of this policy in terms of external developments, especially 
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foreign asset stocks which deteriorate in line with exacerbating foreign debt. Another 
important conclusion from this simulation scenario is that the government should adopt 
case 2 (gradual approach) because it produces less volatility in terms of the major macro 
outcomes. 
However, a comparison between the simulation results for the first policy option 
(expansion in capital expenditure) and the second policy option (expansion in government 
consumption expenditure) indicates a number of suggestions for policy implementation, as 
follows: 
a. Implementing the policy of an expansion in capital expenditure produces a larger 
favourable impact in terms of private sector investment, and in terms of the supply side of 
the economy (crowding in effect) during the whole adjustment process towards long run 
steady state. The policy of expansion in government consumption expenditure does not 
produce such a positive effect during the whole adjustment process, because this policy 
produces an unfavourable effect in terms of private investment and aggregate supply 
(crowding out effect) during periods 7 to 11.  
Overall, the policy of an expansion in capital expenditure compared favourably to 
the other policy during the whole adjustment process. In terms of external developments it 
resulted in a gain of competitiveness and a better performance externally, trade and current 
account (due to a depreciation in the real exchange rate) as well as an accumulation in 
foreign asset stocks, hence decreasing external borrowing. The policy of an expansion in 
government consumption expenditure produced an unfavourable effect in terms of 
external developments during the adjustment process, the trade balance deteriorated in line 
with a deterioration in foreign asset stocks as a result of current account deficits implying 
an increase in foreign debt.  
b. Implementing the two policies (expansion in capital expenditure/government 
consumption expenditure) produces a similar outcome in terms of the interest rate and the 
rate of inflation. However, both policies produce higher inflation during the short run 
period due to the increase in aggregate demand being more than aggregate supply, in 
addition to the financing of the deficit through monetary growth. The interest rate is higher 
as well during the first year of the short run period (lower on impact) due to the increase in 
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public spending arising from the funding component through bond sales; this increase in 
public spending stimulates aggregate demand for output and money. However, the 
simulation results for the two policies indicate that money deficit financing is inflationary 
and shows large sensitivity in terms of interest rates. Bond financing is non inflationary and 
shows little sensitivity in terms of interest rates. 
 It can be concluded from the above discussion that if the government considers a 
fiscal expansion policy in order to improve macroeconomic performance, the simulation 
results suggest that the government should adopt the policy of an expansion in capital 
expenditure because it produces the most desirable outcomes. In addition, it should adopt 
a gradual approach because this produces considerably less volatility in terms of major 
macro outcomes. 
 3. Implementing the government policy approach for both cases 
(unanticipated/gradual) results in adverse effects on almost all the key macroeconomic 
variables under consideration during the whole adjustment process towards long run steady 
state. This policy produces the largest negative impact during the short run period in terms 
of private capital stock, aggregate supply and foreign asset stocks. However, over the whole 
adjustment process, towards long run steady state, this policy has adverse effects in regard 
to a decline in private sector investment and in the supply side of the economy (crowding 
out effect). It is noticeable from the simulation results that the private capital stock and 
aggregate supply decline in both cases during the adjustment process, but with less volatility 
in case 2. Another cost of this policy is that the trade balance deteriorates in both cases 
during the adjustment process because of the appreciation in the real exchange rate. This 
deterioration in both cases also results in a deterioration in foreign asset stocks and current 
account balances, thereby adding to foreign debt. It is worth noting here that the decline in 
the trade balance in case 1 is slightly larger than that in case 2, due to a larger real exchange 
rate appreciation in case 2. The rate of inflation in both cases is pushed up despite the 
decline in aggregate supply, and this is due to the permanent increase in the monetary 
growth rate. The minor advantage of this policy appears to be over the impact period 
because aggregate supply improves in both cases with a larger magnitude in case 1 
(unanticipated), despite an unchanged private capital stock.  
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However, it is clear from the simulation results that, in order to minimise the 
adverse effects of this policy, the government should adopt a gradual approach because it 
leads to much less macroeconomic volatility. Another important conclusion from such a 
policy is that if the government in Lebanon considers applying this approach over a short 
term period, the simulation results indicate that it will have the largest negative impact over 
the short run period in terms of private investment, aggregate supply, and foreign asset 
stocks. Another important finding that the government should be aware of is that this 
policy has the largest problem in terms of higher inflation, and this in turn exacerbates 
Lebanon’s economic difficulties. 
Comparing the simulation results for the three separate government policies 
indicates that the policy of an expansionary monetary policy is favourable in terms of 
reducing the budget deficit compared to the other two separate policies. The expansionary 
monetary policy produces a favourable impact in terms of private sector investment, and in 
terms of the supply side of the economy during the adjustment process. However, this 
policy has an undesirable impact on inflation. 
The other two separate policies produced unfavourable effects in terms of private 
investment and aggregate supply during the adjustment process. But it is noticeable from 
the simulation results (Figure 7.5-7.6) that the separate policy of a reduction in government 
capital expenditure produces the most undesirable outcomes compared to a reduction in 
government consumption expenditure. 
Hence, the main finding from the three separate government policies is that the 
reduction in government expenditures (capital or consumption) exerts the most important 
and undesirable influence on the overall impact. The separate expansionary monetary 
policy produces a favourable impact compared to the others. Hence it is advisable, based 
upon the simulation results presented in this study, that if the government in Lebanon 
decides to implement this overall policy approach, it should be aware that the reduction in 
government expenditures, in order to reduce the budget deficit, is not the best strategy and 
especially the policy of reduction in government capital expenditure. If the government in 
Lebanon decides to implement the policy of expansionary monetary policy in order to 
reduce the budget deficit, our results show that this policy will have some positive effect on 
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Lebanon’s economy, but the government has to be aware that this policy has an 
inflationary effect.  
 
7.5 Summary and Conclusions 
 The main focus of this chapter was to simulate the macroeconomic model 
developed in Chapter 5, and to analyse the adjustment process arising from various 
exogenous shocks, or scenarios, in the context of the Lebanese fiscal crisis. The objective 
being to identify policies that reduce the macroeconomic consequences of these shocks 
and hence improve the macroeconomic performance in Lebanon.  
 Because of the complexity of the model, the analysis of the steady state and 
dynamic properties of the model was conducted through the use of a numerical simulation 
procedure. Simulations require the specification of values for the numerous parameters in 
the model. Unfortunately these values are not available for Lebanon, therefore they were 
obtained from the estimation procedure conducted in Chapter 6 (FIML approach and 
ECM) and from those imposed because of data limitations or in order to ensure stability of 
the model. 
 However, it is clear from the simulation results that implementing the policy of 
expansion in government capital expenditure, for the two cases assumed, produces larger 
favourable impacts upon Lebanese economic development in terms of private sector 
investment, and in terms of the supply side of the economy (crowding in effects) during 
the whole adjustment process towards long run steady state. This policy produces, as well, 
favourable impacts in terms of external developments. It results in a gain of 
competitiveness and a better external performance, in terms of the trade and current 
accounts as well as accumulation in foreign asset stocks, hence decreasing external 
borrowing. It is noticeable that this policy produces the largest positive impact during the 
first year of the short run period in terms of domestic improvements as well as external 
improvements. Hence, if the government gives priority to short-term policy outcomes this 
simulation result supports such a policy. Another important finding is that the government 
should adopt case 2 (gradual approach), because this produces considerably less volatility in 
terms of the major macro outcomes. 
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Implementing the policy of an expansion in government consumption expenditure 
produces unfavourable effects in terms of external developments during the adjustment 
process. The trade balance deteriorates in line with a deterioration in foreign asset stocks as 
a result of current account deficits, and hence results in an increase in foreign debt. This 
policy produces, as well, unfavourable effects in terms of private investment and aggregate 
supply (crowding out effect) during periods 7 to 11. 
Implementing the two policies (expansion in capital expenditure/government 
consumption expenditure) produces similar outcome in terms of the interest rate and the 
rate of inflation. However, both policies produce higher inflation during the short run 
period due to the increase in aggregate demand being more than aggregate supply, in 
addition to the financing of the deficit through monetary growth. The interest rate is higher 
as well during the first year of the short run period (lower on impact period) due to the 
increase in public spending arising from the funding component through bond sales; this 
increase in public spending stimulates aggregate demand for output and money. However, 
the simulation results for the two policies show that money deficit financing is inflationary 
and shows large sensitivity in terms of interest rates. Bond financing is non inflationary and 
shows little sensitivity in terms of interest rates. 
 The main finding is that if the government considers an expansionary fiscal policy 
in order to improve macroeconomic performance, the simulation results suggest that the 
government should adopt the policy of an expansion in capital expenditure because it 
produces the most desirable outcomes. In addition, it should adopt a gradual approach 
because this produces considerably less volatility in terms of major macro outcomes.  
The main findings from our simulation results dealing with the government 
approach to the fiscal crisis, does not support the government policy in dealing with the 
crisis. The results presented here suggest that it produces the most undesirable economic 
outcomes, and hence will only exacerbate Lebanon’s economic difficulties. However, if the 
Lebanese government is willing to go ahead with this approach, it is advised that, based 
upon the results presented here, in order to minimise the adverse effects of this policy the 
government should adopt a gradual approach because it leads to much less macroeconomic 
volatility. Another important conclusion from such a policy is that if the government in 
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Lebanon considers applying this approach over a short term period, the simulation results 
suggest that this will have the largest negative impact over the short run period in terms of 
private investment, aggregate supply, and foreign asset stocks. Another important outcome 
that the authorities should be aware of is that this policy has the largest problems in terms 
of higher inflation, and this in turn exacerbates Lebanon’s economic difficulties. 
The main finding from the three separate government policies is that the reduction 
in government expenditure (capital or consumption) exerts the most undesirable influence 
on the overall impact, and the separate policy of expansionary monetary policy produces a 
favourable impact compared to the others. Hence it is advisable, based upon the simulation 
results presented in this study, that if the government in Lebanon decides to implement 
this government approach, it should be aware that the reduction in government 
expenditures in order to reduce the budget deficit is not the best strategy and especially the 
policy of reducing government capital expenditure. If the government in Lebanon decides 
to implement the policy of expansionary monetary policy, in order to reduce the budget 
deficit, our results show that this policy would have some positive effects on Lebanon’s 
economy, but the government has to be aware that this policy has inflationary effects. 
 It is important to point out that this study is aware that there are other aspects 
(policy options) such as privatisation, borrowing from abroad (with lower interest rates 
compared to domestic rates), and income tax which are important in the context of the 
Lebanese fiscal crisis. But because of the already complex nature of the model, these 
scenarios are left for further research. More detail regarding such further study will be 
presented in the next chapter.  
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Figure 7.1 Expansion in Public Capital Expenditure (Case 1 and Case 2) 
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Figure 7.2 Expansion in Government Consumption Expenditure (Case 1 and Case 2) 
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Figure 7.3 Government Policy Approach (Case 1 and Case 2) 
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Figure 7.4 Increase in the money supply  (Case 1 and Case 2) 
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Figure 7.5 Decrease in government capital expenditure (case 1 and case 2) 
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Figure 7.6 Decrease in government consumption expenditure (case 1 and case 2) 
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Appendix 7.1 Mathematical Solution of the Stable Saddlepath in a 
Rational Expectations Model1 
 
 
The discussion here considers a simple macroeconomic model with only two 
equations in order to derive the analytic expression for the convergent path when 
the saddlepath conditions holds.  
 
Consider the simple two-equation model 
hbyaxx ++=&   kdycxy ++=&    (7.1.1) 
 
Where x  and y  are two variables and khdcba ,,,,,  are constants. The dot 
denotes the rate of change of the variable over time. 
 
However, in order to derive a saddlepath solution which is characteristic of rational 
expectations models, it is assumed that the parameters of equation (7.1.1) should 
satisfy the following: 
 0>a , 0<b , 0<c , 0<d  
  
 Writing equation (7.1.1) in matrix form, we obtain 
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 The characteristic equation for the coefficient matrix is given by: 
 
  
c
a λ−
=0    )()(2 cbadda
d
b
−++−=
−
λλ
λ
  (7.1.3) 
 
 Which has two solutions: 
 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed discussion about the mathematical solution see Begg (1982) and Buiter and Miller 
(1980). 
 283 
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Given the above sign restriction on the coefficients, (ad-bc) is negative and 
{ }2
1
2 )(4)( bcadda −−+  is larger in absolute value than )( da + , confirming that 
one eigenvalue λ  is positive and one is negative. Choosing the negative solution, 
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 The solution to equation (7.1.2) is as follows: 
 
  *)( xxx −= λ&  
  *)( yyy −= λ&  
 
Where *x  and *y  denote the steady state values of x  and y  obtained when 
0== yx &&  in equation (7.1.2). 
 
It is noticeable as well after the previous discussion of a simple macroeconomic 
model with only two equations, that for a more general model by considering the 
linear system of n first order differential equations in n variables itx  at time t, we 
have 
 
 112121111 ...... hxaxaxax ntnttt +++=&  
 . 
 . 
 . 
 . 
 nntnntntnnt hxaxaxax +++= ......2211&  
 
Which in matrix notation can be written as : 
 284 
 
 hxAx tt +=&  
 
Where 
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Consider the eigenvalues λ  of the coefficient matrix A, obtained by solving the 
matrix equation 0=− IA λ , in which I is an identity matrix which has (nxn) 
dimensions. These eigenvalues may be real or complex. If the real parts of all n 
eigenvalues are negative, the system (7.1.4) is Globally Stable, converging to the 
steady state from an initial position. If the real parts of all n eigenvalues are positive 
the system is Globally Unstable, diverging from the steady state from all initial 
positions except the steady state itself. 
 
Steady State Properties of the Macroeconomic Model Developed in this 
Study 
The model possesses a number of analytically unambiguous properties for 
its steady-state solution, which are as follows: 
 0==== pwem &&&&  
0* =−= rre&  
            0== πm&  
            0=f& ; 0=pk& ; 0=gk& ; 0=q  
            0=== pmb &&& ; 0== pb &&  
tg =  
As indicated previously in Chapter 7 the model must exhibit dynamic properties 
which are consistent with its underlying behavioural assumptions, hence ensuring, 
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in the context of this rational expectations model, a stable saddlepath consistent 
with the attainment of long-run equilibrium. In the macroeconomic model 
developed in Chapter 5 there are six dynamic endogenous variables, namely: real 
money balances )(l ; foreign assets stocks )( f ; private capital stock )( pk ; public 
capital stock )( gk ; Tobin’s q )(q ; and the real exchange rate )(c . Four of which 
)(l , )( f , )( pk , )( gk  are assumed to be non jump variables whilst q and e, being 
determined in financial markets, are assumed to be jump variables.  
 As indicated in Chapter 7, the stability of the system depends only on the 
properties of the state matrix A. From matrix A the characteristic equation of the 
system can be obtained, and from this the characteristic roots (or eigenvalues) of 
the system derived. The signs of these will determine the stability of the system. 
With four non-jump and two jump control variables, the system is required to 
produce four negative (stable) roots and two positive (unstable) roots for a 
saddlepath solution to long-run steady state. 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusions, Recommendations, and Further Study 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study has been to achieve three main objectives. First, to develop a 
dynamic macroeconomic model for Lebanon including the budget deficit and the funding 
of it, as well as explicitly highlighting the composition of government expenditures (capital 
or current). The model developed emphasised the effects of exogenous shocks arising from 
budget deficits and the funding of it (e.g. monetary accommodation or bond financing). 
Furthermore, the model developed was utilised to analyse exogenous shocks arising from 
increased government expenditures (capital expenditure or consumption expenditure) and 
their impact upon key macroeconomic variables such as output, private investment, interest 
rates, and inflation amongst others. The government policy response to the Lebanese fiscal 
crisis was also analysed through the use of this macroeconomic model. Second, to generate 
parameter values of key macroeconomic behavioural relationships in the context of 
Lebanon, by using efficient estimation techniques and appropriate data definitions for 
Lebanon (see Chapter 6). This represents a significant contribution to the literature since 
there are no empirical studies on such behavioural relationships in the case of Lebanon. 
Third, there has been no policy analysis in the case of Lebanon using a simulation analysis. 
Hence this research makes a major contribution through simulating the macroeconomic 
model developed in Chapter 5 in order to analyse a number of economic policies essential 
in the context of the Lebanese fiscal crisis, in order to reduce the macroeconomic 
consequences arsing from such policies with the aim of improving the macroeconomic 
performance of Lebanon.  
 
8.2 Summary of the Study 
 This study started with an overview of the Lebanese economy in Chapter 2. The 
aim of this chapter was to examine the economic performance of the Lebanese economy 
over the period 1970-2000, broken down into three distinct phases: pre-civil war period 
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(1970-1974), the civil war period (1975-1990) and the post-war and reconstruction period 
(1990-2000).  
 Over the pre-civil war period, Lebanon was one of the most dynamic economies in 
the Middle East. It boasted low inflation, impressive economic growth rates (the average 
annual growth rate of real GDP was 7.3% during 1970-1974), sizable balance of payments 
surpluses, small fiscal deficits, and a floating, stable, and fully convertible domestic 
currency. 
 Over the civil war period Lebanon not only suffered in human and material terms, 
but its economy also underwent fundamental changes. The infrastructure and industrial 
facilities were destroyed while, at the same time, the economic/political environment 
discouraged further investment. During this period, the annual growth rate of real GDP 
showed large falls and averaged a rate of minus 1.46% (Eken et al. 1995, 4). Also, during 
this period, public finances deteriorated due to crumbling central government authority and 
the resulting inability of the government to collect revenues and/or cut its expenditure. 
This gave rise to huge budget deficits, which registered a rate of -32.3 percent of GDP 
(Eken et al. 1999, 14). These deficits have been financed mainly by the central bank (issuing 
treasury bills) and borrowing from the banking sector. This led to excessive money 
creation, inflation, and exchange rate depreciation. In addition, the phenomenon of 
currency substitution has become so widespread that the Lebanese economy became, for a 
period, completely dollarised (Chami, 1994, 8).  
 Over the post-war period, the authorities set out to bring about economic 
stabilization together with the task of reconstruction and development of the war-ravaged 
economy. Hence, the year 1993 was marked by favourable macroeconomic developments 
like increasing real GDP, falling inflation, a stable exchange rate, and the strengthening of 
foreign exchange reserves. But, it is argued, the government’s participation in the 
reconstruction and rehabilitation process has been exceptionally large and, while it has been 
responsible for much of the country’s recent good fortune, it has also contributed to a new 
and emerging set of problems. The government increasingly took recourse to debt 
financing of these activities, which has left it with a bloated domestic public debt currently 
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standing at 101.4% of GDP and external public debt standing at 33.4% of GDP (BDL, 
1999-2000). 
The Lebanese experience with fiscal deficits and public debt was analysed in 
chapter three. It analysed the public sector deficit and debt in Lebanon during the period of 
1975-2000, broken down into two distinct phases: the civil war period (1975-1990) and the 
post-war reconstruction period (1990-2000). 
The civil war period was a period of deepening crisis for the Lebanese economy, as 
evidenced by the marked deceleration in economic growth and private investment activity. 
The budget deficit as a percent of GDP increased from 12% in 1976 to about 30% in 1990, 
then being one of the highest amongst the Middle East countries. Increased government 
expenditure and reduced government revenues were both responsible for the steep increase 
in the public sector deficits. As a result of large budget deficits during this period, Lebanese 
public debt started to increase after 1975. By the end of 1990, gross public debt 
represented 99.8% of GDP. Of this, 80.6% was due to domestic public debt and the rest, 
19.2%, was external public debt. However, the Lebanese deficit has mainly been financed 
by the issue of treasury bills of various maturities. Short term bills registered a very high 
average share of 85.2% in total treasury bills during the war. Most treasury bills were 
subscribed to by the commercial banks at an average share of 56.9% during the war. This 
would have a negative impact on private investment and the role of the private sector 
overall, because pouring money into treasury bills crowds out the private sector by creating 
a liquidity shortage. It has been argued by many economists in Lebanon, such as Chami 
(1992, 1994), Makdissi (1998, 1999) and others, that the main effect of the huge budget 
deficit, and the way it was financed, was to increase the money supply at an unprecedented 
rate, and to contribute significantly to a rising inflation rate and depreciation of the 
Lebanese pound during the civil war period (Chami, 1992). 
Over the post-war period, two phases in the evolution of Lebanon’s public debt 
can be distinguished. During 1990-1992, the overall budget deficit to GDP ratio declined 
to 11%. This happened as a result of: the gradual reassertion of government authority, 
government revenues increased from 9.7% of GDP in 1990 to 12% in 1992 (revenue 
collection improved especially with respect to customs duties and non-tax revenue); fiscal 
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restraint brought total expenditure down to 23% of GDP while at the same time interest 
payments on domestic debt went down to 6.9% of GDP (Table 3.2) as a result of increased 
monetary financing.  
The second phase of the evolution of the deficit and public debt in Lebanon was 
during 1993-2000. This period was different from the other periods, economically and 
politically, especially with the steady appreciation of the value of the Lebanese pound and 
in terms of the causes of the budget deficit. As a result of rebuilding the country’s 
infrastructure (the government’s crucial contribution to the reconstruction effort), the 
acceleration in the growth of government capital expenditure, together with large and 
expanding current expenditure and the slow recovery of the revenue-generation capacity, 
led to sizable fiscal imbalances. Consequently, government budget deficits increased from 
9.2% of GDP in 1993 to 20.2% and 23.7% in 1997 and 2000 respectively (Table 3.2). This 
huge increase in the budget deficit led to a sustained growth in government debt. During 
1993-2000, the average annual growth of public debt registered 31%, gross public debt, as a 
percent of GDP, increased from 48.6% in 1993 to 102.9% and 151.8% in 1997 and 2000 
respectively, net public debt rose from 38% in 1993 to 141.2% in 2000 (Tables 3.6, 3.7).  
Hence, the Lebanese government is unable to service its debt from revenues, and is 
having to borrow to finance its debt servicing obligations and to pay salaries of civil 
servants. While the public debt in Lebanon has accumulated significantly in the last ten 
years, the Lebanese economy has been slowing down since 1996. The annual real GDP 
growth in Lebanon declined from 38.2% in 1992 to 4%, 3%, 2%, and 0% in 1996, 1998, 
1999, and 2000 respectively (See Chapter 2).  
The main conclusion from this chapter is that debt financing in Lebanon has led to 
a permanent deficit in the budget, high interest rates, increases in the money supply, rising 
inflation, a depreciation of the Lebanese pound, and a slowing of economic growth. Other 
economists in the region such as Bolbol (1999), Chami (1992, 1994), Makdissi (1998, 1999), 
Atia (1998), Ayash (1998) and others believe that the ballooning debt is the cause of 
recession and economic slowdown in Lebanon.  
The aim of chapter 4 was to review from the literature the significance of budget 
deficits for key macroeconomic variables. It can be concluded from the empirical studies 
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presented in this chapter dealing with the impact of public investment on private 
investment and economic growth, that both the method of financing and the components 
of government expenditure could have different effects. Therefore, it is crucial to 
distinguish between current and capital expenditure when evaluating the impact of fiscal 
policy on private investment and output growth. Thus, overall results from the empirical 
literature with respect to the impact of public investment on private investment and growth 
are ambiguous, but the bulk of the empirical literature finds a significantly negative effect 
of public consumption expenditure on growth while the effects of public investment 
expenditure are found to be positive although less robust. 
The major outcomes from the empirical examining the relationship between the 
budget deficit and inflation, showed strong evidence that the budget deficit, through a 
monetisation and rising money supply, could lead to inflation. However, the inflationary 
effect of government deficits depends upon the means by which the deficit is financed and 
the impact of that on aggregate demand. 
 The evidence from a range of detailed studies with respect to the impact of the 
budget deficit on the trade deficit (the twin-deficit) reported in this chapter, was mixed. 
Although the overall results are inconclusive, the majority of these studies found evidence 
towards supporting the twin deficits relationship arising through the exchange rate. Thus 
the key outcomes from all of these studies indicated strong evidence towards supporting 
the Keynesian proposition (conventional view), which suggests that an increase in the 
budget deficit would induce domestic absorption, and hence import expansion, causing a 
current account deficit. 
 Empirical investigations of the impact of budget deficits on the exchange rate are as 
inconclusive as the theoretical arguments. The major conclusion from the empirical studies 
examining the relationship between the budget deficit and the exchange rate showed strong 
evidence, in both developed and developing countries, generally supporting the 
conventional macroeconomic theory, rather than the Ricardian equivalence proposition 
which holds that large deficits have no real adverse macroeconomic effects. It can also be 
concluded from the empirical findings that the effects of budget deficits on exchange rates 
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depends on the way of funding the deficits, whether through taxation or through money 
growth, with each of these tools having different effects.   
The evidence from a range of detailed studies with respect to the impact of the 
budget deficit on interest rates is mixed. Part of the conflicting results can be explained by 
differences in the choice of variables, empirical methodology and the sample period. 
Another important outcome from the empirical studies investigating such a relationship 
indicated strong evidence towards supporting the Keynesian view of a significant and 
positive relationship between budget deficits and interest rates. 
 Thus, chapter 4 has indicated from the existing literature that budget deficits and 
the way they are funded have important macroeconomic implications. Its omission from 
any macroeconomic model for Lebanon would represent a major deficiency. Given that the 
budget deficit and its funding is the key issue in Lebanon it is important, therefore, to 
explicitly include the budget deficit and its funding in any macro model for Lebanon.  
The aim of Chapter 5 was to develop a dynamic macroeconomic model for 
Lebanon incorporating the budget deficit and the funding of it (e.g. monetary 
accommodation or bond financing). The model developed was used to analyse exogenous 
shocks arising from increased government expenditures (capital expenditure or 
consumption expenditure), and their impact upon key macroeconomic variables. The 
government’s current policy approach was analysed through the use of this macroeconomic 
model. The model developed was based on the contributions of the Dornbusch model 
(DB) (1976), the portfolio balance models (PBM) (Branson (1977, 1984)) including the 
work of Dornbusch and Fisher (1980). The model also incorporated the work of Harvie 
and Kearney (1996).  
This chapter highlighted the many deficiencies of the DB and PBM models, in 
particular their neglect of the supply side of the economy, no wealth effects, no funding 
implications from fiscal deficits, and lack of stock-flow interactions, among others. The 
model developed in Chapter 5 attempted to remedy these deficiencies by incorporating the 
supply side of the economy, wealth effects, capital stock accumulation, and budget deficits 
and their funding. The model developed in this chapter was later utilised to conduct a 
number of economic policies through simulation and to compare the macroeconomic 
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effects of different budget funding options on macroeconomic variables, with the aim of 
identifying which of these options provide a better result for the stability and output of the 
Lebanese economy as a whole. 
Because of a lack, or unavailability, of parameter values for key macroeconomic 
behavioural relationships in the context of Lebanon, and the need for these parameters 
values in the conduct of a simulation analysis, Chapter 6 focused upon the estimation of 
the behavioural equations of the macroeconomic model developed by using efficient 
estimation techniques (FIML, ECM) and appropriate data definitions for Lebanon. The 
results from the FIML approach indicated the existence of long run relationships, or 
cointegration, for all the equations employed. The findings of cointegration allow us to 
investigate the dynamics of the system with the information of the cointegration 
relationship, and an error-correction model (ECM) is estimated. Hence these estimates (the 
long run and short run estimated coefficients from cointegration and the error correction 
model) provide a range of possible parameters values, which were used to conduct a 
simulation and policy analysis in Chapter 7 (this will be discussed later). The parameter 
values estimated make a unique contribution to the literature, since there are no other 
empirical studies analysing such behavioural relationships in the case of Lebanon. In 
addition, this chapter examined the time series data to find out whether the series are 
stationary or non-stationary, by using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The 
results showed that only real private consumption expenditure ( pc ), real government 
investment spending ( gi ), rate of change of real bond stocks )( pb &&− , real government 
expenditure )(g  and real private investment spending ( pi ) seem to be stationary I(0). The 
rest of the variables included in the model are found to be non-stationary of different 
orders, either I(1) or I(2).  
The aim of Chapter 7 was to simulate the macroeconomic model developed in 
Chapter 5, and to analyse the adjustment process arising from various exogenous shocks, 
or scenarios, in the context of the Lebanese fiscal crisis in order to reduce the 
macroeconomic consequences of these shocks and hence to improve the macroeconomic 
performance in Lebanon.  
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 Because of the complexity of the model the analysis of the steady state and dynamic 
properties of the model was conducted through the use of a numerical simulation 
procedure. The parameter values used in this chapter were obtained from the estimation 
procedures conducted in Chapter 6 (FIML approach and ECM), and through the 
imposition of values because of data limitation or in order to ensure stability of the model. 
The simulation analysis in this chapter focused upon key aspects of the fiscal crisis 
in Lebanon, namely: an expansion in public capital expenditure on the key macroeconomic 
variables for two cases (unanticipated/gradual) and by assuming that the budget deficit in 
Lebanon is partly financed through monetary growth in addition to bond financing; an 
expansion of government consumption expenditure by also assuming two cases 
(unanticipated/gradual). Finally, a simulation was conducted in order to analyse the 
implications of the government policy approach in response to the Lebanese fiscal crisis on 
key macroeconomy variables, in order to be able to advise or identify alternative policies to 
be used to reduce the macroeconomic consequences arising from such shocks. This study 
has also simulated the separate impact from each of these government policies (such as 
reduced public capital expenditure; reduced consumption expenditure; and an increase in 
the money supply) for the two presumed cases (unanticipated and gradual), in order to 
identify the contribution of each of these to the overall effect. There has been no such 
research in the area of simulation and policy analysis in the context of Lebanon before, 
hence this research makes a major contribution to the literature on the Lebanese economy. 
The main intention of this chapter was to draw important lessons from the impact of such 
shocks on the Lebanese economy, and the impact of alternative policy responses to it (the 
major findings from Chapter 7 will be discussed in the next section). 
 
8.3 Simulation Analysis, Policy Implications, and Major Findings 
  The findings from the simulation results for the scenario of an expansion in 
government capital expenditure, for two presumed cases (unanticipated/gradual), indicates 
that this policy has larger favourable impacts upon Lebanese economic development in 
terms of private sector investment, and in terms of the supply side of the economy 
(crowding in effects) during the whole adjustment process towards long run steady state. 
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This policy produces, as well, favourable impacts in terms of external developments. It 
results in a gain of competitiveness and a better external performance, in terms of the trade 
and current accounts, as well as accumulation in foreign asset stocks hence decreasing 
external borrowing. It is noticeable that this policy produces the largest positive impact 
during the first year of the short run period in terms of domestic improvements as well as 
external improvements. Hence, if the government gives priority to short-term policy 
outcomes this simulation result supports such a policy. Another important finding is that 
the government should adopt case 2 (gradual approach), because this produces 
considerably less volatility in terms of the major macro variables. 
Implementing the policy of an expansion in government consumption expenditure 
produces unfavourable effects in terms of external developments during the adjustment 
process. The trade balance deteriorates in line with a deterioration in foreign asset stocks as 
a result of current account deficits, and hence results in an increase in foreign debt. This 
policy produces, as well, unfavourable effects in terms of private investment and aggregate 
supply (crowding out effect) during periods 7 to 11. 
Implementing the two policies (expansion in capital expenditure/government 
consumption expenditure) produces similar outcome in terms of the interest rate and the 
rate of inflation. However, both policies produce higher inflation during the short run 
period due to the increase in aggregate demand being more than aggregate supply, in 
addition to the financing of the deficit through monetary growth. The interest rate is higher 
as well during the first year of the short run period (lower on impact) due to the increase in 
public spending arising from the funding component through bond sales; this increase in 
public spending stimulates aggregate demand for output and money. However, the 
simulation results for the two policies show that money deficit financing is inflationary and 
shows large sensitivity in terms of interest rates. Bond financing is non inflationary and 
shows little sensitivity in terms of interest rates. 
 The main finding is that if the government considers a fiscal expansion policy in 
order to improve macroeconomic performance, the simulation results suggest that the 
government should adopt the policy of an expansion in capital expenditure because it 
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produces the most desirable outcomes. In addition, it should adopt a gradual approach 
because this produces considerably less volatility in terms of major macro variables.  
The main findings from the simulation results dealing with the government 
approach to the fiscal crisis, does not support the government policy in dealing with the 
crisis. The results presented here suggest that it produces the most undesirable economic 
outcomes, and hence will only exacerbate Lebanon’s economic difficulties. However, if the 
Lebanese government is willing to go ahead with this approach, it is advised that, based 
upon the results presented here, in order to minimise the adverse effects of this policy the 
government should adopt a gradual approach because it leads to much less macroeconomic 
volatility. Another important conclusion from such a policy is that if the government in 
Lebanon considers applying this approach over a short term period, the simulation results 
suggest that this will have the largest negative impact over the short run period in terms of 
private investment, aggregate supply, and foreign asset stocks. Another important outcome 
that the authorities should be aware of is that this policy has the largest problems in terms 
of higher inflation, and this in turn exacerbates Lebanon’s economic difficulties. 
 The main finding from the three separate government policies is that the reduction 
in government expenditure (capital or consumption) exerts the most undesirable influence 
on the overall impact, and the separate policy of expansionary monetary policy produces a 
favourable impact compared to the others. Hence it is advisable, based upon the simulation 
results presented in this study, that if the government in Lebanon decides to implement 
this government approach, it should be aware that the reduction in government 
expenditures in order to reduce the budget deficit is not the best strategy and especially the 
policy of reducing government capital expenditure. If the government in Lebanon decides 
to implement the policy of expansionary monetary policy, in order to reduce the budget 
deficit, our results show that this policy would have some positive effects on Lebanon’s 
economy, but the government has to be aware that this policy has inflationary effects. 
  
8.4 Suggestions for Future Study 
It is important to point out that this study recognised that there are other aspects or 
policy adoptions (such as privatisation, borrowing from abroad), available for the Lebanese 
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government to consider, and they might be beneficial to improving the future economic 
performance of the Lebanese economy. But, because of the complexity of the existing 
model, to generate these aspects on the one hand (in order to derive policy analysis) and 
because of the limitation of time given to this study on the other hand, these aspects are 
left for further research. The challenge being to incorporate them within the context of the 
theoretical macroeconomic framework developed in this study, through means of further 
appropriate extensions to it. 
 However, specifically, the following areas require further study: 
1. It would be interesting to incorporate the issue of privatisation into the 
macroeconomic model developed in this study in order to analyse the impact of this policy 
on key macroeconomic variables, and in order to draw important lessons from the impact 
of such a development on the Lebanese economy. This is particularly pertinent given that 
the Lebanese authority is planning to privatise certain sectors such as transport, electricity, 
and telecommunications, among others in order to reduce the budget deficit. Privatisation, 
in certain cases, may improve the economic efficiency and competitiveness of the whole 
economy, because sometimes the public sector suffers from a lack of managerial capacity 
or the public sector has difficulties in running these sectors due to political involvement or 
corruption. These sectors, therefore, are no longer beneficial for the public sector and it is 
better for them to be privatised. However, the Lebanese authority should study this issue 
more carefully, and more efficiently, before taking any decision that could have adverse 
effects on Lebanon’s economy. Hence the macroeconomic model developed in this study, 
could be beneficial for policy makers or researchers in Lebanon who wish to study the 
issue of privatisation and its potential macroeconomic implications for the economy. 
 2. Another important area for further research is the issue of incorporating into the 
model borrowing from abroad to finance the deficit. The government in Lebanon is 
currently trying to rely on external debt to finance its domestic debt with the aim of 
reducing the cost of debt servicing, due to the difference in interest rates between domestic 
debt and external debt. Further study could incorporate this into the model in order to 
analyse the impact of such a policy on key macroeconomic variables, and in order to draw 
important lessons from the impact of such a policy on the Lebanese economy. 
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 3. A further area for future study in the context of Lebanon is to identify the 
impact of government revenues such as value added tax (VAT) (which has introduced 
recently in Lebanon) on the Lebanese economy, in order to identify how to introduce such 
a policy while minimising its potentially adverse effects on the economy. This could 
provide a good analysis of the effectiveness of tax reform policy, which Lebanon currently 
requires. 
 4. Further study could pay attention to the role of the private sector in terms of 
production, especially in certain sectors which are important for Lebanese exports (such as 
agricultural and industrial exports, among others sectors such as technology and 
communication). This could be considered by incorporating the services sectors into the 
model (disaggregating the model by sector). 
 5. Since Lebanon is in the process of negotiating accession to the WTO, it would 
be a good area for further study to examine the impact of such membership on the 
Lebanese economy. It is worth noting here that many countries in the Middle East, such as 
Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, are already members of the 
WTO. Other countries such as Oman, Saudi Arabia and Yemen are currently negotiating 
entry. WTO membership will allow Lebanon to fully integrate into the world economy and 
the multilateral trading system. The country will maximise the gains from this where it is 
able to find and play an effective role in the global economy. 
6. Since Arab/Middle East countries are in great need to cooperate, integrate, and 
build up trust and alliances with each other to be able to create some economic balance in 
the global era. It would, therefore, be an important area for further study to examine the 
impact of such regional economic and monetary integration for the economies of these 
countries. However, these countries would benefit from economic integration, as such 
integration is expected to improve the terms of trade with the rest of the world and create a 
better global economic and political balance. A major advantage to integration among the 
Arab countries, is the region’s stable and homogeneous culture compared to many other 
areas of the world. The Arab world has the intention and the means to take a new role on 
the global scene. This new role implies a change in the relationships among them and also 
between them and other industrialised nations. In order to fully realise this new role, new 
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forms of cooperation and alliances will have to be found. Ideally, these types of 
cooperation and alliances require a quick and flexible response and operations. However, 
because of the importance of the regional economic integration issue among Arab/Middle 
East nations85, the macroeconomic framework developed in this study, through means of 
further appropriate extensions to it, would be able to look at a two or three country version 
of the model and identify various forms of integration between them and the impact of 
shocks being transmitted from one country to another. 
Overall, since there have not been any empirical studies conducted on key 
macroeconomic behavioural relationships in the context of Lebanon, and since there has 
been no research as well in the area of simulation and policy analysis, developing a dynamic 
and long run macroeconomic model for Lebanon taking into account the budget deficit as 
a key factor seems to be very important. The model developed was able to identify the long 
run steady state properties for each of the key macroeconomic variables under 
consideration, as well as the adjustment process arising from various exogenous shocks or 
scenarios in the context of the Lebanese fiscal crisis. This provides a basis for comparing 
alternative options in regard to improving the benefits and reduce the adverse effects of 
such related shocks upon the Lebanese economy. The model offers an important 
framework, which can be used by researchers or policy makers to generate a number of 
economic policies in order to study their impact upon certain key macroeconomic variables 
and in order to draw lessons from such policies. Furthermore, the model developed, and 
the policy prescriptions derived from it, provides an important guideline for Lebanese 
policy makers, as the results suggest that the Lebanese economy could gain from fiscal 
policy expansion which focuses upon increasing public capital spending (crowding in 
effect). 
                                                 
85 Some of these Arab nations have already established the cooperation council for the Arab states of the 
Gulf (GCC countries which include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
and the Republic of Yemen). As a first step toward economic integration among these countries, a free 
trade zone was established in 1983. The next phase of integration, through the establishment of customs 
unions, came at the Riyadh Summit of the leaders of GCC countries in 1999. A timetable was approved to 
establish a customs union by the year 2005. Furthermore, these GCC countries agreed during the 2001 
Summit in Muscat to a joint customs tariff of five percent by the year 2003, and voted to create a single 
currency by the year 2010. 
 299 
This study not only provides a framework for analysis of the Lebanese economy, 
but is likely to also be applicable to other developing countries in the region such as Egypt, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, among many others, which also suffer from fiscal deficits. 
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